#### YORK UNIVERSITY

Faculty of LAPS

Final Examination

December 7, 2017

# AP/Economics 2300 3.0 FC : Intermediate Microeconomic Theory I

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# time=2 hours

This exam consists of two sections. Part A counts for 40 percent of the grade, part B for 60.

**Part A** : Define any **8** of the following 10 terms. ( 40% : 5% per question )

- 1. convex preferences
- 2. inferior good
- 3. Laspeyres (base-weighted) quantity index
- 4. present value
- 5. (von Neumann Morgenstern) expected utility function
- 6. compensating variation to a price increase
- 7. marginal revenue
- 8. increasing returns to scale
- 9. isoquant
- 10. long-run marginal cost function

Part B: Do any 5 of the following 10 questions. ( 60~% : 12 % per question )

1. Are the preferences represented by the utility function

$$U(F,C) = F + C^2$$

monotonic? Are they convex? (Here F is the person's food consumption and C is her clothing consumption.)

Explain briefly.

2. Is it possible that, in comparing a person's consumption bundles in 2000 (the base year), and 2017 (the current year), the Laspeyres quantity index is less than 1 and the Paasche quantity index is greater than 1?

Explain briefly.

3. What are the income and substitution effects of an increase in the price of food, if a person's preferences could be represented by the utility function

$$U(F,C) = 2\sqrt{F} + C$$

where F is her consumption of food and C is her consumption of clothing?

4. Explain why a person with well–behaved preferences might have a desired level of saving which **decreases** with the rate of return that she earns on her saving.

## continued

5. Suppose that a person is a risk-averse expected utility maximizer, and that she can buy as much or as little fire insurance as she wants for her house, but at a price which is actuarially unfair. That is, the price of buying \$1000 worth of insurance is greater than  $1000\pi$ , where  $\pi$  is the probability of a fire.

Discuss how much insurance this person would choose to buy.

6. What is the own-price-elasticity of aggregate demand in a market which consists of 5000 identical consumers, each of whom has an individual demand function with the equation

$$Q = \frac{100}{p^2}$$

where p is the price of the good, and Q the quantity demanded?

7. What is a person's best bidding strategy in a second–price sealed–bid auction, if she values the object (which is being auctioned off) at \$100, and if there are 10 other bidders.

(In a second–price sealed–bid auction, each of the 11 bidders submits a secret bid on the object. The person who submits the highest bid wins the object, but the price she will have to pay is the **second**–highest of the 11 bids which were submitted.)

8. Why can't there be a perfectly competitive market for a good for which the technology exhibits increasing returns to scale?

### continued

9. What is the (long-run total) cost function  $C(w_1, w_2, y)$  for a good for which the production function is

$$f(x_1, x_2) = \min(x_1, 2x_2)$$

(where  $x_i$  is the quantity employed of input *i*,  $w_i$  is the unit cost of input *i*, and *y* is the quantity of the firm's output)?

10. What is the equation of the short–run supply curve for a firm which has a short– run total–cost function with the equation

$$SRTC = q^3 - 12q^2 + 48q$$

where q is the quantity of output produced by the firm?

#### the end