# GS/ECON 5010 section "B" APPLIED MICROECONOMICS 

## Answers to Midterm Exam October 2011

Q1. What are the Marshallian (uncompensated) demand functions for a consumer whose preferences can be represented by the utility function

$$
u\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=100-\frac{1}{x_{1}}-\frac{4}{x_{2}} \quad ?
$$

A1. The first-order conditions for utility maximization by consumers are

$$
\begin{align*}
& u_{1}=\frac{1}{\left(x_{1}\right)^{2}}=\lambda p_{1}  \tag{1-1}\\
& u_{2}=\frac{4}{\left(x_{2}\right)^{2}}=\lambda p_{2} \tag{1-2}
\end{align*}
$$

so that dividing $(1-1)$ by $(1-2)$ yields

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\left(x_{2}\right)^{2}}{4\left(x_{1}\right)^{2}}=\frac{p_{1}}{p_{2}} \tag{1-3}
\end{equation*}
$$

or

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{2}=2 \sqrt{\frac{p_{1}}{p_{2}}} x_{1} \tag{1-4}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substitution of $(1-4)$ into the budget constraint

$$
\begin{equation*}
y=p_{1} x_{1}+p_{2} x_{2} \tag{1-5}
\end{equation*}
$$

yields

$$
\begin{equation*}
y=p_{1} x_{1}+2 \sqrt{p_{1} p_{2}} x_{1} \tag{1-6}
\end{equation*}
$$

so that

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{1}=\frac{1}{\sqrt{p_{1}}} \frac{y}{\sqrt{p_{1}}+2 \sqrt{p_{2}}} \tag{1-7}
\end{equation*}
$$

which is the Marshallian demand function for good \#1. From equation (1-4), then, the Marshallian demand function for good \#2 is

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{2}=\frac{2}{\sqrt{p_{2}}} \frac{y}{\sqrt{p_{1}}+2 \sqrt{p_{2}}} \tag{1-8}
\end{equation*}
$$

$Q 2$. How much would a risk-averse expected utility maximizer be willing to pay for an insurance policy which offers complete coverage against a loss of $L$ if her initial wealth were $W$, the probability of the loss were $\pi$, and her utility-of-wealth function were

$$
U(W)=\ln W \quad ?
$$

A2. If the person does not purchase insurance, her expcted utility is

$$
\begin{equation*}
E U=\pi \ln (W-L)+(1-\pi) \ln W \tag{2-1}
\end{equation*}
$$

and if she purchases full insurance at a price of $P$, then her wealth will be $W-P$, whether of not the loss happens, so that her expected utility is

$$
\begin{equation*}
U^{I}=\ln (W-P) \tag{2-2}
\end{equation*}
$$

The highest price she would be willing to pay for full insurance is the price $P$ which makes $E U$ equal to $U^{I}$, so that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\ln (W-P)=\pi \ln (W-L)+(1-\pi) \ln W \tag{2-3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Taking exponents of both sides and using the fact that $e^{(a+b)}=e^{a} e^{b}$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
e^{\ln (W-P)}=e^{\pi \ln (W-L)} e^{(1-\pi) \ln (W)} \tag{2-4}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since $e^{a \ln b}=b^{a}$, therefore

$$
\begin{equation*}
W-P=(W-L)^{\pi} W^{1-\pi} \tag{2-5}
\end{equation*}
$$

so that

$$
\begin{equation*}
P=W-(W-L)^{\pi} W^{1-\pi} \tag{2-6}
\end{equation*}
$$

[It can be checked that this risk averse person is willing to pay a premium for insurance : that is, the price $P$ she is willing to pay will exceed the expected $\operatorname{loss} \pi L$, whenever $0<\pi<1$.

From equation $(2-3)$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial P}{\partial \pi}=(W-P)(\ln W-\ln (W-P))>0 \tag{2-7}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial^{2} P}{\partial \pi^{2}}=-\frac{\partial P}{\partial \pi}(\ln W-\ln (W-P))<0 \tag{2-8}
\end{equation*}
$$

Hence $P$ is a strictly concave function of the probability $\pi$ of a loss. That means that $P-\pi L$ is also a strictly concave function of $\pi$. At $\pi=0, P=0=\pi L$, and at $\pi=1$, $P=L=\pi L$. So the function $f(\pi)=P-\pi L$ equals 0 at $\pi=0$, equals 0 at $\pi=1$, and is strictly concave. That means that the function must be positive for $0<\pi<1$, so that $P>\pi L$.]

Q3. Explain why perfect competition is inconsistent with increasing returns to scale.

A3. A couple of different explanations :
(i) Profit maximization under perfect competition implies that each factor be paid the value of its marginal product, so that $p f_{i}=w_{i}$ where $p$ is the output price, $f_{i}$ the marginal product of input $i$ and $w_{i}$ the price of input $i$.

The definition of the local measure of scale economices $\mu(\mathbf{x})$ is that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mu(\mathbf{x})=\frac{\sum_{i} f_{i} x_{i}}{f(\mathbf{x})} \tag{3-1}
\end{equation*}
$$

so that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mu(\mathbf{x})=\frac{\sum w_{i} x_{i}}{p f(\mathbf{x})} \tag{3-2}
\end{equation*}
$$

when the firm maximizes its profit in perfect competition. Therefore, the firm's costs $\sum_{i} w_{i} x_{i}$ will exceed the firm's revenue $p f(\mathbf{x})$ if the firm operates under conditions of increasing returns to scale $(\mu(\mathbf{x})>1)$.
(ii) Suppose that the competitive firm's profit maximization problem has a welldefined solution, in which the firm uses the input combination $\mathbf{x}^{*} \neq 0$, and earns profits of $\pi^{*}=p f\left(\mathbf{x}^{*}\right)-\mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{x}^{*}$. Since the firm always has the option of shutting down and making zero profits, therefore $\pi^{*} \geq 0$. Increasing returns to scale implies then that if the firm doubled all its inputs, it would make profits of

$$
\pi^{* *}=p f\left(2 \mathbf{x}^{*}\right)-\mathbf{w} \cdot 2 \mathbf{x}^{*}=p f\left(2 \mathbf{x}^{*}\right)-2 \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{x}^{*}>2 p f\left(\mathbf{x}^{*}\right)-2 \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{x}^{*}=2 \pi^{*} \geq \pi^{*} \quad(3-3)
$$

under increasing returns to scale. Since $\pi^{* *}>\pi^{*}$, the original solution could not have been an optimum. So there cannot be a well-defined solution to the firm's profit maximization problem.
(iii) This third explanation is only true if the firm's production function is homogeneous of degree $\alpha$.

The firm's profit maximization problem in perfect competition is to maximize $p y-$ $C(\mathbf{w}, y)$ with respect to $y$. The first-order condition for a profit maximum is

$$
\begin{equation*}
p-\frac{\partial C(\mathbf{w}, y)}{\partial y} \tag{3-4}
\end{equation*}
$$

and its second-order condition is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial^{2} C(\mathbf{w}, y)}{\partial y^{2}} \geq 0 \tag{3-5}
\end{equation*}
$$

which implies that the firm's marginal cost $\frac{\partial C(\mathbf{w}, y)}{\partial y}$ must be non-decreasing.
Increasing returns to scale imply that the firm's average cost $\frac{C(\mathbf{w}, y)}{y}$ be decreasing.
But, in general, it may be possible for a firm to have increasing marginal cost, even if it operates under increasing returns to scale.

However, if the firm's production is homogeneous of degree $\alpha$, then

$$
\begin{equation*}
C(\mathbf{w}, y)=y^{1 / \alpha} C(\mathbf{w}, 1) \tag{3-6}
\end{equation*}
$$

so that

$$
\frac{\partial^{2} C(\mathbf{w}, y)}{\partial y^{2}} \geq 0 \quad \text { if } \quad \text { and } \quad \text { only } \quad \text { if } \quad \alpha \leq 1
$$

which is exactly the condition for the firm not to have increasing returns to scale.
[If the firm's production function is not homogeneous of degree $\alpha$, then the cost function could satisfy the second-order conditions, and still exhibit increasing returns to scale. For example if

$$
\begin{gathered}
C(\mathbf{w}, y)=24 \frac{y}{y+1}+4 y^{2}-13 y \quad y \leq 1 \\
C(\mathbf{w}, y)=2 y+\frac{1}{y} \quad y>1
\end{gathered}
$$

for some input price vector $\mathbf{w}$, then the cost function would be continuously differentiable at $y=1$, and would have $M C^{\prime}>0$ whenever $y>1$, but it would exhibit increasing returns to scale whenever $y>1$, since average cost decreases with output whenever $y>1$.]

