Kristin Andrews
Selected Publications
For a full list of articles see my Curriculum Vita
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Courses |
Pantomime in Great Apes: Evidence and Implications
with Anne Russon
Communicative and Integrative Biology, forthcoming.
Orangutan Pantomime: Elaborating the Message
with Anne Russon
Biology Letters, published on-line before print August 11, 2010.
Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity
with Ljiljana Radenovic
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology, Jennifer Vonk and Todd Shackelford, eds. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals
The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, eds. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
with Ljiljana Radenovic
International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFollette, Sarah Stroud, and John Deigh, eds. Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming.
Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind
Inquiry, Vol. 52, No. 5, 2009: 433-448.
I argue that having a theory of mind requires having at least implicit knowledge of the norms of the community, and that an implicit understanding of the normative is what drives the development of a theory of mind. This conclusion is defended by two arguments. First I argue that a theory of mind likely did not develop in order to predict behavior, because before individuals can use propositional attitudes to predict behavior, they have to be able to use them in explanations of behavior. Rather, I suggest that the need to explain behavior in terms of reasons is the primary function of a theory of mind. I further argue that in order to be motivated to offer explanations of behavior, one must have at least an implicit understanding of appropriate behavior, which implies at least an implicit understanding of norms. The second argument looks at three cases of nonhuman animal societies that appear to operate within a system of norms. While there is no evidence that any species other than humans have a theory of mind, there is evidence that other species have sensitivity to the normative. Finally, I propose an explanation for the priority of norms over a theory of mind: Given an understanding of norms in a society, and the ability to recognize and sanction violations, there developed a need to understand actions that violated the norms, and such explanations could only be given in terms of a person's reasons. There is a significant benefit to being able to explain behavior that violates norms, because explanations of the right sort can also serve to justify behavior.
Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2009: 227-235.
Review Article on Folk Psycholoigcal Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons, Daniel D. Hutto.
Politics or Metaphysics? On Attributing Mental Properties to Animals
Biology and Philosophy, Vol 24, No. 1, 2009, pp. 51-63.
Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are unable to self-ascribe due to an early stage of development or impairment, and can be used to describe social and emotional development as well as personality. I describe how instruments such as the Child Behavior Checklist, which relies on intersubjective expert opinion, could be modified to assess other species subjects. The measures are validated via the accuracy of the predictions that are derived, which is an example of the functionality of attribution. I respond to theoretical criticisms against use of this method, and argue that if the method counts as good science for infant cognition research, then it should count as good science for animal cognition research as well. Correspondingly, if the method doesn't count as good science for animal cognition research, then we must be very skeptical of its use with nonverbal humans.
Trends in Cognitive Science, Vol. 12 (1) January 2008, pp. 5-6.
Review of Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind by Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth
Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
First published January 8, 2008.
It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology
Synthese, Vol. 165, No. 1, 2008, pp. 13-29.
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9230-5
I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn't endorse, and so could not serve as the target's reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits--who the person is--rather than by beliefs and desires--what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed.
Innovation and the Grain Problem
Anne Russon, Kristin Andrews, and Brian Huss
Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 30, No. 4, 2007, p. 422.
Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology
In Folk Psychology Reassessed, Daniel Hutto and Matthew Ratcliffe, eds. Kluwer / Springer Press, 2007.
Due to an inaccurate view of human folk psychological mechanisms and practices, many have concluded that no animal has anything resembling folk psychology. However, I suggest that if we accept the claims of social psychologists, and conclude that many human folk psychological practices rest more on heuristics such as trait attribution and inductive generalization than they do on mental state attribution, simulation, or appeal to a folk psychological theory, we can then ask whether animals could use induction and trait attribution for engaging in these folk psychological practices as well. The answer to this question, I argue, is yes.
Speaking Without Interpreting: A Reply to Bouma on Autism and Davidsonian Interpretation
Kristin Andrews and Ljiljana Radenovic
Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 5, October 2006, pp. 663-678.
We clarify some points made in Andrews (2002), and defend the claim that Davidson’s account of belief can be and is challenged by the existence of some people with autism. We argue that both Bouma and Andrews (2002) blurred the subtle distinctions between the psychological concepts of theory of mind and joint attention and the Davidsonian concepts of interpretation and triangulation. And we accept that appeal to control group studies is not the appropriate place to look for an individual who can speak but who has significant problems with interpretation. In this paper we argue that by turning to the clinical literature we can more readily find such a challenge to Davidson’s account.
Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?
Mind and Language Volume 20, No. 5, pp. 521-536(16); November 2005.
I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide between two different accounts of the mechanisms underlying their behavior. Rather than continue to compile data from the old paradigm, Povinelli and Vonk suggest we adopt a new one that can differentiate mental and behaviorist psychological systems and present a new experiment which they claim will do just that. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk don’t provide the promised paradigm shift, and that their proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms. Rather than developing experiments upon the assumption that the attribution of mental states facilitates predictions of behavior in novel conditions, I suggest that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments ask subjects to predict behavior. Rather, experiments which offer subjects the opportunity to look for explanations for anomalous behavior should be explored.
How to Learn from Our Mistakes: Explanation and Moral Justification
Philosophical Explorations , Volume 7, 2004: 247-264.
A new approach to developing models of folk psychology is suggested, namely that different models exist for different folk psychological practices. This point is made through an example: the explanation and justification of morally heinous actions. Human folk psychology in this area is prone to a specific error of conflating an explanation for behaviour with a justification of it. An analysis of the error leads me to conclude that simulation is used to generate both explanations and justifications of heinous acts. It is needed in both these cases because most of us lack theoretical information about evil actors. I will argue that it is difficult to simulate such acts, and hence difficult to develop explanations for behaviour widely accepted as evil. This difficulty explains the judgements made against successful simulators by those who don’t succeed, and so explains the common problem of conflating an explanation with a justification.
Knowing
Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation
Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Quentin Smith and Aleksander
Jokic, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003: 201-219.
Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I predict someone’s future behavior, I would at that moment also have an explanation of the behavior. I argue that advocates of both the theory theory and the simulation theory accept the symmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. However, there is very good reason to believe that this hypothesis is false. Just as we can predict the occurrence of some physical phenomena that we have no explanation for, we are also able to make accurate predictions of intentional behavior without having an explanation. Rather than requiring mental state attribution, I argue that the prediction of human behavior is most often accomplished by statistical induction rather than through an appeal to mental states. However, explanations are not given in these terms.
Why
Bush Should Explain September 11th
America's War on Terror. Patrick Hayden, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson,
eds. Ashgate Publishing, 2003: 29-42.
I argue that the kind of explanation Bush has given for the September 11th terrorist attacks are not in fact explanatory, and those who attempt to offer causal explanations for the attacks have been often condemned by US media outlets. This condemnation comes from the conflation of explanations with justifications. Using research in the philosophy of mind, and moral psychology, I distinguish between these and argue that there is no moral difficulty associated with offering an explanation. Given that having an explanation for a phenomenon allows one to better control the phenomenon, finding a causal explanation for the events is the first step toward fighting terrorism.
Interpreting
Autism: A Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language
Philosophical Psychology Volume 15, Number 3, 2002: 317-332.
Donald Davidson’s account of interpretation purports to be a priori, though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson’s view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson’s theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one need not be a speaker in order to be a thinker. The falsity of these theses has consequences for other parts of Davidson’s world view; for example it undermines his argument against animal thought.
Walter’s
Neurophilosophy of Free Will: A Review
Philo, Volume 6, Number 1. 2003: 166-175.
Our
Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance
Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 7, No. 7, 2000: 12-24.
On
Predicting Behavior
The Padeia Project On-Line: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress
of Philosophy, (1998).
The
First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other
Minds
Etica & Animali: The Great Ape Project, August 1996: 131-141.
Review
of A Delicate Balance: What Philosophy Can Tell Us About Terrorism
Metapsychology Review On-line, December 2002.
©2003 Kristin Andrews