due : Wednesday November 25 before class

Do all 5 questions. Each counts 20%.

1. Another model of duopoly is that of **von Stackelberg**, in which firms choose output levels **sequentially**. That is, firm 1 chooses its output quantity **first**, and cannot change that quantity after it has made its choice. Next, firm 2 observes what quantity firm 1 has chosen, and then chooses its own output quantity. What quantities would the 2 firms choose, if they behaved in this manner, if the cost of production (for each firm) were 0, and if the aggregate demand for the firms' homogeneous product were

$$Q = 12 - p$$

(where p is the market price, and Q the aggregate quantity demanded)?

2. Solve for the equilibrium quantities in a 3-firm Stackelberg model, with the demand and cost functions from question #1 above.

[That is, firm 1 commits first to its quantity q_1 . Firm 2 observes q_1 , and then commits to its own quantity q_2 . Finally firm 3 observes q_1 and q_2 , and then chooses its profit-maximizing output quantity q_3 .]

3. What does the contract curve look like for a 2-person, 2-good exchange economy, with a total endowment of A units of good 1 and B units of good 2, if the preferences of the two people could be represented by the utility functions

$$u^{1}(x_{1}^{1}, x_{2}^{1}) = 1 - \frac{1}{x_{1}^{1}} - \frac{1}{x_{2}^{1}}$$
$$u^{2}(x_{1}^{2}, x_{2}^{2}) = \log(x_{1}^{2}) + x_{2}^{2}$$

where x_j^i is person *i*'s consumption of good *j*?

4. What are the allocations in the core of the following 3-person, 2-good economy? Person *i*'s preferences can be represented by the utility function $u^i(x_1^i, x_2^i)$, where

$$u^{1}(x_{1}^{1}, x_{2}^{1}) = x_{1}^{1}$$
$$u^{2}(x_{1}^{2}, x_{2}^{2}) = x_{1}^{2}x_{2}^{2}$$
$$u^{3}(x_{1}^{3}, x_{2}^{3}) = x_{2}^{3}$$

and the endowment vectors of the three people are $\mathbf{e}^1 = (0, 4), \mathbf{e}^2 = (4, 0), \mathbf{e}^3 = (2, 2).$

5. Find a competitive equilibrium to a 2–good, 3–million–person economy, in which 1 million people have preferences and endowments like person 1 in the previous question (# 4), 1 million people have preferences and endowments like person 2 in the previous question, and 1 million people have preferences and endowments like person 3 in the previous question. [That is, find a competitive equilibrium to an economy which is the economy of question #4 cloned one million times.]