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9

From Traditional Bilingualism to National Monolingualism

ISRAEL BARTAL

National movements springing up in nineteenth-century Europe associated what they termed the "National Revival" with a crucial set of features, without which such a revival could not take place. Outstanding among these, along with territory and historical heritage, was the "national tongue." Generally, this "national" tongue was a particular dialect that became the state language and ousted alternative dialects—or else the language of an ethnic group that had been ousted by the "state language" and whose revival or renewal entailed a struggle for "national rights." These two types of "national tongue" arose in tandem with the historical disparity between national-movement types in modern times. The national "state language" arose decades or centuries before the age of modern nationalism as part of the processes that brought about the emergence of the new centralized state, attaining cultivation and final form at the hands of the authorities under the enlightened absolutist regimes of the late eighteenth century; nineteenth century Romanticism and historico-national dogmas had already added a "national" layer to an existing state of affairs. The languages of the ethnic groups who in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries waged a struggle for their uniqueness or even for mere recognition of their legitimate right to a separate existence had, by early modern times, gone through a stage of declining prestige and now lagged behind, relatively speaking, in their development. Supporters of the development of these languages generally appealed to the historical legacy of an earlier age, in which these languages seemed to be main languages, recognized and endowed with cultural value and prestige.

The history of cultural nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe is replete with outstanding examples of the confrontation between these two types of "national tongue," which were even known to intermingle—as time and political development would have it. The Ukrainian language, for instance, was officially ousted by Russian. Just as the Ukrainians were dubbed "Little Russians," so too their language was adjudged in the nineteenth century to be a colloquial unworthy of cultivation; indeed, restrictions were imposed by the Russian authorities on promoting it and publishing in it. The renewed efflorescence of Ukrainian as a national cultural tongue drew upon the image of bygone prestige—but also upon its claim

to be a historical alternative to the state language, identified with the suppression of the Ukrainian nation by the Russian regime. It was only from the mid-nineteenth century that Polish ceased to function as a state language of administration in broad areas of Eastern Europe, despite Russian control. In Lithuania, Polish was a language of administration and of the higher echelons of society, at least until the Polish Revolt of 1831—following which its status diminished sharply in the western provinces of Russia. An attempt was later made, after the failed Polish Uprising of 1863, to replace Polish by Russian in the autochthonous areas of Poland too, but the stage intermediate between “state language” and “national tongue” barely existed in this case.

The great interest shown by the national movements in the place of language in national life, and the propensity to view the past through a national prism, made their mark of course upon national historiography. “Revivals” of nations and cultural and literary “rebirths” occupied center stage in the historical consciousness. Anything preceding the “revival” stage was portrayed as leading toward modern nationalism or conversely as incompatible with it. Social radicalism, allied to Romantic world-views in the various national movements, equated the language of the “nation” with the tongue of the “people” and linked national and social suppression with the decline of national tongues. To an observer unencumbered by the national-radical image of the past, it sometimes seems bizarre that the potent influence of national ideas could so befog the mind, erasing anything that was out of line with the national direction. Yosef Klausner (1930) was able to write a massive study on the rebirth of Hebrew literature, dismissing as culturally irrelevant the fact that the prime architects of the modern national culture used another *Jewish* language besides—or more than—Hebrew in their writing; in describing the poetic creation of Naphtali Herz Wessely, Klausner paid no attention to the fact that Wessely’s *Shirei Tiferet* also needed expounding against the backdrop of the Yiddish biblical poetry widespread in Ashkenaz in the generations that preceded the Haskalah.¹ Eli-ezer Ben-Yehuda (1949: 12), in the Great Introduction to his thesaurus, all but ignores the fact that in the absence of a living Hebrew another language is being spoken by his compatriots. Only when he enumerates the sources of his thesaurus does the existence of a “popular tongue” suddenly surface, termed (like other such vernaculars) “corrupt languages spoken among our people, Sephardim, Ashkenazim, Yemenites, etc.” But even in the field of Jewish history many more years would pass before attention was turned to the complex nexus of history and language—a complexity to which the diverse national images cannot do justice. There is no comprehending the place of language in the Jewish national revival unless one addresses the social changes that have come upon Jewry in its encounter with modernity, changes in which language, or better, languages, have played so significant a role.

The “opening situation” of the Jewish people in Europe and the Mediterranean rim on the eve of modern times is of a corporation with uniquely defined and agreed features, in the Jewish mind as in the mind of the Gentile environment. One distinctive marker, unchallenged as a principle or a value, is the linguistic: just as Jews dress distinctively, dwell apart and eat just of their own, they have a language all of their own. Notwithstanding, the corporation’s linguistic reality is quite unlike what

one finds in some national historiographies: it is a *bilingual* reality. In this “diglossia” two languages function side by side: the “vernacular,” the everyday spoken language and the language of writing in certain spheres, and the “holy tongue” (*leshon ha-kodesh*), the language of liturgy and religious composition. The vernacular varies according to place and period, changing form like any living language; it has set functions and a known social status; there are things that may be said only in the vernacular, while other things are never written in it. The vernacular has considerable space for Hebrew and Aramaic influence but draws its main influence from the languages of the environment and maintains itself even after a change of environment due to migration, expulsion, change of surrounding population (or its language), or change of regime. The vernacular contains layers of earlier colloquials, such as Judeo-Greek in the Judeo-Spanish of Anatolia and the Balkans, or memories of Slavic tongues in the ancient stratum of Yiddish. *Leshon ha-kodesh* is the language that embraces Hebrew with its various historical components, from the biblical and up to the rabbinic of late medieval times—and Aramaic of various kinds.

The modern period heralds a dramatic switch in this diglossia of the Jewish corporation. New ideas, finding material expression in the policy of European governments toward the medieval corporations as a whole and the Jewish community in particular, seek to snap the bond between vernacular and *leshon ha-kodesh*. The European Enlightenment heralds a challenge to the legitimacy of dialects and argots; rules of the “enlightened despot” type aid and abet the imposition of the “state language” as an obligatory language of administration and cultural medium. The demands of the men of Enlightenment, Jewish and Gentile, over the language issue sit well with the goals of enlightened absolutism: replacement of the vernacular by the “state language”—or in the concrete terms of the day, a demand that the Jews of the Austrian Empire replace the use of Yiddish by German in documents, bills of sale, and communal records and adopt German as their spoken tongue. Maskilim and state officials alike deemed Yiddish unseemly, both linguistically and socially. Insofar as the Maskilim saw the vernacular as the expression par excellence of human reason, the spoken language of Ashkenazi Jewry bore witness to their base spiritual circumstances:

And this language which we speak in this land [Russia], borrowed from the Germans and called German-Jewish, is utterly corrupt, being mingled with corrupt words lifted from Hebrew, Russian, French, Polish and the like, and even the German words are worn and shapeless, and thoroughly disfigured; nor is this language of ours of any use save for simple chatter, and as if this were not all, when we wish to name some sublime concept, our language deserts us. . . . And of those who lack knowledge of those languages [of Europe] we may say what the prophet Isaiah (28:11) said: “for with stammering lips and another tongue will he speak to this people,” and thereby they earn the contempt of the nations among whom we dwell . . . for the man who lacks a pure and lucid language and script is a man despised.

Thus Isaac Baer Levinsohn in his book *Te’udah be-Yisra’el* (pp. 34–35) composed in the 1820s. Yiddish, the vital component in the traditional diglossia, is not a rational language, nor an aesthetic one, and cannot supply the needs of self-

expression and communication. The Jewish Enlightened in Russia require knowledge of a language of “elegance” and “breadth”—one of the European languages. And which European language is best substituted? For the Maskilim of Berlin and Koenigsberg, the matter was a relatively simple one, for Yiddish in those parts was perceived as just another dialect, or argot, of German. What was demanded of the Jews was not essentially different than what their other compatriots were supposed to do: to adopt the “state language” as evolved in Berlin in the eighteenth century.

However, in the multilingual empires of Eastern Europe the situation was a different and infinitely more complex one. The replacement of the vernacular component in the traditional diglossia involved deciding which was the alternative: Russian, Polish, or even German? And the distance between East European Yiddish and Slavic languages did not afford so simple a transition as from Western Yiddish to German, the transition recommended by the Maskilim of Prussia. And sure enough, the Maskilim of Eastern Europe did not come down squarely for the one or the other but opined, like the absolutist rulers themselves, that the Jews were free to opt for one of the European tongues as a substitute for Yiddish. Levinsohn (p. 39) could thus advise his readers in Russia to change from Yiddish either to Russian or to German:

And so too we can say in this country [Russia]: Why Judeo-German [Yiddish]? Either elegant German—or Russian, this being the language of the land and, in particular, an exceedingly broad and elegant language, lacking nought in tone and beauty and in all the sublime qualities that are counted towards linguistic perfection (as I have explained in the book “*Yesodei Leshon Rusya*” [Foundations of the Russian Language] that I have written for the benefit of Jewish youth . . .).

However, the second element in the diglossia, *leshon ha-kodesh*, the language of religious creativity and of prayer, and the traditional channel of communication among the elite of Jewish society in premodern times, was also intended to undergo a change in make-up, standing and functions. The views of the early Maskilim in Germany concerning a return from *leshon ha-kodesh* to the language of the Bible also found acceptance among the Maskilim of Eastern Europe, coming to fruition in their literary creations and grammatical activities. Their desire to distance themselves from the language of the Mishnah and Gemara, from the language identified with the Talmud and rabbinic writing, led to a real change in the role of the Hebrew language. To remove the postbiblical strata was to throw down the gauntlet to the spiritual world of traditional Jewish society. This was, moreover, yet another clear manifestation of a submission to the ascendant rationale of Christian society and an accession to influential literary trends in contemporary European culture. In Galicia, Volhynia, and Lithuania, as in Germany, the Hebrew language began to fulfill functions unknown—or uncommon—in traditional Jewish culture up until the nineteenth century. “Linguistic expansion,” as this change in Hebrew functions was defined, included poetic and prose composition, a new and almost unknown brand of communication (newspapers, periodicals), translations from European belles lettres, and translated adaptations from the scientific, philosophical, and historiographical works that enjoyed a wide European currency.²

Thus the vision of the Eastern European Haskalah was aimed not at *ending* the

diglossia but at *replacing* the two component languages: the state language or a European language (most commonly, German) for Yiddish, and biblical Hebrew for *leshon ha-kodesh*. The new Haskalah-style bilingualism may have reflected, more than all else, the dual character of the Haskalah: the premodern corporative features were indeed to give way to an identification with the centralized state, while the language of worship and spiritual composition was to be cleansed and flushed free of purportedly corrupt substrata. In fact, the more radical the views of a particular group of Maskilim, the more space was made for the state language and the less space for Hebrew, leading to its virtual elimination; in this way, the Maskilim edged ever closer to their vision of integration into the society of subjects of the centralized state. On the other hand, the moderates of the Eastern European Haskalah extended the functions of Hebrew far beyond the “religious” segment of spiritual and cultural life. This contributed in no small measure to its conversion into a secular tongue in which one might write on scientific or general historical subjects or pen stories and poems as in the literatures of European languages. The “secularization” of Hebrew was a central plank in the cultural change brought upon traditional Eastern European society by the Haskalah. Hebrew continued, among other things, as a distinctive feature of Jewish separateness in the new political reality. For many Maskilim in Galicia, Poland, and Lithuania, biblical Hebrew in its Maskilic incarnation became a key element in Jewish identity. While preaching sociopolitical integration in their states of abode and challenging the very existence of the Jewish corporation in all its manifestations, they used Hebrew as a focus of identification with the Jewish past and as a legitimate channel of communication with their coreligionists already cut off from their traditional environment—as well as with Jews from other lands. The Lithuanian Jewish author, Abraham Mapu, gave fine expression to this new relationship to Hebrew:

Pay heed to this, you who fear for the holy things of Israel, who aspire to the earth of the Holy Land and desire its stones; do we not cherish a clod of earth, do we not adore fragments of stone from the Holy Land, recalling that maybe on this earth and on these stones our forefathers’ feet once strode—so how can we not cherish their holy tongue, the thoughts of their heart and the utterance of their lips, within which is all the life of their spirit? Are these not the Holy Scriptures, neglected by the generation who preceded us and who have denied the delight of Israel to the Children of Israel, unknown in our days too save to a couple here and a handful there . . . and how I rejoiced to see my books tugging at the hearts and minds of our best people, the healers of Israel, after they had all but forgotten the Hebrew tongue in their student days.³

In the alternative *bilingual* vision of the Eastern European Haskalah, the traditional spoken language, Yiddish, was to vanish and *leshon ha-kodesh* was to change. Although the Haskalah movement’s views on the language question exerted a powerful influence on the diverse streams that appeared within Eastern European Jewry in the second half of the nineteenth century, it differed in one thing from modern Jewish nationalism: the Haskalah movement did not strive for monolingualism as a normal feature of a distinctive Jewish identity. It was precisely in this sense that the Haskalah so well perpetuated the traditional linguistic lifestyle, which had never known monolingualism until the nineteenth century.

On the other hand, the Haskalah had a highly problematic attitude toward the linguistic reality arising out of the modernization of Jewish society: the Maskilim took up a negative, almost unequivocal, stand on the role of the vernacular. Yet they used it, willy-nilly, as a channel of communication with the traditional masses whom they sought to improve and to change. The first Maskilim in Germany wrote in Yiddish, penning mordant comedies, for example, in which they made sophisticated use of the multilingual reality of the changing Jewish society. In Eastern Europe the authors of the Haskalah went on composing in this language, thus unwittingly abetting a continued cultural activity in Yiddish and lending legitimacy to its use. Modern Yiddish literature and journalism actually came about as an unavoidable if undesirable bridge to the end goals of the Haskalah. Within a few decades, they became a serious competitor for the place of the Hebrew component in the Haskalah-promoted diglossia.

The Haskalah's attitude to the "state language," by contrast, faithfully represented a sociopolitical trend characteristic of Eastern European Jewish society. The Jews tended to adopt the imperial languages: German in the portions of Poland that passed into Austrian and Prussian control, and Russian in the domain of the Czars. But the acculturation in practice to either one of these state cultures was, in the social circles concerned, more rapid and more vigorous than the Maskilim had expected. And so the chances were not great for Hebrew to survive as a component in diglossia as envisioned by the Maskilim. Moreover, in an age of stirring nationalism in multinational empires, to adopt the language of the imperial center was a highly political act, calculated to sharpen the tension between Jews and surroundings in which a revival of the local "national" tongue was being touted.

Thus the beginnings of the modern Jewish national movement partook, on the one hand, of a Maskilic linguistic vision in which a state of diglossia would be preserved but with a change of components. On the other hand, the fin-de-siècle reality found itself facing an exceedingly complex *triglossia*, containing the elements of a traditional linguistic way of life alongside the products of a partial acculturation to the cultures of the state. In the Jewish national movement several new elements were added that were not dominant in the Haskalah's attitude to the language question and which were inherently contradictory: legitimization was given to the "popular language" and to the culture of the popular strata, affording a new conception of Yiddish; and it was henceforth possible to identify the "state language" with the "national language," insofar as the vision of a national political rebirth in a Hebrew-speaking state might be realized. This last new element was nicely formulated by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda (Perelman) in a letter to the editor printed in Peretz Smolenskin's periodical *Ha-Shahar* in 1880 (p. 244):

But we shall be quite unable to revive the Hebrew language save in a land whose Hebrew inhabitants outnumber its Gentiles. So let us increase the number of Jews in our barren land and restore the remnant of our people to the soil of its fathers; let us revive the nation, and the language will come to life!

Modern Jewish nationalism was heralding, for the first time, an idea that was alien to the members of the traditional Jewish corporation: the nation possesses *one* language, fulfilling all functions. In other words, an *end to diglossia*:

Just as Jews can only be a truly living people when they return to the land of their fathers, so too they can only be a living people when they return to the language of their fathers and use it not only in books, not only in matters sacred or philosophical, as argued by Peretz Ben Moshe [Smolenskin], the editor of *Hashahar*, but in actual talk by great and small, women and children, boys and girls, on all things of life and at all hours of day and night, like any other nation with its very own tongue.⁴

Thus the ending of a bilingual state of affairs and the presentation of monolingualism as normal was a complete innovation on the part of modern nationalism; and although not universally accepted in its sharpest form, it did constitute the greatest break with traditional bilingual culture. Which would be the "national language" in the new monolingual situation—the cast-off popular Yiddish idiom rediscovered in the spirit of Romanticism, populism, and social radicalism that had captured the minds of Eastern Europe, or the "historical" tongue heralding in its revival a liberation from exile and a return to a distant, many-splendored past? And what was the political situation that might permit an identity of "state language" and "national language"? A wide variety of answers was forthcoming in turn-of-the-century Eastern Europe. But not by chance, the claims of the proponents of the various languages were sometimes more alike than dissimilar, the new nationalist idea leaving its imprint all around and blurring a simple fact that none but the Orthodox continued to acknowledge at this time of transition from Haskalah to national radicalism: the fact that diglossia was Jewish society's *normal* state of affairs—and one whose elimination was truly revolutionary.

It is no coincidence that this study of the incarnations of the linguistic system of East and Central European Jewry has ended with the focus on the Orthodox. Having proposed alternative limits for the traditional corporation now deprived of its defenses and robbed of its ramparts, the Orthodox also set up linguistic defenses; in parallel to the early Haskalah, which preached replacement of Yiddish by the state language, Orthodoxy began preaching the *maintenance* of Yiddish. In Orthodox thought, the vernacular acquired an ideological significance, akin to the maintenance of distinctive Jewish dress:

It is Jewish law to be different at all times from the nations of the world. . . . Let Israel be distinguished from them and known in its dress and other actions just as it is distinguished from them in its knowledge and its traits. . . .⁵

Two precepts are incumbent upon a father: to talk to his son in the Holy Language and to teach him Torah, and our rabbis have said . . . that our Jewish language [Yiddish] is to be counted as a Holy Language of . . . sorts but on the day that the child begins talking they speak a foreign tongue or Hungarian to him, or change his Hebrew name, they uproot his soul and he is bound to end up going off the straight and narrow.⁶

These writings of Rabbi Akiva Yosef Schlesinger in his book *Lev Ha-Ivri* against the Jewish circles that had undergone acculturation to Hungarian language and culture in the mid-nineteenth century are essentially similar to the strictures of Rabbi Shalom Ber against the Zionists in the 1910s. This leader of the Lubavitch Hasidim vented his wrath upon the portrayal of the Hebrew language as the national language and demanded that his followers vigorously maintain the traditional diglossia

that assigned a sacred function to *leshon ha-kodesh* and a colloquial role to the vernacular. In a letter to several rabbis, Rabbi Shalom Ber stated inter alia that except for the First Temple period—when “all God’s people were holy”—the Jewish people had never been monolingual:

And in Eretz-Israel and Babylonia the Holy Tongue was spoken only by the scholars engaged constantly in Torah, i.e., the Tannaim and Amoraim—including after the destruction of the Temple—whose total occupation was Torah, whereas the masses engaged in worldly matters did not speak the Holy Tongue . . . and in Eretz-Israel as in Babylonia the masses spoke another language.⁷

Indeed, Schlesinger, in a period prior to the rise of the modern national movement, was assuming a situation in which the Jewish people would return to its land and revive the holy language. However, he saw this as a sacred state of affairs, with diglossia coming to an end as part and parcel of the redemption and the Jewish people being cut free entirely from the baneful influence of European modernity. As long as the people is at risk from integration into the cultures of surrounding peoples, the traditional state of diglossia is one of the most commendable means of self-defense against the Enlightenment, religious reform, and the loss of a distinctive Jewish way of life.

By contrast, Rabbi Shalom Ber of Lubavitch represents the extreme Orthodox position against secular nationalism, which had challenged the state of diglossia in the name of the idea of national monolingualism. He distinguishes (pp. 21–22) the *leshon ha-kodesh* of Torah-true Jews from the *ivrit* of the Zionists, prohibiting the latter’s use entirely:

But the fathers of the Zionist idea, who have adopted an entirely different approach and replaced the whole Torah by the nationalist idea, saying “this is your people, Israel, a people like any other people or tongue” . . . and they have therefore made a mighty effort to take hold of the Holy Land, not for its sanctity and purity sake but for the sake of a nationalism which is bound up with land, for there is no nationalism without a country . . . and they have therefore also taken hold of the language, for there is no self-respecting nation without a language . . . and they pay no heed to the value of its sanctity, rendering it a spoken tongue for an entire people and for saying all things, a function that the language cannot really bear, as we have explained, and the whole study of the language is now for language sake alone. . . .

These words are in fact an absolute criticism of the ideas of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, who, as stated earlier, saw the language and land as the bases of the new nationalism and aimed to turn *leshon ha-kodesh* into an only language for the entire people at all times.

The defensive maintenance of bilingualism, in response to Enlightenment and then to Zionism, gave new significance to the place of Yiddish but also added new weight to the use of *leshon ha-kodesh*. The secularization of the Hebrew language, which had already begun in the Haskalah period and had contrived to cut it loose from the talmudic-rabbinical language, was loaded with hostile signification for the values of the traditional corporation. Faced with a modern nationalism that assigned an absolute value to *one* of the two languages in the traditional diglossic system (Hebrew or Yiddish), Orthodoxy sprang to the defense of diglossia, but the

very act gave an entirely new meaning to the maintenance of the diglossic situation. At times Orthodoxy accepted the possibility of replacing Yiddish by the state language (German, and later English)—but vehemently opposed the secularization of the *leshon ha-kodesh* component in the system. And thus, out of opposition to the assignment of a hostile ideological value to a language (Hebrew or Yiddish) and absolute revulsion at language secularization, Orthodoxy created an alternative ideological value for the traditional diglossic system.

In the final analysis, the Haskalah movement, which preached a switch in the diglossic components of traditional Ashkenazi society in its desire to adapt to the changing times, and the Orthodox reaction to the challenges of modernity yielded quite similar attitudes to diglossia. The new nationalist movements, whether preaching Yiddishism or Hebraism, strove for monolingualism. In the historical reality of Eastern Europe and in the successive incarnations of Ashkenazi Jewry in the upheavals of the twentieth century, these trends have left us with the monolingualism of a modern Jewish, Hebrew-speaking state and the bilingualism of a modern Orthodoxy in which *leshon ha-kodesh* and Yiddish (or English) are new heirs to an old diglossia.

Notes

1. See Klausner 1930: 118–28. In this respect, Klausner was perpetuating Wessely’s (1782: chap. 7) own disregard for Yiddish biblical poetry: “And why have several successive generations not produced a single celebrated poet in German or Polish parts? . . . And some of the great Gentile poets of our generation have affirmed that the splendor and beauty of Scripture have no equal among the most celebrated poems, even going back to Antiquity . . . and wherefore have we abandoned them and not followed in their path? But all this has befallen us because we have been raised since childhood under the hand of blithering teachers, who taught us to speak in crass and common figures [i.e., Yiddish].” On Yiddish biblical poetry and knowledge of it, see Shmeruk 1978: 117–36.

2. The term *harḥavat lashon* (language extension) already appears in *Kohelet Musar* edited by Moses Mendelssohn in 1750, p. 161: “Let us learn from other nations who have their language in their land. They did not rest until they had extended the frontiers of their language. . . . And the Hebrews will observe that our language is ready for any eventuality. To weep aloud. To sing songs to the joyful or to condemn the wicked in the gate.”

3. Mapu 1939: 457.

4. Ben-Yehuda 1949, *Great Introduction*, p. 2.

5. Schlesinger 1872: 28b.

6. *Idem*, p. 85a.

7. Schneersohn 1980: 18.

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10

Cartoons about Language: Hebrew, Yiddish, and the Visual Representation of Sociolinguistic Attitudes

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Language attitudes abound in all societies, even in those in which it is not customary, or even not permitted, to study them. This is all the more so in multilingual societies. The multiplicity of languages, and, therefore, usually the multiplicity of ethnolinguistic groups, heightens language consciousness, at the very least, and may also heighten language conflict, i.e., the competition between languages for more prestigious functions or the efforts of one ethnolinguistic group and its internally recognized language "authorities" to be free from the influence or regulation of other groups and their "authorities." Under such circumstances, it is particularly likely that language attitudes will be consciously held, more clearly (although perhaps not always openly) formulated, and become the objects of language-planning efforts on the part of various spokesmen, on an *intergroup* as well as on an *intragroup* basis.

A substantial literature has come into being dealing with language attitudes, particularly during the past two decades.¹ However, a review of this literature reveals that it is only the *verbal* manifestations of language attitudes that has been studied thus far. This is unfortunate. Verbally expressed and expressible language attitudes represent only part of the total attitudinal constellation. Language attitudes may also possess visual dimensions,² i.e., they may pertain to sociolinguistic phenomena that are expressible graphically rather than (or rather than only) verbally. Indeed, the visual expression of language attitudes may become just as culturally established, just as symbolically recognized and accepted, just as ideologically tinted, as are verbal attitudinal expressions vis-à-vis language. Language is, of course, the major symbol system of our species. Accordingly, it is quite predictable

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