"INTERNAL" THREATS AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SECURITY COMMUNITY: AN ARGENTINEAN-BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE OF A NEW SECURITY AGENDA

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The end of Cold War brought a new vision of international security. As post1945 bipolar rivalry came to its terms, democratization was viewed as an irreversible trend and great powers commitment to arms limitation, reflected in START I, START II and Paris Treaty documents, brought a strong support to peaceful resolution of worldwide inter-state conflicts.[2] Visualized in a global context, the new search for peace and stability required a multidisciplinary and multi-institutional cooperation.[3] Thus, for example, as the impact of economic globalization weakened the linkage of national interest to territoriality, defense and foreign policy became closely inter-related.[4] Furthermore, the traditional understanding of "security" needed a redefinition and even a conceptual "revision"[5] in its theoretical, structural and operational aspects,[6] to meet the challenge of the "new agenda" of post-Cold War international relations.[7] Traditional geopolitics did not disappear certainly,[8] however

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[2] Augusto Varas, "La post-Guerra Fría, la seguridad hemisférica y la defensa nacional", in Rigoberta Cruz Johnson, Augusto Varas Fernandez (comp.), Percepciones de amenaza y política de defensa en América Latina, FLACSO, CEEA, Santiago-Chile, 1993, p. 3. The original text is in Spanish, this is an unofficial translation as it will be the case of all originally non-English texts to be mentioned from now on.

[3] Idem, p. 7.

[4] Idem, p. 12.

[5] J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visionning Security", in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1995. Also, Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security", in M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller, Global Dangers Changing Dimensions of International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge/Massachusetts-London/England, 1995.

[6] The theoretical aspect of the security debate is dominated by the Realist/Neorealist vs. Liberal/Neoliberal arguments. To mention just two among many publications dealing with this debate, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, The Perils of Anarchy (the MIT Press, Cambridge/Massachusetts-London/England, 1995) and Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993). However, Postmodern, Critical and Constructivist trends made a remarkable breakthrough. As a matter of fact, the constructivist theoretical framework that would be used in this paper is based on the one proposed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.) in Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1998. "Structural" refers to emerging security orders whether on a global or a regional level (see for example, Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", in G. Allison & G. Trevenson (eds.), Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, W. W. Norton, NY, 1992; Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Shuster, NY, 1992; and David A. Lake & Patrick Morgan, Regional Orders Building Security in a New World., The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1997). "Operational" is about the role of different institutions and their restructuring, including civil-military debate, the role of armed forces, the emergence of new institutions like the Eurocorps, etc.

[7] Roberto Russell, "La agenda global en los años '90", in R. Russell (ed.) La agenda international en los años '90, GEL, Buenos Aires, 1990.

[8] By the mid of 1990s many analysts began to visualize the end of the post-Cold War as the re-emergence of great powers power struggle in the Caucasus and Central Asia reminded the 19th century Great Game. The Caspian oil, the strategic project of TRACECA to link Europe to Central Asia and above all debate about the

issues formerly considered "domestic", such as drug smuggling, organized crime, delinquency, immigration, guns violence, social disturbs, environmental deterioration, etc., started to acquire a transnational dimension. This happens especially when their destabilizing effect to the social cohesion within a country threatens to spread to neighboring countries, and weakened States, for one reason or other, cannot stop this spill-over effect.

The revision of the concept of security, especially when dealing with questions formerly considered as "domestic affairs", leads to the "securitization" of issues that are not inherently security matters but become so through a process. As Roxanne Lynn-Doty explains, "'securitization' refers to a process through which the definition and the understanding of a particular phenomenon, its consequences, and the policies/courses of action deemed appropriate to address the issue are subjected to a particular logic."[9] It is wrong to assume securitization merely an "instrumental process that is controlled by elites and power holders."[10] While key participants, they are no more the only or most important actors, nor is the State the holder of the label. So far, the national security mode is the predominant understanding of security in international relations. It is linked with the survival of the nation-State and the safety of borders against an external threat. But, issues that are centered on society rather than State define a second mode of securitization. "Societal security refers to the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. Societal security is inextricably linked with the notion of identity."[11] Yet a third mode of securitization, human security, focuses the security of people as human beings and "essentially has to do with the well-being of collectives along with various dimensions not included in traditional understandings of national or societal security."[12]

How the securitization process takes place and an internal issue becomes a transnational threat is a complex question. If, as the theoretical concept explains, securitization leads to consider an internal issue a threat to national security, then the result would be a classical power struggle to which alliance formation theories or collective security approaches could provide the needed policy prescriptions.[13] However, these theories focus mainly military threat, hence when dealing with threat of a different nature the prescription could result irrelevant to neutralize the impact. Moreover, while the State

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importance of Eurasia help maintaining the traditional geopolitical vision. Nuclear proliferation became once again a source of concern, as India and Pakistan entered the club and Washington proposed a revision of the 1972 ABM Treaty to be able to develop and deploy an anti-missile defense system, strongly resisted by Moscow. A STRATFOR Global Intelligence Update analysis paper considers that "An extraordinary geopolitical shift currently [is] under way" as the "region where Asia, Europe and Africa meet [becomes] the pivot of the Eastern Hemisphere" (From Jerusalem to Grozny: replotting the Eastern Hemisphere's Pivot, November 22, 1999 at www.stratfor.com).

[9] Roxanne Lynn-Doty, "Immigration and the Politics of Security", Security Studies, vol. 8 Numbers 2/3, Winter 1998/99-Spring 1999, p. 71.

[10] Idem. P. 73.

[11] Idem, p. 77.

[12] Idem, p. 82.

[13] For a theory of alliance formation see the excellent book of Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, NY, 1987. For a critical review of the concept of collective security, see Lynn H. Miller, "The Idea and Reality of Collective Security", Global Governance 5, 1995.

role is of primary importance to deal with military threats, the transnationalization of domestic conflictive issues often takes place within the conditions of globalization that is modifying the traditional functions of State.[14] This is mostly true within advanced processes of integration that permit a greater mobility of goods and people across the borders. As Andrew Hurrell puts, "one of the results of regionalization and of economic integration is to make neighbors more vulnerable to instability across their borders and to increase levels of political interdependence."[15] Sometimes it's the collapse of the State or its serious weakening that allows the transnationalization of domestic threats opening the door for foreign intervention. In any case, civil society[16] is not only directly affected by a threat to its social cohesion, but often participates directly in securitization process for good or for bad.

To deal with new understandings of security issues and securitization processes, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett propose the framework of a "security community" defined as "a transnational region comprised of sovereign States whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change."[17] Within this framework, State's legitimacy is not eroded, neither does a security community replace the State. But "the more tightly coupled a security community is the more State's role will be transformed. In other words, if in a social environment the State's role is limited to and understood as 'protector of national good', the emergence of a transnational civic community will expand the role of the State as it becomes an agent that furthers the various wants of the community: security, economic welfare, human rights, a clean environment, and so on."[18] To study the emergence of a security community, "the (...) challenge is to isolate the conditions under which the development of a community produces dependable expectations of peaceful change."[19] It is, then, a process, where "social learning plays a critical role (...), and is facilitated by transactions that typically occur in organizational settings and core powers",[20] that should be explained. For that, a constructivist[21] approach provides the best tools to

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[14] "The globalization in its actual phase plays a fundamental role in transforming not only the nature of State (...) but also the international configuration of State power." (R. Russell, "La globalización: situación y proceso", Ciclos, año VIII, vol. VII, n. 14/15, 1998). This assumption, however, should not lead to the conclusion of the dissolution of the State as a central actor (see Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State?", World Politics 50, October 1997, and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Globalization and Governance", Political Science and Politics, vol. XXXII, n. 4, Dec. 1999).

[15] Andrew Hurrell, "Security in Latin America", International Affairs 74, 3 (1998), p. 530.

[16] It is worth making some of the observations that Thomas Carothers makes in his article "Think Again: Civil Society" (Foreign Policy, Winter 1999-2000). First, the civil society is a "broader concept encompassing all the organizations and associations that exist outside of the State (including political parties) and the market." Thus, it is not an actor dedicated to "noble causes." However, "an active diverse society often does play a valuable role in helping advance democracy. It can discipline the State, ensure that citizens' interests are taken seriously, and forster greater civic and political participation." Finally, "civil society and the State need each other and, in the best of the worlds, they develop in tandem, not at each other's expense." This remarks would help understanding some of the points that the paper will be dealing with.

[17] E. Adler and M. Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities", in E. Adler and M. Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 30.

[18] Idem, p. 36.

[19] Idem, p..37.

[20] Idem, p. 44.

[21] Various authors within the wide range of critical theorists applied the "social constructivism" to explain international politics. This paper will use particularly the theoretical definitions of Emanuel Adler ("Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructuvism in World Politics", European Journal of International Affairs 3, n. 3,

study "the widening networks and intensified relations between and among societies, States and organizations [that] institutionalize cognitive structures and deepen mutual trust and responsiveness."[22] Two sets of indicators would help to identify the emergence and the existence of a loosely coupled security community. Within the first set are multilateralism, unfortified borders, changes in military planning, common definition of the threat and discourse and language of society, to study the emergence of a security community. Whereas the second set (cooperative and collective security, a high level of military integration, policy coordination against "internal" threats, free movement of population, internationalization of authority and a "multiperspectival" policy) would be used as evidence for the existence of a loosely coupled security community.[23]

To what extend the definition of a security community could be applied to the actual relationship between Argentina and Brazil, the main actors and leading countries of the South American regional integration process, the Mercosur? Or, as Andrew Hurrell asks, is there "an emerging security community in South America?"[24] Undoubtedly there is major shift in the relationship between the two countries that passed from rivalry to close cooperation and this paper would sustain that thesis, based on Hurrell's study. However, it would discuss mainly at what stage is actually that security community and how domestic security issues could affect its progress. The first part would describe the emergence of the security community within a historical perspective, with a particular emphasis on those factors that played a crucial role in ending the rivalry and starting the integration progress, to see if the same factors are still relevant for the further progress of this peaceful change. In the second part a special attention would be given to the respective democratization processes and the civil-military relationship, to determine the causes of divergences in foreign and security policies. Finally, the third part would refer to public security focusing particularly crime and gun violence as nowadays most imminent threat to social cohesion. The aim is to compare the way each society face this *par excellence* internal threat and see if major policy coordination is underway to strengthen the security community. This would not be done neither to neglect the difficulties inherent within the unprecedented challenge of dealing with gun violence issues on a transnational level, nor to deny the primary role of the State and civil society inside the borders, and less to propose a national identity alteration.[25] However, as the conclusion would suggest, if a community is defined by a) shared identities, values and meanings; b) direct relations; and c) reciprocity that express some degree of long-term interest and perhaps altruism,[26] then major interchange on societal level is necessary, both to overcome State policies' limitations to commonly define

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September 1997; "Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamnic Approach for the Study of International Relations and their Progress", in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.) Progress in Postwar International Relations, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991) and of Alexander Wendt ("Anarchy is What States Makes of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", International Organization 46, n. 2, Spring 1992; "Constructing International Politics", International Security 20, 1, Summer 1995).

[22] E. Adler and M. Barnett, Op. Cit., p. 53.

[23] Idem., p. 55-57.

[24] A. Hurrell, "An Emerging Security Community in South America?", in E. Adler and M. Barnett, Op. Cit., p. 228.

[25] That's why when dealing with gun violence it is better to use the concept of "public security" rather then "societal security" which, as the definition given by Roxanne Lynn-Doty (mentioned above in the paper) suggests, is somehow related to identity.

[26] E. Adler and M. Barnett, Op. Cit., p. 31.

an "internal" threat and implement major policy cooperation. This is important even though it is very difficult to define whether the internal threat that gun violence pose to social cohesion produces or does not produce an externality and, thus, threatens the neighbor. Here the main argument would be that violence is a socially constructed process and that a cognitive evolution is central to revert its effect. That's how a security community would be a "mutual aid" society with a "collective system arrangement (...) [and] a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign State and a regional centralized government; that is, it is something of o post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational and national institutions and some form of collective security system."[27] All that, of course, for the sake of a stable peace, as there is no insurance that a process of integration or the emergence of a security community would not be reversed.[28]

"From rivals to partners"[29]: The emergence of a security community

Even though for many analysts since the late nineteenth century Latin America has been considered as a "zone of peace"[30] for the relatively low number of interstate wars, the importance of the actual level of cooperation could not be understood without an explanation of deep causes and relevant factors that ended up with historical rivalry and conflict-prone relationship among Latin American countries. That is particularly true for Argentinean-Brazilian relationship, that went through "the most dramatic change"[31] in the 1980s from a geopolitical rivalry to institutionalized economic and political cooperation. As a matter of fact, the history of conflict between the two countries goes back to the colonial period and the dispute between the Spanish and the Portuguese empires for the control of the river system and the east flank of the Rio de la Plata. After independence, both country fought each other over Uruguay in 1825-1828. Moreover, this rivalry went as far as intervention in each other's internal affairs, as it is showed by Brazil's support for the overthrow of Juan Manuel Rosas (1852). The relationship was particularly tense during the period that goes from the Paraguayan War (1864-1870) to the First World War, when the Baron of Rio Branco in Brazil and Zeballos in Argentina were the foreign ministers and the language of balancing was used to refer to relationship. That conflict-prone relationship never went through an escalation towards war and even occasional rapprochement took

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[27] Idem., p. 30.
[28] Adler and Barnett do mention this possibility of disintegration. Furthermore, they warn that "because a compatibility of core values and a collective identity are necessary for the development of security communities (...) many of the same social process that encourage and serve to reproduce the security community are also associated with its decline." (p. 58). However, they do not go further to study how the process of the emergence of a security community could be reversed, a question that certainly deserves further research.
[29] Borrowed from the title of Julio César Carasales book De rivales a socios (Nuevohacer, GEL, Buenos Aires, 1997) about the Argentinean-Brazilian nuclear cooperation. The borrowing is not casual of course. For long time the nuclear field has been considered as a national security issue and the advanced level of cooperation, if not policy identification, in this field clearly constitutes an indicator for the emergence and perhaps the existence of a loosely coupled security community.
[30] The concept is used by Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World, State University of New York Press, NY, 1998, ch. 3; and Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War, Cambridge University Press, London, 1996, ch. 8.
[31] A. Hurrell, "Security in…", p. 533.

place, especially during the Perón-Vargas (in the 1950s) and and Frondizi-Quadros (1961) presidencies. Overall, Brazil look to the United States as an ally to balance the power of Argentina and Argentina considered Brazil as an 'agent of American imperialism'. From 1960s up to one decade nearly, the discourse of balance of power and the practice of power politics was predominant as military seized the government in both countries (1964 in Brazil, 1976 in Argentina). Brazil thought of itself as a middle power, undertaking a rapid path of economic progress and confident of a the special relationship with the United States. As for the Argentinean military, both for the self-assigned mission of the Occidental "social-economic order", to fight the "internal enemy" defined according to the "national security doctrine", and the strong geopolitical vision of international relations, the Defense budget, that for 15 years oscillated between the 2 a 2,5% of the GNP, increased to 2,9% in 1975, 3,3% in 1976 and an average of 4,2% between 1978-1982 (tension with Chile and the malvinas war).[32]

Then, by the end of the 1970s a dramatic shift took place. "In the security field rapprochement involved confidence building measures, arms control agreements with cooperative verification schemes, shifts in military posture towards defensive orientation and declining levels of military spending, as well as military discourse that avoids the rhetoric of the balance of power and that contrasts sharply with the extreme geopolitical doctrines of the 1960's and 1970's."[33] All these steps were undertaken by military governments and were fundamentally "interest based".[34] An early sign of it was Brazil's proposal in November 1976 for the creation of the Amazon Pact (signed in 1978). Then negotiations took place over the Itai and Corpus dawns in July 1977 and an agreement was signed between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in October 1979, putting an end to 13 years of dispute. In 1978 the two navies undertook the FRATERNO exercises. In May 1980 President Figueiredo visited Buenos Aires, being the first Brazilian head of State who visited Argentina since 1935). Then came the visit of Videla to Brasilia in August of the same year. Finally, an additional agreement was signed in the nuclear field in 1981. The Carter administration's cuts of the military assistance to Argentina for human right abuses, Buenos Aires' rising tension with Santiago de Chile, Brazil's growing perception that its regional policies had been counter-productive and threat to create an anti-Brazilian grouping in Latin America, the erosion of the "Brazil Potencia" dream as the country was perceived more and more a member of the Third World, and the unfulfilled promise of the special relationship with United States,[35] best explain the easing of rivalry. However, "the language of community and of a common Latin American identity did not (...) suddenly appear in the 1980's, but had deep historical roots. Alongside the recurrent fears and

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[32] For security issues and the role of the military, see Kh. Der Ghougassian, <u>The Security Dilemma in the South American Sub-region: Positive Trends in Inter/state Disputes' Resolution, Lack of a "Community" Vision</u>, (unpublished paper, 1995) and <u>Nuevos Temas en la Agenda de Seguridad en el Cono Sur: Redefiniendo el rol de las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas y brasileñas</u> (paper presented at the II International Seminar of the Universities of the Mercosur, Buenos Aires, December 1996).

[33] A. Hurrell, "An Emerging…". P. 231.

[34] <u>Idem</u>, p. 238.

[35] When the Carter administration took the decision to cut of military assistantship to Argentina for human rights abuses, Brazil joined its neighbor to denounce Washington's policy. Although this might well be interpreted as a defensive posture or an ideological identification of military regimes, nonetheless it makes sense to consider it as an early sign of Brasilia's constant policy line of refusing any US intervention to foreign countries' internal affairs.

suspicions, the post-war period saw a number of previous moves to cooperation, especially between Vargas and Perón in the early 1950's and Quadros and Frondizi in 1961."[36]

The process of democratization (Argentina 1983, Brazil 1985) meant a strengthening of the rapprochement process that from 1985 would be institutionalized. One of the most important factor for the strengthening of cooperation is the deep economic recession that affected the whole Latin America in the 1980's and provoked the foreign debt crisis. In other words, it is the severity of the economic crisis that brought the need to deepen the interdependence through institutionalization. However, there is an important internal factor that prevailed as much as the external one. As both countries went through a transition period from the military to civilian rule,[37] both needed mutual aid to prevent any reversal of the democratization trend.[38] That would influence and somehow determine the foreign policies.[39] Thus, for Argentina "(...) democratization had a qualitative influence on (...) foreign policies vis-á-vis Latin America, human rights, defense of democracy and Malvinas."[40] Foreign policy was used to protect democracy and regional peace became central to the maintenance of successful civil-military relations. Moreover, "in part this reflected the close and very concrete link between conflict resolution abroad and democratic consolidation at home -the need to promote regional pacification in order to deprive the nationalists of causes around which to mobilize opinion, to demand a greater political role, or to press for militarization and rearmament."[41] Thus, the Central American conflict would generate an intensive diplomatic activity around the Contadora and the Contadora Support Group that later would merge into the Rio Group, an unprecedented mechanism of diplomatic consultation in Latin America.[42] This particular characteristic of the transition period is relevant, as it shows how an internal security concern motivates foreign policy initiatives. The object of concern was democracy, the political regime, that becomes the central drive of securitization process. Once again, the State, this time the democratic government, has been the main actors and the deepening of interdependence was a State policy.

The democratic transition period has successfully completed in the 1990s in Argentina and Brazil. The military did not interfere to interrupt the constitutional change, even during serious political crises, like the impeachment in 1992 of Brazil's president, Collor de Melo, for corruption. The new phase, that could be labeled as democratic consolidation, coincided with the deepening of the integration process and the end of Cold

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[36] A. Hurrell, Op. Cit., p. 238.

[37] "We are not dealing here with a 'democratic peace' between two well-consolidated democracies but rather with contested process of democratization" (Idem, p. 244).

[38] As a matter of fact, military rebellions in April 1987, January 1989 and December 1990 showed how fragile was democracy and how present yet were the non-democratic forces in Argentina.

[39] For a review of the historical trends of Argentina's and Brazil's foreign policy see Jorge Herrera Vegas, Las políticas exteriores de la Argentina y del Brasil: divergencias y convergencias, ISEN, Documento de Trabajo n. 10, Buenos Aires, Sept. 1995.

[40] Roberto Russell, Democratization and its Qualitative Impact on Argentina's Foreign Policy, ISEN, Documento de Trabajo n. 27, Buenos Aires, Dec. 1998.

[41] A. Hurrell, "Security in…", p. 536.

[42] Mónica Hirst, Carlos Rico, "Latin America's Security Agenda", in Jayantha Dhanapala (ed.), Regional Approaches to Disarmament: Security and Stability, UNIDIR, Darthmouth, 1993. See also Alicia Dorfmann, Puentes sobre turbulencia: la concertación política latinoamericana en los '80, FLACSO/Chile, 1990.

War. Both events had different impacts on security matter. Thus, while Mercosur, the institutionalization of economic integration between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, gave interdependence a more structural characteristic and, therefore, made conflict too costly, the different interpretations that Buenos Aires and Brasilia had for the end of Cold War generated a divergence in foreign policy. It is important, however, to observe that the positive trend in security cooperation would not be reversed. On the contrary, as the Mercosur absorbed 30 and 20% respectively of Argentinean and Brazilian exports, military cooperation reached new levels with agreements, coincidences in policy trends and joint exercises. In September 1990 president Collor de Melo formally rejected any Brazilian desire to acquire nuclear weapons opening the way to the Joint Declaration on a Common Nuclear Policy, institutionalized with the December 1991 agreement to create a bilateral agency for controlling nuclear material (ABACC), followed by the full implementation of Tlatelolco Regime. The Mendonca Agreement in 1991 extended control to chemical and biological weapons. Democratization meant also an identity shift because of changes in economic policy and economic thinking that putted an end to the military role as modernizing agents. That would lead to a sharp drop of military spending (from 4% in 1990 to 2% in 1993 in Argentina's case), a search for new roles, and further military cooperation. During the September 1996 AREX joint exercises, and for the first time since the Paraguayan War, Brazilian troops were present on Argentinean ground. Finally, the Brazilian new National Defense Doctrine (1996) gave priority to the Amazon area and moved troops from the country's southern border with Argentina to the north. That was, perhaps, the most obvious sign that Brazil did definitively not perceive any threat coming from its neighbor. On the other hand, economic regionalism "helped to promote an ongoing process of socialization and enmeshment. (...) [This] process of increased cooperation has been strongly statist project. The development of transnational social networks has not been significant factors in either the ending of rivalry or the moves toward cooperation (...) mostly [due] to changes within the bureaucracies and the growth of institutionalized interaction among an even broader range of bureaucratic actors."[43] However, the process of the consolidation of the Mercosur created important business interests and businessmen became an important social factor pushing towards major integration.[44] Hence, one could even risk the hypothesis of the gradual formation of a transnational bourgeoisie with its interests deeply linked to the regional integration. If formed and firmly positioned within each country, that new bourgeoisie would oppose to the business sector more prone to global trade. The involvement of the business community as an actor in the integration process had two consequences. First, it gave the Mercosur a marked economic characteristic that pushed other issues, such as the social agenda, the political integration or common security problems, to a second plan. Often ignored, especially during economic growth periods, these issues, when urged, were treated through ad-hoc commissions. Second, the business community, at this stage of the integration process, did not show any particular interest for foreign policy postures that diverged as Argentina and Brazil gave different interpretations to the meaning and dimension of the end of the Cold War. That would somehow slow down the integration and mark its limitations.

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[43] A. Hurrell, "An emerging…", p. 252
[44] Alfredo Eric Calgagno, Eric Calcagno, "Un proyecto regional que reclama grandeza de miras", <u>Le Monde Diplomatique/El Dipló</u>, April 2000.

Overall, the process of rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil does give a clear evidence of the emergence of a security community. Practically all the indicators that give such an evidence could be seen clearly through the bilateral initiatives that ended rivalry and gave birth to the integration process.

The scoop of divergences during the consolidation phase

Once observed the emergence of a security community, the question is whether this community is a loosely coupled one. Using the second set of indicators to see any evidence of it important doubts emerge. True, there is free movement of population within the Mercosur. One can even think of some sort of cooperative and collective security, especially at the Argentine/Brazil/Paraguay Triple Frontier zone. Moreover, the Interior Ministers of the Mercosur, plus Bolivia and Chile, signed a Treaty to coordinate the fight against the transnational crime in the Southern Cone, giving further evidence of a sort of common identification of threat.[45] However, divergence in foreign and Defense policies did not allow to fulfill the requirements of other indicators of a loosely coupled security community, even though in every one of them one can find arguments to observe if not the existence at least the possibility of a positive trend. This part would deal with Argentina's and Brazil's foreign and Defense policies' divergences and leave the more specific question of internal threat to the next part.

The divergences in foreign policy between the two countries were mostly due to different interpretations of the end of the Cold War. They started to appear during the consolidation phase of democracy, when a breach appear between the advanced level of convergence in the trade/economic field and the issues linked to regional security and international politics.[46] That distance is due to "a) differences in the interpretation of the costs and gains of the end of the Cold War; b) different international vocations and their corollaries in the respective political/strategic agendas; c) internal asymmetries in security matters due to different levels of subordination of the military to civilian power."[47]

In bilateral relations, "power and relative power have nor wholly disappeared from the equation especially to many in Argentina who fear that deep integration with Brazil is bringing excessive dependence. Equally, thinking on security continues to be influenced by persisting foreign policy differences (for example, Argentina's determination to secure from Washington the (symbolic) status of non-NATO ally, in worked contrast to Brazil's more independent stance vis-á-vis the United States). Nevertheless, the problem of Brazilian power is no longer understood in strategic, let alone military, terms and the idea of actively opposing Brazilian power is largely disappeared."[48] This divergence, surely, does not reflect any conflict hypothesis and is mostly due to "the foreign policy interests of the two countries [that] moved apart and Mercosur's place in respective foreign policies and 'world

[45] <u>Clarín</u>, June 16, 2000.
[46] As the seminar *"The South of the Americas in a World in Transition"*, organized by FLACSO/Argentina and Forosur (September 11-12, 1994, Buenos Aires), concluded
[47] Report of the seminar *"The South of..."* published by FLACSO/Argentina and Forosur, Buenos Aires, January 1995.
[48] A. Hurrell, "Security in…", p. 534.

views' [that] became more ambiguous and contested."[49] As both States took different paths, they also made sure that this divergence won't affect bilateral relations. The question is how this factor would interfere in forthcoming regional security issues, such as the inter-related problems of drug dealing and military intervention in Colombia.

Divergence appeared also in Defense and security policies fundamentally because of the different trends in democratic transition and the civil/military relations that characterized them. This on one hand had to do with the more or less success the military had as "modernization" agents when they took power during the 1960s and 1970s. And, on the other hand, in had to do with the lost or preservation of the prestige they once had. Both factors marked the democratic transition.[50] Thus, the failure of the Argentinean military in modernizing the economy, the 30.000 disappeared persons of the "dirty war" and finally the defeat in the Malvinas war, provoked the complete lost of their prestige and did not left them any chance to negotiate the transition. The military made a complete retiree from politics and the civilian governments have been eager to keep them out of it, as the successful modification of Defense and security laws,[51] the trial to the junta in 1985 (a unique event in whole Latin America) and the repression of military rebellions (even though controversies and divergent opinions still persist within the Argentinean society) show. As a result a fundamental restructuring of the Argentinean armed forces took place and the military started to look for a new role, especially in international peacekeeping missions.[52] The Brazilian military did not suffer neither a defeat in a war, nor a loss of prestige for human rights violations (which, of course, does not mean that they did not commit violations...), and were able to complete a more or less successful role in modernizing the country when holding the power. Thus, not only they negotiated democratic transition but also hold a high profile defining security and Defense policies during that process. This participation of the military in policy definitions enjoyed a consensus within the society. "During the 1989 and 1997 presidential campaigns, not even the candidates that were the most critical to the military asked to put an end to the armed forces."[53] In Brazil, Foreign and Defense policy issues, especially the new National Defense Doctrine, were submitted to academic and public debate with the participation of the military, the government officials, academicians and politicians of all ideological tendencies. Finally, the fact that president Fernando Henrique Cardoso has been able to create a Defense Ministry, resisted by the military during the transition period, is yet another evidence of a rather conflict-less civil-military relations. "I am convinced that armed forces are not a threat to democracy. Lately they are having an exemplary attitude towards democratic institutions",[54] he said in an interview. However, because of the role the Brazilian military held in the transition the process of demilitarization of the public security system "suffered limitations due to the opposition not only of the armed forces, but

[49] A. Hurrell, "An emerging…", p. 255.

[50] Mónica Hirst, Democracia, seguridad e integración, FLACSO, Grupo Editor Norma, Buenos Aires, 1996, ch. 4.

[51] José Manuel Ugarte, "Argentina frente a un nuevo desafío: la seguridad pública", SER en el 2000, n° 10, July 1997.

[52] Lieutenant General Martín Balza, "The Argentinean Army in the 21st century", RUSI Journal, February 1997.

[53] Shinguenoli Miyamoto, "Integración y seguridad regional", Nueva Sociedad 162, p. 159.

[54] Interview realized by Stephane Monclaire in Politique internationale, n° 67, Spring 1995, p. 22.

also of important groups in the police, civil society and political society. Moreover, this process took place parallel with an increase in criminality, urban violence and organized crime, particularly drug smuggling, and reduction of the public budget in Brazil and other Latin American countries creating political pressures that urged the participation of armed forces in public security issues."[55] During the debates, which started with the democratization, the overall tendency was to "limit but not to eliminate the participation of the armed forces to public security issues."[56] As a result, "from January 1985 to October 1997, the armed forces, principally the Army but also the Armada and the Aeronautic, participated in public security affairs at least 31 times. Of these 4 during Sarney's government (1985-1989), 3 Collor's (1990-1992), 7 Itamar Franco's (1993-1994) and 17 Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (1995-1997). Four times to control labor strikes, six to control public manifestations, two for security matters in public events, six to control illegal activities such as extraction of minerals, wood and illegal possession of firearms, and thirteen to control rebellions or threat to rebellions of the police. Even though this participation changed since democracy's restoration, its frequency has not declined. On the contrary it is on increase."[57]

One of the consequences of the military participation in public security is the securitization of the drug problem. "In Brazil, the struggle against drug smuggling and consuming is carried out by the state and federal police, however the armed forces consider that they should be prepared to intervene whenever it threatens the national security."[58] Officially, as the 1996 Anti-drogue National Action Program states, armed forces should provide logistic support, especially for information and intelligence tasks, while the struggle should be carried out by the police. ""Armed forces should give support to federal police operations, especially on the borders. Logistic support, presence and above all intelligence support"[59], is president Cardoso's posture. Nevertheless, the militarization of the drug issue is a marked securitization trend easily observable. Thus, in November 1999 a parliamentary commission proposed the creation of a special military force to fight drug smuggling and the head of the Institutional Security, Gen. Alberto Cardoso, sustained that armed forces might "sporadically" give support in combat actions to police forces.[60] The Anti-Drogue National Secretary (SENAD) favors a military participation but not the militarization of the struggle,[61] which is at best a pretty ambiguous posture. Two factors are clearly present in this securitization process. The first one is the real dimension of the drug smuggling problem and its relation with violence, especially in the favelas (shantytowns) of Rio de Janeiro[62] and the Amazon. The other is the United States' posture that favors

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[55] Paulo de Mesquita Neto, "Fuerzas armadas, políticas y seguridad pública en Brasil: instituciones y políticas gubernamentales", in Rut Diamint (comp.), Control civil y Fuerzas Armadas, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Nuevohacer, GEL, Buenos Aires, 1999, pp. 203-204.
[56] Idem., p. 205.
[57] Idem., p. 211.
[58] Sh. Miyamoto, Op. Cit., p. 155.
[59] Mario Moreira Alves, "FH sobre o crime", O Globo, May 26, 2000.
[60] CONE SUL – Noticias sobre defesa e seguraca no Brasil, n° 31-32, November 3-10, 1999.
[61] Darío Pignotti, "La historia de dos tipos audaces", Página/12, April 16, 1999.
[62] For example, drug smuggling in the Complexo da mare, a Rio de Janeiro neighborhood composed of 15 favelas, reaches 170.000 R$ (approximately 85.000 U$S) and is controlled by well-armed mobs (O Globo, May 26, 2000).

military participation.[63] The Brazilian military are very cautious about the participation issue, for the corrupting power of the drug, and that is also the official posture.[64] However, the increased militarization, as well as the budget destined to the struggle against drug-smuggling suggest increased coincidence with Washington's posture. In Argentina, considered a transit country for the cocaine coming from Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Paraguay to be shipped to Europe, US, South Africa and Australia, politicians, human rights groups and public opinion in general are opposed to military participation. The Argentinean law, like the Brazilian, limits that participation to a logistic support to police and gendarme forces. Even though Washington's desire to see more Argentinean military involvement with the promise of substantial subsidies does not leave indifferent at least part of the political and civil society, public opinion still strongly resist to any modification of the legal negative of any further role of the military.

Delinquency, crime and gun violence: an "internal" threat for the community

The democratic consolidation phase is still going on both in Argentina and Brazil. What undoubtedly creates difficulties for the completion of this process is the deep social crisis that both countries are facing. Insecurity and unemployment are the main causes that are creating increased exclusion of large sectors from the economic process and widening the gap between rich and poor people. While this would not necessarily mean that the regional integration faces any immediate reversal, on the long run the effects of the social crisis would have their inevitable impact on it. This part would deal with the problem of public insecurity of which the rise of criminality[65] is the most visible aspect. One of the factors that is closely linked to the rise of criminality is the proliferation of weapons[66] and the increase of gun violence. How this problem is faced in both countries and what impact could it have on the Mercosur security community would be the main questions to be answered. The data that would be mentioned concerns mostly big cities and important provinces (the federal capital Buenos Aires and the province of Buenos Aires for Argentina, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo for Brazil). Both because of the availability of this kind of data, and because of the fact that the problem is dealt rather on provincial and municipal level.

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[63] The package of 1 billion U$S that the US Congress approved on June 22, 2000 to the fight against drug-smuggling in Latin America do show the magnitude of this factor. About the influence that Washington has upon Latin American governments and politicians decisions in drug policies, see the case of the former Colombian president Ernesto Samper, who from a liberal posture shifted to the most hawkish one, in Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "La polemica sobre la legalización de drogas en Colombia, el presidente Samper y los Estados Unidos", Latin American Research Review, año 2000, n. 1.

[64] D. Pignotti, Op. Cit.

[65] Modern criminality is best explained through three hypothesis. The first one is based on the consequences of demographic increase of a population. The second links delinquency with poverty. The third considers it a problem of behavior. None of the three hypothesis can claim explaining alone the causes of the rise of crime, however they do provide a starting point to understand different cases and situations (Luis Ratinoff, "Delincuencia, paz, ciudadanía", paper presented at the workshop Hacia un enfoque integrado del desarrollo: ética, violencia y seguridad ciudadana, organized by the Interamerican Development Bank, 16 & 17 February 1996, Washington DC. Available as an IDB Document.)

[66] The paper deals with the category of armament labeled as "small arms" or "light weapons" of personal use and understandably not with heavy weapons used for Defense purposes.

Victimization figures show that in Buenos Aires 8.2% of the inhabitants suffered a violent robbery in 1998, the double of what was the percentage four years ago. According to Justice Ministry in 1993 robbery motivated 30% of the total of the homicides, while in 1999 that percentage rose to 53. Moreover, 80% of the armed robbery is committed in public places.[67] Public opinion pools show that insecurity comes on the top of the most worrying issues of the Argentinean society, followed by unemployment. Seven out of ten people is afraid to be a possible victim of violence or delinquency and only one out of four people live without this fear. "Six over ten persons changed their habits during the last years due to the increase of delinquency. Most of them took preventive measures, such as going out less by night or installing alarms and other sorts of protecting devises."[68]

Brazil has become the second country in the world (after South Africa) with the highest rate of homicides with guns. 27.000 victims per year or 10 to 13% of the total of deaths by shooting in the world, according to the World Health Organization.[69] It is in Rio de Janeiro where firearms are used extensively in criminal activities and violent acts against people. In less then ten years violence rate in Rio triplicate from 23 victims/100.000 in 1982 (a rate similar at that time to New York city's). There, as well as in Sao Paolo, the combination of drugs and firearms best explain the highest mortality rate in conflicts between youths.

The relation between social crisis and gun violence is a very complex question. In some societies gun violence cause social crisis, in others the social crisis open way to gun violence. Though one thing is clear: gun proliferation would make the killing instrument available, thus encourage, whether directly or indirectly, crime. And although gun lobbies all over the world object this argument, and some sociological researches do support their point of view, there is a solid base to argue that gun control policy is the best way to curb gun related violence.[70] The question, then, is how do Argentinean and Brazilian societies face the problem of gun control and whether their particular policies permit to conclude over the existence of a loosely coupled security community, using the indicator of policy coordination for an "internal" threat.[71]

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[67] Laura Zommer, "Vivir en peligro", La Nación, December 6, 1999.

[68] Bartolome de Vedia, "Miedo de morir, miedo a vivir", La Nación, May 18, 2000. The statistics used in the article are provided by the report "Public Security" prepared by the Centro de Estudios Unión para la Mayoría and made public in June 1998.

[69] The data is provided by Viva Rio, a Brazilian Non Governmental Organization that leads disarmament campaigns in Rio de Janeiro.

[70] Hugh LaFolette, "Gun Control", Ethics 110, January 2000.

[71] For the status of gun proliferation and the culture of violence in South America see Khatchik Der Ghougassian and Leandro Piquet Carneiro, Connecting Weapons with Violence: the South American Experience, ISS Monograph Series, n. 25, May 1998, Halfway House, South Africa. Specifically for the Argentinean case, see Kh. Der Ghougassian and Angel Hernan Lapieza Spota (with the participation of Cora Fernandez Anderson), "Las armas livianas, la violencia y la seguridad: fundamentos y Líneamientos para una investigación", paper presented at the I Seminar for Security, Violence and Democracy, section: Arms and violence, organized by the Instituto de Política Criminal y de Seguridad de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, in La Plata (Argentina), August 10-11, 1999. A revised and enlarged version of this paper by Kh. Der Ghougassian has been published as "Pequañas pero peligrosas: la proliferación de las armas livianas y las políticas de control en el Cono Sur", in Entrecaminos 2000: New Ideas to New Millenium. Latin America in the XXI Century, a student publication of the Center for Latin American Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. All three of these are used in this essay.

The increase of violence is a worldwide phenomenon with a 50% of rise in homicide rates (considered "the most reliable measure of violence") according to statistics made in a sample of 34 countries in a period of one decade (5.82 homicides/100.000 inhabitants in 1980-84, 8.86/100.000 during 1990-94).[72] The rise of violence is linked to globalization: "Despite the undeniable benefits -particularly in the macroeconomic arena- globalization have aggravated income inequalities throughout the world, spread a culture of violence through increased communication and media, and expanded trade in death industries such as firearms and drugs."[73] These symptoms are clearly observable in Latin America that became the second region where homicides mostly increased within the above mentioned decade (80% with 23 homicides/100.000 inhabitants, whereas in Sub Saharan Africa the rate has been 40/100.000). "Crime rates in Latin America are strongly correlated with city size. Crowding intensifies antisocial behavior and facilitates anonymity and imitation of violent acts."[74] Another factor is increased income inequality, as, according to a study of the World Bank, "Latin America saw a short-lived reduction in income disparities in the 1970s and a surge again in the 1980s when the 10% of the population with the highest income increased its share by more then 80%."[75]

Increase of violence, therefore gun proliferation, can damage the consolidation of a security community. As a matter of fact, the "internal" threat of gun violence needs policy coordination because "many (territorially-based) communities also drive their identity from internal threats", as sustains one of the indicators of a loosely coupled security community. Violence and how to face it is also relevant for social cohesion, as civil society action turns crucial in gun controlling.[76] Gun violence has become an "externality" if we consider the situation of the Iguazú Triangle at the Argentine/Brazil/Paraguay Triple Frontier zone. There, as a matter of fact, the ad-hoc mechanism for cooperation, known as the Iguazú Act, established a policy coordination through a tripartite command mechanism.[77] However, hardly what has been implemented successfully in one particular zone is extended to the rest of the community. So far, there is no further policy cooperation, neither an active interaction on civil society level, to generate a global community vision that would characterize the common definition of the "internal" threat of gun violence.

Argentina does have a solid tradition of gun legislation that goes back to the 1970s. The 1973 law 20.429 regulated gun ownership and the National Register of Arms (RENAR) was created two years later. Brazil had its own gun legislation recently in

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[72] Mayra Buvinic & Andrew Morrison, "Living in a More Violente World", Foreign Policy, Spring 2000.

[73] Idem, p. 63.

[74] Idem, p. 62.

[75] Idem, p. 63. In Argentina the 7.7% annual economic growth from 1992 to 1994 resulted in an enormous increase in the incomes of 105 of the wealthiest families and an insignificant increase for the poorest. Poverty in Brazil is among the highest in the world: between a 31 and 50% (Kh. Der Ghougassian, "Old and New Sources of Weapons", in Kh. Der Ghougassian and L. Piquet Carneiro, Op. Cit., p. 20.)

[76] To address the problem of violence "communities and local leaders can often undertake (...) actions more effectively than multilateral or even national organizations. Municipalities are particularly well placed to coordinate the efforts of such diverse actors as central governments, business, non-governmental organizations, doctors, nurses, teachers, students, journalists -all potentially important allies in the fight against violence." (M. Buvinic & A. Morrison, Op. Cit., p. 70)

[77] Kh. Der Ghougassian, Op. Cit., p. 25-30.

February 1997 when the National System of Arms (SINARM) was created (law 9.437). However, as the problem of gun proliferation and gun violence is worst in Brazil, there is greater consciousness and civil society mobilization to implement further control, whereas in Argentina the debate hardly overpasses the legislative aspect. There are some 6 million illegal weapons in Brazil. 58.8% of them entered the country through smuggling and 70% belong to organized crime. Clearly the main problem is the illegal proliferation. However, 2% of gun deaths are committed with legal guns. Before the creation of SINARM, between 1993 and 1996, 20% of the homicides in Rio de Janeiro were committed after personal disputes, which meant an average of 8.188 victims, of whom approximately 1.600 shot with a gun, in one year. Although during the same period only 4.5% of Rio's inhabitants admitted having a gun, 15.5% expressed wished to own one. Gun victims tool and public opinion pools were alarming. To the point that the Viva Rio NGO launched a disarming campaign in 1999 aiming at the total prohibition of legal sales of guns to civilians. Not only have they been able to collect 1.4 million signatures, but the law that the Rio state parliament sanctioned following the campaign received the support of 70% of the inhabitants. The civil society had reached the conclusion that availability of guns, even legal ones, creates major incentive to commit crime. The success in Rio de Janeiro encouraged president Cardoso to launch a similar campaign on national level. In Argentina, since the assassination of the journalist Jose Luis Cabezas (January 1997), and parallel with the increase of delinquency and violence, the gun debate made its way to mass media and public opinion. To face the threat of delinquency, civil society mobilization lead to the successful implementation of early alert communal programs in Buenos Aires' neighborhoods. Civilian security systems were created in the Saavedra, Palermo Viejo, Colegiales and other neighborhoods in federal capital, whereas in the province during the implementation of the police reform program (1997-1999) Foros Vecinales public security networks functioned with more or less success. There was no intention to replace the State in its security function, but to decrease violence and delinquency establishing trust within the community. Those positive and encouraging experiences, however, did not lead to an organized campaign for further gun control, like the one implemented in Rio. This does not mean that the same measures or approach should be adopted for the Argentinean case, where also the main problem is the illegal proliferation (an estimated 2 million arms) but the use of legal arms in homicides is very low (0.05%). But as violence increase and no efficient answer is given by the State to curb the rise of criminality, public opinion is getting closer to favoring individual and non-institutional self-defense options and RENAR's data shows that arms sales are on the rise. Actually an estimated 70% of the family homes in the Buenos Aires province own a gun. Worst, sometime they are directly or indirectly encouraged to do so by politicians eager to exploit such highly sensitive and responsible issues for electoral aims.

Conclusion: social cohesion and community vision to an "internal" threat

The Southern Cone countries, the four Mercosur partners plus Bolivia and Chile, recognize that gun proliferation will have a serious impact on regional stability,[78] although

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[78] As concluded the seminar *"The proliferation of small arms, munitions and explosives. Its impact on regional stability"*, organized by the Intelligence Service of the Republic of Argentina (SIDE), Buenos Aires, 17 & 18 May 1999.

the situation differs from one country to another. Argentina and Brazil, alongside with Mexico, are active participants in regional and international efforts seeking major cooperation in gun control. However, this active diplomacy failed so far to provide evidence of close policy cooperation, even though, as it has been said, sporadic and ad-hoc initiatives exist in the context of the Mercosur integration process. True, dealing with a threat essentially recognized as "internal" is a complex issue. Or, as A. Hurrell says, "how one deals with the relationship between social and international violence is not clear. Yet continued high level of social conflict and the privatization of violence provides a further reason for doubting the existence of even loosely coupled security communities."[79]

The State, of course, could do a lot, at least much more than what has been done actually. Thus, policy coordination between Argentina and Brazil in gun control issues could include further steps, such as comparative approach to arms legislation, a regional register of arms transfer, common postures and high profile in regional and international forums and gun control initiatives, etc. What doesn't yet exist, however, is a major interchange between civil society. In other words, the civil society mobilization to face the threat to social cohesion is not extended beyond the bounders of that same society. Gun control campaigns or successful implementation of neighborhood safety programs remain local experiences. For example, there are no social networks linking Argentinean and Brazilian NGOs to interchange information and expertise, or help diffusing a successful initiative. The civil society mobilization is a way to overcome the limitations of State policy and, sometime, to counter-balance it whenever necessary. On the other hand, as violence is "a socially constructed behavior"[80] State action is important but not sufficient to end it. The threat of gun proliferation does not lay only in the spread of public insecurity, but mostly in the culture of violence that it encourages. Symptoms of a new culture of criminal violence, different from the political violence of the 1960s and 1970s, are quite observable in the Southern Cone.[81] A "gun culture" could soon take the dimension that it has in Central America, Southern Africa or, more recently, in the Caucasus, where the sale of weapons provide not only security bur survival for impoverished residents. As the 5th Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime (Bangkok, Thailand, 23-25 May 1999) concluded, "changing the culture may be one of the most important 'strategies' to reduce the use of firearms. (...) NGOs can play a powerful role in pressing for changes in firearms policies."[82] This would imply a wider perspective of the regional integration, a "complementarity between peoples and nations" with the participation of "NGOs, universities, cultural and social agents."[83]

Else, if the "internal" threat of gun violence, that is challenging the social cohesion in each country today, is not faced within a community vision, and handled both with State action and civil society mobilization, it could provoke a serious damage to the integration process. In the 1980s the newly established democracies had to coordinate policies to

[79] A. Hurrell, Op. Cit., p. 260.
[80] Edelberto Torres-Rivas, "Tras la violencia y el miedo, la democracia", Sistema 132-133/1996, p. 77.
[81] Kh. Der Ghougassian, "Changing patterns of violence in Buenos Aires", in Kh. Der Ghougassian and L. Piquet Carneiro, Op. Cit., pp. 42-62.
[82] Document available at http://www. Cscap.org/CSCAP289.Doc.htm
[83] From the declarations of Luiz Alberto Gómez de Souza, Brazilian sociologist, "El Mercado común visto desde Brasil", Le Monde Diplomatique/ el Dipló, April 2000.

prevent regional threats to the fragile democratic regimes. Now their action should aim at preventing the internal challenge to the security community that emerged through the democratic transition process. Policy coordination would also be crucial on a regional and international level to prevent the negative impact of external trends, such as the increase of world arms trade.[84]

Civil society mobilization is fundamental for the learning process and the strengthening of a community conscience beyond the national borders.

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[84] 780 billion U$S has been spend on armaments in 1999 according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and while great powers increase their Defense budget, developing countries are those that mostly spend to buy arms. Of the international trends are not immune even regions where conflict levels are low. According to the Center of Economic Studies for Latin America (CEPAL), in 1999 Latin American countries spend 10 billion U$S more than what they spend in 1998 in armament. CEPAL calculated that military spending is proportional to investments in public health and education: for each dollar spent to buy arms, 1,1 is invested in health and 0,9 in education.