Ariel Sharon and the Algerian Analogy 

(June 12, 2002)

One major if little noted influence on politics comes from the stock of analogies or metaphors we use to understand crucial events. The word "Munich for example, evokes images of cowardly democracies surrendering in the face of an aggressive dictator. "Munich" remains one of the most powerful, and often-used rhetorical term in western politics. One phrase used to good effect for a while referred to the "domino effect," the prediction that, one by one, all the nations of southeast Asia would succumb to communism if the U.S. didn't intervene in South Vietnam. More recently, the Bush Administration tried to add the phrase "axis of evil" to our vocabulary in order to describe the enemies of democracy and to marshal support for the Administration's policy aggressive policy toward Iraq.

Metaphors, analogies and rhetorical devices often help the public see things in historical perspective or provide shorthand reference points for political decision-making, but sometimes they can be dangerously simplistic. One such dangerous analogy comes from Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon who once told French President Jacques Chirac, "Mr. President, you must understand that for us here, it's like Algeria. We have no other place to go and, besides, we have no intention of leaving."

Mr. Sharon wanted to draw an analogy between Israel's conflict with the Palestinians and France's 1954 to 1962 war in Algeria. For Mr. Sharon the two conflicts were similar because the French, like the Israelis today, fought a bloody and brutal war to suppress a guerilla movement which used any and all means, including urban terrorism, to drive those who they saw as "occupiers" from their country. But there the resemblance ended, because, as Mr. Sharon observed, unlike the French Algerians who fled to mainland France after Algerian independence in 1962, the Israelis have no homeland to retreat to. Thus, the only alternative for the Israelis is to crush the Palestinian guerillas.

But Mr. Sharon seems to have missed some important lessons of the Algerian War.

The first is that you can win a battle and lose the war. During the eight year long conflict, the Algerian guerillas massacred men, women and children, ritually mutilated the corpses of French soldiers, and by war's end in 1962, had killed over 3,000 civilians through terrorist attacks on cafes, restaurants and hotels in urban areas.

The French army responded in kind. Algerian National Liberation Front suspects were brutally tortured or held in prison without charge, mass round-ups occurred with collateral civilian casualties and collective punishment was practiced when villages suspected of cooperating with or harboring terrorists were bombed from the air. The French also initiated a policy of "regroupment" by forcing entire populations to move from their homes into camps or rural areas under the watchful eye of the French military.

In 1957, fed up with the fact that urban casbahs had become safe havens for terrorists, the French government called in elite French parachute regiments to clean them out. With brutal efficiency the parachutists carried out their mission lane by lane, house by house until the bulk of the guerilla forces were forced to retreat to rural areas and to the mountains.

Yet, five years later, after the deaths of over 350,000 Muslims and 18,000 French soldiers, Algeria had its independence.

What happened?

The answer is that you can capture or kill terrorists, but it is very difficult to kill the ideas that motivate them. President DeGaulle and the French were not willing to bear the continuing economic, social and human cost of occupying a country whose inhabitants wanted independence and were willing to pay any price to get it.

A second lesson Mr. Sharon might have drawn is that there is no reason why negotiations cannot take place during wartime. After all, the French government negotiated with the Algerian guerilla leaders from March 1961 to May 1962 while both sides were hard at war. And Mr. Sharon should remember that Henry Kissinger was busy negotiating with the North Vietnamese while the Vietnam war was in full swing. By imposing unrealistic conditions on peace negotiations and refusing to take seriously the recent Saudi proposal, Mr. Sharon has demonstrated that he learned little from his study of the Algerian War.

Third, today a terrorist, tomorrow a citizen. Amongst those millions of Algerians who poured into France after Algerian independence in 1962, there were certainly many who had fought against the French and who had participated in terrorist acts. Yet, having won their battle, they integrated into French society, took out French citizenship and abandoned violence. Of course, one might argue that this proves Mr. Sharon's point–only when France left Algeria did the terrorism cease. But the other side of the coin is that it was not existential hatred of the French that motivated the Algerian terrorists. Once a political solution was reached terrorism as a political tactic was abandoned.

Fourth, a statesman is one who shapes policy not in accord with the winds of public opinion, nor even in accord with his own previously formed views, but rather in light of the long-term interests and ideals of the nation. President DeGaulle came to power in 1958 on the shoulders of French generals in Algeria who swore to keep Algeria forever in the French orbit. However, when DeGaulle realized that France could keep the guerillas at bay only through a permanent occupation of Algeria, that is, at the price of its soul, he made the only possible choice and gave Algeria its independence.

In light of the continued suicide bombings in Israel, and the apparent failure of Mr. Sharon's militaristic approach, it might be helpful to revisit the France-Israel analogy in order to draw the appropriate lessons. ٱ

© Harvey G. Simmons, 2003