Money in Internal Migration: Financial Resources and Unequal Citizenship

WILLEM MAAS

Oh, if you ain’t got the do re mi, folks, you ain’t got the do re mi
Why, you better go back to beautiful Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Georgia, Tennessee
California is a garden of Eden, a paradise to live in or see
But believe it or not, you won’t find it so hot
If you ain’t got the do re mi

– Woody Guthrie, chorus of “Do Re Mi” from Dust Bowl Ballads

At the height of the Dust Bowl that precipitated the largest ever internal migration in the United States, Los Angeles Police Department chief James Edgar Davis organized a “bum blockade” in 1936 by sending 136 officers to all major entry points on California’s borders with Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon, with orders to turn back migrants who had “no visible means of support.”

Described in John Steinbeck’s celebrated novel The Grapes of Wrath, the migrants, mostly American citizens from Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, New Mexico, and Arkansas, were labeled with the derogatory term “Okies” and blamed for an economy already devastated by the Great Depression. Political candidates accused them of shiftlessness, lack of ambition, school overcrowding, and stealing jobs from Californians, and supporters of the blockade included The Los Angeles Times, the city’s Chamber of Commerce, sheriff, prosecutor’s

1 “Dough” is slang for money. Verse 1 of the song ends with “the police at the port of entry say / ‘You’re number fourteen thousand for today,’” and after the chorus, verse 2 starts with “You want to buy you a home or a farm, that can’t deal nobody harm / Or take your vacation by the mountains or sea / Don’t swap your old cow for a car, you better stay right where you are” – alluding to the economic uncertainty of internal migration, the high number of internal migrants, and the police officers patrolling the California state border to turn back internal migrants who were poor. Thanks to Sara Saidi for research assistance and Tesseltje de Lange and Annette Schrauwen for suggestions.

2 Maas 2013a; Rasmussen 2003. Parts of this chapter build on a piece which appeared in a forum about urban citizenship: Maas 2020a. The word “bum” connotes a lazy or homeless person; the “bum blockade” took place in February 1936.
office, some judges and public officials, railroads, the county Department of Charities, and hard-pressed state relief agencies.\textsuperscript{3} Responding to criticism that the blockade was an outrage, \textit{The Times} editorialized “Let’s Have More Outrages” and praised it as a way to keep out “imported criminals . . . radicals and troublemakers,” while others lauded the police for “providing much-needed protection against such swarms of two-legged locusts,” meaning unemployed fellow Americans from states affected by the drought.\textsuperscript{4}

Californians feared not only economic competition but also illness from their immigrating fellow citizens, and disease-fearing Californians burned to the ground one riverbank shantytown, home to some 1,500 Dust Bowl migrants.\textsuperscript{5} The blockade ended after two months, prompted by the negative publicity caused by the police refusing entry to a celebrity Hollywood director whose hobby was mining in Arizona and who had tried to return home wearing his dirty work clothes. The director sued Davis and the LAPD for not letting him back into California, quickly dropped the suit when the police threatened him and his family, but too late to turn public opinion.\textsuperscript{6} The end of the blockade seemed to safeguard freedom of movement across state borders, but in 1939 the district attorneys of several counties most affected by Dust Bowl migrants began using California’s 1933 Indigent Act to reduce migration into California by poor people. The Indigent Act outlawed bringing indigent persons into the state, and the district attorneys indicted, tried, and convicted more than two dozen people who helped their poor American relatives move into California. But the American Civil Liberties Union challenged the prosecutions and pushed the issue all the way to the US Supreme Court, which ruled in 1941 (in the case \textit{Edwards v California}) that states had no right to restrict interstate migration by poor people or any other Americans.\textsuperscript{7} Despite that ruling, prioritizing local citizenship over national citizenship continues, not only in the United States but also in other societies.

\textsuperscript{3} Rasmussen 2003.  
\textsuperscript{4} Conner 2016; Maas 2020b; Rasmussen 2003. 
\textsuperscript{5} Kiger 2019. 
\textsuperscript{6} Davis had sent his right-hand man, LAPD Lieutenant Earle Kynette (later sent to prison for planting a bomb to discourage an investigation into a different matter), to forcibly persuade director John Langan to drop the suit, who quickly complied, but it had already generated too much negative publicity. Rasmussen 2003. 
\textsuperscript{7} Weiser 2020.
As shown below with illustrations not only from the United States, but also from China, India, Canada, Europe, and beyond, money plays a part in all kinds of migration, both as facilitator and as barrier. This is true not only of international migration, the movement of people across international borders, but also of the movement of people within a political system, known as internal migration. Although the vast bulk of academic attention focuses on international migration, internal migration is a much more prevalent form of the movement of people; even counting only movements between a country’s largest administrative units, there are over three times more internal migrants than international migrants worldwide. Yet as the Dust Bowl migrations demonstrate, the movement of citizens across internal boundaries is not always free; central governments must strive to guarantee the rights of internal migrants.

As the other chapters in this book make clear for international migrants, rich or otherwise desirable migrants are generally valued, while poor or undesirable migrants are generally feared or shunned. More often than not, money makes the difference between being wanted or unwanted – and this holds true even when the prospective migrants are internal migrants with shared rights and citizenship. Housing restrictions, efforts to attract well-off residents, and limits on mobility for those needing public assistance are only some ways in which money acts as barrier or incentive to internal migration. These various roles of money in internal migration

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8 Most current is the UNDP’s “conservative” estimate that in 2009 there were some 740 million people who had moved between the largest administrative units in their country (states in the United States or India, provinces in Canada or China, etc.) compared with about 210 million people who had moved internationally (International Organization for Migration 2019, 19; Skeldon 2018, 1); by 2019 the number of international migrants had increased to 272 million, there were 41.3 million people displaced internally due to conflict and violence (with Syria 6.1 million, Colombia 5.8 million, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 3.1 million accounting for the largest numbers), with no updated estimate of the total number of internal migrants. In counting internal migrants, the territorial unit matters significantly: the smaller the unit, the greater the number of “migrants”: as Skeldon notes, in India in 2001 some 42.2 million people were classified as having moved across a state boundary; but 76.8 million people had moved from one district to another within their state, and some 181.8 million people had changed residence within their district. To take a US example, someone moving from Manhattan across the river to New Jersey might be classified as an internal migrant (moving states from New York to New Jersey) while someone moving from Manhattan to Buffalo NY (600 kilometers away but still within New York State) might not – unless the chosen unit is the city, in which case the number of internal migrants becomes much larger.

9 Bruzelius and Seeleib-Kaiser 2020; Maas 2008; Maas 2009; Maas 2013a; Maas 2017; Maas 2020c.
migration demonstrate the ways in which financial disparities and conditions exist in tension with ideas of equal citizenship.

**Socioeconomic Status and the Limits of Equal Citizenship**

Socioeconomic status is a key marker of disparity in societies, and contemporary societies place a high premium on people who are healthy, highly educated, and able to navigate the demands of a capitalist economy, with its values of competitiveness, merit, and individual achievement – values that are in tension with ideas of democracy and equal citizenship. Of course the idea of democratic equality is a relatively recent invention, in historical terms. Until the middle of the twentieth century, for example, Americans “were defined by law and custom as local citizens, and local laws determined whether they could receive benefits or even move from one place to the next”; by the 1970s, however, public opinion and policies had converged on the view that the “federal government bore some responsibility for migrants and that migrants, as national citizens, were entitled to the same rights and privileges as long-time residents. The contemporary welfare state and conception of national citizenship emerged out of these debates over internal migration.”

Among many other effects, the premium placed on desirable citizens makes subsidized housing unattainable for poor prospective internal migrants. For example, the New York City Housing Authority specifies that while non-residents may apply for subsidized housing, “due to NYCHA’s long waiting list, available apartments will be offered to applicants who live or work in New York City first” – effectively barring low-income non-residents. Furthermore, only people who already live or work in New York City can qualify for priority assignment as victims of domestic violence, “working families” who “do not live or work in New York City will not be assigned any working family priority,” and even homeless people must have previously resided in NYC to qualify for priority. The result is that only those with the means to afford market rates can move to NYC unless they want to risk becoming homeless; other cities have similar policies.

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10 Parts of this section expand on the forum discussion in Maas 2020a; see also Seubert 2020.
12 Minoff 2014.
13 In England, local councils decide who is eligible for “council housing,” and commonly exclude people without local connections. Furthermore, many councils require applicants to have lived or worked in the area for a certain time before they can even apply to be placed on the waiting list. For example, one London council states that applicants must “have lived...
Of course people without the means to afford market rates do move to new cities in search of economic opportunity or to escape bad situations in their place of previous residence, but any public assistance they receive tends to come from national or regional governments rather than municipal authorities. Even politically progressive bastions such as San Francisco and New York deport poor and homeless people to other jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{14} This is nothing new. Indeed, cities were engaging in cost–benefit analysis of migrants and residents even before there were states.\textsuperscript{15} For example, the Dutch Republic’s economic success depended on a constant stream of migrant workers, sailors, soldiers, servants, as well as transmigrants to the Dutch colonies in Asia and America. Cities such as Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leiden, Rotterdam, Gouda, and Middelburg attracted highly skilled and wealthy migrants by reimbursing moving costs, extending capital to (re)start businesses, making available manufacturing space, and offering tax rebates – benefits that often sparked the locals’ envy. Leading families monopolized political positions while individuals could be stripped of citizenship for irresponsible behavior. Citizenship was usually acquired through birth or marriage but could also be purchased, which was attractive because of the municipal social welfare provisions reserved for citizens.\textsuperscript{16}

As in the Dutch Republic, today’s “world cities” seek to attract the “best and brightest” – but they sort potential residents by socioeconomic status either through the operation of market forces (which may appear neutral but are shaped by many factors that are far from neutral) or through active intervention. Echoing Seubert (cities are “increasingly less a home for ordinary people who want to live in the city”),\textsuperscript{17} a Toronto Region Board of Trade report notes that housing in Toronto is “increasingly unaffordable, unsuitable and unavailable”; existing homes “often do not meet the needs of lower- and moderate-income people. Employers are finding it harder to recruit and retain employees, and workers are facing tough choices between more expensive housing and longer commutes. Left unchecked, these forces will drive Toronto in the same direction as

\textsuperscript{14} Maas 2020b.
\textsuperscript{15} Prak 2020.
\textsuperscript{16} Maas 2013b, 396.
\textsuperscript{17} Seubert 2020, 25.
San Francisco, New York and other global cities where only a select class of professionals can afford to live.”

The report cites as one model the University of British Columbia, which offers “more than 10% of its campus housing portfolio [. . .] to full-time faculty and staff for 25% below market rates,” is “piloting a rent geared to income (RGI) program for lower-income staff,” and offers low-interest-rate loans and grants for down payments. Another model is Whistler, which requires developers of new properties “to either build accommodation for their future workers or provide cash-in-lieu for the [Whistler Housing Authority] to build workforce housing. The WHA can also negotiate with private residential developers to grant higher density rights if that increase is used for affordable housing for the workforce.” The report notes: “Qualified occupants must work a minimum 30 hours per week at a local business and must occupy their unit full-time as their primary residence. WHA enforces these rules by an annual attestation and a complaints-based investigation and enforcement process.” Such models are a remarkable instrumentalization of housing for workers (only good workers qualify for subsidized housing, and they must leave once they stop working), yet they are far from unique; qualification for local privileges varies based on socioeconomic status and is unrelated to the supposed equality of citizenship status.

Both public and private housing markets increase inequality in cities by excluding those who cannot afford high housing costs. Public housing authorities tend to increase exclusion through qualifying criteria that keep out newcomers or socially undesirable people. The WHA has a waiting list just like the NYCHA and like public housing authorities elsewhere, which all apply cost–benefit calculations. They may evict residents for using illegal drugs or abusing alcohol; entire households may be evicted if any member of the household or even a guest engages in drug-related criminal activity. In the private market, the affordability crisis discussed in the Toronto report is not unique: young university graduates are flocking to cities, and living in smaller and smaller spaces, but less educated people are leaving. Cities are increasingly populated by

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18 Toronto Region Board of Trade, 27
19 There is of course a long history of housing provided by companies in so-called company towns; the difference is that the WHA and similar associations are public rather than private.
20 “Know Your Rights: Housing and Arrests or Criminal Convictions | The Bronx Defenders” 2021
21 Barría 2021
Money and Internal Migration in the United States, China, India, and Europe

There is much concern about internal migrants being attracted by higher levels of social benefits within federal states or other free movement systems such as the European Union, yet the evidence that significant numbers of migrants are motivated by higher benefits is slim to nonexistent. An oft-cited study based on data from the early 1990s found that poor US residents were much more likely to move to another state because of the “push” of increased competition for jobs from immigrants moving to their state of origin than they were influenced by the “pull” of higher social assistance benefits in their state of destination. One newspaper article about several families who had moved from Chicago, Illinois, to Madison, Wisconsin, quoted the co-author of a book on so-called “welfare magnets,” who said that most academic studies found that migration to higher-benefit states “is real, but is quite modest” because decisions to move are “as complicated for poor people as they are for rich people” and are rarely mono-causal – but that state legislators would often trim benefits to ensure they were not more generous than neighboring states, despite the lack of evidence for significant benefit-induced migration. Other studies repeat the finding that the level of welfare benefits has no or only marginal effect on decisions to move between states in the United States, despite increasing disparities in levels of social assistance.

As a non-democracy, China can curtail the internal migration of its citizens by allowing provinces and cities to impose residence requirements and restrictions. Despite official restrictions, millions of people move from rural to urban areas and from central provinces to the industrialized coast, leading to China having the largest number of “illegal” migrants in the world: as of 2019 there were an estimated 288 million people in the so-called floating population. An earlier study estimated that fully one-fifth of China’s population consists of migrant

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22 Thompson 2019
24 Frey et al. 1996
workers, drawn by higher earnings but also (with sharp gender differences) non-economic motivations such as personal development. One detailed study of internal migrants in China found that three main concerns of local governments determined their willingness to extend local citizenship rights to internal migrants: economic development (demand for workers), fiscal protectionism (limiting outsider access to scarce resources), and social stability (fear of outsiders). Local citizenship rights are more valuable to poorer migrants, because they rely on public services and cannot afford private options. When writing new policies, “local bureaucrats try to ‘guess who has money’, to attract people who ‘will not depend on the government’.” More generous welfare policies and government services are correlated with stricter policies, protectionist trends are strongest for low-skilled labor migration, and news media reports often conflate internal migrants, crime, and social disorder. Such disparities and discrimination for Chinese citizens seeking to move within China run counter to the idea of equality.

Because China is not a democracy and does not guarantee freedom of movement to its citizens, India is a better illustration of the limits of equal citizenship and free movement rights within democracies. As in China, internal migration within India is seen as key for economic development. And like almost all democratic societies, India guarantees freedom of movement within the territory to all citizens. Yet every one of the Indian states has policies that favor that state’s residents in access to education, employment in the public sector, and social assistance programs. “Migrants have little or no state-level support and are often scapegoated by local law enforcement and politicians for any trouble. They are underpaid, underserved and unable to be fully productive. Interviews with interstate migrants across India revealed widespread despondency about their quality of life and a yearning to go back home eventually.” The result is that migrant status in India is strongly correlated with socioeconomic status, as reflected in a 2017 report by the Indian government’s Working Group on Migration, which recommended that hostel facilities need to be provided to accommodate migrants from marginalized communities. Social security provisions are usually not portable across state boundaries, so migrants lose access when they

28 Vortherms 2017, 113.
29 Vortherms 2017, 115.
30 Deshingkar and Grimm 2005.
31 Aggarwal et al. 2020.
leave their home states, and also cannot gain access at their destinations. The Working Group concluded that “is important to confront discrimination whenever it appears and reinforce the contributions that migrants make to their places of residence and reaffirm the rights of Indians to settle and work anywhere in India.”

An independent report characterized internal migrants in India and neighboring countries Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives as being “stateless without losing the state’s legal recognition”; lack of proper “nutrition, health hazards, illiteracy and the tag of outsiders within their own countries make them run from one place to another to live a life without rights and dignity” – with the result that “citizenship has no meaning” for internal migrants.

Meanwhile, the evolving system of free movement guaranteed for citizens of EU member states by EU citizenship faces similar challenges. Departing from the earlier dynamic of ever more open and mobile societies, recent years have seen a turn toward more restrictive welfare policies in Europe. Similarly, the 2003 Long-term Residents Directive was hailed by some as a new form of membership related to EU citizenship but is available, after five years of continuous residence, only to third-country nationals who can “prove that they have adequate resources and sickness insurance to avoid becoming a burden”; even after individuals acquire long-term resident status, member states may “limit equal treatment in respect of social assistance and social protection to core benefits.”

As the chapters in this volume by Schrauwen and Mantu confirm, the basic political dynamic is one of the European Commission and Court generally supporting increased rights while member state governments generally advocate restrictive measures for both third-country nationals (who do not have automatic rights to live and work in the EU) and EU citizens (for whom EU citizenship had long promised that ideal). Other research has found that intra-EU migration is generally seen as a positive phenomenon in contrast to a generally negative perception about immigration from outside the EU. Yet EU mobility may also strengthen the primacy of national citizenship for stayers. And in Europe – as in the United States,
China, and India – there is discrimination against the poor and others of low socioeconomic status. Increasingly, the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg emphasize social affiliation with the host society, thereby cautiously embracing moderately communitarian narratives of membership that temper the traditional emphasis on equal treatment and residence security across borders.\textsuperscript{39} Such moves represent a departure from the ideals of equal citizenship and fit with a political dynamic in which governments engage in cost–benefit analysis of prospective immigrants and emigrants.

\textbf{Governments Distinguishing Desirable from Undesirable People}

Governments of all kinds and at all levels – whether national, regional, or local – engage in cost–benefit analysis to determine which migrants or residents to encourage and which to discourage from moving. Governments seek to attract or retain desirable people, while blocking undesirable people from moving in or encouraging them to leave.\textsuperscript{40} This means that proposals such as Maarten Prak’s to view citizenship as a club with initiation dues can seem appealing: considering local rights in economic terms could open up “local citizenship to a conversation about ownership and access, including the compensation that the established feel they are entitled to from the new members of their community.”\textsuperscript{41} Yet such economic conversations are inherently exclusionary, because they limit access to those who are able to afford it.

Since the rise of national citizenship, one role for national governments has been to counter the discriminatory tendencies of “mean cities” discussed by Enrico Gargiulo and Lorenzo Piccoli. In Italy, as in many other countries, registering one’s residence is necessary to access social assistance, public housing, public health, and more. But sometimes local voters, urban movements, and municipal administrations deliberately make registration difficult, thereby restricting the rights not only of immigrants but also those of fellow citizens deemed undesirable, such as people who move a lot, Roma, and homeless people.\textsuperscript{42} This role is mirrored by EU citizenship, which provides that citizens of EU Member States may live anywhere within the territory of the Union only as long as

\textsuperscript{39} Thym 2020.
\textsuperscript{40} Maas 2020b.
\textsuperscript{41} Prak 2020.
\textsuperscript{42} Gargiulo and Piccoli 2020.
they do not “burden” the host society (though the Citizenship Directive provides permanent residence without preconditions after five years of legal residence). European cities have not been particularly welcoming toward Roma, for example, and some governments have similarly sought to limit access for retirees, students, or members of other marginalized groups.43

**Dissuading or Banning Undesirable Residents**

Very few governments voluntarily extend rights to people perceived, correctly or incorrectly, as a threat or burden. Anyone who doubts the proclivity of cities to ban undesirable people has not followed the news about low-level sex offenders with decades-old convictions being banned from public areas44 (and often being unable to work as a result); or about people with mental health, addiction, or disability issues getting a criminal record for being homeless45 (and hence becoming ineligible for public housing); or any of the numerous petitions to expel high-profile (or low-profile46) criminals. President Trump’s executive order requiring both states and localities to consent before refugees can be resettled47 could be considered a move toward urban citizenship because it gives cities a role in determining who may reside, but it also sets exclusion as the default.48

The transition from the Trump to the Biden administration in the United States recasts the discussion about immigration, but both international and internal migrations have a local dimension. Although the national-level political rhetoric in the United States often tends to be restrictionist, the actual actions of local governments are often more accommodating, often because of the economic contributions that immigrants make coupled with overarching civil rights norms.49 Historically informed research demonstrates that US states restrict or expand rights for Americans in an enduring tension between state and national citizenship – including for free movement between the states.50 The upshot is that some

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43 Gehring 2013; Lafleur and Mescoli 2018; Maas 2020c; Parker and López Catalán 2014; Schenk and Schmidt 2018.
44 Lovett 2012.
45 Healy 2017.
46 Newell 2020.
47 “Executive Order on Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement” 2021.
48 Weinberg 2021.
49 Graauw 2021; Williamson 2018.
50 Colbern and Ramakrishnan 2020.
states and localities are more welcoming than others, either for inter-
national migrants or for internal migrants, or both. Although signif-
cic numbers of internal migrants moving to Canada’s westernmost province
of British Columbia access social welfare, the province’s Housing
Minister affirmed that “We don’t have border security here that says you
can’t come into British Columbia. If you arrive at a shelter here, we don’t
judge you by where you come from. We try to help you.” At the same
time, many Canadian provinces and US states impose strict residency
requirements on individual receiving social assistance, effectively limiting
their mobility within the federation. For example, Quebec and Ontario
specify a seven-day maximum period of absence per month before assist-
ance payments are stopped; such policies make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for individuals receiving public assistance to search for employment
opportunities in other jurisdictions.

Access to housing acts as a barrier (for the poor) or facilitator (for the
rich) to free movement. Comparative research confirms that individ-
uals who live in public housing are less mobile than those who do not.
This is nothing new, as governments have long been attempting to
ameliorate living conditions for the poor. The US federal Department
of Housing and Urban Development’s HOPE IV program, created in
1992, allowed cities to replace low-income housing projects with
mixed-income housing. In the process, the program dispersed tens of
thousands of low-income residents, who lost their existing
communities. One study found that even those low-income residents
who had received vouchers to move to higher-income areas tended to
cluster in poor African-American neighborhoods, reinforcing
a stratified housing market. Even well-intentioned programs may
thus dissuade free movement. As another example, the federally funded

51 “Nearly one in seven new welfare recipients in B.C. last year were from out-of-province,”
affirmed The Province newspaper in 2016, arguing that, as “more homeless and
unemployed people continue to arrive here, British Columbia should make it clear to
other provinces that offloading their poor on B.C. is not acceptable.”
52 Quoted in Maas 2020b
53 The government of Ontario specifies that a “person who is absent from Ontario for a period
greater than seven days is not eligible for assistance unless the absence is approved by the
Administrator as necessary for reasons of health or exceptional circumstances”: www
.mcss.gov.on.ca/en/mcss/programs/social/directives/ow/9_2_OW_Directives.aspx) while
a similar policy in Quebec has been decried as violating human rights: www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/quebec-welfare-travel-court-1.5379695
54 Lui and Suen 2011.
56 Oakley and Burchfield 2009.
Medicaid program is the largest source of medical and health benefits for almost one-quarter of the US population (primarily low-income Americans); yet Medicaid benefits vary significantly from state to state, and moving between states often results in confusion and disempowerment.57

**Attracting Desirable Residents**

Social class and inequality separate those able to migrate from those lacking the means.58 This is true not only for international migration but also for internal migration. Surveying a burgeoning literature on local citizenship, Bauböck is right to worry that “the integrity and inclusiveness of local democracy would be jeopardised if those born in the city or descending from parents established in the city enjoy special privileges – as they do under the Chinese hukou system,”59 but similar privileges exist in democratic states. The ideal resident is wealthy, healthy, and employed rather than poor, sick, or needing assistance. Underpaid teachers or nurses have a higher socioeconomic status than an unemployed person or someone with a criminal record or mental illness – indeed, many cities try to attract young workers by offering incentives60 – but if they do not have enough money, they are often relegated to less desirable neighborhoods. Wealth, rather than any other element of socioeconomic status, is increasingly the sole criterion for being able to afford city life.

By 2018, over 200 US cities had a median home value over $1 million – clearly unaffordable on the median national household income of $61,937; meanwhile, even though over 46 million people (over 14% of the overall US population) lived in “non-metro” areas, these areas accounted for less than 10 percent of overall GDP.61 Perhaps Bauböck is right that “cities should determine who their citizens are independently of how states do this” – but increasing the capacity of cities to grant citizenship rights would not necessarily ameliorate the problem of inequality and might in fact aggravate it, as cities act like other governments and engage in overt or covert selection processes that privilege some people over others. In a system in which state and local governments provide social welfare,

57 Michener 2018.
58 Bonjour and Chauvin 2018.
59 Bauböck 2020.
60 Maas 2020a, 71, mentions incentives such as the one by Tulsa, Oklahoma, offering $10,000 for tech workers moving to Tulsa.
61 Maas 2020a, 71, and calculations from U.S. Census Bureau.
encouraging the out-migration of people who are “burdens” and encouraging the in-migration of people who are “contributors” make financial sense; San Francisco buses over 1,000 homeless people out of the city annually, while New York City also pays for destitute residents to “return home” to other parts of the United States, most notably Puerto Rico.  

Meanwhile Puerto Rico and other states actively recruit the rich. Puerto Rico has special tax incentives to attract millionaires and billionaires from the rest of the United States: zero tax on dividends, interest, and capital gains. Florida’s lack of state income tax often succeeds in attracting wealthy Americans from other states: in 2016, the relocation of a single taxpayer (hedge-fund billionaire David Tepper) from New Jersey to Florida caused New Jersey’s income to fall by hundreds of millions of dollars. Such examples simply scratch the surface of the political and economic consequences of internal migration, and the role that money plays in persuading or dissuading such movements.

**Conclusion: Money versus Citizenship in Internal Migration**

Just as the 1936 “bum blockade” on California’s borders was popular when it kept out migrants perceived as undesirable but lost support when a celebrity was denied readmission, so too similar political dynamics are at play with internal borders in contemporary societies, both democratic and not. Examples raised in this chapter from Canada, China, Europe, India, and the United States demonstrate that money facilitates or inhibits internal migration. Tax policies, access to housing, differences in job opportunities between cities and rural areas, and other disparities make it difficult for central governments to safeguard free movement. When protectionism seeking to limit access to scarce resources, or fear of outsiders as threatening social stability, competes with economic motivations (e.g., demand for workers) or identity claims (common citizenship), central governments must intervene if they wish to guarantee free movement. When social security provisions in federal states such as India are not portable across state boundaries, migrants lose access when they leave their home region while being unable to gain access in their destination region, a scenario that is comparable to debates about the possibilities and limits of citizenship of the European Union in facilitating free movement among the EU member states. Though the analysis above has been on natural

62 Maas 2020b.
63 Maas 2020b.
persons, it could easily be extended to companies and other legal persons: as local governments seek to attract “desirable” residents and dissuade or ban “undesirable” residents, central governments must mitigate the financial and other inequalities that threaten the ideal of equal citizenship.

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