Human Security in The Global Era

Kyle Grayson

Introduction[1]

The end of the Cold War has forced us to rethink state security.Nowhere is this more apparent than in the relationship with human well being. Public authorities now are starting to acknowledge that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development, and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament (Axworthy 1997: 184). With the 'clear and present dangers' of the Cold War no longer possessing its former rhetorical power, the national interest is no longer as effective in justifying actions that are driven by Machiavellian and Hobbesian imperatives. While one cannot deny that there may have been other reasons than the high politics of humanitarianism, missions to the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia, and East Timor do reflect a profound change in the security outlook for many states of the world. Security is beginning to be reconceptualized both above the state as international security and below as human security. Many medium-sized countries like Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland are attempting to meet these challenges by being at the forefront of the human security movement. A people-centred conception of security provides the best opportunity for the generation of a new kind of public good.

This paper will argue that if public goods theory is going to be coherent, it needs to be rethought in a political, rather than economic, framework that stresses demands

by citizens/groups and supply by political institutions. At the same time, it will be demonstrated that viewing public goods in this manner will have fundamental consequences for how we understand human security.

Although a strong case for human security as a public good is presented, it still must be acknowledged that many obstacles exist in the way of broadening the security agenda to encompass an expanded and meaningful notion of human rights. The next section will outline some of these challenges: including who should provide the bulk of the resources and services needed if human security is to become a global reality in the post-Washington consensus era, overcoming the problems of cooperation in the international arena, the potential reordering of the international system, globalization, and establishing new international norms.

The case will be made that the provision of human security will involve an ever-changing mixture of ‘public’ (i.e., the state) and ‘private’ (e.g., non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations), depending on the time and place. Therefore, the global public domain, best represented in this instance as the area both between and interlinked to the state, market, and civil society, will be the site where many of these issues are discussed, debated, and ultimately resolved.

The final section contends that human security is here to stay. Despite concerns that the combination of being proactive and concentrating on the well being of individuals will erode state sovereignty, human security and the state are not necessarily antithetical. Although an increasing number of other actors will be involved, strong states will be needed in order to provide the essential public goods required for human security to be fully realized at a global level.

The Transformation of Security: from States to People

Although human security has been a term bandied about in discussions of security during most of the post-Cold War era, the *United Nations Development Report,* 1994 is regarded as the venue, which introduced human security and its allocative spirit. The UNDP definition of human security is broad and far-reaching. In retrospect, it best reflects a call for a change in thinking, rather than a practical plan for the implementation of human security and its underlying principles in international affairs. While the UNDP articulation has been called 'unwieldy' by some, it provides the most ambitious reconceptualization of what human security might come to be in the global era.

In the *United Nations Development Report,* human security is distinguished from traditional security in five key ways. First, rather than being a concern with weapons, human security is tied to *notions of human life and dignity.* Second unlike traditional security which was bounded by the borders of individual states, human security is presented as a universal concern *unconstrained by territorial borders*. Most threats, which endanger human security are common to most people, although it is acknowledged that the intensity of the threat may differ. Third, it is argued that all of the components of human security are *interdependent.* Different threats to human security are related, mutually enforcing, and likely to have global repercussions. Fourth, the provision of human security is thought to be much easier to achieve through *early prevention* rather than through intervention at later stages. Finally, unlike realist security, which is state-centered, human security focuses on *individuals* (UNDP 1995: 229).

The converse to human security is human insecurity and can be equated with extreme vulnerability to conflict, violence, environmental degradation, and perhaps

even market forces (Suhrke 1999). More importantly, Caroline Thomas has asserted that human insecurity should be viewed not as the result of an '...inevitable occurrence but as the result of existing structures of power that determine who enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not' (Thomas 1999: 4). These structures can be local, national, or international. They may be economic, social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or military in nature.

As a result of this new thinking on human (in)security and the vulnerability of common people, it is now acknowledged that the modern state has often used its monopoly of force and power to deny the rights and appropriate the resources of its citizens (MacFarlane and Weiss 1994: 279).[2] In other words, through the pursuit of national security, it is now accepted that states can degrade the security of their own citizens (MacFarlane Weiss 1994: 279). Of course a 'people-centred' view of security does not demand that the state be absent from security discussions or be seen as necessarily in opposition to human security. In many third world countries, the collapse of the state itself, and with it, the institutions of civil society has become an acute part of the problem (Osler Hampson and Oliver 1998: 385)

Some countries, such as Canada, have emphasized this point repeatedly in its literature devoted to human security. It argues that the 'security of states is essential, but not sufficient, to ensure the safety of individuals' (Heinbecker 1999:1).

A Definitional Quandary: Human Development or Human Security?

More broadly, human security as envisioned in the *United Nations Development Report* 1994, is made up of seven key elements. These include economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (i.e., human rights) (UNDP 1995: 230-234). As a result of the

components, which comprise human security, six issues have been labeled as the major threats of the next century. They included unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities (both within and between states), migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and international terrorism (UNDP 1995: 234-236). The UNDP argues that in order for these threats to be dealt with effectively, both individual states affected by these problems and the international community, as a whole must be willing to respond.

From the UNDP perspective, human security demands that the freedom of the individual to live and exercise choices should be prioritized over the state's acquisition of power in the international arena. Accordingly, the UNDP asserts that human security requires that 'people can exercise their choices freely and that they can be confident in the knowledge that today's opportunities will not be lost tomorrow' (UNDP 1995: 230). This of course means that human security must engage itself in processes of democratization at all levels from the local to the global (Thomas 1999: 4). Human security is then also inextricably tied to human development which is all about widening the spectrum of choices that people will have the opportunity to make decisions on (UNDP 1995: 230).

States must provide the opportunities for individuals to develop their own capacities especially with the help of effective educational and health services. They were to ensure that economic growth is broadly based so that everyone has access to increased economic opportunities and to design programs that allow all sections of society to gain but give weaker groups proportionately more (UNDP 1995: 236). The World Bank had also championed such policy prescriptions in order to promote development (World Bank 1997). Therefore, in tandem, from the UNDP perspective, human security and human development envision a world where people will be able to take care of themselves, have the opportunity to at least meet their most basic needs,

and to be able to earn their own living.

The inclusion of the development dimension of human security by the UNDP has not been completely endorsed by members of the human security vanguard. These states have been very wary of the UNDP's explicit blurring of human security and human development because the lack of clarity impedes the kind of analytical precision required for foreign policy decision-making.[3] For instance, Canada has been quick to try and distinguish these two concepts while recognizing that they are related and mutually reinforcing. In the latest outline of human security offered by the Canadian government, human security has been defined as 'freedom from fear' and human development has been defined as 'freedom from want' (Axworthy 1999: 7).

Refocusing the Debate

Canada has also tried to emphasize the practical policy side of human security by arguing that 'the litmus test for framing an issue in human security terms is the degree to which the safety of people is at risk' (Axworthy 1999: 5). Therefore, where a UNDP vision of human security might argue that a lack of primary education facilities in a region is an issue of human security, the Canadian government would be very unlikely to do so. Instead, there has been a considerable effort to focus attention on human security issues directly tied to the use of force, especially in instances where it directly affects civilians. Therefore, middle powers such as Canada and Norway have been active in the areas of small arms control, children in armed conflict, gender dimensions in peace-building, land mines, and the establishment of an effective International Criminal Court to investigate war crimes.[4]

Given these two versions of human security, what form should human security be taking? In my opinion, the UNDP version of human security is too broad and reflects

many elements that would be best assumed under the rubric of human development; however, at the same time, the Canadian version sells itself far too short. If human security is the freedom from fear, it has to be acknowledged that there are fear inducing phenomenon in the global age that do not necessarily stem from violent conflict. Foremost among these is the spread and establishment of unregulated global markets. Although the spread of markets has created a great deal of wealth, it has also produced profoundly terrifying side-effects for many people of the world including astounding human rights violations of workers and those opposed to unregulated markets (e.g., the murder of Ken Saro Wiwa, a Nigerian activist critical of Shell Oil). Another serious threat is environmental degradation, which may not only threaten a people's livelihood, but also their culture (e.g., indigenous groups in the Amazon). Known as 'social dumping', these fears are generated by the deliberate practice of reducing labour and environmental standards in order to attract foreign corporations. (Stanford et al 1993: 1)

For this vision of human security to be viable, the international community must be prepared to endorse the concept. It needs to make full contributions to human security, maintain group solidarity in crises, demand that all countries adopt policy measures for human security, develop new networks of global and regional cooperation, increase preventive diplomacy efforts, and redesign existing global and regional institutions in order to make them better able to deal with the challenges at hand (UNDP 1995: 236). None of this is easy to accomplish yet; it is hoped that a fresh perspective on public goods may offer potential solutions to the challenge of ensuring the viability of human security.

Public Goods: the Search for a New Theory

Like security in international relations, public goods in economics are a powerful theoretical concept with a long history and much baggage. Unfortunately, the way that public goods have been theorized in mainstream economics (i.e., neo-liberal economics) is both strange and confusing. First, the language used is arcane and limited. Second, public goods are seen as an aberration rather than as a 'natural' result of social living. Third, the criteria required for a good to be considered public are highly unrealistic and analytically imprecise. Therefore, a new theory of public goods is needed, one that is able to break free of its neo-liberal prison. It will be argued that public goods should be thought of as the result of political factors rather than market conditions; however the economic criteria can be saved if they become normative rather than descriptive. From rethinking how we view public goods, potential sources for solutions to ensuring the viability of human security will be revealed.

Public goods are not a new concept in economics. Early liberals like Adam Smith who promoted the merits of laissez-faire capitalism were also faced with the problem of being able to account for why the market might not be able to supply efficiently and effectively every good needed for the well-functioning of society. Smith recognized that government intervention and provision were needed in a number of select areas including the establishment of a justice system, the enactment and enforcement of laws, protection against invasion (i.e., realist security), and the provision of schools and other public goods (Cornes and Sandler 1986: 3). The legacy of viewing public goods as a failure of the market has stunted public goods theory to this day (See Kaul this volume.

Early liberals like Smith failed to understand that public goods historically predated the capitalist market system. For example in Rome, aqueducts and

bathhouses were public goods often constructed and financed by the state for the use/benefit of citizens. By assuming the universality of their ‘Leviathanesque’ conception of markets, neo-liberals continue to view public goods as a symbol of the failure of markets to encompass every area of economic and social activity (Foldvary 1994: 1). The important question according to mainstream economics is what are the necessary conditions for market failure and how do they encourage the production of public goods rather than the more logical question of how have markets taken over the provision of so many goods and services?

Private goods in mainstream economics are not problematic because they exhibit the characteristics of ‘excludability’ and ‘rivalness/competitive consumption’, which allows them to be demanded and supplied through market mechanisms. ‘Excludability’ refers to the requisite conditions that allow a producer to prevent others from consuming a good or service whether it is a monetary barrier such as price or some kind of physical barrier. ‘Rivalness/competitive consumption’ signifies the normal market situation where one person's consumption of a good or service necessarily reduces the possible consumption available for another of the same good or service. In other words, ‘rivalness/competitive consumption’ is a term that denotes the causes of scarcity from the demand side of the market equation. Thus, to have a public good, one must have open and continual access, a trait that economists have failed to acknowledge.

The unproblematic nature of private goods for economics hides a very important fact; while private goods are consumed by individuals they are produced within social communities and therefore are inextricably embedded within community structures and relationships. The downplaying of the social in economics, which allows for the assumption of atomistic producers, gives the misleading impression that private goods are more private than really is the case.

Like private goods, economics has declared that public goods have two defining characteristics. Not surprisingly, in contrast to private goods, these characteristics are ‘non-excludability’ and ‘non-rivalness’. It is these two conditions that contribute to market failure. But the real story of public goods is not the conditions necessary for the occurrence of market failure but the more illusive story of how public goods may be created in these situations.

The first characteristic of public goods, non-excludability, which will be renamed ‘inclusiveness’ for this paper, refers to the inability of a producer to prevent people from consuming a good. For example, fresh air would be an inclusive good in that it would be extremely difficult for a firm to charge for its consumption and prevent those who would not pay from breathing air.

Non-rivalness, the second characteristic of public goods which will be called ‘cooperative consumption’ in this paper, refers to the fact that consumption of the good by an individual will not necessarily reduce the quantity or the utility of the good available for others. In other words, cooperative consumption will not necessarily create scarcity. The classic cooperative consumption example used by mainstream economics is a lighthouse because many ships can use it as a beacon without decreasing the ability of other ships to ‘consume’ its service.

According to economics, goods that are inclusive and exhibit cooperative consumption will cause private producers to either under produce them (the soft hypothesis) or not produce them at all (the strong hypothesis) because there will be too little a return (if any) on investment due to free-riders who are those who consume without contributing to production.[5] Often underpinning this assessment is a large reliance on the tenets of game theory with its assumption of self-interested rational actors within an anarchical economic realm.

The Three Flaws of Economic Public Goods Theory

There are three major flaws with theorizing public goods in the economic manner outlined above. First is that perfect inclusiveness and cooperative consumption do not exist in real world situations. As has been implicitly argued above, goods and services tend to have a mix of private and public characteristics whose manifestation depends on the situation in which they are being demanded and supplied (Auld and Eden, 1991).

The private-public split based on the characteristics of inclusiveness and cooperative consumption represents a false dichotomy. A good/service that is largely privately provided in one country like health care in the United States may also be publicly provided in another country as is the case in Canada and the United Kingdom. Moreover, even if a good is publicly provided, there may be private elements within its provision like in Canada where health care is publicly provided but prescription medications must be paid for.

Figure One shows not only the evolution of public goods but also the malleability of the mainstream characteristics for a public good (Sandler 1999: 24-25). For example, the Law of the Sea has traditionally been seen as a way of avoiding the marine ‘tragedy of the commons.’ While exhibiting inclusive characteristics because no country is excluded from turning to the Law of the Sea to justify or inhibit an action, it only partially displays cooperative consumption characteristics because of the difficulty in enforcement. Moreover, in terms of market failure, it is unclear whether regulations similar to the Law of the Sea could in fact be privately provided through voluntary regulations and codes.

In an attempt to incorporate these nuances into public goods theory, economics has developed several categories of public goods including pure public, impure public,

Figure 1: Simplified Typology of the Evolution of Public Goods from Traditional to Modern

	The Commons	Military Alliance	Law of the Sea	Protection of Intellectual Property	International Airwaves and Satellite Feeds	Tied Foreign Aid and Peace-keeping	Common Markets
Key Aspects	recognition that regulation of common property is required in order to advert tragedy	formal agreement among group members to coordinate military activities	an inter-nationally accepted regulatory mechanism although enforcement may be weak	state guaranteed legal protection against the unauthorized utilization of ideas	science and technology policy based on state/private sector initiatives	yield two or more outputs which may vary in their degree of publicness	rules and regulations for economic inter-dependence among members of a group
Traditional	yes: classic public goods example	yes: attempt by states to fortify security	yes: method of avoiding tragedy of the commons	yes: state needed to enforce private property rights	no: result of techno-logical advancement	no: moves towards international re-distribution	no: outgrowth of neoliberal paradigm
Excludable	no: by definition all have access to the commons	yes: must be part of the alliance	no: all are subject to the rules and regulations	no: all are covered by the provisions	yes: must purchase membership	yes and/or no: depends on the goods and services being provided and to whom they are being provided	yes: must be part of the economic bloc

Competitive Consumption	yes: regulation required to prevent commons from being destroyed through consumption without reinvestment	partially: providing for the security of one member may reduce the security of others	partially: resources employed in one area for enforcement may leave other areas exposed	no: in theory all can be protected effectively	partially: limited number of airwaves and satellite feeds	yes and/or no: depends on the types of goods and services being provided	partially: some benefit from rules and regulations more than others
Market Failure	yes: market unable to regulate itself	inconclusive: could the private sector provide state security?	inconclusive: could this be privately provided through voluntary regulations and codes?	yes: failure of the market to protect private property rights	yes: requires state capital	inconclusive: can a profit be derived from these activities?	inconclusive: neoliberals would argue market by definition can provide

club, joint products, and externalities. However, far from providing analytic clarity, these concepts only add to the public-private confusion and create largely unnecessary divisions based on a narrow technical understanding of the exhibited characteristics of particular goods.

The second major problem with the mainstream definition of public goods is that the whole notion is predicated on market failure. According to Joseph Stiglitz, it is the failure of markets which provides the rationale for government provision of particular goods and services and that the public sector should only concern itself with areas in which the private sector cannot work effectively (Stiglitz 1988; Stiglitz and Squires 1998: 144). This is simply not true and represents a feeble attempt on the part of the mainstream to justify why their dreams of a perfect market society have not yet come

true. To turn a neo-liberal argument against itself, it is true that many public goods could be privately provided, but they are not being privately provided for a reason. In contrast to Stiglitz, Lauraine Eden and Fen Olser Hampson believe that the provision of public goods cannot be explained by 'politco-market failures' alone. It is often allocative failures (i.e., failures in redistribution) that are the driving force for the production of public goods, especially at the international level (Eden and Olser Hampson 1997: 375). Eden and Olser Osler Hampson assert that states must be concerned with distributional conflicts, both internal and between rich and poor countries (Eden and Olser Hampson: 375), but the question that Eden and Osler Hampson avoid answering is why? Asking this important question leads to the final major weakness of the mainstream approach to public goods.

The final weakness of the mainstream approach to public goods is that it is overly mechanistic and deterministic. It has absolutely no room for the role of human agency in determining whether a good will be public or private. It is purely on the basis of supposed inclusiveness and cooperative consumption (often discovered by mathematical formula) that a good is declared public by the mainstream. From the arguments of Eden and Osler Hampson, it becomes clear that human agency is a major part of the public goods phenomenon. Without people making political demands for various forms of redistribution through the provision of particular goods and services, there would be no imperative for the provision of public goods even in the case of so-called market failures. The role of human agency in the provision of public goods illustrates that the economic definition is far too limiting to be of any real value in describing public goods. Therefore, the public goods concept must be rethought in primarily political terms.

Public Goods: Political Demand, Political Supply

According to James Buchanan, public goods are ‘goods and services demanded and supplied through political institutions’ (Buchanan 1968: 5). Therefore instead of the muddled economic criteria of inclusiveness and cooperative consumption, all that is required to determine if a good is public (or if it is not public), is to see if the good is being demanded by people and supplied by a political institution at the appropriate level (e.g., the local, national, regional, or international).

In sharp contrast to most traditional thinking on public goods, it is not economic theory alone (if at all) which determines if and when a good or service should be public, but rather political processes, philosophical outlooks, availability of resources, and the preferences of citizens in a democratic society. This mirrors the discussion generated by Paul Samuelson's *Theory of Public Expenditure* more than forty years ago and his argument that the social welfare function is only a reflection of ethical preferences held by group members (i.e., society) and can therefore vary with the code of ethics in place (Samuelson 1954; Margolis 1955; Colm 1956). Buchanan's definition is also congruent with Eden and Olser Hampson's emphasis on failures in redistribution as a root cause of public goods and the implicit role granted to human agency within their framework.

There are, of course, some conceptual shortcomings in viewing public goods as the result of political demands. The first is the demand variable of the definition, how much demand is necessary? Does it require unanimity, a majority, or a sizeable minority? I would take the position that all that is required to meet the demand criterion is that a sizeable minority need to engage a political institution with demands for some good or service. This reflects the contemporary nature of politics at all levels, including the local, national, regional, and international, where coherent unanimous or majority positions are exceedingly rare on any issue.

The second problem with the demand criterion is that just because something is being demanded does not necessarily make it ‘good’ in a utilitarian or moral fashion. However, Buchanan's political definition is only meant to be a descriptive device, not a normative standard. As Olson has argued:

> There is no necessity that a public good to one group in a society is necessarily in the interest of the society as a whole. Just as a tariff could be a public good to the industry that sought it, so the removal of the tariff could be a public good to those who consumed the industry's product. This is equally true when the public good concept is applied only to governments; for a military expenditure or a tariff, or an immigration restriction that is a public good to one country could be a public bad to another country and harmful to world security as a whole (Olson 1971: 15).

Therefore, the establishment of a normative standard for public goods is needed.

The third potential problem with the political definition is the term political institution. The first key question (and a staple of much political-economy analysis) is where do political institutions come from? Political institutions do not appear out of thin air; they are the result of human action often based on demands for certain forms of representation, such as parliaments, or demands for the provision of particular services, for example in the form of education systems. The second question, which follows from the first, is, does this mean that only governments or inter-governmental organizations can provide public goods as is implicitly assumed by mainstream economic definitions? Is it possible for institutions traditionally considered ‘private’ like multinational corporations (MNCs) or groups considered to be ‘semi-public’ like non-governmental organizations to supply the goods and services that are demanded? For

example, do voluntary codes against the employment of child labour adopted by several MNCs under pressure from advocacy groups constitute a public good? The answer is yes; in any instance where MNCs and NGOs are involved in processes of debate, discussion, and negotiation within the public domain, these groups should be considered political institutions (See Hodess this volume). This is especially true in circumstances where governments may be unwilling or unable to directly supply a public good (for whatever reason) that is being demanded by a particular group of people.

The ability of non-government institutions to supply public goods demonstrates that many institutions that have been considered private have vibrant public elements willing to address issues of redistributional failures. Therefore, the creation/establishment of political institutions should be seen as the catalyst for further public goods production. This is particularly true in the case of human security because its implementation, which is often difficult for typical state institutions to provide, demands the introduction of new approaches and the application of new expertise in order to meet its objectives (Simmons 1998: 94-95).

Despite the potential shortcomings outlined above, Buchanan's political definition of public goods is the best analytic tool to determine whether or not a good is public in a descriptive sense. This definition though (as explained above) can put the analyst in the uncomfortable position of having to declare that a good, policy, or service that may be immoral and/or concentrates benefits to one group is a public good. Therefore, it is important to establish a normative standard by which goods that meet the descriptive criteria can be judged. This normative standard is offered by the economic definitions of public goods. In other words, while all that is needed for a good to be declared public is that it be demanded and supplied through political institutions, ideally it should also exhibit inclusive and cooperative consumption features. The

astute reader may find this position to be in opposition to earlier remarks; however, this is consistent with the earlier statement that inclusiveness and cooperative consumption are muddled economic criteria. From an economic perspective, which requires clear classification, inclusiveness and cooperative consumption are not effective because they are open to interpretation. As ethical criteria, their subjective nature is less problematic.

It is also important that if one is analyzing a public good at the international level, inclusiveness and cooperative consumption should be transgenerational so that the enjoyment of a good today does not exclude or take away enjoyment from future generations. For example, a policy designed to reduce poverty that contributes to long-term ecological degradation should not be considered a public good for this normative position. Furthermore, a public good should be universal in the sense that other countries or people will also be able to enjoy any benefits (Kaul et al 1999: 2-3). The closer a good or service is to this ideal, the more value it has to the group as a whole. It is important then to evaluate human security (as put forth in this paper) using the public goods criteria because public goods theory can help to determine if human security is a global public good.

Human Security: A New Public Good?

Given the definition of human security argued for in this paper, is it possible for human security to meet the descriptive criteria of a public good?[6] There is little question that human security responses to fears produced by violent conflicts have been demanded for some time including the establishment of an International Criminal Court and moves to regulate the flows of light weapons. Responses to these types of human security demands are being supplied by several different forms of political

institutions including governments, NGOs, and MNCs. Novel arrangements between governments and NGOs have already helped to produce global public goods like the international ban on landmines. In addition, recent events including the protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle demonstrate that the fear of social dumping aspect of human security is also being demanded by groups and states both from the developed and developing worlds. However, governments and MNCs have been less willing to supply human security in this issue area, leaving NGOs in isolation as the only political institutions trying to adequately address the problem.

When judged from a normative standpoint using the economic definition, human security theoretically is a solid global public good; however, human security as it has been and is currently being practiced runs into some difficulties. This is quite apparent when the universal and trans-generational aspects of inclusiveness and cooperative consumption are demanded. Many operations undertaken in the name of human security still seem to exhibit the exclusionary and competitive consumption characteristics of traditional security. For example, recent operations in the former Yugoslavia have offered, at best, short-term security for people involved in disputes by separating conflicting sides with little effort exerted to ensure that the sources of conflict in the region are adequately addressed in order to guarantee peace for the future. Human security issues like the international drug trade have continued to target certain segments within western societies leading to record prison populations, as well as targeting countries of the developing world without seeking to alleviate the underlying structural inequalities that have allowed the trade to flourish. While there is much talk surrounding environmental issues, far too little progress has been made at the global level in order to ensure that future generations will have access to natural resources.

For these reasons, it might be best from the normative standpoint to see human

security as a work in progress. Currently, while human security may be a public good in the descriptive sense of the term, from a normative standpoint, it still appears to have some of the exclusionary and competitive consumption baggage of traditional security. Human security represents a move in the right direction, by seeking to address problems that would have been ignored during the Cold War, but its practices are not as public as they should be. In part, this is a direct result of the cross-breeding of realist security and human security in many policymaking circles like the United States where human security is invoked in some instances, such as involvement in Haiti, and realist security is utilized in others, like the American rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty.

All hope should not be abandoned though. If the type of human security that is being advocated by those countries known as the 'moral minority,' including Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Australia can entrench itself in the global security agenda, it is likely that the normative criteria of inclusiveness and cooperative consumption, including the requirements of trans-generationality and universality for each, will be better reflected in security policy at all levels. To date human security has displayed a tendency to pursue short-term easy-fix solutions, which do not involve structural transformations. In the future, the requirement that all underlying issues of a human security issue be considered and managed in order to prevent the continuation

Figure2: Short-Term and Robust Responses to Human Security Issues

Threat	Short-Term Response	Robust Response
Light Arms Transfers	Non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament treaties	Targeting producers and suppliers of light arms as well as consumers

Social Dumping	Bi-lateral, regional, and multi-lateral agreements on minimum labour and environmental standards	Re-examining the principles of free trade with respect to the social costs of increased productivity, production, and wealth
Migration Pressures	Allowing short-term increases in levels of immigration Building refugee camps	Tackling the problems which spur migration (e.g. economic inequality, ethnic tensions, environmental degradation)
Environmental Degradation	International Treaties and Protocols	Rethinking the relationship between modes of production, consumption patterns, and the environment
Drug Trafficking	Declaring a 'War on Drugs'	Addressing the issue of poverty brought on by falling agricultural commodity prices
International Terrorism	Increased training and resources for anti-terrorist security forces worldwide	Providing more venues and greater access for sub-state groups in national and international politics

of current threats and/or the debut of new threats may be realized. Figure 2 presents policy examples of the two different approaches outlining the kinds of policies needed for robust human security. For example, in the case of environmental degradation, robust human security requires more than simply going through the motions of trying to manage a problem by developing international treaties and protocols; it necessitates a complete rethinking of the current economic system.If the transformation of security, which has already generated a shift from realist security to a partial form of human security, is to continue several major obstacles will have to be overcome.

Human Security as a Public Good: the Role of the Public Domain

For human security to be thought of as a public good, in both a descriptive and normative sense, answers to at least five major questions regarding its provision will have to be developed by the international community. The answers to these questions will be generated by the public domain, which can be thought of as the area between the state, the market, and civil society, as well as being inter-linked to these three structures. Because the public domain will be the site of debate, discussion, negotiation, and compromise in trying to find solutions to the human security provision problem, it is very likely that in the end, human security will involve an ever-changing mixture of public (i.e., the state or inter-state) and private (e.g., non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations) providers depending on the time, the place, the international situation, and the issue(s) involved.

According to Daniel Drache, the notion of the public domain derives from the pre-neo-liberal view of the market economy, which did not see markets as all encompassing and argued that civil society was a critical non-market sector. This older view of the market economy argued that there were goods and services available to civil society that could not be bought or sold. It was asserted that not only did people enjoy the 'consumption' of these goods and services, but that they often attributed their well-being to the existence of such goods and services (Drache 1999). Therefore, the public domain was conceived as assets that were held in common which could not be bought or sold on the open market. Drache argues that:

> the public domain is a privileged site where the price mechanism of the market and the regulatory power of the state constantly clash and vie for dominance. As a result, the public domain is strengthened, weakened, or transformed and its

resources provide civil society with its strength, vitality, and organizational capacity (Drache 1999: **).

The adequate provision of human security will necessarily depend on the balances reached within the global public domain between the market, state, and civil society. In turn, these shifting balances will be a result of the negotiated solutions reached within the public domain in response to the problems of international cooperation, resource provision, reordering of the international system, globalization, and international norms.

Five Challenges to the Future Provision of Human Security

The ability of states to cooperate in the international system has been a staple topic of international relations since the 1970's and while the basis of international cooperation may be a fascinating line of inquiry, the relevant problem for human security is how to get all of the players involved in the international system (e.g., states, sub-state groups, inter-state groups, multinational corporations, NGOs) to agree to use human security as the guide post for their actions? This is, of course, is required if human security is going to meet the normative criteria of a public good. In addition, the multifaceted nature of human security will demand that diverse groups of states and private organizations be able to work with one another. Any attempt to build greater international cooperation will therefore involve the public domain and interactions between the state, markets, and civil society.

The second major question that will have to be answered (probably on an issue by issue basis), in order for human security to become a reality, is who will provide the necessary resources? The provision of human security is obviously a massive

international undertaking. As discussed earlier, both the private and public sectors have the ability to contribute resources for human security. Moreover, because human security seeks to be a global public good, the private/public sector question is transposed onto which country (ies), region (s), or international organization (s) should be contributing. Before the introduction of human security, Robert Keohane had addressed the contribution issue by arguing that any state which benefits from an institutional arrangement should pay their fair share (Keohane 1989: 109). Of course, this is not the way that things tend to work in the international arena. Therefore, the resource issue will still be quite contentious because, at least in the short-term, the gains from an international commitment to human security would be perceived as likely to be more concentrated in underdeveloped countries with the required resources most likely coming from developed countries.

In the midst of such discussions, it is also important to determine who can most effectively provide the resources for human security. For example, in a case where food supplies need to be delivered to a remote rural region, it may be a combination of state (s) and business (es) who supply the food, with NGOs who already have people on the ground in the region, delivering the supplies. It is likely that those who can contribute and that those who can contribute most effectively will change depending on the human security issue involved. Therefore, once again, the public domain will serve as the arena where these decisions will be made.

The argument has been made that the provision of human security necessarily requires a reordering of the international political system and its concentration on inter-state relations, to a new more inclusive international political system that recognizes the importance of new global actors like NGOs and MNCs (Coate et al1996; Lipschutz 1992; Roseneau 1992). Some have called for a rethinking of the privileged position of the state in international relations and the downgrading of the notion of national

sovereignty (Makinda 1996). Some have argued that the United Nations must be redesigned in order for it to undertake the role of an effective world legislative body (Archibugi 1993). Others have focused on developing improved regional organizations which could undertake the activities necessary to ensure human security (MacFarlane and Weiss 1994: 283). Not surprisingly, states, inter-state organizations, markets, and civil society all have a vested interest in advancing a structural design for the new international system which places them in the best possible, and therefore, most influential position. The final result will, of course, stem from actions and counter-actions within the public domain. It may be in vogue to lament that the market will inevitably come out on top, but this is far from certain, especially if human security is able to gain a foothold outside of the human security vanguard countries.

Related to this last point, the notion of globalization has become the 'boogie-man' for leftist scholars and the labour movement at the end of the twentieth century. Perceived as the lead horse of the pending world economic, social, and political apocalypse, globalization is blamed for the processes of 'global pillage' and the 'eclipse of the state'.[7] The pop culture definition of globalization, which sees it as being about 'borderless nations, stateless firms, infirm states, and a new frontier without frontiers' reflects the hysteria surrounding the concept (Copeland 1997: 17). Many forget that globalization is a double-edged sword and can provide benefits, such as increasing communication networks, spreading new ideas, and increasing transparency. The manifestations of these benefits are important, especially if human security is going to become a global reality.

While Daryl Copeland may argue that the policy of harmonization required by globalization translates into an agreement on the lowest common denominator, there is nothing inherent in the processes of globalization that prevents it from being an agent of positive change (from a human security perspective) and raising the bar on

international standards. Already this has been seen with the global promotion and spread of democracy. Therefore, globalization is not inherently evil. If the state and civil society components of the public domain exert an effort to balance those with an interest in a ‘global pillage’ and make human security their end goal, the processes of globalization can in fact become something to be celebrated rather than reviled.

Human security will require that certain international norms be established for the behaviour of all actors at every level from the local to the global. Unlike realist security, which could recommend policies of inaction if an issue was deemed not to be a concern of the national interest, human security requires, at the most basic level, that appropriate action be undertaken any time that human life and dignity are threatened. This change from a state-centred to an individual-centred (though not in the neoliberal sense of an individual) conception of security will involve changes to the norms of behaviour in international relations. No longer will the interests of the state be able to supersede those of its citizens or the citizens of other countries. Human security also demands that the principles of redistribution be adopted as an international norm. For example, peace-building initiatives require a transfer of funds and resources from a donor group to a receiving group in order to ensure that armed conflict is avoided. Given the current popularity of the neo-liberal doctrine and its distrust of non-market allocative functions, as embodied in the Washington Consensus, establishing the principle of redistribution may be a hard sell, but that does not mean that it should be abandoned.

There is, of course, also a problem with how the international community can ensure compliance to the norms of human security. The legitimacy of armed conflict and other punitive actions, such as sanctions, will have to be re-examined from the human security perspective because recent history has shown that these actions often hurt those they are meant to protect. For example, sanctions against Iraq have

adversely affect the general Iraqi population while Hussein remains firmly in power. If norms are to be changed, the process of changing them will take place within the public domain as all of the key sectors involved debate and negotiate (Ratner 1998: 79). Once again the results of these struggles within the public domain will have important consequences for human security.

Given that the public domain will have an enormous influence on the shape of human security (or if human security is even able to fully develop as a paradigm), and recognizing that the public domain is a site where both the private and the public interact, it is safe to assume that the provision of human security will be divided among states, markets, and civil societies. How the responsibility is divided will be in a constant state of flux, due to the fact that the most effective provider (s) will likely change with the issue involved. Human security then represents the new breed of public good, which is demanded and supplied through political institutions (whether they be public or private) and which uses the traditional economic concepts as a normative standard rather than as a raison d'etre for government provision due to conditions of market failure.

Human Security, the State, and Sovereignty: Combat or Coexistence?

Although many analysts and policymakers dismiss it as the sexy buzzword of the moment, events around the world will continue to demonstrate that human security is necessary. Major international players through false accusations and fear mongering have tried to derail human security at every possible opportunity. The potentially most damaging arguments are those that claim human security will erode the state and state sovereignty. While recent events have shown that non-state actors can contribute to the practice of human security, strong states are still necessary in order to contribute

and coordinate indispensable public goods. Moreover, of what purpose is state sovereignty when a state's authority is not legitimate in the eyes of its citizens because it is unable to offer the most basic of protections against fear?

Whether one is prepared to admit it or not, human security is not going to fade away into the background. Ensuring that current world events and conditions have limited negative consequences demands that human security be the organizing concept of international relations for the foreseeable future. In particular, the rise of intra-state violence and the possibility of continuing inter-state conflict, two issues that traditional views of security have been unable to contribute meaningful and satisfying solutions for, demonstrate that human security must establish, maintain, and strengthen the ability of people to live dignified lives free from fear. Although many academics have been able to adapt well to this changing security agenda, particularly those in Australia, Canada, and Great Britain, there have been problems convincing colleagues and policymakers within other countries, especially the United States, of the importance of human security even in the absence of Cold War style strategic imperatives (Freedman 1998: 49). While adherence to human security may be guiding the foreign policy of countries like Canada, Norway, and Sweden, it is not making as big an impact on the global great powers like China, Russia, or the United States.[8] Of utmost importance is the perception that human security represents a downgrading of state sovereignty. Even a number of developing countries, like Indonesia, are concerned with the state sovereignty implications of human security having only been free from colonial rule for an historically short period of time.

There is a fear that because human security is able to justify outside interference in the internal affairs of states under particular circumstances, such as rampant human rights abuses as was the case with Kosovo, that this power may be abused by the West with the 'White Man's Burden' reappearing with an updated agenda for the next

century. Critics assert that many of the components of human security are in reality Western values that are culturally relative and/or inappropriate for countries of the South. More importantly to the great powers, are worries within the policymaking elite that human security will interfere in the achievement of foreign and economic policy goals by constraining policy options. China would like to avoid any negative international costs from its horrendous human rights record. Russia does not want any outside interference in its dealings with its ethnic minorities or conflicts within members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The United States does not want to completely dismantle its military-industrial complex supposedly weakening its international standing. This has been demonstrated in the recent American refusal to sign chemical weapons protocols or the landmines ban.

Being somewhat constrained in policy options, especially ones that may incorporate the threat or use of violence, does not mean that the age of the state is over or that state sovereignty is being overly compromised. In essence, human security demands that states be both responsible to their own citizens and to citizens of other states around the world by concentrating on the security issues that are affecting people directly with an emphasis on providing a lasting solution rather than a short-term quick fix. Long term solutions to problems like the international drug trade, international migration, environmental degradation, crime, social dumping, and armed conflict will be global public goods. In order for such solutions to be possible, states must continue to play a vital role in international relations. States must be effective and strong. States must continue to provide public goods, give incentives and support to other actors like NGOs and MNCs in the provision of public goods, and actively engage in discussions with the market and civil society within the public domain. Rather than calling for the death of the state, human security demands a revitalization.

Conclusions

In the aftermath of the Cold War, with the emergence of new international actors and new international phenomenon, security has moved away from being a state-centric concept concerned with power, toward a notion of human security, which concerns itself with human life and dignity. Problems like environmental degradation and intra-state violence, which could be ignored are now increasingly being seen as global security threats that must be addressed for their consequences and their potential implications for every human being and state on this planet.

Human security can be described as a public good because it is being demanded by people and is starting to be supplied through political institutions both of the traditional state variety and non-traditional institutions like NGOs and MNCs. The economic criteria for public goods, inclusiveness and cooperative consumption, assume that market failure explains the public provision of goods and services. Such thinking is misguided. Instead it is often allocative failures, public demand, and/or the willingness of a political institution to supply a particular good or service that determines if it is ‘public’. Rather than providing a formula to determine if a good should be ‘private’ or ‘public’, the economic criterion for a public good generates a normative standard which can be used as a benchmark. Ideally, public goods should include anyone interested and the consumption of the good by one individual should not subtract from another’s enjoyment of the same good. In reality, few public goods can fully reach this standing. Human security has the potential to meet the normative criteria but thus far has fallen short. Therefore, it should be viewed as a work in progress.

If human security (or any other public good) is to realize the tough normative standard outlined by the economic definition, it will be a result of interactions within the

public domain, the area which draws the forces of the state, market, and civil society into discussion, negotiation, and resolution. Because human security involves these three forces, its provision will necessarily involve a mixture of both public and private producers, depending on the issue and situation.

Fears that human security will compromise state sovereignty are greatly exaggerated by those with less than honest intentions. While adherence to the principles of human security may restrict particular types of policy options, it also requires an effective and strong state, which gains its legitimacy through responsibility to its own citizens and the citizens of other states. This will require that the state continue to provide and support the provision, by other political institutions, of public goods that seek to address allocative failures within various issue areas. Human security, the state, and public goods can be mutually intertwined and reinforcing.

Endnotes

1. Many thanks go out to the Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies at York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. This paper was written as a part of the “Public Domain” project conceived and orchestrated by Robarts Director Daniel Drache. I greatly benefited from the combined wisdom of our numerous discussions over a year long period and the Public Domain Graduate Student workshops organized by the Centre. I would also like to thank Amitav Acharya and David Mutimer from the Centre for International and Security Studies at York University. Their comments and enthusiasm towards earlier drafts of this paper were greatly appreciated. Any errors though are my own responsibility.

2. The violence of the modern state towards its own citizens is taken up from a post-modern perspective in David Campbell’s seminal book on foreign policy and

national identity (Campbell 1992)

3. One wonders though how much of this theoretical division between human security and human development is a product of Canada having a separate government department, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), for international development issues.

4. These initiatives are outlined in the Lyosen Declaration put forth by Canada and Norway.

5. It is important to remember that public goods can also be 'public bads' like pollution or the spread of disease which mainstream economics perceives as stemming from the 'tragedy of the commons'.

6. Although not the topic of this paper, human development could also be considered a public good as well, given the criteria that I am using

7. Although he has coined the term the 'eclipse of the state', Peter Evans argues that the real danger of the global era is not that states will end up as marginal institutions but that meaner and more repressive ways of organizing the state's role will be the only way of avoiding the collapse of public institutions (Evans 1997: 64).

8. Unfortunately, critics point out that it is debatable even within the pro-human security countries how big a commitment to human security really exists. For example, in Canada, development aid budgets have been slashed throughout the 1990's and for the fiscal years of 1997 and 1998, only $10 million was directed towards peace building initiatives (Osler Hampson and Oliver 1998: 388).

Works Cited

Archibugi, Daniele (1993) "The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitian Democracy", *Journal of Peace Research* 30 (3): 301-315.

Axworthy, Lloyd (1997) “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership” *International Journal* 52 (Spring): 183-196.

Axwrothy, Lloyd 1999) *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World,* Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Birdsall, Nancy (1998) “ Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World” *Foreign Policy* 111 (Summer): 76-93.

Bobrow, Davis B. and Boyer, Mark A. (1997) “Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations”, *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* 41 (6): 723-748.

Booth, Ken (1991) “Security and Emancipation”, *Review of International Studies* 17 (4): 313-26.

Buchanan, James M (1968) *The Demand and Supply of Public Goods*, Chicago: Rand McNally.

Buzan, Barry (1991) *People, States, and Fear*, 2nd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Campbell, David (1992) *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Coate, Roger A., Alger, Chadwick F. and Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (1996) “The United Nations and Civil Society: Creative Partnerships for Sustainable Development”, *Alternatives* (Jan-March): 93-121.

Colm, Gerhard (1956) “Comments on Samuelson's Theory of Public Finance”, *Review of Economics and Statistics* 38 (4): 408-412.

Connolly, William E. (1993) *The Terms of Political Discourse*. 3rd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Copeland, Daryl (1997) “ Globalization, Enterprise, and Governance: What does a

Changing World mean for Canada", *International Journal* 53 (Winter): 17-37.

Cornes, Richard and Sandler Todd (1986) *The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Drache, Daniel (1999) " The Public Domain After The (Uncertain) Triumph of Markets" *Forthcoming*.

Eden, Lorraine, ed. (1991) *Retrospectives on Public Finance*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Eden, Lorraine and Osler Hampson, Fen (1997) " Clubs are Trump: The Formation of International Regimes in the Absence of a Hegemon" in Robert.Boyer (ed.) *Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 361-394.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1995) " Exporting Feminism", *Journal of International Affairs* 48 (2): 542-557.

Evans, Gareth (1994) "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict", *Foreign Policy* 96 (Fall): 3-20.

Evans, Peter (1997) "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization", *World Politics* 50 (October): 62-87.

Foldvary, Fred (1994) *Public Goods and Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services,* Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Freedman, Lawrence (1998) " International Security: Changing Targets", *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring): 48-63.

Kaplan, Robert (1994) "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly* 273 (February): 44-76.

Kaul, Inge,Gruberg Isabelle and Stern, Mark A.. (1999) "Defining Global Public Goods", in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, Mark A. Stern (eds.*) Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the Twenty First Century*, New York: Oxford University

Press, pp. 2-19.

Kegley Jr., Charles W. and Wittkopf Eugene R. (1995) *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 5th ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Keohane, Robert O. (1989) “Closing the Fairness-Practice Gap” *Ethics and International Affairs* 3: 101-116.

Keohane, Robert O. (1997) “Problematic Lucidity: Stephen Krasner's "State Power and the Structure of International Trade"”, *World Politics* 50 (October): 150-170.

Krasna, Joshua S (1999) “Testing the Salience of Transnational Issues for International Security: The Case of Narcotics Production and Trafficking”, *Contemporary Security Policy* 20 (1): 42-55.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (1992) “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society”, *Millennium* 21 (3): 389-420.

MacFarlane, S. Neil and Weiss, Thomas G. (1994) “The United Nations, Regional Organisations and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America”, *Third World Quarterly* 15 (2): 277-295.

Makinda, Samuel M. (1996) “Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations”, *Global Governance* 2: 149-168.

Margolis, Julius (1955) “A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”, *Review of Economics and Statistics* 37 (4): 347-349.

Martin, Lisa (1999) “ The Political Economy of International Cooperation” in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, Mark A. Stern (eds.) *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the Twenty First Century,* New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 51-64.

Milner, Helen (1992) “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses”, *World Politics* 44 (April): 466-96.

Olson, Mancur (1971) *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of*

Goods Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Osler, Hampson Fen and Oliver, Dean F. (1998) “Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axeworthy doctrine”, *International Journal* 54 (Summer): 379-406.

Peterson, V. Spike (1992) “Security and Sovereign States: What is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?” in V. Spike. Peterson (ed.) *Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 31-64.

Ratner, Steven R (1998) “International Law: The Trials of Global Norms”, *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring): 65-80.

Roseneau, James N (1992) “Citizenship in a Changing Global Order” in James. N. Roseneau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.) *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 272-294.

Samuelson, Paul A. (1954) “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”, *Review of Economics and Statistics* 37 (4): 387-389.

Sandler, Todd. (1999) “ Intergenerational Public Goods: Strategies, Efficiency, and Institutions”, in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, Mark A. Stern (eds.) *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the Twenty First Century*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 20-50.

Sens, Allen G. (1997) “ Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada” Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia.

Simmons, P.J. (1998) “Learning to Live with NGOs”, *Foreign Policy* 111 (Fall): 82-96.

Stanford, Jim, Elwell, Christine and Sinclair Scott (1993) *Social Dumping Under North American Free Trade*, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1988) *Economics of the Public Sector*. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Squire, Lyn (1998) “International Development: Is it Possible?”, *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring): 138-151.

Suhrke, Astri(1999) “Human Security and Interests of State”, *Security Dialogue* 30 (3): 265-276.

Thomas, Caroline.(1999) “ Introduction”, in Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilken (eds.) *Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1-23.

Tickner, J- Ann (1988) “ Hans Morganthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation”, *Millennium* 17 (3): 429-440.

United Nations Development Program (1995) “ Redefining Security: The Human Dimension”, *Current History* 94 (592): 229-36.

Walker, R.B.J. (1990) “ Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics”, *Alternatives* 15: 3-27.

World Bank (1997) *World Bank Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World*, New York: Oxford University Press.