Facts: Ontario, in 1876, enacted legislation regulating fire insurance policies that specified the standard conditions which were "deemed to be part of every policy of fire insurance" made within the province.  Under the legislation, an insurance company had the power to omit any of the additional provisions provided it warned the policy purchaser of the changes.  The Respondent, Parsons purchased insurance in Ontario and then had a fire.  When he went to collect the Appellant  insurance from Citizen Insurance Company refused to pay.  The Respondent went to Court.  At Trial, the Appellant argued that it was not bound by the Provincial Insurance Act because it was ultra vires of the province's powers.

Issue: Is the Provincial Insurance Act valid within s. 92(13) or does it violate s. 91(2)?

Decision: Judgement for the Respondent, the appeal was dismissed (legislation was intra vires).

Ratio: There are two important ratios to note about this case.  They are:

1) Limitation on s. 91(2): s. 91(2), dealing with trade and commerce, is limited to the following areas:

1) International Trade
2) Interprovincial Trade
3) Regulation of Trade affecting whole Dominion

Section 91(2) should not be read to include the power to regulate by legislation the contracts of a particular business or trade, such as the business of fire insurance in a single province.

2) Provinces Can Regulate Contracts: Provincial legislatures have the jurisdiction to regulate contracts of a particular business or trade as long as it is within the province.

Important Notes:

1) Narrow Reading of Constitutional Provisions: When interpreting the Constitutional division of powers concerning s. 91(2), the Courts should adopt a narrow reading because to do otherwise would give federal government too much power if it was read too broadly in nature.

2) Look at the "Pith and Substance" (matter) of Legislation: When analyzing the legislation, the Courts should look at the actual matter of the legislation to see if the subject matter is within the constitutional division of powers.

Under this, the Courts must decide if the matter is within a particular division.  If it is, then the Courts must decide if the matter is within an exclusive clause.

Facts:  The Appellant Russell was charged with violating the Canada Temperance Act.  At Trial, Russell was convicted and appealed on the grounds that the Canada Temperance Act was ultra vires of the federal government's powers because it violated s. 92(9), (13) and (16) of the Constitution Act, 1867.  The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Appellant's appeal so the Appellant appealed to the JCPC.

Issue: Is the Canada Temperance Act ultra vires of the federal government's powers (i.e. does it infringe upon s. 92(9), (13) or (16))?

Decision: Judgement for the Respondent, the appeal was dismissed.

Ratio: There are two important ratios to note about this case.  They are:

1) Canada Temperance Act Does Not Violate s. 92: The Canada Temperance Act does not violate any of the sub-sections under s. 92.  Specifically:

1) s. 92(9): The Canada Temperance Act does not violate this section because it limits revenues rather than trying to raise revenues for the federal government.

2) s. 92(13): The Canada Temperance Act does not violate this section because Parliament is allowed to enact laws for the good of the country under POGG even if it affects Property and Civil Rights (problematic aspect of decision because POGG is a residual power rather than an enumerated power).

3) s. 92(16): The Canada Temperance Act does not violate this section because the problem is not a matter within local jurisdiction (i.e. the pith and substance of the law is not aimed at a specific province) because it is an uniform piece of legislation aimed at remedying an evil in the Dominion.

2) Parliament Can Use POGG To Limit Provincial Rights: Under this decision, the JCPC ruled that Parliament could use POGG to "trump" provincial powers if there is a need for uniform legislation to address a nationally pressing concern (problematic decision because it was a broad reading of POGG that expanded it beyond what was originally intended B suppose to be limited if it comes within a provincially delegated power).