GS/ECON 5010 Assignment 3 F2005

due : Wednesday November 9 before class

Do all 5 questions. Each counts 20%.

1. What are the market price, and aggregate quantity sold, in long–run equilibrium in a perfectly competitive market for which the demand function has the equation

$$Q = \frac{6000000}{p}$$

(where Q is aggregate quantity demanded, and p the price), if there is free entry by identical firms to the industry, each of which has the long–run total cost function

$$TC = 9000q - 600q^2 + 15q^3$$

where q is the quantity produced by the firm?

2. Suppose that firms in a competitive industry were not identical. Instead, there are 10 firms each with a cost function $TC(q) = q^2/2$, 10 more firms each with a total cost function $TC(q) = q + q^2/2$, 10 more firms each with a total cost function of $TC(q) = 2q + q^2/2$, another 10 firms each with cost function $TC(q) = 3q + q^2/2$, and so on. Firms are free to enter and exit the industry. What is the equation of the long-run supply curve for the industry?

3. How would the output of a single-price monopoly vary with its fixed cost F, if it had a cost function C(q) = F + cq, and faced an inverse demand function p = a - bq (where a, b and c are positive constants, with a > c)?

4. What is the Cournot equilibrium, if there are n > 1 firms in the industry, each producing a homogeneous product, each with identical total cost function TC(q) = cq where c > 0 is some constant, if the market demand function is

$$Q^D = p^{-a}$$

where p is the price of the good, Q^D the total quantity demanded, and a > 1/n?

5. Solve for the equilibrium of a Cournot duopoly, if firms produce a homogeneous output, the demand for which obeys the function p = a - Q where p is the price of the good, $Q = q_1 + q_2$ is the total quantity sold, and a > 0, if firm #1 could produce the good for nothing, and if firm #2 had the total cost function

$$TC(q_2) = cq_2$$

where a > c > 0.

How does the profit of firm 1 vary with its rival's marginal cost c of production?