

Q1. Are the preferences described below transitive? Strictly monotonic? Convex? Explain briefly.

The person consumes 2 goods, food and clothing. A bundle A will be ranked as at least as good as bundle B if **either** of the following conditions holds :

(i) bundle A contains at least twice as much food as bundle B ;

(ii) bundle A contains at least half as much food as bundle B , and the amount of food in A added to the amount of clothing in A , is at least as large as the amount of food in B added to the amount of clothing in B .

If neither (i) or (ii) is true, then bundle A is not considered at least as good as bundle B .


A1 First of all, the preferences are **not** transitive. To show this, what we need is a single example in which $A \succeq B$, and $B \succeq C$, but in which it is not true that $A \succeq C$.

Suppose that $A = (3, 8)$, $B = (5, 5)$ and $C = (7, 2)$, where the first number in each pair is the quantity of food in the bundle, and the second number is the quantity of clothing. Comparing A and B , part (i) of the definition applies, so that A is at least as good as B . Comparing B and C , part (ii) of the definition applies again, so that B is at least as good as C . But the amount of food in C is more than twice as much as the amount of food in A . So A is **not** ranked as at least as good as C , which means the preferences are not transitive.

The preferences here **are** strictly monotonic. Suppose that bundle A contains strictly more food than bundle B , and strictly more clothing. Then the definition above says that A must be ranked as at least as good as B . But neither (i) nor (ii) holds when we compare B to A : B doesn't have twice as much food as A , and B does not have as much food plus clothing as A . So B is **not** at least as good as A . Saying A is at least as good as B , and B is not at least as good as A is exactly the same thing as saying A is strictly preferred to B . So if one bundle has strictly more of both goods, then it must be strictly preferred. (And if bundle A has at least as much of each good as B , then it must be at least as good as B , from part (ii) of the definition above.)

The preferences are **not** convex. Again, to show this, a single counter-example is sufficient. Suppose that $A = (3, 12)$, $B = (8, 0)$, and $C = (2, 16)$. Part (i) of the definition says that B is at least as good as A . Part (ii) of the definition says that C is at least as good as A . Now let D be a convex combination of B and C , the bundle that is halfway between B and C . Then $D = (5, 8)$. Bundle D does not contain at least twice as much food as bundle A ; the amount of food in D , added to the amount of clothing in D , is less than the amount of food in A , added to the amount of clothing in A . So bundle D is **not** at least as good as A , even though it is a convex combination of bundles B and C . This example shows that preferences here are not convex, since $B \succeq A$, $C \succeq A$, but it is not true that $D \succeq A$, even though D is a convex combination of B and C .

Figure 1



(Figure 1 shows the set of bundles which are at least as good as $(3, 12)$: they are all the bundles on, or to the right of, the red line in the figure. This is not a convex set.)

Q2. Are the preferences represented by the utility function below strictly monotonic? Convex? Explain briefly.

$$U(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \max(x_1 + x_2 + x_3, 3x_1)$$

A2. These preferences are **not** convex. To show preferences are not convex (or not monotonic, or not transitive), it is sufficient to provide a single counter-example. So let $A = (3, 3, 3)$, $B = (4, 0, 0)$, $C = (0, 6, 6)$. The utility levels for the 3 bundles are $U(A) = 9$, $U(B) = 12$, $U(C) = 12$. So both B and C are at least as good as A , since they each yield higher utility. Now take a convex combination of B and C : $D \equiv 0.5B + 0.5C = (2, 3, 3)$. Since $U(D) = \max(8, 6) = 8$, therefore $U(D) < U(A)$. The bundle D is on a lower indifference surface than bundle A , even though D is a convex combination of two bundles (B and C) which are each on higher indifference surfaces than A .

Q3. Calculate a person's Marshallian demand functions, if her preferences can be represented by the utility function

$$u(x_1, x_2) = \min(x_1 + x_2, 2x_2)$$

A3. Calculus is not that much help here, since the indifference curves for this utility function are kinked (as in the diagram) : if $x_1 > x_2$, then $u(x_1, x_2) = 2x_2$ and the slope of the indifference curve is 0 ; if $x_1 < x_2$, then $u(x_1, x_2) = x_1 + x_2$ and the slope of the indifference curve is -1 . So, unless $p_1 = p_2$, the solution to the consumer's maximization is at a kink or a corner.

If $p_1 > p_2$, then the slope of the budget line is greater than the slope of the indifference curve, so that the consumer is at a corner : she maximizes her utility by spending all her money on good 2.

If $p_1 < p_2$, then the slope of the budget line is between the slopes of the two segments of the indifference curves. The consumer chooses the kink, at which $x_1 = x_2$.

If $p_1 = p_2$, then the consumer is indifferent among all points on the budget line for which $x_2 \geq x_1$: she does not have a unique Marshallian demand, because her preferences are not strictly convex.


So her Marshallian demands are :

(i) if $p_1 > p_2$, then $x_1^M(p_1, p_2, y) = 0$ and $x_2^M(p_1, p_2, y) = y/p_2$.

(ii) if $p_1 = p_2$, then $x_1^M(p_1, p_2, y)$ is any x_1 less than or equal to $y/2p_1$, and $x_2^M(p_1, p_2, y) = \frac{y}{p_1} - x_1^M(p_1, p_2, y)$.

(iii) if $p_1 < p_2$, then $x_1^M(p_1, p_2, y) = \frac{y}{p_1 + p_2} = x_2^M(p_1, p_2, y)$.

Figure 3



(Figure 3 : Indifference Curves for Question # 3)

Q4. Calculate a person's Marshallian demand functions, if her preferences can be represented by the utility function

$$u(x_1, x_2, x_3) = x_1 - \frac{1}{x_2} - \frac{4}{(x_3)^2}$$

A4. These are **quasi-linear** preferences, since the utility function is of the form $u(x_1, x_2, x_3) = ax_1 + f(x_2, x_3)$ (where here $a = 1$ and $f(x_2, x_3) = -\frac{1}{x_2} - \frac{4}{(x_3)^2}$). With quasi-linear preferences, the Marshallian demands for goods 2 and 3 will be independent of income.

To solve for the person's Marshallian demands, take the first-order conditions from the person's utility maximization, $u_i(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \lambda p_i$, for $i = 1, 2, 3$. Here, those conditions are

$$u_1(x_1, x_2, x_3) = 1 = \lambda p_1 \quad (4-1)$$

$$u_2(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \frac{1}{(x_2)^2} = \lambda p_2 \quad (4-2)$$

$$u_3(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \frac{8}{(x_3)^3} = \lambda p_3 \quad (4-3)$$

Equation (4-1) implies that $\lambda = \frac{1}{p_1}$, so that equation (4-2) can be written

$$\frac{1}{(x_2)^2} = \frac{p_2}{p_1} \quad (4-4)$$

or

$$x_2 = \sqrt{\frac{p_1}{p_2}} \quad (4-5)$$

Equation (4-5) is the Marshallian demand function for good #2, since it expresses quantity demanded of good #2 as a function of prices and income. Substituting for λ into equation (4-3) yields

$$\frac{8}{(x_3)^3} = \frac{p_3}{p_1} \quad (4-6)$$

or

$$x_3 = 2\left(\frac{p_1}{p_3}\right)^{1/3} \quad (4-7)$$

which is the Marshallian demand function for good #3. To get the Marshallian demand function for good #1, the budget constraint must be used. Since $p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 + p_3x_3 = y$, therefore,

$$x_1 = \frac{y - p_2x_2 - p_3x_3}{p_1}$$

From equations (4-5) and (4-7)

$$x_1^M(p_1, p_2, p_3, y) = \frac{y}{p_1} - \sqrt{\frac{p_2}{p_1}} - 2\left(\frac{p_3}{p_1}\right)^{2/3} \quad (4-8)$$

Equations (4 – 5), (4 – 7) and (4 – 8) define the Marshallian demands only if all three expressions have non–negative values. If p_1 is so high that expression (4 – 8) is negative, then the person is at a corner solution. She chooses to consume none of good 1, and chooses x_2 and x_3 so as to maximize $-\frac{1}{x_1} - \frac{2}{(x_3)^2}$ subject to the constraint that $p_2x_2 + p_3x_3 \leq y$. The first–order conditions for this maximization imply that

$$p_2x_2 + 2(p_2p_3)^{2/3}x_2^{2/3} = y \quad (4 - 9)$$

which implicitly defines the Marshallian demand function for good 2, when good 1 is so expensive that the person chooses not to consume any of good 1. But I don't think that equation (4 – 9) can be solved explicitly for x_2 .

Q5. Calculate the Marshallian and Hicksian demand functions, the indirect utility function, and the expenditure function for a consumer whose preferences can be represented by the utility function

$$u(x_1, x_2) = \ln x_1 + \ln x_2 - \ln(x_1 + x_2)$$

A5. The first–order conditions from the consumer's utility maximization problem are

$$\frac{1}{x_1} - \frac{1}{x_1 + x_2} = \lambda p_1 \quad (5 - 1)$$

$$\frac{1}{x_2} - \frac{1}{x_1 + x_2} = \lambda p_2 \quad (5 - 2)$$

which can be re–arranged to

$$\frac{x_2}{x_1(x_1 + x_2)} = \lambda p_1 \quad (5 - 3)$$

$$\frac{x_1}{x_2(x_1 + x_2)} = \lambda p_2 \quad (5 - 4)$$

Setting the left side of (5 – 3) divided by the left side of (5 – 4) equal to the right side of (5 – 3) divided by the right side of (5 – 4),

$$\left(\frac{x_2}{x_1}\right)^2 = \frac{p_1}{p_2} \quad (5 - 5)$$

or

$$x_2 = \sqrt{\left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)}x_1 \quad (5 - 6)$$

Substituting for x_2 from (5 – 6) into the budget constraint $p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 = y$ yields

$$x_1(p_1 + \sqrt{(p_1p_2)}) = y \quad (5 - 7)$$

or

$$x_1 = \frac{y}{\sqrt{p_1}(\sqrt{p_1} + \sqrt{p_2})} \quad (5 - 8)$$

which is the Marshallian demand function for good #1. Substituting from (5 – 8) into (5 – 6) yields the Marshallian demand function for good #2,

$$x_2^M(p_1, p_2, y) = \frac{y}{\sqrt{p_2}(\sqrt{p_1} + \sqrt{p_2})} \quad (5 - 9)$$

The first-order conditions for the “dual” problem, or minimizing the cost of a given utility level, are

$$\frac{\mu}{x_1} - \frac{\mu}{x_1 + x_2} = p_1 \quad (5 - 9)$$

$$\frac{\mu}{x_2} - \frac{\mu}{x_1 + x_2} = p_2 \quad (5 - 10)$$

These two equations again imply equation (5 – 6) above. Substituting for x_2 from (5 – 6) into the “given utility” constraint

$$\ln x_1 + \ln x_2 - \ln(x_1 + x_2) = \bar{u}$$

implies that

$$\ln x_1 + \ln \sqrt{p_1} - \ln \sqrt{p_2} + \ln x_1 - \ln(\sqrt{p_1} + \sqrt{p_2}) - \ln x_1 + \ln p_2 = \bar{u} \quad (5 - 11)$$

or

$$x_1 = e^{\bar{u}} \frac{\sqrt{p_1} + \sqrt{p_2}}{\sqrt{p_2}} \quad (5 - 12)$$

which is the Hicksian demand function for good 1. Substituting from (5 – 12) into (5 – 6) yields the Hicksian demand function for good #2,

$$x_2^H(p_1, p_2, \bar{u}) = e^{\bar{u}} \frac{\sqrt{p_1} + \sqrt{p_2}}{\sqrt{p_1}} \quad (5 - 13)$$

The expenditure function is defined as cost of the Hicksian demands,

$p_1 x_1^H(p_1, p_2, \bar{u}) + p_2 x_2^H(p_1, p_2, \bar{u})$. From equations (5 – 12) and (5 – 13), then

$$e(p_1, p_2, \bar{u}) = e^{\bar{u}} [\sqrt{p_1} + \sqrt{p_2}]^2 \quad (5 - 14)$$

The indirect utility can be calculated as

$$v(p_1, p_2, y) = \ln x_1^M(p_1, p_2, y) + \ln x_2^M(p_1, p_2, y) - \ln [x_1^M(p_1, p_2, y) + x_2^M(p_1, p_2, y)]$$

which (from equations (5 – 7) and (5 – 8)) equals

$$v(p_1, p_2, y) = \ln y - 2 \ln [\sqrt{p_1} + \sqrt{p_2}] \quad (5 - 15)$$

Equations (5 – 14) and (5 – 15) confirm that here $e(p_1, p_2, v(p_1, p_2, y)) = y$,

and $v(p_1, p_2, e(p_1, p_2, u)) = u$. As well, equations (5–12), (5–13) and (5–14) show that Shepherd’s lemma holds : $\partial e / \partial p_i = x_i^H(p_1, p_2, u)$ for $i = 1, 2$.

[These preferences are actually examples of *CES* preferences. Suppose that $\rho = -1$, in the textbook formulation of *CES* preferences. Then

$$U(x_1, x_2) = [x_1^{-1} + x_2^{-1}]^{-1}$$

The expression in the square brackets is $x_1^{-1} + x_2^{-1} = 1/x_1 + 1/x_2 = \frac{x_1+x_2}{x_1x_2}$. Taking this to the power -1 means inverting it, so that

$$U(x_1, x_2) = \frac{x_1x_2}{x_1 + x_2}$$

for *CES* preferences when $\rho = -1$. And the direct utility function $u(x_1, x_2) = \ln x_1 + \ln x_2 - \ln(x_1 + x_2)$ is the natural logarithm of this *CES* utility function $U(x_1, x_2)$.]