DIALOGUE: INTERSECTIONALIZING EUROPEAN POLITICS: BRIDGING GENDER AND ETHNICITY

Immigrant integration, gender, and citizenship in the Dutch Republic

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Most contemporary studies of immigrant integration take place in the context of stable, strong, and relatively centralized states able to craft policies and see them enacted. In contrast, this article considers immigrant integration in an emerging state – the early Dutch Republic, a political entity whose legitimacy was confirmed only later with the Peace of Westphalia, the treaty that arguably established the institution of state sovereignty. A confederation of 7 of the 17 Netherlandic provinces, the boundaries of the new republic were unsettled and a distinct national consciousness was lacking. But despite its tenuous early existence, the Dutch Republic became a major destination for immigrants. The reconquest of Antwerp by the Spanish sent migrants from the southern provinces, mainly Protestants whose numbers would grow to approximately one-tenth the new republic’s population. They were joined by Jews from Portugal and elsewhere and religious and economic migrants chiefly from Germany, Scotland, and Scandinavia and, later, Huguenots from France. The immigrants settled mainly in the cities; the Dutch Republic overtook northern Italy as the most urbanized region in Europe, with immigrants comprising half the population of many cities. A multivalent inquiry that includes gender is critical for understanding immigrant integration in the Dutch Republic. I argue that attracting and integrating immigrants simultaneously ushered in the Dutch “Golden Age” and helped create the (nation-)state.

Keywords: immigrant integration; Dutch Republic; citizenship; migration; gender

Introduction: immigrant integration in the Dutch Republic

Skeptical readers may question the relevance of examining phenomena from the world of four centuries ago for understanding the philosophy, politics, and practices of immigrant integration today. This is the more so because concepts such as state, citizenship, immigrant, and integration had very different meanings in the seventeenth century. In this article, I argue that studying immigrant integration in the Dutch Republic is important precisely because the conceptual categories we today take for granted were then in the process of being created. A historical perspective allows us to unpack their contemporary meaning and significance. Thus, studying immigrant integration in the Dutch Republic is to some extent an analytical enterprise, as it encourages us to question our assumptions about the meaning of state, citizenship, immigration, and integration.

Examining the conceptual origins of our analytical categories is useful not only for contemporary studies of migration and ethnicity, but also for studies of gender. As the editors emphasize in the introduction, political scientists working on gender and immigration/ethnicity often pursue comparable questions about the political inclusion or exclusion of women and immigrants/
minorities. Such studies focus on power structures, participation, inequality, and the politics of representation, and employ similar concepts such as political opportunity structures, identity politics, racism, sexism, and discrimination. Both strands of research are moreover concerned with the way in which categories such as citizenship, ethnicity, and gender function in their analyses.

Many authors today question the enduring fixation on “national models of integration.” Some advocate a multilevel governance perspective to show how national models are far from monolithic and how, even in the most centralized and unitary states, local policies in cities can be more integrationist or pragmatic than national policies. Others have concluded that both sub- and supranational (EU) levels of governance have become meaningful arenas for debate and policy formulation on immigration and integration. One argument advanced in this article is that plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose: the integration of immigrants has always involved municipal or local authorities alongside national ones. This speaks to ideas of multilevel citizenship (Maas 2007, 2013a, 2013b) as well as contemporary findings that local governments are increasingly promoting their own concepts of citizenship, with positive results:

if local polities can treat foreign residents on the basis of their status as “local citizens” regardless of nationality, they might be more representative, more efficient in providing basic services to a wider subset of the population, and better prepared to address/prevent problems related to migrant communities. (Pedroza 2013, 40)

This article has four main sections. It first sketches the development of a distinct Dutch identity and its interactions with an ascendant form of political organization, the state. The second section examines immigration as a catalyst for the astounding success of the new state that emerged in the northern Netherlands. I argue that the Dutch Republic was what may be termed the first migration state. Attracting and retaining the best immigrants was central to the economic, scientific, cultural, and political primacy of the Netherlands during the seventeenth century, the Dutch Golden Age. The third section focuses on the development of citizenship in the Dutch Republic, emphasizing the importance of relative tolerance for religious and other minorities and the protection of individual rights against the state. The fourth section focuses on gender, emphasizing the relative freedom of women in the labor market of the Dutch Republic. Tolerance, individual rights, and economic liberties were not a Dutch invention – precursors such as the northern Italian city states (coincidentally also republics, such as Venice and Florence) also thrived on tolerance and economic and political liberties – but they were crucial in attracting immigrants who helped transform the northern Netherlands from a mostly rural backwater to a dominant international power.

**State formation**

On 26 July 1581, the States General of the United Netherlands, following careful and deliberate consultations with all the provinces and “despairing of all means of reconciliation and left without any other remedies and help,” declared it had been forced:

in conformity with the law of nature and for the protection of our own rights and those of our fellow countrymen, of the privileges, traditional customs and liberties of the fatherland, the life and honour of our wives, children and descendants so that they should not fall into Spanish slavery – to abandon the King of Spain and to pursue such means as we think likely to secure our rights, privileges and liberties.¹

This Act of Abjuration did not come as a surprise. The Dutch-born King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V had abdicated in 1556 in favor of his brother Ferdinand I (who succeeded him as Holy Roman Emperor) and his son Phillip II (who succeeded him as King of Spain
and other Spanish territories, including the 17 Provinces). While Charles V had been relatively moderate on religious matters, Phillip II was a more fervent Catholic and moved to implement the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (the religion of the ruler determines the religion of the ruled) negotiated by his father and his uncle (Ferdinand I) at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. In a significant drawback, *cuius regio, eius religio* applied only to Catholicism and Lutheranism, not to other dissident forms of religious expression, such as Calvinism, which had become important in the 17 provinces (roughly, present-day Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and parts of northern France).

Charles V had been an effective state-builder. During the fourteenth century, the dukes of Burgundy had started consolidating various Netherlandic territories under their rule and this process continued and intensified under the Habsburgs when they inherited the Burgundy legacy in 1477. The Burgundian-Habsburg state remained fragmented, however, and it took until 1543 before all 17 Netherlandic territories were united for the first time under the same ruler, Charles V (Stein 2010, 13). Charles moved to eliminate the various special privileges and relationships that had characterized the "composite state" (Elliott 1992) common in early modern Europe, and under the Pragmatic Sanction of 1549 all 17 provinces became subject to the same rules of succession.

The divisions within the 17 provinces have traditionally been interpreted to mean that coherence "was achieved by the enterprising policy of a high-minded dynasty" (Huizinga 1948, 271). More recent historical research on the tension between centralization and particularism highlights the friction between regional identities and the potential development of a supra-regional Netherlandic identity uniting all 17 provinces (Stein 2002). As one scholar notes, the:

> Low Countries present us with a very rich case of identity formation. In rapidly changing political circumstances, identities, too, proved dynamic; continually reinvented and manipulated in order to legitimize the existing situation or to mobilize forces to attain new goals. (Stein 2010, 13)

Historians until the mid-1980s were skeptical of claims that there was a collective identity and unity in the 17 provinces before the Dutch revolt; subsequent research, however, has demonstrated that a common identity existed and survived the division of the Low Countries (Schepper 1987). This common identity was mostly cultural but grew to have "national" characteristics. By the 1560s, as a result of (opposition to) Habsburg state-building:

> Dutchers in the core provinces were beginning to think more territorially. The national sentiment may not have been very robust – it should be remembered that juridically there was no such thing as a Low Countries nationality – but at least the concept of the Netherlands as a single defined country was rather clearer than it had been 50 years earlier when Charles V had succeeded. (Duke 2009, 51)

Such findings nuance dominant claims about state formation resulting from "war and the preparation for war" (Tilly 1990, 14–15). They also add complexity to the view of the nation as "a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation-state' … nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around" (Hobsbawm 1992, 2nd:10). Another example of this added nuance and complexity is research documenting the attachment of the people of the Netherlandic province of Guelders to the Holy Roman Empire rather than to the Burgundians and Habsburgs (Noordzij 2008). What are the implications for straightforward narratives of nation-state formation if the population of one of the 17 provinces identified more as "German" than "Dutch"?

Language is usually seen as one of the leading makers of identity and a language border (such as the one between French and the various Dutch dialects in the 17 provinces) a major hindrance to the development of a shared political identity. Yet recent historical scholarship about the 17 provinces has uncovered "virtually no trace of an identity formation based on language... In fact, most evidence points to the ease with which people communicated across languages"
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(Stein 2010, 16). Note that it was only in the second half of the sixteenth century that the Dutch vernacular was codified and standardized.

Recognizing nuance and complexity fits with the critique of what has been called “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), the taken-for-grantedness of nation-states in much research and the conflation of society and nation. It also invites us to reconsider our assumptions about immigrants and integration. What do we mean by these concepts and how have their meanings changed over time and space?

Charles V’s successor Philip II appointed non-Dutch-speaking Catholic governors for the Netherlandic provinces, leading as early as the 1560s to resistance led by William the Silent of Orange. To crush the resistance, King Philip sent the Duke of Alva with 10,000 troops, who executed a thousand people including many elites, imprisoned and confiscated the property of many more, and levied heavy new taxes. The popular revolts of 1572 hardened Alva’s resolve; he ordered his troops to massacre the townspeople of Mechelen, Naarden, and Zutphen. The “sea beggars” — Dutch anti-Catholic pirates recently expelled from English ports — kept up the pressure on Alva’s forces. In 1576, unpaid and undernourished Spanish troops mutinied and left the rebellious north for the prosperous south, where they plundered Antwerp and slaughtered thousands of townspeople in what became known as the Spanish Fury. This led to the Pacification of Ghent, in which all the provinces agreed to unite to drive out the Spanish. But the agreement was short-lived: in 1579 the southern provinces recanted and re-declared fealty to the Spanish King and the Catholic Church in the Union of Atrecht (Arras, present-day France). The response from the north was the Union of Utrecht. The seven northern provinces continued as the breakaway United Provinces of the Netherlands.

As the war continued, William the Silent offered the republic to the Duke of Anjou (the younger brother of the King of France), who accepted but then fled when he foresaw that he would be unable to overcome the Spanish forces. When William was assassinated in 1584, the States General offered the country to King Henri III of France and then to Queen Elizabeth of England, who both declined. Spanish victories continued, including the Spanish reconquest of Antwerp in 1585. The situation hardly seemed propitious, but by 1625 the Dutch Republic had become the “hegemonic power of the capitalist world-economy” (Wallerstein 1980, 38), the “first truly global” empire (Israel 1990, ix). How to explain this stunning reversal? The following two sections suggest that it had much to do with immigration and citizenship.

**Immigration**

After the Dutch revolt of 1572, the northern provinces became the main destination for immigrants from the south, who mostly moved to cities. Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leiden, Rotterdam, Gouda, and Middelburg drew immigrants from Antwerp, Brussels, Mechelen and textile centers in Flanders, Brabant, and Hainaut such as Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, Hondschoote, Doornik, Valenciennes, and Bergen (Mons). Economic and political motives for migration may have frequently overlapped; not only Protestants but also Catholics moved north (Roy van Zuydewijn 2002). Their numbers were significant. Antwerp, which had been the most important city in northwestern Europe and attracted many migrants from the countryside, lost over half of its population, virtually all of whom moved north (Baeotens 1976). One estimate is that Antwerp’s population sank from nearly 100,000 in 1567 to only 42,000 in 1589, while other towns such as Ghent, Bruges, Mechelen, Audenarde, Nieuwpoort, and Ostende lost about half of their populations (Carlier 1994, 358). Many moved directly to Holland, Zeeland, and other northern provinces; others moved first to England or various German states before being lured to the Dutch Republic (Woltjer 1994).
At first it was unclear that the northern Netherlandic provinces would become the destination for those fleeing the southern Netherlands. In the late 1560s — before the Dutch revolt and the escalation of the conflict — many Protestant emigrants from the southern Netherlands had settled in southeastern England, particularly London (Stein 2006). Others left to join existing Netherlandic communities in the Protestant German states. While the ruler of the 17 provinces (Philip II) was a fervent Catholic, England and many German states had Protestant rulers. It may have seemed that only a war against Spain would safeguard Protestantism in the Netherlands, and unlikely that these weak and divided provinces could defeat the mighty Habsburg Empire.

The leaders of the northern Dutch cities began to actively recruit southern refugees. The secret of their success — perhaps in some ways analogous to the contemporary competition for highly skilled immigrants — was to offer all sorts of incentives and inducements, including reimbursing moving costs, extending capital to (re)start businesses, making available manufacturing space, and offering tax incentives.

These measures were not always popular with the indigenous population, which sometimes envied the favoritism shown to the foreigners (Briels 1978, 35). One commentator complained that “all foreign nationalities” were “favored, advanced, and less taxed than residents” and that the foreigners were given all sorts of privileges and freedoms.²

The cities nevertheless competed with each other to attract the best immigrants. For example, Leiden in 1577 sent an agent to Gloucester, England, to attract linen and woolworkers. The leaders of Haarlem in 1578 exhorted the Walloon community of London to relocate, promising to pay the salary of a French-speaking church minister and lauding their city’s stability and prosperity. Other Dutch cities contacted refugee communities in London, Norwich, Sandwich, and Colchester in attempts to convince them to move (Briels 1978, 99 (see note 3)).

The efforts to recruit immigrants from the southern Netherlands paid off. Various population registers show that by 1622 there were approximately 150,000 southerners residing in the Republic, approximately 10% of the total population (Briels 1978, 21). As most southerners settled in the cities, the concentration of immigrants in urban areas was much higher: an estimated one-third of Amsterdam residents, two-thirds of Leiden and Middelburg residents, and similarly significant groups in the smaller cities.

As Table 1 shows, the concentration of immigrants in the Dutch Republic's major cities ranged from one-third to significantly over half of the population (Briels 1978, 21). The immigrants from the south were often highly skilled and wealthy. Greater religious tolerance and economic opportunity were the driving forces for migration from the south; debate continues over which factor was the most important.³

The religious tolerance in the Netherlands is often characterized as religious freedom, but perhaps religious freedom is not the correct term because — as elsewhere in Europe — there was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>% immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>104,932</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leiden</td>
<td>44,745</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middelburg</td>
<td>40,000?</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haarlem</td>
<td>39,455</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delft</td>
<td>22,769</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>19,780</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
<td>18,270</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouda</td>
<td>14,627</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Population of eight major Dutch cities, 1514–1795.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1514</th>
<th>1622</th>
<th>1675</th>
<th>1795</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>104,900</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>217,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leiden</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>44,800</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haarlem</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>39,500</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>21,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>53,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delft</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>22,800</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>13,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>38,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
<td>10,900</td>
<td>18,300</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouda</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>11,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a public religion (Calvinism) and most public offices were open only to those who professed it. What made the Dutch Republic unique was its relative tolerance. Despite the Calvinist majority, Catholics, Jews, Lutherans, Mennonites, Remonstrants, Quakers, Pilgrims, and others were permitted to worship in private, to establish their own schools, and to publish their own books (Chua 2007, Chapter 6).

Regardless of whether it was driven chiefly by relative religious tolerance or by economic opportunities, immigration fueled the demographic growth of the Dutch Republic and its cities. Amsterdam's population exploded from some 10,000 at the start of the sixteenth century to over 200,000 by the end of seventeenth century (Nusteling 1985).

Table 2 shows the population of eight major Dutch cities, with significant increases during the seventeenth century followed by stagnation or decline in the eighteenth century (Hart 1989, 665).

The revocation of the Edict of Nantes, directed against Protestantism in France in 1685, led to an exodus of Hugenots, many of whom settled in the Dutch Republic. Estimates of their numbers range from less than 35,000 to 50,000. The Hugenots, with their skills and wealth, had a significant impact on Dutch economic life (Lucassen 1994a). Total immigration between 1600 and 1800 is estimated at around half a million people (De Vries 1995).

In 1688 a Dutch fleet of nearly 500 vessels landed in England and, with the English Parliament's acquiescence, allowed stadhouder William III of Orange to wrest power from his father-in-law, James II, who was Catholic. In what became known as the Glorious Revolution, William became King of Britain, ruling jointly with his wife (James II's daughter) Mary Stuart. He promptly brought over from Amsterdam his Sephardic financiers, who would soon be joined by many skilled textile workers, scientists, artists, and others, beginning a "massive outflow of capital, human and financial, from the Dutch Republic, to England" and transforming England into Europe's pre-eminent place of freedom for immigrants and religious minorities (Chua 2007, 166).

For research on immigrant integration, an important question is the extent to which migrants from the southern provinces should be considered immigrants per se. Most contemporary migration literature distinguishes between immigrants (from abroad) and internal migrants (from within the same state). If we accept that Charles V had recently created a single state out of the 17 provinces, then migration from Antwerp, Brussels, Lille, or even Luxembourg to Holland or the other northern provinces should be characterized as internal migration. But this recent union of the various provinces should not yet be considered a state, because the state as an organizational form emerged only after Dutch independence was finally recognized in the treaties of Westphalia, at the same time as a new system of political order based on state sovereignty.

Although many migrants spoke French as their primary language, others spoke various forms of Flemish which, though recognizably distinct, were quite similar to various northern Dutch dialects. As with language, religion was not a barrier to integration; many immigrants from the
southern provinces were attracted to the north precisely because they could practise Calvinism or other Protestant beliefs. The following section illustrates the incomplete construction of a national narrative out of multiple patria and nations. For example: “All the provinces had privileges preventing the appointment of foreigners as officeholders, though reciprocal recognition mitigated this restriction. Nevertheless, Brabanters were excluded from office in Holland and vice versa” (Duke 2009, 60). Despite the veneer of shared statehood imposed by the Habsburg rulers, the 17 provinces could not be considered a state with a single nationality or shared citizenship.

Citizenship

Late sixteenth-century society in the 17 provinces was characterized by the tripartite division, dating from the Middle Ages, between citizens (with full rights), inhabitants (without such full rights), and foreign residents (with even fewer rights) (Kuijpers and Prak 2002). To be a citizen meant practising a profession or being a member of a guild. Leading families monopolized the holding of office while individuals could be stripped of citizenship for irresponsible behavior. The acquisition of citizenship depended on birth or marriage, though it could also be purchased. Purchasing citizenship was attractive because of the social welfare provisions this provided — particularly the extensive social welfare provisions developed in the cities of the Dutch Republic (McCants 1997).

One important welfare institution was the burgerweeshuis, an orphanage restricted to the children of citizens. For seasonal workers, dockworkers, sailors, and others, social provisions such as the orphanage were attractive forms of insurance. The increasing operating costs of these social welfare provisions caused successive city administrations to increase the price of purchasing citizenship. In Amsterdam, there were much higher fees for purchasing citizenship from 1624.

The most important right of citizenship remained the right to belong to a guild. In 1668, Amsterdam created the new status of resident (ingezetene) — a status that was free and bestowed the right to join a guild (Kloek and Tilmans 2002). The city had expanded geographically in 1657 and it was difficult to find enough people to settle the new territories. At the same time, the city administration wanted to attract the best immigrants from the Spanish Netherlands (then at war with Louis XIV’s France). As these potential immigrants would have to flee without their capital, they would be unable to pay the resident charges. By the end of the seventeenth century, roughly one-quarter of Amsterdam’s adult male population held citizenship — some 20,000 individuals.

Here citizenship (poorterschap) means the rights and privileges associated with a city. But another version of citizenship was the status of belonging to a province. When northern political leaders around 1585 started to feel threatened by the growing power of immigrants from the southern provinces, they invoked a fifteenth-century rule restricting the holding of political office to those born in the province. Justifying this exclusion from access to citizenship and the impossibility of naturalization, the eminent jurist Hugo Grotius explained that foreigners from the southern provinces should live peacefully in the northern provinces and ally themselves with the indigenous population so that their native-born children would have access to political office (Briels 1978, 84).

Citizenship thus operated both as a means of integration (the native-born children of immigrants would have access to its rights) and of exclusion for first-generation immigrants. The immigrants in question were mostly southerners. In 1587, Gerhart Prouninck, one of the mayors of Utrecht, sent an angry letter to the States General to protest being barred from its meetings. Though, as Mayor of Utrecht, Prouninck would normally have had the right to attend, he had been born in Den Bosch (only 40 kilometers away) in the southern province of Brabant and today the capital of the Dutch province of North Brabant (Eggen van Terlan 1908). Similarly,
in 1591 the city of Rotterdam decided to exclude immigrants from Flanders and other "foreign" persons from the Admiralty and admit only "good patriots, native-born" (Bijlsma 1918 cited in Roy van Zuydewijn 2002, 53).  

While immigrants from the south, and in some cases their children, could be denied access to political office by virtue of their "foreign" birth, those already serving in office (for example in military positions in the war against Spain) could not be excluded retroactively. As a result, southerners who were indispensable were kept on a leash by refusing to grant them naturalization "ad honores," meaning they were permanently excluded from citizenship (Briels 1978, 84). Even the churches were not immune to discrimination directed principally against southerners: the province of Holland in 1620 ordered that at least half of the board members of churches should be composed of native-born citizens (Briels 1978, 87).  

Opposition to immigrants, from the southern provinces and elsewhere, did not abate. In 1624, for example, the city of Rotterdam tightened its exclusions by targeting not only the foreign-born but also their native-born children, decreeing that "no persons shall be nominated to Vroedschap (Council) other than those born Hollanders and born of Hollander parents."  

Gender  

In studying immigration to the Dutch Republic, the lens of contemporary gender studies perspectives signals the importance of further research on the gendered aspects of migration for understanding the Dutch case; as in studies of other cases, both European and non-European, research explicitly addressing gendered aspects of migration has until recently been relatively scarce. This research also demonstrates how the case of the Dutch Republic, though quite distant historically compared with contexts that are studied more regularly, can lay bare some of the assumptions of contemporary gender studies. One thing to notice is that the Act of Abjuration's appeal to "the life and honor of our wives, children, and descendants" was not an isolated incident of clear gender roles. In fact, debate about gender roles permeated society.  

Aside from being the most urbanized society in Europe, the Dutch Republic also likely had the highest level of education in Europe and probably the world. For example, an estimated 30–40% of the Republic's inhabitants were literate, a huge proportion for the time (Roy van Zuydewijn 2002, 15). Not only men but also women were literate; literacy, along with accounting and book-keeping, was helpful for business as well as at home.  

As cities depended on trade and manufacturing, the labor market participation of women was encouraged. As a result, there may have been less gender inequality in the Dutch Republic than elsewhere in Europe at the time. In the northern Netherlands, opportunities for women to become involved in commercial enterprise — whether as entrepreneurs, in the family business, or as employees — were favorable and women enjoyed relative economic freedom (Heuvel 2007, 85). Although research on the role of women in early modern Europe is ongoing, most recent scholarship emphasizes the relatively high level of economic activity in the Dutch Republic and the central role of women in Dutch economic life (Schmidt 2005).  

As the introductory essay illustrates, intersectional approaches emphasize how gender intersects with other statuses or forms of identity such as citizenship, ethnicity, nationality, class, sexuality, religion, rural or urban status, and ability. The case of the Dutch Republic is one in which government administration was decentralized, with central agencies superimposed on municipal and provincial governments. Citizenship was above all municipal, while nationality was often provincial (with individuals excluded from offices and benefits by virtue of being born outside the province). For poor young immigrant men, including those from the southern Netherlands, marrying the daughter of a city poorter (citizen) was the simplest way to become a citizen;
young immigrant women had less chance of marrying into citizenship because of a surplus of marriage-aged women (AI and Lesger 1995).

Because of high mortality among (almost exclusively male) sailors and soldiers, there were more women in the Netherlands than men. A surplus of women compared to men was not particularly unusual in early modern Europe, where a ratio of 11 women for every 10 men was demographically normal. Among the poorer urban population in the Dutch Republic, however, the surplus of women to men was exceptional: because of the large-scale out-migration (and often death) of (male) sailors and soldiers and in-migration of (female) servants, the ratio of adult women to men in Dutch cities may have been as high as 3 to 2 (Pol 1994, 78–9).

Because of the surplus of women, poor women had difficulty finding marriage partners; this was especially true for those born outside the Republic’s cities. Research comparing the origins of brides and prostitutes in Amsterdam concludes that, in the second half of the seventeenth century, prostitutes were mostly newcomers to the city while the majority of brides were Amsterdam-born (Pol 2011, 144–147).7 Male immigrants from Germany, the southern Netherlands, Scandinavia, and even the rural parts of the Republic prized above all the daughters of citizens as marriage partners, with a secondary preference for wealth and skills (Kuijpers 2005, 207). Amsterdam was particularly attractive because of its generous social assistance programs (Pol and Kuijpers 2005). Here, the link between gender and citizenship is key: upon marriage, the daughters of Amsterdam citizens received “what could be seen as a dowry by the municipal authorities in the form of citizenship for their bridegrooms, a privilege that was worth fifty guilders, the equivalent of two months’ wages for a man of the laboring classes” (Pol 2011, 150).

Further research into how gender interacts with citizenship, class, urban status, and ability will be critical for understanding how the Dutch Republic became a migration state, a situation where migration is as important as any other factor in providing for the security of the state and the economic well-being of the citizenry (Hollifield 2004). The Dutch Republic’s economic success depended on a constant stream of female and male migrants – migrant workers, sailors, soldiers, servants, as well as immigrants and transmigrants to the Dutch colonies in Asia and America – and the numbers of immigrants relative to the size of the indigenous populations was higher in the Dutch Republic than elsewhere (Lucassen 1994b, 783).

In terms of motivations for migration, the reasons of relative religious tolerance and political security discussed above may have been less important for some migrants than economic factors: by some estimates, wages were 30–50% higher in the western Dutch provinces than in the east or south, while wages in the poorer adjacent German states were only 30% of those in Holland (Lucassen 1994b, 781–782). A constant stream of immigrants was coupled in the Dutch Republic with assimilation rather than discrimination – though, as discussed above in the section on citizenship, first-generation immigrants (even Dutch-speaking, ethnically identical immigrants from the southern Netherlands) certainly faced discrimination. Within several generations, the distinct southern Netherlands, German, Scandinavian, Huguenot, and other immigrant minority communities were assimilated into mainstream society (Lucassen 1994b, 796–797) in ways analogous to those found in another immigrant society uniting against a foreign oppressor under the motto e pluribus unum.8

Conclusion

The integration of immigrants in the Dutch Republic offers insights into the integration of immigrants in other times and places, including in contemporary states affected by globalization and increased economic linkages. The Netherlands in recent years, some argue, has been at the forefront of new immigration, integration, and citizenship policies that seek to limit diversity and
combat segregation based on religion, culture, and ethnicity (Vermeulen 2007; Maas 2010, forthcoming). One of the lessons from the Dutch Republic, however, is that diversity can lead to spectacular success on economic and other fronts. To the conventional claim that the search for uniformity arises with the French Revolution, which gave rise to nationalism and the modern idea of the state, we may posit the counterclaim that nationalism understood as the search for a common identity within the context of common political structures is a much older phenomenon. The case of the Dutch Republic also shows that the integration of immigrants has always involved municipal or local authorities alongside national ones and that a common citizenship interacts with other categories such as gender, class, urban status, and ability in fostering a cohesive society.

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Notes
2. "alle uytheemsche natien int stuck van de traffquen, handelingen, negotiatien ende navigatien wel eerder ghefavorisereert, ghevoordert ende min belast dan de inghesetenen vande lande selfs" and "behendijlicken lockten ende tot haer trocken met haer previlegien, vrijheden ende andersins te gheven.” E. van Meteren, Historie der Nederlandscher ende haerder Naburen Oorlogen etc (The Hague, 1614), folio 306v, 424r, cited in Briels at 35.
3. Religious freedom was identified as the most important by Schelven (1919). The primacy of economic opportunity as a reason for immigration to the Dutch Republic is more often defended by economic historians such as Houtte (1952).
4. "inde politicke regieringe derselve, nijemandt en werden geadmitteert dan naturelle ende ingeborene vanden lande" (Briels 1978, 83).
5. "goede patriotten, wesende ingeborenen van den landen.”
6. There was an exception for the children of former Vroedschap members: “dat geen personen tot Vroetscap sullen werden genomineert, dan die gebooren Hollanders ende van Hollantsche ouders gebooren syn, sonder dat nochtans daer onder begreepen werden de kinderen van degeene die Raden off Vroetscappen deeser Stede geweest syn, maer werden deselve gehouden voor gequalificeert ende gelyk als naturalisert om to Vroetscap genomineert te moogen werden.” Resolution of 20 April 1624 in (Engelbrecht 1892, 83), cited in Roy van Zuydewijn (2002, 53).
7. Between 1650 and 1699, 57% of brides but only 21% of prostitutes were born in Amsterdam; 22% of brides but 50% of prostitutes were born in the Dutch Republic outside Amsterdam; and 21% of brides but 29% of prostitutes were born abroad, especially Germany (Pol 2011, 146).
8. The case of the Dutch Jewish communities may be a partial exception to the general “melting pot” metaphor; intermarriage in the seventeenth century remained low (Kuijpers 2005) as many in the Sephardi community focused on international trade: “no other Jewish community has ever exerted so appreciable an economic influence, over several continents, as Dutch Sephardi Jewry in the seventeenth century,” asserts Israel (1990, 417). With full emancipation following the French Revolution, Dutch Jewish communities proceeded down the traditional path of assimilation as measured by diversification of occupational status, education level, spread of housing, intermarriage, and deconfessionalization (Lucassen 1994b, 797).
References


