

**GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN THE PROCESS OF HEMISPHERIC
INTEGRATION: CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTHERN CONE**

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For seven years, the American continent has been immersed in a process whose ultimate goal is its integration --an objective leveraged by the Summit of the Americas. Other president and minister-level summits such as the Ibero-American Summits or the Rio Group meeting also seek --through multilateralism-- to lead the region towards its insertion into the global society. All these forums claim a common thing: the need to reaffirm democratic processes and to produce significant improvements to the economic well-being of (Latin) American people. For that purpose, they work on the hypothesis that *integration* is a means to promote development and that *democracy* is the right system to attain such development.

From the far end of the continent, the Southern Cone watches --and participates in-- this process.¹ It agrees with this goal but it harbors doubts on the way to get there. Thus, after the experience of authoritarian rule that characterized most of the past century, Southern Cone nations now can experiment both the potentialities and difficulties of democratic consolidation as a political regime style.

Therefore, key values for a democratic society such as the desire to live in peace, the strengthening of institutions and the aspiration that justice, fairness and social solidarity may be achieved, are not always a reality in the political and social life of these nations. When this happens in consolidated democracies, we can think of gradual and even sector reforms to correct the process. But in young, poorly-consolidated and economically-impaired democracies not capable of immediately rendering benefits to the people, governance is often at stake. When the attainment of democratic values seems to be stalled at the point where political liberties are exercised, this may not be too attractive for those who fight every day for their survival. This is where a special vision emerges: that democracy associated with the fact that the market reigns over everything else (Ferrer 1997:24-27)² may be a system that ensures inclusion only to a few --usually corrupted-- and that violence is the only means available to outcasts in their fight for being heard. This is associated to the fact that the regular crime is economically beneficial to

many, and bears low costs. The gaps in criminal legislation, the different judicial criteria in approaching crimes and the small penalties lead to situations where criminals are not, in practical terms, punished for their actions (Fajnzylber P., Lederman D., and Loayza N. 1998:3).³ This also happens because it is believed that the State does not seem to be capable of controlling the problem.

This scenario may be understood in the Southern Cone if we watch its history and the systematic use of violence as a way to solve conflicts. Although it has been manifested in different ways --owing to a complex set of conditions-- violence has been a recurrent phenomenon in the whole Latin American history. Some of its manifestations were the civil wars and the fights between indigenous peoples of the pre-Columbian past, the conquest wars, independence battles and post-independence anarchy aimed at imposing a political project to give form to the new nation-states, the revolutionary insurrection proclaiming a new political, social and economic order in the 1970s, and the state violent response against these movements. And, at present, the extended violence derived from poverty, inequity and crisis in the expectations for a better quality of life.

In the last decade of the XXth century, the Southern Cone countries have been experiencing a remarkable escalation in violence --quantitative and qualitatively different from the old forms of political violence-- now perpetrated by large numbers of marginal elements which, with higher or lower organization levels but supported by the same frustration and despair, turn to crime in the crave for a better destiny. The emphasis on insecurity appearing in most opinion polls as one of the most significant sources of social concern and soaring criminality indices are clear examples of the importance acquired by this complex phenomenon posing serious challenges to governance.

The perspective of a hemispheric integration process and the reformulation of Governments' roles, where the provision of security represents one of the main --and few-- motives for their very existence, are both facts that urge for academic reflection on the manners

in which democratic States can respond to the increasing concern about human security, and particularly, about the violence phenomenon.

During the '60s and '70s, military dictatorships in the Southern Cone perceived revolutionary insurgence as a type of conflict representing a manifestation of Cold War bipolar antagonism and hence, a threat to national security. This caused the emergence of a repressive organization, bitterly criticized by succeeding democracies, whose goal was the establishment of domestic peace on the basis of a militarized society.

The Southern Cone nations, which in the past responded to violence through authoritarianism and the exercise of State-organized violence, now face the challenge of controlling violence with legal means and responding to the culture of a democratic environment.

This paper will try to address these concerns: What are the special characteristics of the Southern Cone in terms of governance and security? How can the subregion be incorporated into the dynamics of the hemispheric integration process, if it continues facing such challenges to democracy and human security? How to approach the problem of insecurity without violating, for the purpose of maintaining public order, the formal framework that define a democratic system?

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT AND THE SUB-REGIONAL PICTURE

Over the last decades of the 20th century, one of the most important transformations in the political history of mankind since the advent of modern times has taken place: the *State* --the master of the institutional-political picture from its inception in the 16th century-- started to undergo several difficulties that challenged its very existence.

This State, which, particularly after the Second World War, found its best expression in the Welfare State, has traditionally been defined by the possession of two fundamental elements: the monopoly of legitimate violence and a territory where it exercises its jurisdiction (Weber 1922:1056; Held 1997:129).⁴

The globalization process or, in other words, the 'process by which national sovereign States intermingle and relate with transnational players and their respective potential power, guidelines, identities and interrelations' (Beck 1998:29) brought about serious challenges to the classical legitimizing formula of the State, both regarding its existence and authority. In the first place, the challenge to the Welfare State, a notion that is no longer sustainable for nations with scarce resources in a globalized scenario. Such States have had to reform their structures and functions, going from a Benefactor State status to the *minimum* State formula. Secondly, the challenge of what could be called the cornerstone of the State's very existence: its sovereignty (Rojas Aravena 2000:17).⁵ What is the present relationship between the formal domination of the States and the actual development of the people in their territories? This needs to be analyzed both from the viewpoint of economic practices and domestic/foreign policy decisions, or from the viewpoint of the phenomena that affect even the monopoly of violence, as in the case of new threats to security (Van Creveld 1991:ix)⁶.

For most of Latin American countries, and more specifically for the Southern Cone nations, the challenge posed by this process of global political transformation was deepened when it overlapped with its own regional process: the return of democracy as a political system. This assumed that, in practice, the new systems had to adapt themselves to a time of continuous transformation not yet having the necessary institutional strength to understand and design the best ways of adapting to the change. Thus, the inherent weakness of these States was exacerbated even more. After decades of authoritarianism, the same concept of representative democracy had to be re-adopted again to become part of the citizens' culture.

Civil society emerged and looked at itself in the mirror after such authoritarian darkness, naturally seeking ways to communicate its interests and desires. But this time, the interaction between citizens and the State (which in the past was mainly centered on political parties and trade unions) started to be occupied also by civil society organizations, especially because people were strongly questioning the quality and objectives of such political and union representations.

The natural vulnerability of these young democracies was augmented by the difficulties of the political leaders to take over the government office in an efficient and service-oriented way. In the 1980s, one president was overthrown on charges of corruption in Brazil. In Argentina, a president had to call for elections in 1989 before his term expired, due to rampant hyperinflation that nurtured a situation that made it impossible for him to stay in office. In 2001, other former president was prosecuted and detained for illegal sale of arms to Ecuador and Croatia during his mandate.

In the meantime, the sensitive relations between the political leadership and the military have also conditioned the scope of action of elected representatives who had to quickly learn not only to command the armed forces in order to do away with the phantom of military involvement in politics, but also to conduct them in a framework of economic strain and mission crisis as a result of the changes in the international arena. This learning process has not always rendered positive results. On the contrary, we now see the lack of institutionalization of policies in terms of security and defense, which impairs the health and survival of democratic regimes. In Argentina, for example, the weakness of the political leadership and the remains of the dictatorial past in terms of human rights have caused civil-military disputes that seem to be endless. In Paraguay, military intestine strife and the struggle between the military and civilians have turned the country into a violence-torn territory where corruption reigns. In Brazil, the armed forces continue to have significant power to influence on national politics. Lastly, although other examples could be cited, we have the Chilean case where conditions imposed to institutions by Augusto Pinochet's government before the return to democracy, prevent or delay full democratic development.

While efforts were made in order to rebuild the political regime and re-establish democratic relations between civilians and the military, Southern Cone countries have started to assess the possibility of integration with their neighbors as a way that could lead these countries, with almost no destiny, to find a place in the international arena. Integration as a political process, the ultimate goal of which is the formulation and implementation of agreed and/or common policies

related to problems shared by sovereign state entities, became part of the everyday language of political life.⁷

In this environment, in March 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion, which gave way to the *Mercosur* (South Common Market), a master agreement that set forth mechanisms⁸ aimed at the creation of a free trade area and a Customs Union intended to establish a Common Market by the end of 1994. However, this expectation was not met at that deadline. The Summit of Ouro Preto changed the schedule and implemented, as of January 1995, a Customs Union with lists of exemptions and a system of adjustments up to the year 2006, which has entailed ongoing and often rough negotiations among party states.

The start-up of the Summit of the Americas process with the ultimate goal of attaining hemispheric integration, caused logical challenges inside the subregional area. In the beginning, the initiative was seen with some skepticism regarding its true possibilities of success, but its continuity in time has led to a more serious reflection that includes the US view that hemispheric commercial integration has overcome all changes of administration. Thus, there is more or less enthusiasm depending on the country involved. Argentina, which, over the last 10 years, undertook a foreign policy oriented towards an alignment with the United States, naturally (at least without any resistance) endorses a process originated mainly from such country's initiative.⁹ Brazil, a natural leader in the subregion, aspires to talk with the US from that leadership position and this causes some reluctance to the initiative. Over the past few years, Chile has attempted to join the NAFTA and thus holds a wait-and-see position: it supports the process but keeps contacts with the integration system in the subregion, as it has not succeeded in being accepted by the US as a partner.

This Mercosur process of integration does not provide for the inclusion of security matters yet. However, in practice, economic integration and security relations have been interrelated, working symmetrically and on parallel paths in a positive manner. From their inception as nations, the Southern Cone countries in the 19th Century turned their strategic rivalry into the pillar of their relations. In spite of that, this was not translated into wars. During the 20th century --and particularly during the military dictatorships-- the neighbor was a potential enemy. In that

sense, the dominating perception that drove the different national projects was that of building a strong State, with a clearly differentiated and autonomous model, not only with respect to that country's neighbor but also to the international system.

This model --inspired in the realism that reigned at that time in international relations, and in the successful example of some powerful nations of the planet-- adopted the balance of power as its strategic doctrine (Donadio and Tibiletti 1998:92-118). Maybe, the mistake of the Southern Cone leaders was not to understand that, for the weaker States, strategic options are not as flexible and wide as for those nations that are part of the international power system. In times of the Cold War, while Europe was starting to think of economic integration, Argentina, Brazil and Chile were rivals over border disputes and would enthrone the image of the *other* as a hindrance to be overcome and even eliminated. With more force during the last military dictatorship of the 70's, the permanent danger of military confrontation between Argentina and Brazil and between Argentina and Chile, almost became a reality.¹⁰

But starting in the decade of 1980 with the nuclear agreements between Argentina and Brazil taken by the hand of democratization and of the changes in the international environment, the old rivalry slowly became a partnership relationship. The Southern Cone nations went from a logic of conflict to one of cooperation, that privileged understanding over divergences. In terms of strategic security, remarkable progress was made until the present time. Today the armed forces themselves are talking about the benefits of combined action and jointness. Mercosur and economic integration relations were a powerful factor in overcoming threat perceptions. In an environment unthought of twenty years ago, today the main power supply utilities in Argentina are in the hands of Chilean companies; Brazil is Argentina's main trade partner and Argentine companies supply gas to Chilean territory.¹¹

At the present time, the process of economic integration undergoes difficulties inherent to the weakness of national economies, mainly in terms of the relationship between Argentina and Brazil. The differences in the trade balance and the negotiations over tariffs with which both countries are trying to protect their national industry lead to doubts on the steps to be followed.¹² The reaffirmation of the economic integration initiative through the FTAA has

served, over this year, as an alert to Mercosur. Having the relationship of economic integration and security been reversed, the transformation of the security environment may now become one of the main pillars to support the desire of partnership, such as the growing economic integration did when it drove the elimination of mistrusts in the past.

However, this relationship is not as symmetric as in past decades. With the arrival of the 21st century, domestic governance conditions in each country of the subregion are heading towards becoming an independent factor that may condition all progress attained so far in terms of democracy and integration among countries and with respect to the rest of America.

THE GOVERNANCE INTERNAL CONDITIONS

The “crisis of identity” the State undergoes in young democracies in the South of the hemisphere makes it difficult to attain an effective performance. In relation to security, the accelerated transformation of the international scenario during the last decade of the twentieth century caused, both in political and academic environment, the need for reformulating security concepts. Here, security is understood as the situation in which the States build and maintain the capacity of facing and deterring potential threats to their national interests.

As is known, once the west-east conflict came to an end, west countries tended to assume that –upon the “success” of the democratic ideal as the government regime and way of living– the world would embrace endless peace time. But, upon occurrence of subsequent events, it became obvious that post Cold War period did not seem a peaceful scenario. International relations became more complex and difficult to predict. Also, it seems clear that without a transcendental human life concept and an understanding of the psychological and cultural phenomena that influence on the way of thinking and behavior of citizens all around the planet (Brunner 1998), the “new international order” proclaimed by former US President George Bush will become another utopia created by mankind all along the centuries. Thus, concept of security as a function of the State cannot disappear but there should be a rethinking of such function so as to become more efficient to new challenges.

The main risk posed by this new order is the instability of peaceful law-abiding environment, not only among nations but *inside* them. In this “order” marked by uncertainty, the nature of conflicts that States are supposed to face has changed significantly. Threats to security that may have an impact on the governance of a nation can be broken down as follows:

- conventional threats, typical of security strategic dimensions which allegedly include the employment of military instruments and related to the *national defense* field.
- threats to *domestic security*, related to public security, to which the State responds using police and security forces.

As to regional strategic security, the efforts made on economic integration and the search for higher confidence-building among military forces in the South Cone have eliminated conflict scenarios previously perceived. Governments resources crises have impacted on the ability to maintain big armies with reasonable operational levels.¹³

Rather than inter-state conflicts, it is now the threats to domestic security and the response by the States to such threats what jeopardizes the prospects for democratic development of governance in the sub-region. This kind of threat is mainly composed of:

- the increased perception of insecurity in every day life aside from lower living conditions and the exclusion of a part of the population from the economic-social system and,
- the so called new threats to security, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime.

From political violence to social violence?

The presence of insurgency in Latin America is an unquestionable data, as shown by the examples of Colombia, Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Peru. But in the Southern Cone, with the reserves each particular case merits, the last expressions of political violence were those occurred in the early ‘1980s.

Tracing back the elements that explain the reversal of this phenomenon, so widely extended in 1960s and 1970s requires analyzing elements of both external and internal origin. To this end, it should be agreed that the ultimate goal of political violence –an expression here involving both insurrection and the corresponding state reaction— is the perpetuation, maintenance, or change of a specific social order and, hence, of the power structures and relations defining a society and the State itself.

A first element to be taken into account for this change is the end of the Cold War, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of popular democracies in East Europe. The end of the confrontation between two universal projects to which to ascribe (that not only laid a division line between States but extended to the interior of national societies) distorted the objectives and the motivations of the parties involved in the experience of the revolutionary fight. And, in the end, affected the very concepts legitimizing violence from both sides. A second element is related to the role of military dictatorships (Argentina 1976-83, Brazil 1964-1985 and Chile 1973-1990) which used repression forces and political demobilization of wide social sectors and, with different levels of effectiveness and costs, were able to disarticulate the action of urban and rural guerillas. The third and last element is the democratization process undergone by all the countries in the sub-region in the eighties. The restoration of democracies stimulated the emergence and consolidation of a political culture that is more pluralistic, more tolerant of diversity and, coupled with the mechanisms that ensure the channeling and articulation of people's demands proper of democratic systems, opened up to the participation in political life of previously excluded social players that had in the past adopted armed resistance as a means of expression.

But while the democratic regime consolidates, the globalization process and the need to reinsert countries into international economy bring about the implementation of rationalization processes which are mostly inspired in neo-liberal conceptions and focused on State reform and modernization. Until now, this was pursued through fiscal adjustment, economic deregulation and decentralization and privatization of state-run companies resulting in increased public service tariffs and unemployment. Such policies entail the aggravation of the trend towards

extended social exclusion. As stated by García Delgado (1998:163), ‘the coexistence of political stability with decreasing mobility and political inclusion with social exclusion was already evident after the transition to democracy’.

These States (which in the national history of the South Cone countries were the backbone of development through social insertion, job promotion and industrialization) are withdrawing from the social and economic scenario while fiscal crises and high foreign indebtedness rise.¹⁴ With a State moving away, the lack of protection of those people needing tools to adapt to the new system becomes evident. The management of the economic life is left in the hands of an impersonal market. Under the new doctrine, labor regulations conquered in the past become sectorial “privileges”, the access to a new level of standard of living does not only become difficult, but an important part of the population also experiences difficulties to keep their current sources of income. During the last 10 years, poverty and inequality conditions have significantly increased in the sub-region, leaving an important part of population cut off from the economic and social system (García Delgado 1998:111).¹⁵ Despite having acceptable growth rates during that period, said growth focused on some sectors of the population but it was not translated into an improved life quality of the people as a whole. Inequality in the distribution of revenues confirms the following: the highest levels of population hold most of the income.¹⁶ As another indicator shows, current unemployment rate in Argentina is 14.7% and 6.9% in Brazil, while in Chile (showing the most ordered and promising economic figures) the rate is 9.7%, going up slowly in the last three years.¹⁷

Coupled to the social exclusion picture in times of globalization, there is an increase of violence which is not political violence, as in the last decades, but *social* violence (Beck 1998:139-140)¹⁸. The relationship between social violence and exclusion is reinforced by post modern culture influence, not observing referential values and the absence of sense of reality caused, in many cases, by the introduction of drugs (Brunner 1998:40-41).¹⁹ The lack of a sense in life is worsened by --many times scandalous events-- political and economic corruption.

In this sense, this may be called social violence since it is rooted in the very conditions of the life of society, instead of being originated by the search of a change in the political order. In fact, the lack of legitimacy of politics is growing together with illegitimacy adjudicated to governments due to corruption acts and the inability to improve the quality of life of the people. The sources of this social violence can be mainly observed in three fields: the *common crime activities* (thefts, homicides), the *social conflicts*, and the *organized crime action*.

As to the increment of the common crime activity, there is an increasing concern not only in the sub region, but in the rest of the world related to public insecurity as an element which impedes the economic development and quality of life. The official acknowledgement of this problem by the Brazilian Government indicates this concern: ‘Violence has increased. This is a fact that cannot be challenged and it is distressful for the whole society. The Brazilian citizen has lately been exposed to many ways of violence such as: crimes, attacks, injuries and many other violations. (...) It is not unreasonable that crime is one of the most important concerns for

²⁰.

In a previous analysis, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998) implemented econometric patterns to find the causes of crime rates in Latin America. Results showed a correlation between inequality and crime ²¹. Another study carried out in Argentina (Paraguirre D’Elia 2000) ²², also found this relationship, mainly referring to thefts; the same has been discovered in Chile.²³ Despite economic growth in Argentina (interrupted during the last two years), Brazil, and Chile, crime has increased significantly. Public insecurity has become one of the biggest concerns in the citizens’ every day life. In this sense, so the objectivity of common violence crimes as the *perception* of citizens with respect to increased insecurity in every day environment are important factors. This perception responds to a merely subjective reality. It has to do with sensations and beliefs, general statements transmitted “word of mouth”, based on sources that, sometimes, may not be precise. Anyway, insecurity became one of the principal demands at the State level, being the latter perceived as inefficient to guarantee the rights and freedom of the country inhabitants. Consequently, more severe enforcement of criminal laws as well as more presence and participation by the police force is demanded.²⁴

Together with the increase in criminal activity, the loss of job possibilities – and therefore, of respectable living conditions—may lead to believe that the use of force may be the only alternative for those who attempt not to become outcasts in the current economic system. Social conflicts due to employment claims has become a day-after-day issue in Argentina and Brazil. The methods employed (road blockades, occupation of public spaces and properties) show a social picture of instability stir governments themselves. These start to hesitate about applying the force of the law in case of conflicts originated by legitimate claims. For the protesters, their appearing in public and their being considered in the mass media represent the hope that their claims will find a response by the government, as they have been “forced” to use such methods even if they do not wish to do so.²⁵ Coupled with this, the always latent risk of violent groups who blend in social conflicts appears as a reminder of the past history of the region.²⁶

Both common crimes and social conflicts are also linked --in the same scenario-- to other sources of violence: organized crime and even transnational crimes. Most acts of violence are associated with drug abuse; in the case of Bolivian citizens, intense social protests have taken place due to a plan --not accepted by farmers-- to eradicate coca plantations.

Transnational criminal activity has made a cruel appearance in the sub-region. In these very days, the Argentine Supreme Court is --after 9 years-- trying to investigate the bombing of the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 1992. The inability of the State to find an answer to this act of terrorism shows the weaknesses of the Argentine government to guarantee security in the event of an international terrorist attack. This is even more dramatic if we consider that two years later (July 1994) another bombing -even more cruel- was perpetrated against the main Jewish association where 86 people were killed in the center of the capital city of the country. In this latter case, the weakly-based hints resulting from the legal investigation so far have led to the presumed participation of *Policía Bonaerense* (police force of the largest Argentine province).

No country in the sub-region is free from the so-called *non-traditional threats* (or "new threats"), which challenge the state authority and exceed its capabilities. If we think of a fundamental characteristic of the State, namely the monopoly of state violence in some territory,

non-traditional threats clearly challenge this conception (Brunner 1998:116-117).²⁷ Such is the example of the Brazilian case where the actions of non-state players such as the colombian guerrilla or drug-trafficking, turn the control over the Amazonia into one of the main security concerns for political and military decision-makers to address.

These criminal forms are also related with the vulnerabilities inherent of the new --and poor-- democracies: the corruption of public employees is one of the most outstanding aspects of this issue.²⁸ While the government activity is considered by many members of the political class as one more form of personal progress than service to the people, the money from illegal activities is a temptation hard to resist. The lack of education of police forces, and the slow or absent Justice system to fight against the actions of criminal organizations also place the State in a very weak position. Even the legislation is seen as insufficient and inadequate for these types of new issues: Parliaments for years debate over bills such as the money laundry protection act, or the legal standing of "the repentant" person while several scandals also take place around them, such as the corruption charges on the Argentine Senate (2000) or on the Brazilian one (2001).²⁹

The State in the face of security threats

The existence of sources of violence in the domestic order leads to the consideration of two aspects: the issues that put at stake the normal development of the every-day life of the people (with a resulting feeling of insecurity), and the response that the State gives for the resolution of such issues. In authoritarian times, the strong control exerted by the State (even the exercise of violence itself) ensured domestic security by means of repression and fear: order was imposed through the omnipotence, free will, and impunity of the military forces and the police. In a democratic system, the guarantee of rights and freedom of citizens impose restrictions to the unlimited action of the State, which not only *controls* but also *serves* the people (Binder and Martínez 1998:13-14).³⁰

In other words, it is no longer an issue of attaining governance, but *democratic governance*. Security as a State's obligatory function continues to be one of the most sensitive and challenging issues of current times: how to match sovereignty with international community

jurisdiction? How to respond from a democratic environment to domestic security issues and those of transnational criminal phenomena?

If security refers to one of the basic instincts of human beings such as survival, the State must guarantee security as part of the maintenance of its own legitimacy. In the scenarios described so far, the South Cone States face serious challenges to their internal order that put at risk the very rationale behind the Leviatán. In the collective view, they slowly but inevitably resemble more of a sort of Gotham City than an efficient entity where citizens may go with confidence in search for a greater security. If we consider the youth of these democratic regimes, the question to be solved boils down to how long it would take for these citizens (used to authoritarian and charismatic characters who, with a "stick" would promise law and order) to ask some "masked hero" to protect them "in the middle of the night". When the lack of response by the State becomes a constant trend, the trust in the Law ends in the eyes of the citizen. Given these facts, can we think of a confrontation between a *civil* and *uncivil* society as a future scenario? Can the State prevent the society from returning to an original *state of nature*?

The State's exercise of the security function is associated to its nature of keeper of the legitimate monopoly of violence. With respect to domestic security,³¹ and given the characteristics of the previous order dominated by the national security doctrine, there has been, in the South Cone, some consensus among democratic leaders with respect to the fact that threats to domestic security may be addressed making use of police and militarized forces (such as the Carabineros, Military Police or Gendarmerie), rather than using the armed forces. In other words, the latter would be used as a last resort. This is how the risk of militarization is prevented, as well as the increase in the use of violence. This decision also takes into account the characteristics of the doctrine and training of military forces and the consequences that their performance in domestic security mission would have in terms of the de-professionalization of their specific mission.

The underlying risks of including the so called new threats in the field of defense or of requesting military intervention in police-specific issues are also perceived in terms of what the return of the military players to a significant place in the decision-making system would mean

for democratic governance, and how civil-military relations would be affected if the military were to participate in domestic security missions (Donadio 2000:29-37).³² What would mean, for instance, the irruption of armed forces in a house looking for "drug-traffickers"? The governments, which at present lead defense policies in a tangential manner, *in an peace environment that assumes a low level of military activity*, will they be able to lead the forces *within their own territory*? Can the unpopular political class resist the re-legitimization that the society will make out of the military as the only institution that can solve national problems?

At present we can see:

- A constant debate in the media among the so-called "guarantors" and the "stick policy" promoters. But, while a discussion takes place on the doctrine to be applied, few efforts are made in the parliaments and administrations to change the roots of the authoritarian (and corrupt) structures and practices of police forces or to design a more effective criminal policy. The requests for order made by the people seem to be interpreted only in the repressive aspect, while State efforts to *prevent* crimes are almost non-existent.

- The threat of repression to social conflicts as the first --and sometimes only-- response, which also feeds violence by such groups that are demanding for better conditions

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- The start of requests for the intervention of the military to restore the order, both for the control of common crimes and organized crime.³⁴

In sum, looking to the future, democratic governance in the sub-region faces a sort of dilemma: How to respond to the public demand for more public order without violating the formal framework that characterize, as a minimum, a democratic system? If the current configuration of the economic and social system is based on the existence of a mass of excluded people, and criminality and social conflicts can not be solved by a State that is quickly losing its legitimacy and that lacks economic resources, will state force guarantee the necessary order, or will it increase the level of internal conflict? Even more, if in the event of a chaotic scenario, the State runs the risk of disappearing, it is likely that it will resort to repression and, even,

militarization as a way to gain force. This would produce some risk to the reemergence of authoritarianism in a democratic culture that is still young.

CONCLUSIONS:

THE OPPORTUNITIES OF THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS PROCESS

What may integration with other countries mean for such States that envision their future plagued with dangerous forms of internal disintegration? In principle, the answer points to two possibilities: it means a merely speech-like behavior by the heads of State that does not translate into concrete policies, or an *opportunity*.

We have seen that the re-emergence of violence as a method to settle internal conflicts threatens the full development of democracy in the sub-region. It is, thus, crucial both for the success of the integration process as well as for the very survival of national social groups to find answers to the causes that generate such conflicts, preventing the State from responding with the same methodology. The *securitization*³⁵ of economic and social problems is not necessarily equivalent to a democratic governance environment. Although the different manifestations of violence that increase the demand for security seem to call for the implementation of a greater degree of coercion, actions such as the prolonged suspension of individual guarantees, mass repression to face social conflicts, the violation of human rights, the deterioration of the rule of law, the granting of more powers to a suspected police, or even the inclusion of the military in such scenarios do not seem to be the best idea to consolidate the democratization of the political culture. Even more, the militarization of conflicts such as those caused by transnational crime may result in the de-professionalization of the military and in problems with civil-military relations, not to mention what role would be played by a police force or a military force whose members live in the same conditions of those they are required to repress.³⁶

Over the last decades, the South Cone has made considerable progress in terms of democratization. This is shown by the presidential and parliamentary electoral changes and the efforts of countries to be inserted in the international scenario in terms of foreign policy. This has made an isolated sub-region an example of democracy to be followed in Latin America. Not

only did the causes of possible international conflicts disappear, but an active role was also played in the settlement of other conflicts such as the Central American one (where the Contadora Group had an obvious role and paved the way to the Rio Group creation) or the war between Ecuador and Peru, where these countries efforts as guarantors stopped and pacified the conflict. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have also supported the efforts made by the international community to attain an environment of peace and security through the participation of national armed forces in peace-keeping missions under UN auspices.

The South Cone as a zone of peace and democracy has been an achievement of each country's societies. These were societies that had gone through a cruel internal war and then recovered the value of democracy as a method for their political life. Although the task of revitalizing the democratic institutional tissue has been complex, an interesting process of civil society protagonism is underway. Specifically in the field of security, this translates into the replacement of the object it should serve: human security (some called it public security); meaning not placing the object of security on the State but rather on the *individual*.³⁷ Therefore, in this view, the function of the State does not only comprise providing external and internal security to face the threat of the use of force, but also to ensure appropriate living conditions for the people (García Pelayo 1982:29).³⁸

Thanks to the political definitions adopted from its inception, the Summit of the Americas represents an opportunity for the countries of the sub-region. Starting with the key concepts of *democracy*, *development* and *human security*, it unifies into one single statement the horizon that the South Cone nations wish to reach.³⁹ However, looking towards a medium and long term scenario where the sub-region would be an active part of this process, three factors should be addressed and supported:

- *The role of the international community* (in this case, the hemispheric community): such as in the 1980's, the close look of the international community helped young democracies remain in place, the look and push that this community may provide so that Governments may actually work towards the elimination of corruption and the improvement of the life of their people may become a relevant factor. This applies mainly

to the role that organizations like the OAS, or even the most developed democracies of the hemisphere may play, including --in the United States case-- the control it may exert on corruption of its own national companies.⁴⁰ Also specifically in the case of the United States, it would assume overcoming internal government contradictions tending towards ending invitations to militarize certain functions of domestic security, and to provide an appropriate political framework for the discussion of the problem of foreign debt and trade relations, which are key issues for the economies of the sub-region.

- *The role of civil society.* This assumes the creation and maintenance of civil society institutions (such as NGO's) that may provide a place for support and supplementation to such areas where the State may have weaknesses. In the field of domestic security, both the States and international organizations and foundations can provide the economic support these organizations need to accomplish their task. In this sense, there is still a long way to go in the south cone nations with respect to the strengthening of civil society institutions.⁴¹

- *The role of leaders:* as in the history of these countries, the leading classes elaborated a project for the country that drove national development, at present (considering the re-foundation implied in the return of consolidated democratic systems), it is fair to anticipate the emergence of a protagonic attitude of leaders. The shift from authoritarianism to democracy, from the omnipresent State to the minimum State, from the Cold War to the current international environment including globalization, and from societies that would accept any order imposed to it to societies that actually oversee actions, assumes challenges relating to the change of culture and design of strategies for the leaders, so that they may be up to the role to be played (Ferrer 1997:50-51)⁴². It is important to carry out programs to train the leaders and to have a continuous exchange of ideas, which can be provided by other countries with more democratic experience.

Under the present conditions, it is hard to imagine the sub-region in the face of the process of integration under way. Sustaining internal governance means actively working in order to ensure a zone of peace and stability capable of attracting investments and generating economic

wealth, whose results may act as a benefit for the majority of the people. Both the weakness of the State to address such forms of organized crime such as the violence derived from social exclusion offer an ominous perspective. The sub-region has lived previous times in which violence was the method chosen to settle conflicts. In this sense, it is fair to expect that the push given by the highly developed democracies may help to do away with the ghost of internal confrontation or social chaos, understanding that such a scenario may carry forward security consequences even to other sub-regions in the western hemisphere (the Colombian case has been an example of this). External and internal peace is a value for the entire region and not only for those who are mostly affected.

If the statements of the Summit of the Americas are truly practices by the countries involved, this will be an opportunity for our countries, so that future generations may achieve the goal: a consolidated democracy that may bring together political freedom, economic dignity and peaceful environment as key values of their way of life.

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END NOTES

¹ The expression Southern Cone is understood as the subregion including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay; or in other words, Mercosur + Bolivia and Chile. The agenda of this subregion, in many respects, does not have significant differences with respect to the rest of Latin America with the issue of preserving democratic institutions, the insertion of the economy in the global system, as two of the main ones. However, more specifically from the viewpoint of strategic security, the subregion has two particular characteristics, the first being the strategic irrelevance of the subregion in the global context and the second, the search for a new model of civil-military relations, clearly differentiated from the countries of the Andean subregion, where there is a stronger presence of the armed forces as key players in the political, economic and social system, still legitimized by the rest of the system players.

² 'Starting with these fictions on the nature and scope of economic and financial links that presently prevail in the world order, there is now a fundamentalist view of globalization. This suggests that the dilemma of development in a global world has disappeared for a simple reason: that main decisions today are not adopted by the societies and their states but by transnational agents.

'The message is, thus, a clear one: the only thing that can be presently done is to adopt friendly policies to attract markets. What are those policies, though? Such that serve dominant interests. These include openness of the economy, deregulation of real and financial markets, shrinking of the State to the minimum functions of security and law and order, fiscal balance, and price stability. (...)

'At present, the fundamentalist perspective of globalization also suggest the existence of a natural order that should be based –literally-- on the power structure of contemporary world order. This is the return of absolute power and discretionism but, in this case, not of monarchies but of markets.

'The fundamentalist view also influences the current debate on democracy's governance. If the power is actually on the markets, it is a question of making democracies generate friendly policies for the markets. Lack of governance would then consist of the resistance by societies and political systems to ratify the decision of the markets. Whenever they do not succeed, they can no longer have governance.' (Ferrer 1997:24-27).

³ In this case, the theory of Gary Becker –awarded with the Nobel Prize- seems to be confirmed in relation to the following statement: 'some individuals become criminals because of the financial and other rewards from crime compared to legal work, taking account of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity of punishment' (Fajnzylber P., Lederman D., and Loayza N. 1998:3).

⁴ Max Weber's has been used as the classical definition: 'the State is the human community which, within a certain territory --the concept of "territory" being of the essence of the definition-- claims for itself (successfully) the monopoly of legitimate physical co-action.' (Weber 1922:1056). Close to it, is David Held's definition, who said 'I understand sovereignty to be the political authority of a community that has the recognized right to exercise the powers of the State and determine the rules, regulations and measures within a territory.' (Held 1997:129).

⁵ 'The State crisis is evidenced by an essential aspect, its sovereignty. The State's loss of control over the regulation of essential aspects of the international economy is causing a change in the political-economic configurations of power (...)' (Rojas Aravena 2000:17).

⁶ 'Unless the societies in question are willing to adjust both thought and action to the rapidly changing new realities, they are likely to reach the point where they will no longer be capable of employing organized violence at all. Once this situation comes about, their continued survival as cohesive political entities will also be put in doubt'. (Van Creveld 1991:ix).

⁷ Starting in 1986, Argentina and Brazil began to make some movements towards a future integration, raising the issue of increasing bilateral trade and implementing joint industrial modernization, through the agreement for Argentine-Brazilian integration signed on July 29.

⁸ As a block, MERCOSUR has signed free trade agreements with Chile (1996) and Bolivia (1997); a master agreement for interregional partnership, cooperation and political coordination with the European Union (1995) and agreements with the Andean Community and the Central American Common Market.

⁹ In May 2001, the differences inside the Argentine Government became public. While the Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo was in Washington stating his support to the idea of conducting bilateral negotiations with the United States, towards the entrance of Argentina to the FTAA, Foreign Minister Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini was trying to convince Brazil that Argentina was still committed to Mercosur. See for example 'Le bajan el tono a un debate', Diario Clarín May 9 2001. Available from <http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2001-05-09/e-01802.htm>

¹⁰ In 1978, Argentina and Chile were on the brink of war owing to differences in their border demarcation. Argentine troops had already been deployed to the border zone when the Pope's involvement prevented the conflict from starting. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, the conflict over Corpus Itaipú dam de-escalated before reaching a deployment stage, but strongly marked the perception of enmity that both countries had.

¹¹ For example, in a visit made last year to Argentina, the current Chilean president Ricardo Lagos proposed the creation of a "strategic alliance" between both nations and reinforced the idea that 'Only together shall we be able to meet this third challenge, namely the new economy and the new characteristics of technological advancement'. See 'De La Rúa y Lagos cambiaron medallas y ratificaron su alianza', Diario Clarín May 19 2000, 6. Also, as way of example, it is worth mentioning these remarks of Brazilian President Fernando H. Cardoso:

'The agenda of the Brazilian diplomacy is the national interest and, today, the national interest boils down to one key word: development, understood not only as an economic process but also as a way of growth that includes democracy and social justice as basic elements (...). If Brazil were a small country with border problems, lying in a conflictive area of the world, with ethnic rivalries, with problems of refugees, its agenda would undoubtedly be a different one. But it is not. It is a big country with a large population and no border disputes, no ethnic rivalries and located in a region that is probably the most peaceful of the world (...) This does not mean that Brazil may not have a security agenda, not only in the military area but also in terms of diplomacy, especially on issues such as drug-trafficking and organized crime. However, the relatively comfortable situation that characterizes the country in political and security matters supports the fact that its diplomatic resources may be focused primarily on the fundamental aim I mentioned above: the promotion of better conditions for development, democracy and social justice. For this reason Brazil has been building a more modern and rational insertion of the country in the international order." In the same conference, held at the Rio Branco Institute (Brazilian diplomatic school), three of the main elements of this "rational insertion" of Brazil are made clear:

'In the first place, the strengthening and expansion of Mercosur, a project that goes well beyond the merely commercial aspect. In a recent conversation with the president of Argentina, both heads of state explored the viability of building a "small Maastricht". (...)

'In the second place, it highlights the construction of an integrated area of peace, democracy and prosperity in South America and, in this context, the strategic alliance with Argentina, the building of a closer relation with the Andean countries, the settlement of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute, the defense of democracy (the overcoming of the institutional crisis in Paraguay), among other relevant elements (...) the main task of the Brazilian diplomacy is that of strengthening --on a continuous basis-- our South American space. This means deepening and expanding Mercosur, the starting point for our regional and hemispheric insertion, aside from consolidating the alliance with Argentina and developing bonds with Bolivia and Chile (...). This also means to advance in the negotiations with the Andean Community (...).' (Cardoso 2000:244-245).

¹² At the Mercosur Summit organized by the Davos Forum in Buenos Aires in May 2001, the differences over tariffs surfaced notoriously. One of the main Argentine newspapers covered the issue as follows: 'By mid 90's, Mercosur attracted huge interest (political, commercial, academic) in the entire world. But now, six years later, **its glow has faded** (...) The strained relationship between strong members Argentina and Brazil over successive devaluations of the Real revealed during the meeting; the verbal darts exchanged between Minister Domingo Cavallo and Brazilian officials, different stances towards the FTAA and, over all, the **economic problems faced by Argentina**, in particular, and Brazil slowed down the rhythm of integration and this transpired during the meeting'. See 'El Mercosur no entusiasma tanto como hace seis

años', Diario Clarín May 23 2001. Available from <http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2001-05-23/e-01901.htm>.

¹³ There is plenty of bibliography as regards the transformation of the strategic security environment in the South Cone. See, for instance papers presented during the III National Meeting on Strategic Studies held in October 2000 in Argentina, available from <http://www.enee.ser2000.org.ar/>

¹⁴ As regards Argentina, Brazil and Chile, basically the State played a key role in national development, leading these countries out of a agricultural state to industrialization ; and using the armed forces as well as the education system to unite the population scattered throughout the territory. This process was better observed during the 1920s and 1960s, when, by the State action, the basis for the industrialization process as well as for the social system providing labor protection were established. Dictatorships –particularly in Argentina- reverted the industrialization process and based their economic policy on indiscriminately incurring in foreign debts.

¹⁵ *'In social terms*, this is where it reveals its main weaknesses compared to other member states of the MERCOSUR, due to its increasing social differences and declining distribution of income, not as a result of the effect of regional integration but as part of the effect of the unlimited openness to the outside. These differences are a particular force in Brazil, but are also very pronounced in Argentina, which came from a tradition of a more equal society. These forces are also present in Chile regardless of the success of their economic policies. The truth is that, from all those regions continentally expanded, Latin America is the one that paid the least attention to the matter. Therefore, the social part of integration (incorporating unemployment issues, the young and poor people, depressed geographical areas, workers circulation, human rights, matters relating to health, education, etc), "the social MERCOSUR". The truth is that so far little or nothing has been done about it'. (García Delgado 1998:111).

¹⁶ According to the data given by the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2000 of the World Bank, in Brazil the share percentage in the income corresponding to the highest 20% of the population is of 63%, while the lower 20% only earns 2.6%. As regards Chile, values are 61% and 31.5% respectively; and for Argentina, 50.3% and 4.4%.

¹⁷ For all these cases, official figures were given. As regards Chile, time series can be consulted at http://www.bcentral.cl/Indicadores/frames/Empleo_desocupacion_INE_frame.htm

¹⁸ 'Poverty is changing the quality of these cruel processes which range from inclusion to segregation: they increase alarmingly and cause fragmentation in various ways. Quoting Zygmunt Bauman, social communication between the wealthy who globalize and the poor who localize threatens to break because between the globalization winners, at the top, and globalization losers, at the bottom, there are no longer spaces where to fight for justice and equity. 'At the same time, those excluded –unlike the XIX and early XX century proletariat-- have lost their pertinent area of power as if they are no longer needed. They are only left with the tool of violence to show how terrible their situation is'. (Beck 1998:139-140).

¹⁹ 'The available technologies and sciences they are based on have changed for ever our representation in the world and our way to interact in it, though at the expense of destroying our certainties and leaving us submerged in a state of confusion. Paradoxically, knowledge has made us more instead of less insecure. In addition, contemporary fears derive from observing around us as a result of demographic pressure, knowledge applied to production and the irresistible advance of modernity. (...) Cities will continue growing, urban suburbs will be more populated, massive transfer within and between countries will tend to increase. All this produces fear and insecurity and may lead to barbarian's arrival, violence in the (Brunner 1998:40-41).

²⁰ Government of Brazil, 2000. Plano Nacional de Segurança Pública. Brasília: Government of Brazil, 17.

²¹ 'Some of the interesting results are the following: Greater inequality is associated with higher intentional homicide and robbery rates, but the level of income per capita is not a significant determinant of national crime rates. (...) Drug production and drug possession are both significantly associated with higher crime rates. Regarding dynamic effects, we find that the homicide rate rises during periods of low economic activity.' (Fajnzylber P., Lederman D., and Loayza N. 1998:2).

Iparaguirre D'Elia 2000).

²³ 'A poll made two years ago to young people involved in legal proceedings points out that 50% of such people had not completed elementary school. Among the reasons given to drop out school, they mentioned: discipline problems, lack of interest and economic problems. Before getting in trouble with the law, about 80% indicated to have developed some kind of economic activity such as: machine shop apprentice, industrial cleaner, worker, car guard, carton collector, bus "toad", junior, auxiliary assistant, seller on streets, freighter and loader. Such activities were abandoned because they did not earn enough so as to meet their needs (...).

'This group of criminals usually perpetrate crimes against properties. In fact, half of these people are involved in thefts by using force and violence. Through this kind of crimes, they get money easily so as to have access to consumer goods: clothes (sport shoes, brand jeans and leather jackets, etc), drugs, alcohol and entertainment (video games and pool)'. See 'Delincuencia juvenil aumenta por desempleo' Diario La Tercera July 17 2000. In the same note, quoting a study by Fundación Paz Ciudadana, it is also mentioned that 'The economist of U. Católica, Roberto García – who, in 1995 released the investigation *Robo y Delincuencia de Paz Ciudadana* – confirms that the unemployment rate would have a positive impact on

²⁴ In the Argentina case, recent polls indicate that 8 of each 10 citizens fear to be assaulted in Buenos Aires (the capital city). See 'Las Cifras Oficiales del Delito', Diario Clarín May 22 2001. Available from <http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2001-05-22/s-03101.htm>

²⁵ In Argentina, for instance, during the conflict originated by the crisis and possible bankruptcy of the national airline which was privatized in the 90's (Aerolíneas Argentinas), workers cut off the operation of the international airport. Some days before, in the suburbs of Buenos Aires city, roads had been blocked claiming for job possibilities. On a TV show, the protesting union head and " Santillán (Head of road picketing in provinces) manifested that such action was the only way to show their discontent by at least making their claims public. When they were asked if violence was the best means to solve the conflict or if restrictions should be imposed on social protests, union members of Aerolíneas Argentinas responded that company members intolerance left them no other choice. In the meantime, the CTA Head asked the following: When restrictions shall be imposed on the economic groups' voracity and corruption acts by which misappropriation of funds take place in the State resources? TV Show: Hora Clave, Channel 9, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 14 2001.

In Brazil, one of the main expressions of the social conflict is that headed by the *Movimiento de Trabajadores sin Tierra*, which, for more than six years has been claiming an agricultural reform. In their last action, they occupied the land of the Senate President. See 'MST volta a invadir fazenda de Jader no Folha de Sao Paulo June 14 2001.

²⁶ So far, these are only unofficial versions stating the insertion of possible subversion groups and even, the Colombian guerrilla participation in the conflicts taking place in North Argentina.

²⁷ 'Basically, the modern State is a bureaucratic control and coordination mechanism supported by the monopoly of force and the national ideology expressed through it. When confronted with globalization challenges, this same concept and such design are insufficient and, therefore, challenged. Control and coordination bureaucratic procedures (...) are now ineffective to deal with off-territory phenomena such as international market economy, drug trafficking, global communication, environmental threats and global wealth distribution. The same situation is faced by the state within its local communities, which are subjected to the pressures exerted by de-traditionalism processes and by an increasing fragmentation and privatization in the market arena.' (Brunner 1998:116-117)

²⁸ This concept is adopted, for instance, by the Public Security Plan launched by the Brazilian government in 2000. Among other things, it states the following: 'One of the main reasons for the rise in crime levels in Brazil lies is the growth of organized crime and drug-trafficking. (...) The criminal organizations involved in this kind of activities have a significant economic power which enables them to make others fall to corruption, posing a serious threat to society and democratic institutions' (Government of Brazil 2000:17).

²⁹ In relation to the Argentine Senate, the country's Vice-president at the time submitted his resignation based on the argument that the (*his*) government was not working forcefully enough to resolve the issue of the alleged bribes paid to senators for approving a Labor Reform Bill. In Brazil, one of the most important political leaders, Senator Antonio Magalhaes, had to resign in May 2001 in the midst of a political crisis. He and another senator were accused of having violated the parliamentary vote secrecy by trying to find out what other parliamentary members had voted.

³⁰ Today, the domestic security issue is again a key matter in the agenda of the countries in the region, after some relative decline at the beginning of the democratic transition. As an issue deeply rooted in public debate, this matter brings together two main elements: the perception of domestic unrest and a sense of public insecurity, and the consequent demand for security on the one hand, and the need to establish effective controls over security forces within the democratic framework. This does not only take place within the national reality framework but also within the transnationalization context and the increase of international relations giving way to new modalities. This exerts permanent pressure on two elements to be considered in the dynamics of the democratic system: maintaining some level –objective and subjective- of public order (...) and the respect for the exercise of human rights'. (Binder and Martínez 1998:13-14).

³¹ In the so-called national security doctrine in effect in Latin America during the Cold War, national security was conceptually compared to national defense. Therefore, the armed forces were the natural instrument in charge of providing security. The object of security was not only to prevent external threats, but also to control all aspects of the social life spectrum to prevent threats to "the order" posed by communism. So, the militarization of social life as well as national security prevailed over individual security.

³² In March this year, the Army's Secretary General in Argentina met with the Head of the Labor Union that opposes to the government for a barbecue in private to discuss the "possible social turmoil" about which the Army was so worried about. Later on, the government denied the existence of such a concern but did not deny that such meeting had been held. See 'Asado con los militares en el sindicato de camioneros', Diario Clarín May 29 2001. Available from <http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2001-05-29/I-02201.htm>.

³³ In Argentina, there have been seven deaths as a consequence of violence during these social protests in the last five years.

³⁴ The possible involvement of the Latin American armed forces in the fight against the "new threats" (mainly the fight against drug-trafficking) is a reason for constant debate in the region for less than a decade now. In Brazil, this has already happened in 1995 during the so-called Rio Operation. With respect to criminality, in Argentina there has been in the course of this year an express request by citizens of a major city (Bahia Blanca) for the Army to take over the control of common crimes there. In Brazil, another significant event has been the sending of the Army to control a police revolt motivated by salary claims in May this year. See 'Envían el ejército a sofocar una rebelión policial en el norte de Brasil', _____ May 29 2001. Available from <http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2001-05-29/I-02201.htm>

³⁵ We understand by this a process through which a problem or an issue becomes the object of security that the State should guarantee with its available means of force. The limits between public and national security concept are not clear; in fact, the international academic community has devoted many years to discuss this matter and no acceptable conclusion was drawn. If the security concept should be extended to include all life conditions, it will continue to be part of the discussion. In the meantime, we consider that the relationship between democratic governance and security is based on the use of physical force the State has (namely, the armed forces, the militarized forces and the police). Therefore we understand that public security must be guaranteed by the State, making use of the instruments appropriate to each level of security. In the case of the economic dimension of security, the State should do it through the implementation of measures guaranteeing, among other things, free access to basic commodities to lead a decent life.

³⁶ Low salaries available for the Forces under the State may lead not only to a situation where many of its members must resort to other jobs, but also to corruption as a means for them to improve their income.

³⁷ See the following interesting definition of citizen security stated by the Government of Chile: ‘the set of social, political, economic, cultural and institutional conditions that ensure the appropriate and normal operation of the community and citizens’s life. In sum, this is about guaranteeing a dignified life for all
Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio del Interior, Dirección de Seguridad Pública e Informaciones, 1995. Seguridad Ciudadana, Democracia y Participación. Santiago de Chile: Gobierno de Chile, 16.

³⁸ ‘The defense of the national society used to focus on the external and internal defense against crimes and subversion. Today, we should add defense against contingencies and global economic needs, environmental deterioration, natural resources depletion, against the generation and growth of antagonisms inside society, etc’. (García Pelayo 1982:29).

³⁹ ‘We reaffirm our commitment to maintain peace and security through the effective use of hemispheric means for the peaceful resolution of disputes and the adoption of confidence- and security-building measures. (...)We reaffirm that the constitutional subordination of armed forces and security forces to the legally constituted civilian authorities of our countries, as well as respect for the rule of law on the part of all national institutions and sectors of society, are fundamental to democracy. (...)We reiterate our commitment to combat new, multi-dimensional threats to the security of our societies. Foremost amongst these threats are the global drug problem and related crimes, the illicit traffic in and criminal use of firearms, the growing danger posed by organized crime and the general problem of violence in our societies. Acknowledging that corruption undermines core democratic values, challenges political stability and economic growth and thus threatens vital interests in our Hemisphere, we pledge to reinvigorate our fight against corruption. We also recognize the need to improve the conditions for human security in the Hemisphere.’ Third Summit of the Americas, April 22 2001, Declaration of Quebec City.

⁴⁰ Two worthy examples: in the most astounding case in recent times, a parliamentary Committee in Argentina is investigating cases of money laundering in the country with hints indicating that Citibank may be directly involved. A previous case, IBM was related to bribes paid to certain Argentine Government officials.

⁴¹ The number of NGOs related to security issues not only in the sub region but all across Latin America is very small. We do observe more activities in the academic and university fields.

⁴² ‘The resolution of the development dilemma in a global world rests on the exercise of freedom to act that each country has. The fact that such freedom may lead countries to unconditionally accept the established rules of the game, adopt non-feasible measures or initiate alternative directions of self-centered and open development is more dependant on internal factors than on external restrictions. Such factors include the size of the territory and population, political and cultural traditions, the cohesion of society and the quality of the elites leadership’ (Ferrer 1997:50-51).