At the Crossroads of the Radical
The Challenges of Castoriadis’s Thought

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World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination
by Cornelius Castoriadis
edited and translated by David Ames Curtis
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997, hbk £45.00 pbk £14.95

Fait et à faire: Les Carrefours du labyrinthe V
by Cornelius Castoriadis
Paris: Seuil, 1997

CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS’S death on 26 December 1997 silenced one of the most consistently original and critical voices of the postwar era in Europe. Despite his considerable reputation on the Continent, as well as the efforts of some interpreters,1 Castoriadis’s writings remain relatively unknown in the English-speaking world when compared to those of other scions of the contemporary Parisian scene.2 In many ways, his peripheral status reveals more about the current state of play in the field of intellectual production and consumption than the value of his oeuvre per se. Castoriadis is a thinker who has always worked against the grain, eschewing the main theoretical trends which have swept through the Western world in the last half-century – whether one thinks of existentialism, orthodox Marxism, structuralism, Lacanism, postmodernism or neo-Kantianism.3 Furthermore, his work cannot be neatly located within the reductionist Paris/Frankfurt mould shaping many discussions of critical theory, since it defies simplistic genealogical or typological classifications; his is a uniquely rich stance inspired by Aristotle, Kant, Freud, Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Merleau-Ponty – and much else in between and since then – which must be
encountered on its own terms rather than derived from any preconceived interpretative grids.

The two books under consideration assemble essays published by Castoriadis over the last decade, extending the themes presented in *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (1987 [1975]), the work in which most of his conceptual and theoretical apparatus is elaborated. *World in Fragments* (*WIF*) is composed of a series of texts published in the last four volumes of Castoriadis’s *Les Carrefours du labyrinthe* series (1986, 1990, 1996, 1997), of which *Fait et à faire* (*FAF*) is the latest instalment. Given this, both works overlap with one another in terms of the ideas pursued and the chapters themselves. However, this need not be viewed pejoratively, for Castoriadis’s thought can most fruitfully be understood as spiral-like rather than linear: it unceasingly goes back on itself, not to reinforce a hermetic whole, but in a genuine striving toward self-clarification, reflection and engagement with social life (Redeker, 1997: 24). ‘The world – not only ours – is fragmented. Yet it does not fall to pieces. To reflect upon this situation seems to me to be one of the primary tasks of philosophy today.’ Opening *World in Fragments*, this fragment represents not only as a description of Castoriadis’s Weltanschauung, but of his work as a whole. What stands out, then, is the sheer breadth and depth of a mind appearing to know no bounds. In this age of self-proclaimed interdisciplinarity, Castoriadis’s encyclopaedic knowledge of the human and natural sciences is dazzling: from psychoanalysis to theoretical physics, from linguistics to Greco-Western history, not to mention European philosophy, seemingly treacherous waters are navigated with constant poise.

Rather than examining the two books separately, and given the chronological as well as thematic intimacy which exists between them, I will focus upon three main clusters of ideas emerging out of their reading: (1) Castoriadis’s radical ontology; (2) his project of individual and collective autonomy; and (3) his analytical contribution to a hermeneutics of modernity.

**An Ontology of Creation**

As many analysts have noted, ontological reflections strikingly pervade Castoriadis’s writings. His project aims at displacing abstract rationality from its pedestal as the core constituent of our view of human nature; not logic, as is conventionally believed, but the creative power of the radical imaginary is what distinguishes us from other living species (*WIF*, pp. 127–8; *FAF*, p. 261). Interestingly, this putting forth of the imaginary is accomplished by inflecting the tradition of philosophical anthropology with psychoanalytical accents. In ‘The Discovery of the Imagination’, a key chapter of *World in Fragments*, Castoriadis demonstrates that the act of stumbling upon ‘the scandal of the imagination’ (*WIF*, p. 245) has caused many a canonical figure in the history of Western philosophy to baulk: one after the other, Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty came across the imaginary side of human life, yet either systematically overlooked or obscured its existence. Even Freud, the master-analyst of the
unconscious, followed his philosophical counterparts in theoretically repressing the imagination; it remained for him the Great Unsaid, the disruptive and uncontrollable force which needed to be brought under the empire of rationality (WIF, p. 249; FAF, pp. 149, 151). While Castoriadis’s argument is convincing, one wonders whether his claims could be qualified by an examination of what Taylor (1989) has termed the ‘expressivist turn’ in modern European philosophy; indeed, the Romantic celebration of experience, expression and authenticity initiated by Rousseau and Herder did put a premium on the imaginary as a source of inspiration transcending the strictures of the narrowly rational or the already given.

Castoriadis’s psychoanalytically infused ontology insists that beyond the purely logical – the ‘ensemblistic-identitarian’ (or ‘ensidic’, for short) dimension – is always already found another, irreducible imaginary dimension whose magmas of signification burst forth with untamed energy (FAF, p. 214). From this elementary reality flows the revolutionary potentiality of creation; a theory of existence as creation, fuelled by the radical imaginary, is thereby developed. Out of the fact that being is ‘abyss, or chaos, or the groundless’ (WIF, p. 3), human beings and societies forge institutions as well as social imaginary significations. Nietzsche’s claim that ‘when you look into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you’ (1954a: 89) provoked angst in some, whether Sartre’s sense of the weighty burden of human liberty (1943) or Kundera’s ‘unbearable lightness of being’ (1984). By contrast, Castoriadis believes that the act of staring into the abyss is the catalyst which precipitates our thinking and acting beyond the confines of ensidic logic, our breaking away from the tyranny of mimesis and the eternal reproduction of what exists so as to create new socio-historical forms; in other words, this is the move from ‘the instituted’ to ‘the instituting’ (FAF, pp. 17, 23). We need not God to save us, only our capacity to imagine and to live freely.

For Castoriadis, this ontology of creation expresses the ordinary fact that each society constitutes a universe of being and significations for itself in order to exist socio-historically (FAF, pp. 212, 267). Extending Kant’s rationalist dictum, ‘Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!’ (1991: 54, emphasis in original), Castoriadis’s call challenges us: in essence, ‘dare to be fully human’ and, as such, ‘dare to freely and consciously create both yourself and your society’. According to him, a rupture is produced at the very moment when self-consciousness about the human origins of all social institutions comes forth, from which follows an explicit problematization of inherited patterns and practices (FAF, p. 20). Socrates’ celebrated saying, ‘an unexamined life is not worth living’, represents, in Castoriadis’s mind, the beginning of the dual philosophical and democratic projects; while the first is motivated by the critical interrogation of established norms and meanings, the second enables collective reflection and deliberation about such fundamental questions. Being activities that dare to ask both why we live and how we should live collectively as human beings, philosophy and democracy break the closure of signification required for the institution of society (WIF, p. 17). Castoriadis underlines the interrogative
drive in the imaginary, the putting of ourselves and our institutions into question without pre-given answers – perhaps knowing that we cannot know once and for all, yet still asking the questions precisely because of the risk and aporia which they entail (FAF, pp. 130–1, 139–40).

All in all, the pivotal role of his ontological reflections needs to be set within the context of his overarching intent. Nowhere in World in Fragments or Fait et à faire does ontology constitute an end in itself; rather, it serves as the foundation upon which the other dimensions of his thought are constructed. Creation may be part of human nature, but the institutional forms that it may take are neither solely ontological or ethical matters – rather, they are eminently political ones.

The Project of Autonomy

In Castoriadis’s eyes, then, both philosophical questioning and democratic politics initiate a break with mimetic thought fuelled by the imagination’s creative thrusts. It is at this point that the notion of autonomy, the heart of Castoriadis’s socio-political project, comes to the fore as a possibility generated under participative, critical conditions of individual and social existence. While closely interdependent, two dimensions of Castoriadis’s vision of autonomous life can be distinguished. First, autonomy consists in establishing a different relationship between the human psyche and the unconscious; through explicit reflection upon its desires and impulses, the self can lucidly decide which to follow (FAF, pp. 143, 154; WIF, p. 122). This model of an autonomous subjectivity differs widely from better-known theories about the relationship between the unconscious and social life: Freud’s analysis of the necessary non-gratification of our instinctive drives in civilization (1994), or the more libertarian-anarchistic doctrines of Marcuse (1955) as well as of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘schizoanalysis’ (1983). For Castoriadis, it is neither a matter of inherent repression or liberation of the libidinous drives of our psyche, but of awareness of their content and of self-conscious choice. In such a context, his categorical imperative, ‘become autonomous, and . . . contribute as much as you can to the autonomy of others’ (FAF, p. 59), fully comes into its own.

The cultivation of a reflexive self cannot therefore be isolated from the project of collective autonomy, which he defines most concisely as ‘posing one’s own law for oneself’ (WIF, p. 329). In other words, society must become perpetually self-instituting, recognizing that it is the source and origin of its own existence; according to Castoriadis – and here echoing Durkheim’s sociocentrism – this entails creating norms, values and rules without any authority that is external to the socio-historical domain itself. However, autonomy should not be conflated with notions of independence or absolute individualized freedom. It does not consist in doing whatever we please, but rather, as Kant knew well, in acting within the bounds that we explicitly determine for ourselves (FAF, p. 62; WIF, pp. 332, 340–1); liberty is thus constructed within the social fabric, not against or outside of it. Hence, far from inspiring despair or guilt, or even creating the need for an overman,
Zarathustra’s cry of ‘God is dead!’ (Nietzsche, 1954b: 124) can be perceived as an opportunity for humanity to take full responsibility for its destiny by questioning the inherited social order, and formulating the guiding social and cultural frameworks within which it will decide to live.

Castoriadis contends that the drive toward autonomy was exclusively launched during two historical periods, first in ancient Greece, then subsequently in late medieval Western Europe. Yet if this is the case, one must ask: how, that is to say, by what means, can the project of autonomy be extended beyond the brief and culturally circumscribed interludes within which it has been contained? Moreover, why have almost all individuals and human communities chosen to live heteronomously? To the first query, Castoriadis responds agnostically by claiming that the striving toward autonomy simply came about as a rupture, and that to explain how it did so in ancient Greece or during the first European Renaissance is nonsensical. Habermas (1987a: 332–3) and Joas (1989: 1194) have convincingly outlined the problems with such an argument. Apart from a latent attachment to revolution, Castoriadis does not conceive of the socio-political vehicles through which such a break could take place; the trigger toward participatory democracy, equality and liberty is largely absent from his theory.

Furthermore, in a way reminiscent of Gramsci (1971), Castoriadis does not attribute the widespread appeal of heteronomy to coercion as such, but rather to consent achieved through mechanisms of socialization (notably the ways in which contemporary capitalist societies excel in initially generating and subsequently satisfying the needs of their members). Nonetheless, his analysis of socialization could have been extended in at least two directions. At an existential level, the consistent human urge to fall back upon extrasocial sources of signification and authority can be related to our unwillingness to confront the responsibility of ultimately being free and the consequent requirement of forging meaning out of our own lives. This ‘fear of freedom’ can make us recoil from the permanent daring necessary for an autonomous existence (Fromm, 1942; Sartre, 1943). From another perspective, strategies of socialization aim not only at the endorsement of established social significations and institutions, but also at the self-disciplining of subjects via the mental and bodily internalization of rules of collectively validated conduct; the social arena produces specific subjectivities which are guided by concepts of normality and obedience (Foucault, 1977), thereby making the pursuit of autonomy a daunting task.

The radical openness demanded by social autonomy – and fostered by philosophical and democratic activities – is contrasted by Castoriadis to the act of closure characterizing heteronomous societies ‘in which the nomos, the law, the institution, is given by another’ (WIF, p. 86). Social heteronomy is defined by the delimitation of a threshold of inherent belief beyond which the self-institution of society cannot be challenged; because they are sacred, accepted per se and in toto, extra-social factors (God, nature, history, reason, tradition, etc.) are illusorily perceived as the sources of the instituted society (WIF, pp. 319–20; FAF, pp. 42–3). Castoriadis
believes that this heteronomous condition, this closure of signification and occultation of human self-constitution, is the main attribute of the overwhelming majority of societies throughout history; heteronomy is the rule of social organization, and autonomy the exception.

The dichotomous character of Castoriadis’s societal typology, whereby communities are studied as either autonomous or heteronomous, must be closely interrogated. It remains unclear whether the two ideas are best understood as mutually exclusive meta-societal realities which can be employed to characterize a specific society taken as a whole, or whether – given the fact that, according to Castoriadis, autonomy has never been fully realized socio-historically – they are intra-societal dynamics which play off each other within each social formation. Indeed, he admits himself that if the seeds of an autonomous social order were planted in ancient Greece and late medieval Western Europe, the harvest has yet to be bountiful; it could be argued that, albeit each for different reasons and to different extents, Castoriadis’s two instances of collective autonomy were powerfully moulded by forces of heteronomy.

Moreover, Castoriadis’s thought restricts itself to a single civilizational horizon, that of the ‘Greco-Western tradition’ which contains the prospect of autonomy, while other sociocultural communities (whether identified as ‘traditional’ or ‘archaic’) are branded as similarly heteronomous (Arnason, 1989b: 43–4). If such a distinction needlessly homogenizes the internal diversity of these communities, it also underestimates the open and critical potentialities of several non-European philosophical and political models. It remains ironic that Castoriadis convincingly deplores the modern West’s relative ignorance and provincialism in relation to the vast multitude of current and past human modes of life (FAF, pp. 42–3, 217), while at the same time rarely venturing outside the bounds of a European frame of reference himself.

A Hermeneutics of Modernity

Fait et à faire and World in Fragments substantially contribute to the elaboration of the third major component of Castoriadis’s framework: his analysis of modernity as constituted by the conflictual intertwining of two imaginary significations, autonomy and rational mastery. While the former is exemplified by the emancipatory drive toward the radically democratic self-creation of society, the latter (which he sarcastically names ‘pseudo-rational pseudo rationality’) is embodied by capitalist and bureaucratic logics (Arnason, 1989a: 323; WIF, p. 61; FAF, pp. 219–20).

To this extent, and although the parallels are not exact, Castoriadis’s perspective can be connected to other interpretations of the modern epoch highlighting the tense interplay between two socio-political horizons. The most prominent ‘classical’ illustration of this can be found in Weber’s examination of the interrelation between instrumental-purposive and practico-ethical rationality, whereas more recent examples include Habermas’s system and lifeworld dynamic (1987b), Touraine’s study of the
relationship between rationalization and subjectivation (1995) and Wagner's analysis of the processes of liberation and disciplinization (1994). Because it considers the process of subjectification as both potentially constraining and enabling, even Foucault’s later work on ‘technologies of the self’ (1982, 1988a, 1988b) can be included within this set of dialogical and multi-layered perspectives on modernity – of which Castoriadis’s is perhaps the most hermeneutically rich.

Where Castoriadis’s argument becomes less convincing is in his pronouncements on the contemporary era. The period from 1950 to the present is designated as one of ‘retreat into conformism’ (WIF, p. 39) during which the dual institution has been damagingly skewed toward one of its poles; meaningful and conflictual debate about the fundamental orientations of society – in a word, the underpinnings of the project of autonomy – is believed to have virtually disappeared from the terrain of the political, confronted by the conquest of rational mastery in most spheres of social life (WIF, pp. 36–9; FAF, p. 76). Moreover, Castoriadis contends that ‘generalized conformism’ in the socio-historical arena is neatly complemented by two philosophical currents, French Nietzscheanism and a neo-Kantian ‘post-metaphysical humanism’ (Mongin, 1996). Though guided by diametrically opposed logics, they are taken together as symptomatic of the existing crisis of imaginary significations, as well as the widespread depoliticization of the public sphere (WIF, pp. 42, 110).

Such an assessment of the current epoch as the nadir of autonomy, under assault by the combined forces of bureaucratization, individualism and the fetishization of the economy, is needlessly bleak. In fact, a more measured evaluation of present sociocultural developments in the Western world could be generated within the framework of his own notion of the dual institution of modernity; an examination of the factors tending toward democratic contestation and self-creation, in addition to those phenomena driven by the logic of instrumental rationality, would have provided a less deterministic reading. Yet Castoriadis is attached to a holistic conceptualization of socio-political change, enabling him to argue that recent social movements have ended in ‘semifailures’ in light of their supposed incapacity to institute new imaginary significations (WIF, p. 39). From this follows his ambivalence about the possibility that more circumscribed struggles for autonomy, aimed at the self-constitution of particular institutions or imaginary significations, are valid in and of themselves; more often than not, he suggests that they can only contribute to the complete actualization of autonomy by adopting more totalizing political outlooks which would extend critical or emancipatory practices to every part of the social whole. The contributions of social actors who may not be committed to a wholesale transformation of the instituted order, but to the realization of limited objectives at the local, national and global scales of politics, are thereby systematically undervalued. However, applying Castoriadis’s own framework, it may be useful to remember that every society and historical moment is a complex and unstable amalgamation of several trends, combined in ever-varying
configurations – the present no less than the past, the non-European world no less than the West.

**Conclusion**

Both *World in Fragments* and *Fait et à faire* bear testimony to the fact that Castoriadis has written an iconoclastic, multifaceted and uncompromisingly radical body of work which merits a wide readership. The voice streaming out of these two books is not that of a master waiting in the wings to step on to the stage of history, even less is it that of a leader of a school demanding strict allegiance. What Castoriadis does, instead, is invite us to think and act for ourselves, thus fostering the eternal, all-too-human quest for knowledge and freedom, for self-expression and self-determination. The gauntlet has been thrown down; it remains for us to pick it up, in memoriam, and use Castoriadis’s work to assist us in unflinchingly facing both the calm and the storm of our century’s end.

**Notes**

I would like to thank Diane Pacom for sparking my interest in Castoriadis’s thought, as well as Peter Beilharz and Johann Arnason for fostering it.


2. One commentator has declared that, despite his relative marginality, ‘Cornelius Castoriadis must be ranked amongst the most powerful figures of French intellectual life in this second half of the 20th century’ (Redeker, 1997: 24).

3. Castoriadis was both poststructuralist and post-Marxist *avant la lettre*, already denouncing the excesses of the linguistically driven structuralist enterprise as well as those of bureaucratic Stalinism during the 1950s and 1960s.

4. Habermas has gone so far as to describe Castoriadis’s philosophy as expressivist, contending that autonomy aims at making possible ‘authentic self-realization and freedom in solidarity’ (Habermas, 1987a: 330).

5. Therefore, the claim that Castoriadis’s ontology leads to a ‘mystical cosmology’ (Honneth, 1986: 77) is misplaced to the extent that it trivializes, even devalues, the psychoanalytic (rather than strictly philosophical) nature of his contribution to our understanding of being.

6. As we will see below, Castoriadis sidesteps this problem by suggesting that modernity is characterized by the tense interplay of two imaginary significations, rational mastery and the project of autonomy. Nevertheless, the point is that not only rational mastery, but heteronomy itself can be considered an intra-societal institutional dynamic.

7. It should be noted that Castoriadis is not condemning rationality itself, for the latter contributes to autonomy through the anthropocentric belief in the capacity to understand the world solely by way of human reason. Rather, he is criticizing the
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absurd effects of rationalization, whereby the excessive spread of and faith in pur-
pose-instrumental rationality (Weber’s Zweckrationalität) begins to have irrational
consequences.

8. While Castoriadis is sympathetic to Ferry and Renaut’s critique of what they dub
‘68 thought’ (1985), he does not share their diagnosis of the events of May ’68, and
even less their embrace of Kant and German idealist philosophy.

9. His understanding of the peculiarity of modern Western societies, which have
subordinated all facets of social life to its economic dimension, shares much with
Polanyi’s pioneering work in economic anthropology (1944) as well as Dumont’s
more recent treatment of the question (1977).

10. This refers, of course, to the famously and eerily prescient quip which an
exasperated Lacan made in 1969, when holding his seminar at a rowdy Vincennes
lecture theatre: ‘What you aspire to, as revolutionaries, is a Master. You will have
him’ (quoted in Dosse, 1997: 150).

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