Single–Price Monopoly

"single-price" means that it charges the same price for each unit it sells : it does not **price discriminate** among different buyers, or among different units bought by the same buyer

two approaches

first : choosing quantity

pick quantity q so as to maximize profits

$$p(q)q - C(q, \mathbf{w}) \tag{1}$$

where p(q) is the (aggregate) inverse demand curve it faces — and $C(q, \mathbf{w})$ is the cost function of chapter 3 (with y now called q)

an alternative approach would be to have the firm

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choosing price

pick the price P to maximize profits

$$PQ(P) - C(Q(P), \mathbf{w})$$
(2)

where Q(P) is the market demand curve first–order conditions

$$Q(P) + PQ'(P) - C_q Q'(P) = 0$$
 (3)

or

$$Q'(P)P[\frac{Q(P)}{Q'(P)P} + 1] - C_q Q'(P) = 0$$
 (4)

which can be written

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$$-Q'(P)[MC - P(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon})] = 0$$
 (5)

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where

$$\epsilon \equiv -Q'(P)\frac{P}{Q(P)} \tag{6}$$

is the (absolute value of the) market own-price elasticity of demand

so at the monopoly's optimum

$$MC = P(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}) \tag{7}$$

marginal revenue :

$$MR \equiv P(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}) \tag{8}$$

since $MR \equiv \frac{d}{dq}(p(q)q)$

mark-up rule :

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$$P = MC(\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}) \tag{9}$$

need : $\epsilon > 1$