Public Law II
Review Notes for Mid-term Exam, 2005
POLS 3605 3.0, Winter, 2005
    •    Welcome to the course, Keele and Glendon!
    •    This is a “technology enhanced learning” course
    •    You MUST use WebCt and participate in discussion groups
    •    You MUST attend 70% of the lectures, even though the lectures are videostreamed
    •    Course outline
    •    Assignments & grading
    •    Mock Trials
    •    Group work
    •    If you’re thinking about withdrawing from the course, you need an advising appointment with me first.
    •    If you haven’t taken Public Law I, the first 4 lectures will be posted on the WebCt site for this course.  Watch the lectures to get the background you need for this course.  (These won't be necessary for the mid-term exam, but the subjects are useful background to understand terms used in Public Law II.)

Human Rights
    •    Ronald Dworkin: " …individuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the institutions that govern them….  They possess [this right] not by virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice.”
    •    Sniderman, Russell, Fletcher, Tetlock:  commitment to tolerance.
    •    My approach:  every human being deserves -- and owes to others -- respect and fair treatment.
    •    C.B. Macpherson:  rights include opportunities to exercise those rights (positive rights).
    •    Difference between human rights and civil liberties:
        –    “human right”:  derived either from positive law, or natural law.  (eg. legal rights in Charter)
        –    “civil liberty”:  ability to act without constraints (eg. the “fundamental freedoms” in Charter)

Rights in liberal democracies
    •    Basic principles of human rights and civil liberties:
    •    1.  optimal freedom
     J.S. Mill:  “harm” principle for limits
2.  procedural fairness when there are limits
3.  equality of application of rights and freedoms
    •    Reasonable Limits to Rights:
        –    some relevant differences in ability (eg. qualifications for driver's license, or to become a doctor, or age restriction for voting)
        –    promote honesty (eg. limits to freedom of speech:  law suits for defamation)
        –    need to preserve public order  (police searches, anti-terrorism)
        –    to deal with emergencies
        –    resolve conflicts between one right and another
        –    community-wide restrictions on moral behaviour (eg pornography)

Origins of Rights-Consciousness in Canada
    •    Political theory of liberalism
        –    European Renaissance of 15th century
        –    Protestant reformation
        –    Glorious Revolution (England:  1688)
        –    John Locke:  Second Treatise on Gov’t 1690
        •    rule of law  “one rule for the Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at Court and the Country Man at Plough”
        •    judicial independence
        –    Two principles of liberalism:  freedom & equality
        •    common law protections for individual freedom:
            –    strict attention to rule of law:  Entick v. Carrington 1765: cabinet minister sued for breach of privacy
            –    mens rea
            –    crown must prove case beyond reasonable doubt
            –    free confessions; can’t be forced to self-incriminate
            –    prerogative writs (habeas corpus)
    •    Development of democratic values
        –    growth of franchise

    •    U.S. Bill of Rights
        –    Jefferson (declaration of independence):  “…all men are created equal [and] endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights [including] Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”  (1776)
        –    To get 1787 (2nd) constitution ratified, state leaders insisted on a Bill of Rights; added in 1789 as first 10 amendments to 1787 constitution:
        •    freedom of speech, press, assembly & religion
        •    procedural rights:  no unreasonable search or seizure, right not to testify against self, can’t be punished twice for same offence, due process safeguards, no cruel or unusual punishment
        •    positive legal rights:  speedy trial, jury trial for serious cases, reasonable bail, to bear arms, and to refuse accommodation to soldiers

    •    Canada’s bilingual and bireligious heritage
        –    demands in 1864 for guarantees of minority language and minority religious education rights prior to Confederation in 1867
        –    “small bill of rights”: (Hogg)
        •    S. 133 of BNA Act:  Eng or Fr in Parl, Quebec leg., and Can & fed courts; similar guarantees in Manitoba in 1870, & AB and Sask in 1905
        •    S. 93:  safeguards existing denominational school rights
    •    Legislative Supremacy
        –    Preamble to BNA Act:  Canada’s constitution “similar in principle” to that of the U.K.
        –    legislative supremacy one aspect of U.K. constitution:  seems to contradict idea of a constitutional bill of rights
        –    A.V. Dicey:  Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885)
        •    human rights protected by common law
        •    written constitution is too rigid; trust legislature & common law judges

Civil Liberty Cases prior to Can Bill of Rts
    •    Early B.C.:  plenty of disc leg against Orientals.  JCPC record mixed
        –    1899:  JCPC stuck down law restricting employment of Orientals as ultra vires prov. Jurisdiction
        –    1902:  JCPC upheld denial of vote to Orientals - leg sup
    •    Private suits by Blacks against private disc:  some succeeded, most didn’t because cts emphasized private right to contract
    •    Sask:  disc leg ag Orientals:  upheld by SCC, 1914

    •    “Persons” case:  1930
    •    Alberta Press Case (1938)
        –    impugned:  package of Social Credit legislation:  unanimously struck down
        –    “Duff doctrine”:  because Can. const is “similar in principle” to that of U.K., courts can strike down legislation violating trad. human rights.  Also, Canada is a democracy: H of C is representative.  “Free public discussion … is the breath of life for parliamentary institutions”

    •    Treatment of Japanese Canadians during W W II:  courts did not intervene
    •    “Gouzenko affair” in 1945:  secret trials of 26 under War Measures Act without usual procedural protections.  Led to Can Civ Liberties Association
    •    Duplessis era
        –    Saumur, 1953:  SCC struck down Que City bylaw about littering, but which was aimed at Jehovah’s Witnesses
        –    Switzman v. Elbling, 1957:  SCC struck down Padlock Law because it trenched on Parl’s crim law jurisdiction
        –    Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 1959:  Roncarelli posted bail for JWs, and Duplessis cancelled his restaurant liquor license.  Roncarelli sued Duplessis for violation of rule of law (Frank Scott represented Roncarelli), and won.
Canadian Bill of Rights
    •    Spearheaded by PM John Diefenbaker, and enacted in 1960
    •    S. 1:  rights to life, liberty, sec of person, enjoyment of property, equality before law, freedom of religion, speech, assembly, association and press have existed and continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex
    •    S. 2:  lists traditional common law legal rights:  habeas corpus, no arbitrary detention or imprisonment, no cruel or unusual punishment, no arrest without lawful reason, right to retain lawyer without delay, right not to be forced to incriminate self, innocent until proven guilty, ind and imp tribunal, reasonable bail, interpreter.  Right to a fair hearing in accord with fundamental justice to determine rights and obligations.
    •    “notwithstanding clause”
    •    Robertson & Rosetanni v. the Queen (1963)
        –    impugned:  fed. Lord’s Day Act
        –    Ritchie (for majority):  Freedom of religion “has existed;” therefore no violation
        –    Fr of Rel means an absence of disabilities, but govt’s can promote religious practices
        –    Although Act as a religious purpose, the effect is purely secular
        –    Cartwright dissented:  both purpose & effect of Act compel, under penal sanction, observance of a particular religious holy day
        –    Courts can strike down laws under Bill of Rights; otherwise the “notwithstanding” clause would not be necessary

    •    Drybones (1970)
        –    impugned:  section of Indian Act that made it an offence for an Indian to be intoxicated off a reservation.  No reservations in NWT.
        –    Drybones claimed equality before the law violated
        –    Ritchie (for majority):  Where it is “an offence…on account of race…to do something which all Canadians who are not members of that race may do…” there is a violation of equality.
        –    Ritchie adopts Cartwright’s reasoning from Rosetanni that notwithstanding clause means Bill of Rights is more than a rule of construction.
        –    Cartwright dissented.  Said he’d changed his mind since Rosetanni.  It would be dangerous for the courts to usurp legislature’s role by deciding what statutes violate Bill of Rights.
Canadian Bill of Rights (3)

    •    Lavell & Bedard (1974)  
        –    impugned:  part of Indian Act that states that if an Indian man marries a non-Indian, he retains status and his children inherit it, but if an Indian woman marries a non-Indian, she forfeits her status, as do her children.
        –    Ritchie for majority (5-4):  equality before the law, according to Dicey, means equality in the administration of the law.  
        –    If all Indian women are treated equally, there’s no necessary discrimination.  (Indian women aren’t compelled by law to marry non-Indians).
    •    Bliss (1979):  
        –    impugned:  part of Un Ins Act that stipulated longer qualifying period for work absence due to pregnancy.  SCC:  no discrimination, as the provision applies to everyone.
    •    Oil, Chem and Atomic Workers case (1963):  SCC says it’s OK for BC gov’t to prohibit union political contributions if received from check-off.
    •    1969:  SCC upholds Alberta discriminatory legislation against Hutterites
    •    Dupond (1978):  SCC upholds a Montreal by-law that allowed Council to ban all demonstrations for 30-day periods.
        –    Beetz:  Demonstrations are not “speech in action,” therefore no violation of freedom of speech
        –    Beetz dismissed the Duff Doctrine
        –    Laskin:  strong dissent
    •    SCC’s record under Bill of Rights led to support for idea of a constitutional Charter of Rights

The Road to the Charter
    •    1968:  Trudeau became PM.  He wanted:
        –    stronger federation
        –    patriation of constitution
        –    Const. Charter of Rights
        –    better-protected language and mobility rights
    •    1970:  Molgate-MacGuigan Committee found strong support for a const. Charter
    •    1971:   Victoria Charter
        –    agreement for Ch and pat.
        –    opposed in the end by Quebec and Alberta
    •    1976:  PQ elected in Quebec
    •    1980:  Referendum
        –    Trudeau promised renewed federalism
    •    1981:  
        –    negotiations; no agreement
        –    “unilateral” patriation attempt
        –    reference to 3 Prov Cts of Appeal; appeal to SCC
        –    SCC Ruling:
        •    legal, but breaks convention
        –    Nov. 1981 const conference
        •    compromise
November 1981 compromise
    •    Patriation of constitution with the amending formula favoured by most of the premiers (the 7-50 formula), but which Trudeau had opposed
    •    acceptance of a constitutional Charter of Rights which would contain a “notwithstanding” (non obstante) clause
    •    Trudeau insisted that the notwithstanding clause not cover language rights, minority language education rights, or mobility rights; notwithstanding clause would have a 5-year limit

The Charter of Rights
became law April, 1982
    •    1.  Limitations clause
    •    2.  Fundamental freedoms:
        –    conscience and religion
        –    thought, belief, opinion & expression
        –    press and other media
        –    peaceful assembly
        –    association
    •    3-5:  Democratic rights:  
        –    citizens right to vote and run for office
        –    5 yr limit to life of H of C or prov. Assembly except during war etc. if supported by 2/3 vote
        –    sitting of Parliament, and prov. Legislatures, at least every 12 months
Mobility and Legal Rights
    •    6.  Mobility rights
        –    1.  to enter, remain, leave
        –    2.  to move within Can. and pursue livelihood, subject to laws that don’t discriminate and residency provisions,  and restrictions in provinces of high unemployment
    •    7-14 Legal rights:  eveything in Bill plus
        –    freedom from unreasonable search or seizure (s. 8)
        –    trial within reas time
        –    jury trial if liable to 5 years imprisonment
        –    no retroactive offences
        –    no double jeopardy
        –    least punishment if law varied
Equality and Language
    •    15  Equality before and under the law
        –    without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability
        –    Affirmative action programmes OK
    •    16-22:  Language
        –    supplements S. 133 of CA, 1867, which is still in effect
        –    applies to Canada (fed) and New Brunswick only, though other prov’s can opt in
        –    Eng & Fr “official langs”
        –    Debates, statutes, Hansard in 2 langs
        –    Eng or Fr can be used in courts
        –    right to receive services or communicate in English or French with gov’t
Minority Lang Education, remedies
    •    23:  Minority lang ed
        –    citizens whose first lang is Eng or Fr, or who attended prim school in Eng or Fr, have right to educate children in that lang.
        –    Siblings rights
        –    applies where numbers warrant
    •    24:  remedies
        –    (1) “...such remedy as the court considers appropriate”
        –    (2) evidence may be excluded if its collection violated a right, if admitting it “would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”
    •    25:  aboriginal and treaty rights not reduced by charter, including rights under Royal Proclamation of 1763, and land claims agreements
    •    26:  other existing rights not reduced by Charter
    •    27:  multicultural heritage of Canadians to be kept in mind when interpreting the charter
    •    28:  equal guarantee to males and females (this section isn’t covered by the “notwithstanding” clause)
        –    29:  denominational school rights in CA, 1867 not reduced
        –    30:  Territories included, now and later
        –    31:  Charter does not extend legislative powers; it is a limit
        –    32:  Application to Parl, legislatures, gov’ts (& 3 year delay for s. 15)
        –    33:  a notwithstanding clause can be inserted into legis. re ss. 2 or 7-15; 5 year limit; can be renewed
        –    34:  ss. 1-34 of CA, 1982 cited as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, 2003:  example of application of Ss. 23 & 24
    •    Impugned provision:  order of a trial judge to force Nova Scotia to provide secondary schools in the French language, and report on its progress.
    •    Nova Scotia CA:  S. 24 doesn’t give judges the power to supervise implementation
    •    SCC:  5-4 decision:  upheld the authority of the trial judge under S. 24(2)
    •    Iacobucci & Arbour for majority of 5:
        –    if delay is tolerated, govt’s can avoid Charter obligations
        –    ordering gov’t to report on progress is a “creative blending of remedies,”and leaves gov’t with discretion as to how to build & provide schools, and their nature
    •    Lebel & Deschamps for minority of 4:
        –    violates separation of powers
        –    reporting order too vague
        –    judges shouldn’t meddle with administration
        –    a deadline for construction, and threat of a contempt order, is enough

The Charter and Its Critics
    •    The Charter undermines legislative supremacy & therefore democracy
        –    Mandel:  elected legislators are closer to the needs of the poor and oppressed.  Judges are business-oriented.  No Charter decision has/will benefit the disadvantaged
        –    Morton-Knopff:  Judges may be  “captured” by special interest groups, mostly on the left.  This subverts democracy.
        –    Charter erodes participatory democracy.  Human rights can only be protected by the vigilance of citizens
    •    Cost of litigation compared to the political process
        –    Lavigne case:  NCC spent $500,000; unions $400,000 +
        –    OFVAS case:  why didn’t artists use political process to change Ont censorship law?  Didn’t know how.
        –    But think of cost of lobbyists
        –    Charter litigation focuses attention on cases that happen to get to court, not necessarily most imp issues for society (Dean Monahan, Osgoode Hall Law School).  
        •    Cts should interpret Ch to promote democracy
    •    Courts are inappropriate for making policy on human rights
        –    Stare decisis is backwards looking, compared with the possibility of forward-looking policy formation processes in public service/legislature
        •    eg. Appropriate procedure for determination of refugee cases
        •    Schachter case (changes to parental leave policy)
        –    Adversary system
        •    gov’t lawyers argue for a narrow interpretation of Charter, whether or not this is gov’t policy
        •    courts rely on arguments from counsel.  Sometimes, no section 1 arguments
        •    Do judges get a complete analysis of the issues?

        –    Backgrounds of judges
        •    older than average adult
        •    disproportionately married with children
        •    predominantly male
        •    New Canadians and Aboriginals under-represented on bench
        •    most from business or professional family
        •    tend to be successful
        •    appointment process for Prov Courts and prov. Superior courts improving.  Elevation procedure, and SCC secretive
        •    Similar problems with lack of representation in legal profession
    •    Why do we tend to trust judges more than elected politicians?
    •    Was the Charter worth the upheaval it took to get it?
        –    Will revisit this question last week of class

Michael Mandel & the Legalization of Politics
    •    Judges are supposed to decide based on principle, and avoid policy.
        –    Hard to separate neatly
        –    Judges tend to be conservative on social and economic questions
        –    Judges tend to be “active” to support interests of business and capital, and “restrained” in relation to advancing the cause of the disadvantaged
        –    American precedents tend to support the advantaged
    •    Our legal system assumes all litigants are equal in ability to defend positions.
        –    This is why U.S. courts are reluctant to find affirmative action programs constitutional
    •    Charter is supposed to defend the socially weak against majority rule.  
        –    But the socially strong have more to gain
        –    Elected govts can act to advance the cause of the disadvantaged.  Charter allows them to avoid some issues.
Knopff & Morton:  Charter politics
    •    Agree with Mandel that Charter allows legislatures to pass difficult issues to courts
    •    Charter is a “two edged sword” -- can slash to the right or the left, depending on the judges
    •    Do we want judges to be the “official public philosopher?”
    •    Should judges be
        –    “non-interpretivists” (will of framers -- a straight jacket) or
        –    “non-interpretivists”  (creative, but perhaps against democracy)
    •    The Charter Revolution (1999):
        –    groups with axes to grind have used Charter to subvert democratic process
        •    feminist groups
        •    academics
        •    special interest groups (eg. Canadian Civil Liberties Assoc, gay and lesbian organizations, the gun lobby, NCC)
        •    groups representing “Charter” Canadians (the handicapped, seniors, new Canadians, Aboriginals)

Other Charter commentators
    •    Christopher Manfredi
        –    s. 33 makes Charter more democratic
        –    s. 33 became unpopular because of signs case
    •    Alan Cairns
        –    Charter has empowered “Charter Canadians”
    •    Peter Russell:
        –    Charter is here to stay, so how can we make sure it works well?
        •    Judicial appointment
        •    better judicial training
    •    My view:
        –    basic principle behind democracy is mutual respect.  Mutual respect leads to:
        •    democratic institutions
        •    respect for minority rights
        •    rule of law
        •    respect for freedom
        •    respect for integrity
        –    What is important is how well courts perform discretionary functions, not whether they have discretion.  Do judicial decisions promote mutual respect?

Application of Charter

Big M Drug Mart
Impugned:  Lord’s Day Act
Calgary drug store challenges Act as violation of S. 2
Does Charter apply to corporations?
“everyone” in S. 2 (fund freedoms) and “anyone” in S. 24 (remedies) includes legal persons
Bill of Rights precedents
Does Robertson & Rosetanni apply?
Dickson:  Charter doesn’t simply “recognize and declare” existing rights.  Applies to present & future legislation
Do we look only at effect of impugned legislation, as in Robertson & Rosetanni?
No:  purpose equally important.  Purpose is clearly to promote particular religious observances (from 1677)
Purpose of Charter:  tolerance, freedom, equality. 
Freedom is founded on “respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person.”
“Purposive” approach to application of Charter

Freedom of Religion
What is purpose of freedom of religion?
History: forcing religious belief does not work
Christians realized that their religion demands tolerance.  Everyone given a conscience by God; to compel belief therefore dishonours God
rel minorities need protection from tyranny of the majority
Preamble to Charter: “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law.”
Act therefore violates s. 2.  Can it be saved by s. 1?
Crown arguments:
need a day of rest conforming with needs of majority.
Dickson:  No; Charter is to protect religious minorities
society needs a weekly day of rest so families can spend time together.
Dickson:  good argument, but that’s a provincial responsibility.  LDA was a federal law under criminal power.  Now only provinces can regulate.
Operation Dismantle
1983:  peace groups challenged cabinet decision to test U.S. cruise missiles; violates s. 7.
1985:  SCC decision
Argument:  testing will destabilize status quo, making Canada vulnerable to attack from Soviet Union
Are cabinet decisions subject to the Charter, even when under the prerogative power?  Yes:  S. 32 includes “government,” broadly defined
Are politicial issues justiciable?
This is a U.S. approach
Any legal issue is justiciable in Canada
Should the case proceed to trial?
Dickson:  no, because the arguments of the peace activists are speculation; no proof that s. 7 would be violated.  No legal issue, no standing.  Wilson:  need proof that the tests would violate s. 7 rights of specific individuals
Use of Charter for publicity purposes

Oakes (1986)
Impugned:  reverse onus clause in fed Narcotic Control Act. 
If found guilty of possession of a narcotic, presumed guilty of trafficking unless accused can prove otherwise.  Claim of Oakes:  violates s. 11(d) presumption of innocence.
Oakes:  found guilty of possession of 8 one-gram vials of hash oil in 1981.  Challenged trafficking charge.
Does reverse onus violate s. 11(d)?  Yes.  Saved by S. 1?

In a free & democratic society, the gov’t objective must be of sufficient importance to justify limiting a right.

What is objective of reverse onus clause? 
Dickson:  Curb drug trafficking.  This is of sufficient importance.
Rational connection between objective, and means used?
Dickson:  no.  Possession of a small amount of a narcotic does not necessarily mean trafficking is involved.  This isn’t a rational way to get at the traffickers.
Because the impugned legislation has failed the first prong of the second part of the test, it’s not necessary to consider the other 2 prongs of Part II.

Other two prongs of Part II of the Oakes test:
the right that is limited should be impaired as little as necessary to meet the government objective
there must be an overall balance between the harm done by limiting the right, and the good achieved by meeting the legislative objective.  The cure can’t be worse than the disease.

Summary of Oakes Test for appliction of Section I of Charter:

    I.  Sufficient Importance Test:  The objective of the impugned legislation must be of sufficient importance to justify overriding a right.  (In order to appply this test, the judges first need to state what they think is the objective of the impugned legislation.)

    II.  The three-pronged proportionality test:
       a)  there must be a rational connection between the objective of the legislation that infringes a right, and the means used.
       b)  rights must be limited as little as necessary to achieve the objective of the legislation.
       c)  overall, the good accomplished by overriding a right must outweight the harm done by overriding rights.

R. v. Edwards Books and Art (1986)
Prov. Sunday closing legis co-existed with Lord’s Day Act (double aspect doctrine)
Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act
challenged by Edwards Books & Art, & 3 others
most retail business must close Sundays.  However, those with less than 5000 sq ft and less than 8 employees can stay open, if closed on Saturdays
Objective:  create a weekly holiday generally available
no religious purpose, so no direct violation of S. 2
there’s an indirect and unintentional violation, because legislation places a greater burden on non-Sunday observers
Section 1 Analysis:
Part I of Oakes Test: is objective substantially important?  Yes.
Edwards (2)
The opportunity for families to spend time together is “a pressing and substantial concern.”
Second part of Oakes test:
a) rational connection:  if objective so important, why are there so many exceptions (eg. factories non-retail businesses)?  1970 Ont Law Ref Comm Rep:  unions, need for entertainment on Sundays.  Rat conn test is passed.
b) minimal interference of rights:
Alternatives:  1. Anyone can refuse work on Sundays.  2.  Those employers with religious convictions can choose closure day.  3.  Remove size restriction for Saturday observers.  All alternatives inadequate, so test is passed. 
Dissenters:  Wilson:  favoured 3rd alternative.  “duty to accommodate” already there.  Beetz:  All that’s needed is right not to work on Sundays.  La Forest:  Cts shouldn’t second-guess legislatures.
c) overall balance:  majority agree test is passed

Dolphin Delivery (1986)
Impugned:  a court order made under common law that prohibited secondary picketing until legal issues determined
Does Charter extend to common law?  If so, does Charter cover common law in private law area?  (McIntyre wrote dec)
Common law:  yes. (s. 52): 
any law inconsistent with const is of no force or effect
common law in private law area?

S. 32:  what does “government” mean?  Charter applies to all enacted laws, whether private or public, but not to contracts made according to private law.
McIntyre rejects Montesquieu’s definition of government.  “Government” is commonly used to refer to executive branch only.  If “gov’t” refererred to courts, all judicial orders in private law are covered.  Not intent of framers of Charter.
Dolphin Delivery (2)
But Cts will apply same principles to private law decisions anyway
McIntyre:  If secondary picketing was governed by legislation, would prohibiting it violate the Charter?  First, ban on secondary picketing does violate S. 2 (Beetz dissenting).  However, the Oakes test is passed, because Union members can express themselves elsewhere (minimal impairment).
Wilson wrote separate concurring decision, applying the Oakes test in more detail.
BCGEU case (1988)
prov. govt employees’ union went on strike in 1983, and picketed Vancouver Courthouse.  CJ issued an ex parte injunction (not under private law) prohibiting picketing.  Union appealed, but lost, given the relevant parts of the Dolphin Delivery precedent.

McKinney v. University of Guelph (1987)
York and other universities had compulsory retirement provisions.  Unions applied for a ct order in 1986 that comp retirement violated Charter.
Does the Charter apply to universities?  No:  insufficient government control.
Is the provision in Ont Hum Rts Code that excludes those over 65 from employment discrimination a Charter violation?  Yes - s. 15
Oakes test:
a)  Objectives:  balance between rt to work and need for a pension, and affirmative action for younger workers.  They are pressing and substantial.
Part II: 
rational connection:  yes
minimal impairment:  yes
overall banance:  yes
Wilson dissented.  Universities covered.  Com ret doesn’t meet Oakes test.  L’Heureux-Dube:  universities not covered, but HRC exemption doesn’t pass Oakes

Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004].
Amselem & others set up succahs on balconies of co-owned building (like a condominium) during Jewish religious festival of Succot.  Building managers & other co-owners said this violated the rules re balconies, and were granted an injunction to prevent succahs on balconies.  Amselem & others appealed to Que CA & SCC under Quebec Charter, Can Charter and Quebec civil code.
Majority (5) led by Iacobucci:  Freedom of religion means managers must accommodate.  No hardships in this case.  Courts shouldn’t judge what religions require.  (Similarly, you have a right not to write an exam on a religious holy day that is important to you.)
Minority (4) led by Bastarache:  proper for courts to consider evidence about what religions require.  Other legitimate alternatives were available.  Quebec Charter & civil code protect right to enjoyment of property, and personal security, both of which Amselem and others violated by setting up succahs on balconies.

Québec Secession Reference (1998)

    •    Ref Q a result of Chretien-Dion “Plan B” strategy for combatting separatism
    •    Questions:
        –    1. Under Can Const, can Québec secede unilaterally, without a constitutional amendment?
        –    2.  Under Int law, can Québec secede unilaterally?
        –    3.  If conflict between (1) and (2), which takes precedence?
    •    Legal answers clear in advance.  Why, then, did SCC write such a lengthy judgment?
    •    1.  Can Québec secede unilaterally under constitution?
        –    Arguments in favour based on democracy.
        –    What is democracy?
        –    Our democracy is based on shared values.  Dem is self-governance, respect for human dignity, protection of minorities. Unilateral secession puts these values at risk.  Thus, there’s a duty to negotiate if a clear majority votes in favour of a clear question.  Clarity must be defined by the political process, not the courts.
        –    Was SCC too activist, or not activist enough re “clear question” and “clear majority”?
Québec Secession Reference (2)
    •    2.  Does international law give Québec the right to secede unilaterally?
        –    Amicus for Quebec:  right to self-determination belongs to all “peoples.”
        –    Do Québeckers constitute a “people”?
        –    SCC:  not necessary to decide, because even if yes, the right only exists where a “people” is mistreated.
    •    right to only arises under international law where “a people” is governed as part of a colonial empire, “is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where ‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self- determination within the state of which it forms a part.”
Québec Secession Reference (3)
    •    Spring of 2000:  Bill C-20:  “An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity….”
        –    Within 30 days of a prov legislature tabling a referendum question, H. of C. must declare whether question is “clear.”
        –    If question considered “clear,” and a majority votes in favour, H of C must determine whether majority is “clear.”  Consider:
        –    Size of majority
        –    Proportion voting
        –    Views of political parties
        –    View of Senate

Keegstra (1990)
    •    Keegstra was a high school teacher in Eckville, AB.  Taught stuedents anti-Semitic theories.
    •    charged with violating s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code -- “wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group by communicating anti-semitic statements to his students.”
    •    convicted at trial
    •    AB Ct of Appeal:  s. 319(2) violates S. 2 of Charter
    •    SCC:  The violation of S. 2 can be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
    •    4-3 decision:  Majority is CJ Dickson, Wilson, L'Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier; minority is La Forest, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ.
    •    Majority decision:  
        –    Section 2(b) should be given a “large and liberal” interpretation, and so it covers even hate speech.
        –    Oakes test:
        –    I)  Substantial importance test:  gov’t objective:  prevent harm caused by hate propaganda, is of sufficient importance
    •    Part II:  Proportionality test
        –    a) rational connection:  yes.  Prohibiting hate propaganda  prevents harm resulting from it.  (historical examples)
        –    b) fr of exp limited as little as necessary?  Yes:  only “most severe” forms of hatred covered.  Private communications not covered.  There’s a defence of “truth,”  if accused can prove on bal of probabilities.  Promotion must be willful, so mens rea protected.
        –    c) good outweighs harm.  Hate propaganda does not contribute to self-development, quest for truth, participative democracy.
    •    Dissent:  
        –    K’s communications offensive, but not threats.  Not violent, didn’t advocate violence.  Difficult to draw line between hate speech, and valid criticism. Speech that advocates changing the basic conceptions about our society must be protected.
Keegstra (3)
    •    Oakes Test:
        –    Gov’t objective is of sufficient importance.
        –    Part II:  (proportionality)
        –    a) rational connection:  not necessarily.  Hate might just go underground, or be disguised to fit the law.  Prosecution might create sympathy.  Publicizing the case might have the opposite of effect intended.  Valuable speech might be inadvertently supressed.
        –    b) S. 319(2) is overbroad.  Dn of “hate” is too subjective.  True statements about a group might result in hate.  
        –    c)  Harm outweights good.  Might have a “chilling effect.”  It prevents free and open debate.  No proof that S.319(2) promotes social harmony & indiv dignity.
    •    Reverse onus issue:  
        –    can’t be convicted if you prove statements are true.  Maj:  violates presumption of innocence, but passes Oakes test for same reason as the rest of 319(2) does.

Zundel (1992)
    •    Charged with violating S. 181 of Crim Code:  publishing “a statement, tale or news that he knows is false and causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest.”  Zundel published pamphlet, “Did Six Million Really Die?”
    •    convicted at trial; upheld by Ont CA.  Zundel:  S. 181 violates S. s(b) of Charter:  freedom of expression.
    •    SCC:  4-3 upholding Zundel’s claim.
    •    Majority:  La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, McLachlin.  Dissenters:  Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci. (Dickson, Wilson gone).
    •    Majority:  S. 181 infringes 2(b). All expression covered, except violent.  Purpose:  free expression to promote truth, pol & soc participation, and self-fulfillment.  Includes beliefs majority of Canadians find wrong, false or unpopular.  Content irrelevant.
    •    False statements that someone believes true can sometimes have value.
    •    Parliament’s purpose re 181:  copied UK legis to prevent slander against nobles, to preserve order.  Rejects “shifting purpose” argument.  Even if accepted that current purpose is to prevent harm, that’s not specific enough to pass Part I of Oakes Test.  S. 319(2) is more specific.
    •    Even if Part I had been passed, S. 181 fails on Part II.
        –    a)  rational connection:  no rational connection between promoting social harmony, and means used.  S. 181 could cover nearly any controversial statement.  It could have a chilling effect, producing the opposite of the result intended.
        –    b) certainly does not restrict rights as little as necessary to achieve objective
        –    c) clearly S. 181 does more harm than good.

Zundel:  dissenters
    •    S. 181 violates S 2(b) of charter.  However, it is saved by S. 1.
        –    S. 181 is vague, but a judge’s job is to define vague phrases in law, eg. “public interest.”  “A ‘public interest’ likely to be harmed as a result of contravention of s. 181 is the public interest in a free and democratic society that is subject to the rule of law.”  A democracy promotes free public discussion, equality, liberty and human dignity.
        –    S. 181 is clear enough to provide a substantially important objective (prevent harm [injury], promote tolerance) to pass Part I of Oakes.  Original medieval purpose has changed, as Parliament has amended the legislation over time.
        –    Part II Oakes test is also passed.
        –    a) rational connection: rational connection between suppressing deliberate lies that could result in unrest, and preventing harm.  Used rarely because hard to prove deliberate lies, and that they could result in unrest.
        –    b)  not overbroad:  courts can tell difference between opinion and fact.
        –    c) good outweighs harm.  Spreading willful lies does not further public debate.
Butler (1992)
        Impugned:  s. 163 of Crim Code:  prohibits sale of obscene materials, i.e. where a dominant characteristic is the undue exploitation of sex, or sex and crime, horror, cruelty and violence.
    •    Butler:  convicted of selling & renting hard core video & magazines in Winnipeg.  Butler's Argument:  s. 163 violates s. 2(b) of Charter.
    •    Trial judge:  obscenity restricted to materials that depict sex & cruelty, lack of consent, or dehumanization.  Convicted on 8 counts only (he'd been charged with over one hundred offences)
    •    Court of Appeal:  All of S. 163 is a reasonable limit.  Convict on all counts, not just 8.
    •    SCC (unanimous 9-judge decision):  clarified meaning of obscenity.   S. 163 infringed 2(b), but SCC’s dn of obscenity can pass the Oakes test.  Butler to be tried again.
    •    Sopinka (+6):  The test for obscenity:  Is exploitation of sex “undue” according to “community standards test”?  This is not what Can’s would tolerate for selves, but what they’d tolerate others being exposed to re harm to society.
    •    Consent is important, but not necessarily determinative.
    •    Re works of art: “internal necessities” test:  is the material required for serious treatment of a theme?
    •    Judges apply the “reasonable person” test:  what would a “reasonable person,” informed of the relevant facts, decide?
    •    sex & violence:  nearly always undue exploitation
    •    sex that’s dehumanizing: undue if risk of harm substantial
    •    sex that’s not violent or degrading is tolerated unless it involves children
    •    “internal necessities” test: judge must determine whether material is really necessary, or the work is an excuse for exploitation.  If in doubt, err on side of freedom of expression
    •    Oakes test passed:
    •    I:  Objective of preventing harm is pressing & substantial
    •    II:  a) rational conn exists between supressing obscene materials and preventing harm.  Community standards test is sufficiently clear.
    •        b)  rights minimally impaired.  Only potentially harmful material caught, and there’s an internal necessities test
    •        c)  good outweights harm
    •    Dissenters:  (L’Herueux-Dube & Gonthier):  generally agree with Sopinka, but think that sometimes materials that don’t combine sex and violence, or sex considered
        dehumanizing, can be obscene because there’s a community consensus that the materials may result in harm by contributing to the “deformation of sexuality.”

Sharpe (2001)
    •    late 1990s, John Robin Sharpe of Vancouver was charged with two counts of possession of pornographic materials under the part of S. 163 of CC prohibiting possession of child pornography, and with possession of these materials for the purposes of distribution.
    •    Sharpe argued the legislation intended to protect children was over-broad, unnecessarily interfering with his privacy and his freedom of expression.  Some of the stories/drawings came from his own imagination.  Won at trial and CA, crown appealed to SCC, heard in 2000.
    •    SCC:  4-3 legislation valid, but majority “read in” two restrictions:
        –    the leg would not be construed so as to apply to "(1) self-created expressive material: i.e., any written material or visual rep’tion created by the acc’d alone, and held by the acc’d alone,  exclusively for his/her own personal use; and (2)  private recordings of lawful sexual activity ... created by or depicting the accused, provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity and is held by the accused exclusively for private use."  (eg. of 17-year-olds legally married)

Little Sisters (2000)
    •    Impugned:  the section of the federal Customs Tariff Act that prohibits importation of obscene materials, and creates a “reverse onus” on importer to prove that materials are not obscene.
    •    Little Sisters bookstore:  imported gay/lesbian erotica, and had materials confiscated by customs officials.  Bookstore challenged the customs legislation as a violation of S. 2(b) of Charter:  freedom of expression.
    •    SCC:  6-3:  reverse onus provision is unconstitutional.  However, the prohibition against importing obscene materials is constitutional.
    •    The CT Act is a prima facie violation of the Charter, but passes the Oakes test.
    •    Objective of legislation:  prevent Canada from being inundated by obscene material from abroad
        –    I:  Substantially important: yes
        –    II:  proportionality:  a) customs procedures rationally connected to objective.  b) there’s minimal impairment if Butler test applied, and  c) there’s an overall balance
    •    Butler definition of obscenity must be applied by customs officers.  The wording of the Act allows for that.
    •    Customs officials delayed unnecessarily (30 days reasonable), and were “high-handed” in applying a stricter standard to homosexual than to heterosexual materials.  Actions of public servants ruled unconstitutional, not the law.
    •    Dissenters (Iacobucci, Arbour & LeBel)
        –    The Act is not minimally intrusive.  The Act contains neither procedural safeguards, nor a guarantee that customs officers understand the Butler test.
        –    Allowing appeals to a superior court rather than a specialized tribunal is “completely impractical” given the “sheer number of contested prohibitions.”
        –    The defects of the impugned legislation outweigh its benefits.  Some have been denied “important literature” (how to prevent AIDS), and some artists have their work labeled as “obscene” when it’s not obscene according to the Butler test.

Ford & Devine cases
    •    1977:  Bill 101, Charter of the French Language.  
        –    Prohibited English on most commercial signs to encourage immigrants to assimilate with the francophone culture.
    •    Quebec Charter of Human Rights (1975)
        –    guarantees freedom of expression
        –    Contains a limitations clause like s. 1 of Charter
    •    PQ:  Blanket override of existing legislation enacted in 1982
    •    1984:  Ford & Brown claimed right to post bilingual outdoor signs
    •    1978:  Devine & Singer displayed signs in English only & convicted under B 101
1988 SCC decision: Ford
    •    Is blanket override under s33 constitutional?
        –    SCC:  procedural only
        –    part of 101 subject to Can Charter; override expired.  1984 amendment:  subject only to Quebec Charter as 5-year override still valid.
    •    Freedom of expression
        –    Does it apply to ideas only, or language of expression too?
        –    Commercial expression too?
    •    Does 101 violate Fr of Exp in Canadian & Quebec Charters?  Yes
    •    Can the violation be justified by s.1 etc.?
        –    Sociolinguistic studies
        –    Substantial importance of preserving Fr culture: yes
        –    rational connection yes
        –    Limit rights as little as necessary:  no.  Studies conclude bilingual signs work if French predominates.
Devine & After
    •    Devine:  
        –    Following Ford, Devine must use bilingual signs
        –    101 violates fed criminal law power?  No:  92(13)
        –    Guarantee of equality in Quebec Charter of Rights violated?  Yes, but bilingual requirements are a reasonable limit
    •    Bourassa could have amended 101 to allow for bilingual signs, French predominating
        –    instead, used S. 33 to re-enact French-only signs law
        –    over next 5 years, debate in Quebec concluded SCC was right.  Even the PQ government did not re-enact the override.  This is how S. 33 is supposed to work.

RJR-MacDonald v. AG Can (1995)
    •    Impugned:  fed Tobacco Products Control Act, which regulated tobacco advertising
    •    Div of powers issue:  this is valid legislation under criminal law power.
    •    Charter issue:  decided 5-4 that legislation is a violation of 2(b) of Charter.
    •    All 9 judges agree that the legis violates 2(b).  Disagreed over application of Oakes test.
    •    Majority:  Part I:  objective is to prevent Can’s from being persuaded by tobacco advertising, and discouraging people who see package from smoking.
    •    Oakes Test:        These are important objectives, so Pt I passed.
    •    Part II:
    •        a) rational connection:  social science evidence not conclusive that the means used are likely to work (dissenters disagreed)
    •        b) minimal impairment:  no.  No evidence to show that less obtrusive measures are just as effective.
    •        c) harm of legislation therefore outweighs any good it does.
    •    Dissenters:  (La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Cory):  The legislation passes the Oakes test.  The courts must defer to the policy choices of legislatures in
    •    cases like this where leg. is trying to prevent something extremely harmful.  Oakes test must be applied less strictly.  Courts should not second-guess legislative policy choices.  
    •    Following SCC decision:  Parliament enacted new tobacco advertising legislation that complied with SCC decision.  
    •    Janet Hiebert, who wrote Charter Conflicts (2002):  Parliament didn’t need to defer.  Could have come back with a more persuasive case, as in the rape shield issue.

Mid-Term Exam
    •    What will be on the mid-term exam?
        –    Objective questions only (eg. Matching, fill-in-the-blanks)
        –    Know an overview of history of human rights in Canada, and events leading up to the Charter
        –    Know the main human rights cases prior to the Charter
    •    Know the content of the Charter
    •    Know the Oakes test for Section 1
    •    For the cases we’ve studied:  (everything including today)
        –    What is the impugned legislation?
        –    Was it upheld or struck down?  Were there dissents?  Why?
        –    What does the case teach us about how the Court interprets the Charter?

Legal Rights
    •    S.7:  right to life, liberty, & security of person unless deprived thereof through fundamental justice
    •    s.8:  Unreasonable search and seizure is forbidden.
    •    9.  Arbitrary (illegal) detention or imprisonment is forbidden.
    •    10. Everyone who is arrested or detained has the right:
        –    a)  to be told why immediately
        –    b)  to retain a lawyer and be told of this right     
        –    c)  habeas corpus (to be freed if illegally detained)
    •    11.  Persons charged with offences have the right
        –    a)  to be informed reasonably quickly of the charge
        –    b)  to a trial within a reasonable time
        –    c)  not to be a witness against oneself
        –    d)  to be presumed innocent until proven guilty before an independent and impartial judge 
        –    e)  to bail unless unreasonable
        –    f)  to trial by jury if liable to 5 yrs in jail
    •    12. No one can be subjected to cruel or unusual treatment or punishment.
    •    13. Evidence given by a witness in court can't be used against that witness later on.
    •    14. Everyone has a right to an interpreter.

Singh (1985)
    •    Refugee determination process
        –    pre-Singh:  those not approved abroad apply at airport; examined by an officer; transcript sent to Ref St Adv Comm.  Rec to Min.  Ap allowed to Ap Bd; can decide with minister’s evidence and transcript, & no oral hearing
    •    Both Charter & Bill of Rights issues
        –    court requested additional submissions on Bill.
        –    Impugned:  ref det process under Immigration Act
    •    Wilson:  decided under s. 7 of Charter.  “Everyone” includes refugee applicants.
        –    Is it life, liberty or sec of person at stake here?  Yes:  security of the person.
        –    Is this violation in accord with fundamental justice?  No.
        •    Fundamental justice- nat justice prin of “hear both sides.”  App has a rt to know case against self, and reply to it.  Therefore, oral hearing required.
        –    S. 1:  crown presented no arguments.

    •    Beetz:  Bill of Rights still there
        –    right to “a fair hearing acc to fundamental justice to det rights and obligations” violated
        –    Beetz strikes down part of Immigration Act; other judges concur
        –    decision resurrects the Bill of Rights.  Beetz also refers to statutory bills of rights as “constitutional or quasi- constitutional.”
    •    After Singh:
        –    Fed gov’t totally unprepared
        –    backlog in ref cases:  3 yrs
        –    some took advantage of backlog. But some bona fide refugees stopped at border (Charter does not apply outside)
        –    May 1987:  C-55, “safe 3rd cty”
        –    C-84:  apprehend ships at sea; penalty for assisting ref applicants who had not applied abroad
        –    tremendous opposition to bills
        –    CRDD created, but members mostly patronage appointments then.

Therens (1985)
    •    1982:  Therens collided with tree in Moose Jaw; taken to police station for breathalizer test.  Not told of right to counsel.
        –    If he’d refused test, would have been charged with refusing:  same penalty
    •    Police didn’t inform because operating on Bill of Rts precedents:  requesting a breath’zer test not “detention.”
    •    Le Dain:  B of Rts precedents don’t necessary apply to Ch
    •    Is preventing contact with counsel a “reasonable limit?”
        –    No:  not “prescribed bylaw,” and there’s time in 2 hrs.
    •    Would admitting the evidence bring admin of justice into disrepute? (s. 24 - 2)?
        –    Majority (Estey):  yes
        –    Dissent on this issue:  Le Dain says admit evid here; exclude in future.  McIntyre dissented too:  not to admit brings admin of justice into disrepute.
    •    Aftermath:  1000s of cases dropped

B.C. Motor Veh Act Case (1985)
    •    1982:  BC gov’t created an “absolute liability” offence:  if you drive with license suspended, automatic jail term.  Mens rea not applicable.
    •    Issue:  does an ab liab offence violate “fund justice” in s. 7 of Charter?  
    •    BC gov’t sent ref question to BC CA in 1982; app’d to SCC
    •    Should “fundamental justice” be interpreted in a procedural or substantive way?
    •    Procedural:  life, lib and sec of person can always be limited, if correct procedures followed
    •    Substantive:  in some cases, even correct procedures cannot justify limiting life, lib or sec of person
    •    debates in Parliament:  framers wanted S. 7 interpreted in a procedural way; fear of repeat of “Lochner era” in U.S., where U.S. judges interpreted “due process” in a substantive way, and stopped social welfare reforms

    •    Lamer:  legislative history should be admitted but given “minimal weight,” as no proof that a maj of MPs and Senators agree with the views of some
    •    Lamer:  combination of an absolute liability offence, and a jail term, results in a violation of fundamental justice.
    •    S. 1:  it’s possible that the crown could have proved a reasonable limit, but crown did not present any evidence on this issue.
    •    Therefore, a “reasonable limit” has not been established.

Valente (1985)
    •    Shortly after Charter came into effect, Valente went to trial, charged with dangerous driving.  He claimed that the Provincial Court judge he appeared before was not an “independent” tribunal under Charter S. 11(d).  The SCC declared that Prov. Ct. judges in Ontario are independent, even though the guarantees of their independence are different from those for Superior Court judges.
    •    The decision established that there are 3 “essential conditions” for jud ind:
        –    security of tenure: there must be impartial inquiry before a j can be removed
        –    financial security:  legislated right to a salary
        –    institutional independence:  judges must control those aspects of case flow directly affecting adjudication
Askov (1983-1990)
    •    Issue:  11(b)  rt. to trial within a reasonable time
    •    In this decision, court developed the “Askov” test for unreasonable delay. Consider
        –    length of delay
        –    explanation of delay
        –    was there a clear waiver of right to trial within reasonable time?
        –    has the delay prejudiced accused (hurt the case of the accused)?
    •    In this case:
        –    length of delay is unreasonable
        –    the cases of Askov et al have been prejudiced
        –    explanation:  Delays in Peel are shocking.  Relies on Carl Baar’s evidence
        –    no clear waiver of right
    •    Baar’s 1993 article commenting on Askov:
        –    judges misinterpreted the stats (Can Bar Rev 1993)

Rodriguez (1993)
    •    S. 241(b) of criminal code:  prohibits assisted suicide.
    •    Rodriguez:  dying of Lugerrig’s disease.  Wanted declaration that 241(b) violates her s. 7 right to security of person, & s. 12 rights (cruel treatment) & s. 15 rights (equality), because it prevents her from arranging an assisted suicide once life becomes unbearable, and she will be physically unable to end her life.
    •    Majority (5) Sopinka
        –    no infringement of any rights.  Even if s. 15 violated, s. 1 saves.
    •    Minority: (3 dec’s)
    •    McLachlin & L’Heureux-Dubé:  s. 241(b) violates fundamental justice (s. 7), & can’t pass the Oakes test for S. 1.
    •    Lamer:  s. 241(b) violates s. 15, & can’t be saved by s.1.

Mills (1999)
    •    Issue:  Privacy vs. right to fair trial
    •    O’Connor decision (1995): Ct requires 2-step process.  1. Acc’d to show pte rec’s likely to be of value in defence.  2. Judge will release records if satisfied that:
            Private record is necessary for full defence
        –    Extent of reasonable expectation of privacy allows
        –    Request for record not based on bias
        –    Victim’s dignity or sec of person not unreasonably affected
    •    Bill C-46 (1997):  did new legislation comply with O’Connor?
    •    C-46:  requires
        –    application in writing by accused for private records
        –    judge holds in camera hearing re whether to review
        –    if necessary, judge reviews the private record; accused doesn’t see it.
        –    judge decides whether record or parts should be provided to accused
        –    judge can order restrictions on media publication
    •    Court:  advocates dialogue with legislature
    •    C-46 is acceptable balance between privacy and rt to fair trial
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (2004)
(also known as the "spanking case")
    •    Impugned:  S. 43 of Crim Code that justifies “reasonable use of force” by parents and teachers against children.
    •    Foundation sought declaration that S. 43 violates ss. 2, 12 & 15 of Charter.
    •    SCC:  6-3 charter violations can be upheld under s.1 (Oakes test passed)
    •    McLaughlin +5: S. 43 adversely affects security of the person, but fundamental justice is protected.  Force is limited by what is “reasonable under the circumstances.”
        –    What’s “reasonable” is clear enough to pass muster.  What’s reasonable is determined by international treaty obligations, circumstances, expert evidence, social consensus, and case law.
        –    spanking is not “cruel and unusual” (s. 12)
        –    No violation of S. 15 (equality).  There’s no discrimination.  A child’s dignity not offended.  Children need guidance and discipline.

    •    Dissenters
        –    Binnie
        •    S. 43 violates s. 15 (equality).  Children are marginalized, and their dignity is offended.  However, S. 43 passes the Oakes test for parents.  The objective of preventing criminalization of corporal punishment is important.  Rights are minimally impaired because the law permits only minimal force.  Overall, the good outweighs the harm.  Not so for application to teachers:  expectations are different.  None of the Oakes test is passed for teachers.
        –    Arbour:
        •    S. 43 violates S. 7 of Charter (security of person).  Fundamental justice is violated because the section is so vague.  (What is reasonable force?)  Therefore, the limit is not “prescribed by law,” as required by S. 1 of the Charter.
        –    Deschamps
        •    There’s a violation of S. 15 based on age.  Children are vulnerable.  The objective of giving parents & teachers reasonable latitude in nurturing children is important.  There’s a rational connection between this objective and S. 43.  However, children’s rights are not limited as little as necessary, and overall, the current wording of S. 43 may do more harm than good.  Therefore, the Oakes test isn’t passed for Deschamps.