Reading Questions for David Hume, "Of Miracles" and for Immanuel Kant, "Introduction" to Critique of Pure Reason

1. In Hume's essay, how specifically does Dr. Tillotson argue against "real presence"? What does he mean by the phrase? How does this argument situate Tillotson in the tradition leading up to E. D. Hirsch?

2. For Tillotson, what is the difference between sensation and reporting? What is the ultimate arbiter of truth? Is this an embrace or a rejection of previous philosophical hierarchies?

3. Why is testimony typically acceptable as a way of getting at truth according to Hume? How is its efficacy limited?

4. How does testimony of the extraordinary or the marvellous strain our faith in testimony according to Hume?

5. How does Hume define a "miraculous event"? What part does experience play in this definition? Where do miracles come from according to Hume?

6. What does Hume mean by a "mutual destruction of arguments"?

7. For Hume, how does emotion contend with reason in the production of miracles? Which emotions?

8. Is Hume's cautioning against the dangers of eloquence a mere repetition of the Platnonic/Socratic warnings against orators? How are these thinkers specifically different?

9. What inspiration informs proper speech for Hume? How is such inspiration geographically distributed?

10. According to Hume, what does the civilized rhetoric of naturalism have in common with barbaric supernaturalism?

11. For Hume, how does the testimony of miracles destroy itself? If this is true, what kinds of testimony can survive?

12. How does miraculous testimony contaminate the writing of history according to Hume's essay? How are we to guard against such a threat?

13. How does Kant distinguish between empirical universality and strict universality?

14. What are Kant's instances of a priori knowledge in Part II of the "Introduction"? How do they differ? In what way(s) are they similar?

15. What does Kant mean when he writes, "a priori . . . principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself"?

16. For Kant, is our necessary concept of substance a "cause" of substance?

17. How is reason different from understanding according to Kant?

18. What does Kant mean by "the construction of our fictions"?

19. How does metaphysical investigation ease its anxiety by referring to objects in Kant?

20. According to Kant, why must synthetic judgments go "outside" themselves? How do mathematical syntheses go outside themselves without reference to the empirical world? What does Kant mean by "intuition"?

21. How does Kant use "natural disposition" to explain the existence of metaphysics? Why does he find this strategy inadequate?

22. Why must Kant's study be a "critique" rather than a "doctrine" of pure reason?