

Gender, Race and the Politics of Peacekeeping¹

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Peacekeeping has been a central feature of UN activities for over thirty years, and yet one which has been relatively insulated from any form of critical scrutiny. The general disposition toward peacekeeping has been that it is, at a minimum, a benign use of military force. In part, this assumption depends upon the requirement that peacekeeping forces are brought into a situation with the consent of the parties involved and that they will fire only in self-defence. Those criticisms that exist around peacekeeping tend to focus on the question of whether a particular situation is suitable to peacekeeping efforts (ie. Bosnia-Herzegovina), and potential 'inefficiencies' in particular elements of peacekeeping exercises, but not on the value and dynamic of peacekeeping itself. Moreover, there has been a renewed interest in peacekeeping, not only at the level of international organizations² and national governments, but within the popular media and general public as well. Too much of this attention has adopted uncritically and without careful examination the stance that peacekeeping is a viable and welcome alternative to other forms of military force.

Part of the argument of this chapter is that the favourable image associated with peacekeeping within the international community is not always supported by the events associated with actual missions. This chapter will examine two cases, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the

Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, or, as it is more popularly known, the Somalia Inquiry. An examination of these two cases demonstrates that, as in any military mission, the relations of power informing peacekeeping missions are far more complex than a superficial reading of the peaceful and altruistic blue-bereted soldier reveals, and depend at least in part on important gendered and racialised distinctions. Those distinctions sometimes have enormous consequences for the people in countries in which peacekeeping missions are deployed: in the Somalia example, two men were shot by Canadian peacekeepers and a third, Shidane Arone, was tortured and beaten to death; in Cambodia, accusations of sexual harassment, violence and abuse surround public perception of the UNTAC mission there. Under such circumstances, we must ask: if peacekeeping missions result in violence, sexual harassment and abuse, how peaceful the peacekeepers?

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia - UNTAC - is cited by the UN and regarded by many mainstream observers as something of a success story for the UN. William Shawcross, speaking at the general assembly of the International NGO Forum on Cambodia called it an 'international triumph'³ and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has written that the 'international community can take satisfaction from the peacekeeping operation it mounted and supported in Cambodia.'⁴

The success, achieved in an eighteen-month mission in Cambodia, included the reduction of violence, the repatriation of some 370,000 Khmer refugees, and the conduct of a relatively free and fair election in which some four million people, or 85 percent of Cambodia's registered voters participated.⁵ The UN claimed as well, again in the words of Boutros-Ghali, that the mission 'boosted Cambodia's economy by raising funds internationally for economic rehabilitation and expansion throughout the country.'⁶

The UNTAC effort also achieved some important successes with regards to women within Cambodia. Most notably, the freedom of association which prevailed in many respects during UNTAC and the efforts of UNIFEM to incorporate women's issues into the general election resulted in public education and information campaigns in the printed media and on radio and television as well as a four-day National Women's Summit which brought together Cambodian women from all sectors of society in order to identify and prioritize women's issues in order to lobby political parties contesting the election and then later the government itself.⁷ The Women's Summit has been credited with the emergence of an indigenous women's movement within Cambodia as well as a number of indigenous women's NGOs, which in turn have been credited with a very effective lobby of the Cambodian government such that important equality rights provisions eventually made it into the new Cambodian constitution.⁸

Though UNTAC was considered a success in many respects, there are also some discussions of problems associated with the mission. For example, the UN failed to achieve a situation of political

neutrality, as pledged in the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, in part because the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the demobilisation and cantonment process and threatened throughout the mission to disrupt the election campaign.⁹ This problem was widely attributed to poor planning in advance of the mission and, in particular, the delayed deployment of the UNTAC mission.¹⁰

Likewise, the presence of UNTAC may have diminished, but did not stop political violence, which was aimed at both political party members and ethnic Vietnamese. The massacres and exodus of ethnic Vietnamese, many of whom were second and third - generation Cambodians, were not sufficiently addressed by the UN, according to critics. As Grant Curtis points out, 'no party, including UNTAC, made efforts to protect the rights of Cambodia's ethnic Vietnamese population.'¹¹ Indeed, the extent of the UNTAC response was to organize the 'Safe Passage' operation, which as Raoul Jennar writes, effectively legitimized the forced departure of the Vietnamese.¹²

These are obviously very serious concerns, but there are also another series of issues which emerged throughout the UNTAC mission, and which are seldom discussed in UN documents or mainstream accounts of the mission.¹³ Though credited with helping to create the emergence of a fledgling women's movement as well as a number of women's NGOs, there were also a number of important negative consequences for women within Cambodia as a result of the UNTAC mission. These include the reported exponential increase in prostitution to serve UNTAC personnel, with the Cambodian Women's

Development Association estimating that the number of prostitutes in Cambodia grew from about 6000 in 1992 to more than 25000 at the height of the mission.¹⁴ Some reports indicated that the majority of prostitutes were young Vietnamese women, though these estimates are more likely a result of anti-Vietnamese sentiment as any reflection of reality.¹⁵

While the presence of prostitutes was not new, and by many accounts frequenting prostitutes is a regular feature of many Cambodian men's behaviour, Cambodians were nonetheless alarmed by the dramatic increase in prostitution and noted that prior to UNTAC it was quite hidden in Cambodian society but became something which was very prevalent and open.¹⁶ The rise of child prostitution has also been linked in some NGO reports to the arrival of UNTAC.¹⁷ The widespread use of prostitutes was raised by the Khmer Rouge as part of their efforts to undermine the peace process when they accused peacekeepers of being too busy with prostitutes to check on the presence of Vietnamese soldiers.¹⁸ As Judy Ledgerwood wrote: 'Some Cambodians were more inclined to believe Khmer Rouge propaganda that UNTAC was collaborating with the Vietnamese to colonize Cambodia when they saw UNTAC personnel taking Vietnamese `wives'.'¹⁹

The influx of nearly 23,000 UN personnel and the dramatic rise in prostitution also appears to have resulted in a dramatic rise in cases of HIV and AIDS, with the WHO reporting that 75 percent of people giving blood in Phnom Penh were infected with HIV (though this is considered inflated by some observers) and another report indicating that 20 percent of soldiers in one French batallion

tested positive when they finished their six month tour of duty.²⁰ UNTAC's chief medical officer predicted that as many as six times more UN personnel would eventually die of AIDS contracted in Cambodia than had died as a result of hostile action.²¹

As criticism toward UN personnel within Cambodia grew, a number of what Judy Ledgerwood describes as 'telling' actions were announced. Peacekeepers were warned to be more discrete, for example by not parking their distinctive white vehicles outside massage parlours and in red light areas and by not frequenting brothels in uniform.²² A second response was to ship an additional 800,000 condoms to Cambodia.²³

In addition to prostitution, charges emerged also of sexual abuse and violence. Raoul Jennar reported that in 1993, 'in the Preah Vihear hospital, there was for a time a majority of injured people who were young kids, the victims of sexual abuse by UN soldiers.'²⁴ A number of interviewees reported that there were frequent claims of rape and sexual assault brought to women's NGOs during the UNTAC period, but often many days or weeks after the rapes were alleged to have taken place such that the usual expectations surrounding evidence collection could not be carried out and therefore claims could not be substantiated to the satisfaction of UN officials.²⁵

It is also a widely shared view among many Cambodian women and men that the phenomenon of 'fake marriages' was widespread during the UNTAC period. Simply put, a UN soldier would marry a Cambodian woman, but only for the duration of his posting to Cambodia, at

which point he would abandon her. Some women were reported to have been abandoned as far away as Bangkok, and left to their own devices to make their ways home. In addition to the emotional trauma of fake marriages, they were enormously 'shameful' for women in a society, which as in most societies, has very strict norms about what is appropriate behaviour in 'good' women.²⁶

In part as a response to the sexual harassment which prevailed during UNTAC, an open letter was delivered to the to the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cambodia, Mr. Yasushi Akashi. In the letter, 165 Cambodian and expatriate women and men accused some UNTAC personnel of sexual harassment and assault, violence against women and against prostitutes and of being responsible for the dramatic rise of prostitution and HIV/AIDS.²⁷ Mr. Akashi responded by saying that it was natural for hot-blooded young soldiers who had endured the rigours of the field to want to have a few beers and to chase 'young beautiful beings of the opposite sex.'²⁸ After an outraged response Akashi pledged to assign a Community Relations officer to hear the complaints of the Cambodian community.²⁹

Finally, and in contrast to the claims by Boutros-Ghali about UNTAC contributions to economic development in Cambodia, the UNTAC mission has been blamed instead for economic dislocation. Grant Curtis reports that with skyrocketing inflation the price of a kilogram of high quality rice rose from 450 riels to a high of 3,000 riels, and settled eventually at some 1800 - 2000 riels; the price of fish and meat rose by 80 per cent; housing rental prices

increased at least four times and UNTAC personnel often paid Phnom Penh-based rents at the provincial level, resulting in increases there also. UNTAC did contribute somewhat by hiring locals, but also drew most of the few trained or experienced Khmer away from Cambodian administrative structures and into UNTAC, and salary payments to local staff comprised less than one percent of total local expenditure. Finally, the riel was devalued by 70 percent during UNTAC.³⁰ In situations of economic dislocation and inflation, the most vulnerable members of society become even more vulnerable still, and within Cambodia women comprise a large proportion of the vulnerable.

Such an analysis of the mission, while concerned primarily with issues of social justice and security for women in Cambodia, also has implications for those looking for policy-relevant advice. As Kien Serey Phal notes, there are important lessons to be learned from a mission whose military focus may not have been up to the task of the larger, and more long-term, concerns of community-building, peacebuilding, human security and development. She writes:

There is a need for the recognition of the success of the peace process in protecting the political rights of Cambodian people and facilitating the improved political participation of women but also of the relative failure of the process to promote social and economic equality, and in

particular, to prevent and mitigate violence against women and ensure the protection of fundamental human rights.³¹

For those of us coming from countries which deploy soldiers on peacekeeping missions, the lessons should be obvious. As Cynthia Enloe notes, 'Everyone who sends troops needs to rethink what kind of soldiering works to keep the peace. Because a peace that involves sexual exploitation and sexual violence is no peace at all.'³²

The Somalia Inquiry

Mainstream accounts of the kinds of issues raised above about the UNTAC mission are often attributed, as Janet Heiningger writes, to the problems of establishing a 'common standard of behavior' among contributing countries.³³ In other words, the problem is explained by the fact that some contributing countries, usually those with less experience in peacekeeping missions, send troops not well-suited to the expectations associated with peacekeeping. In the Cambodian case, the Bulgarians are cited as the chief offenders. While not to deny that particular contributing country soldiers may have caused specific sets of problems, it is important to note also that such arguments deflect attention away from more general critical concerns and turn such issues into 'technical problems'. Thus rather than ask questions about the value of relying chiefly on soldiers as peacekeepers³⁴, ethnic arguments are deployed in such a way that the primary concern becomes 'problems of co-ordination.'

One contributor country normally excluded from any concerns about 'co-ordination' and which has been viewed in general as the peacekeeping country *par excellence* is Canada.³⁵ The very favourable image associated with Canadian peacekeeping has been undermined recently, however, as a result of the shooting of two Somali men and the torture and murder of a Somali teenager, Shidane Abukar Arone, by a number of Canadian peacekeepers from the Canadian Airborne Regiment on duty in Somalia in March of 1993. On March fourth of that year two Somali men were shot in the back by Canadian peacekeepers, one of whom died. While an initial investigation concluded that the Airborne members had acted properly, a Canadian military doctor later reported that the dead man had been killed 'execution style' and moreover that he had been pressured to destroy his medical records concerning the murder.³⁶ On March 16, at least two Airborne members beat Shidane Arone throughout the evening, abusing him verbally throughout with racist epithets, and by midnight he had died. Arone's murderers also photographed his ordeal, which were released in the course of Courts Martial proceedings in November of 1994.

The release of the very graphic and horrifying photographs of Arone's murder (the soldiers themselves called them 'trophies'), and the subsequent revelations by the Canadian military doctor that he had been pressured to cover-up details of the March fourth shooting led the Canadian Minister of National Defence to call for a public inquiry into the Somalia mission. This was followed two months later by the release of two sets of videos, the first a

video from the Somalia mission, portions of which portray Airborne soldiers describing the Somalia mission as 'Operation Snatch Niggers'; the second a number of videos depicting the Airborne's hazing rituals which included, among other things, images of Airborne soldiers vomiting or eating vomit, being smeared with feces, and with the single black soldier in the regiment being forced to walk around on all fours with the phrase 'I love the KKK' written in feces on his back.³⁷

The first reaction by mainstream observers of peacekeeping to the Arone murder was to dismiss it as the act of a few 'bad apples'. The bad apple theory, moreover, was quickly linked by military apologists to problems associated with economic downsizing. As Joseph Jockel argued, the Somalia crisis was the result of a personnel shortage, itself the result of years of underfunding. Under these circumstances, for Jockel, the army 'felt compelled to send to Somalia a unit of the Canadian Airborne Regiment whose fitness for deployment was doubtful.'³⁸

The release of the Somalia and hazing videos undermined the 'bad apple' theory and suggested, at least, that the type of behaviour which led to the shootings and Arone's brutal murder was more pervasive within the Airborne Regiment, if not the Canadian military as a whole. And importantly, it was not the shootings or the murder of Shidane Arone, but the release of the hazing video which led the Minister of National Defence to announce on January 23 1995 that the elite Airborne Regiment would be disbanded.³⁹ As Romeo St. Martin writes:

Allegations of racism, torture and murder weren't enough to bring down the Canadian Airborne unit. Even a videotape filled with racist comments was dismissed as 'bravado' by the unit's supporters. However video of the Canadian troops frolicking in a sea of vomit, piss and shit outraged the public and was cause for swift action by Defence Minister David Collenette to disband the regiment.⁴⁰

A concern with a breakdown in the 'chain of command' replaced the assumption that the Somalia murders (usually referred to as 'unfortunate events') were the result of a few bad apples. It is an examination of the chain of command which is the focus of the Somalia Inquiry.

Whether it is a 'few bad apples' or problems in the 'chain of command', what we are not likely to see at the Inquiry or any of the more traditional analyses made of it is any analysis of the ways in which these events are a product of what many feminists describe as militarized masculinity.⁴¹ What is clear, however, is that there is ample evidence in the shootings, the murder of Arone, the various videotapes and now testimony emerging at the Inquiry to support such an analysis. In addition to Arone's torture and murder and the visual evidence from the hazing videos, what has been shown in testimony, questioning and documents submitted thus far to the Inquiry is that, in contrast to the notion that the Canadian military by virtue of its participation in peacekeeping missions is

a quite benign, altruistic and peaceful institution, in fact, it is one in which the glorification of force, hierarchy, racism and violence against women, are like most militaries, an important part of its culture.

Within the first week of the Inquiry's evidentiary hearings, for example, the Canadian public learned that military officials had allowed members of the Airborne who were either known members of racist skinhead organizations or who were under investigation for suspected skinhead and neo-nazi activity to be deployed to Somalia.⁴² None of the suspected skinheads were charged in Arone's murder, but considerable concern was raised that knowledge of the racist activity had been clearly documented over a year before the unit was deployed to Somalia. Indeed, those documents indicated that the entire Canadian Forces Base Petawawa (home to the Airborne) 'appear to be one of the several areas where right-wing activities are centred.'⁴³

Other revelations followed. In November, lawyers for the Canadian Jewish Congress alleged that members of the Airborne held a celebratory dinner to honour Marc Lepine, the man who massacred fourteen women at the Université de Montréal in 1989. A former member of the Airborne confirmed the dinner had taken place and commented, '... it would have been the same as having an Adolf Hitler party on his birthday ... It's just the shock value.'⁴⁴

One of the questions which Inquiry Commissioners posed to many witnesses in the first phase of the hearings concerned a number of incidents involving the Airborne prior to its deployment to

Somalia. The first was a reported 'torching' of an officer's car at the base and the second was a shooting spree by members of the Airborne within a nearby provincial park. The Commissioners wondered aloud whether officers should have taken these incidents more seriously and as evidence of a real problem of command and control within the regiment.

Retired Major General Lewis Mackenzie's response to these questions was revealing. He suggested that because the Somalia mission had been upgraded from a Chapter six (peacekeeping) mission to a Chapter seven (peace enforcement) mission, the soldiers were all 'psyched up,' and though he did not want to excuse their behaviour prior to deployment, he thought that excitement might explain these incidents. He pointed out that there had only been three chapter seven missions in UN history to that point: Korea, the Gulf War and Somalia. Somalia had become 'a non-blue beret fight, as it were,' and that while 'some of this is macho stuff,' there was 'more prestige' for Airborne soldiers being deployed on a chapter seven mission than a chapter six.⁴⁵ There is more prestige, in other words, for soldiers to be involved in a mission of real soldiering, in which they are no longer restricted to firing only in self-defence.

In addition to these various revelations, one of the first documents tabled at the Inquiry confirmed what feminists have long-argued⁴⁶: the level of violence against women is disproportionately high within militaries, and this is true also of the Canadian military. The Hewson Report was a 1985 inquiry into infractions and

antisocial behaviour within the Mobile Command, with particular reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Major General Hewson had been charged with investigating whether there was a higher rate of disciplinary infractions (ie. criminal behaviour) within the Canadian forces than within Canadian society more generally. The report was initiated after a series of media stories covering crimes by Airborne members, one of which involved the murder of a civilian with a machete.⁴⁷

Hewson reported that there was no higher incidence of crime within the Canadian Forces, and in fact 'there appears to be a lower incidence of serious pathology and violent behaviour in the CF than in the Canadian population at large.'⁴⁸ However, two important qualifications were noted, the first was that while there was a lower incidence of violent crime more generally, there was 'a relatively higher frequency of sexual offences which should be further investigated.' The second was that within the Canadian Forces, there was a higher incidence of violent crime within the Canadian Airborne Regiment.

Hewson's explanation for the higher incidence of violent crime within the Airborne relied on explicitly gendered arguments and focused on the 'characteristics' of local residents and the concentration of single soldiers in Petawawa. The Report noted that 'Due to the physical nature of local industry (lumber and agriculture) the local civilian male population is considered robust and tough.'⁴⁹ Add to this a concentration of single male

soldiers, the report noted, and there resulted the potential for violence, particularly in 'disputes over girls:'

When compared to a relatively small local female population, this high concentration of young single soldiers creates an unbalanced, artificial society which is a source of undue stress to many servicemen. The young single soldier with his new `sporty' car, regular and higher pay and job security has a tendency [*sic*] to attract the local female population; this further antagonizes the local male population already frustrated (particularly so in Quebec) by the high level of unemployment. This creates a highly volatile situation; the local civilian police on both sides of the river state that most incidents of violence are over girls.⁵⁰

The report had comparatively less comment to make on the higher incidence of sexual assaults within the Canadian Forces, noting only that it deserved further study. Further studies were not forthcoming, perhaps in part because Hewson never indicated *how much* higher the level of sexual assaults were.⁵¹ In fact, however, an appendix outlining `crime case synopses' for 1984/85, indicates that the number of sexual offences within the Canadian Forces is staggering. If one includes within the category of sexual assaults all assaults in which the victim is a woman, more than half of the

141 crimes listed were either sexual assaults or physical assaults against women: 76 out of 141 cases, or 54 percent. It is very telling that not only did these figures not appear in the text of the report but in commenting on these statistics, Hewson noted that the crime case synopsis 'does not, statistically, reveal any significant or alarming trends.'⁵² Moreover, the recommendation to study further the 'higher frequency of sexual assaults' did not even make it into the Report's Summary of Main Recommendations.⁵³

What is being revealed at the Somalia Inquiry is the extent to which even Canada's beloved blue-bereted soldiers rely on the racism, violence and sexism which is inherent in the creation of soldiers and militarized masculinity. In an observation which could serve as a textbook definition of militarism and militarized masculinity (and which could have been read as a prediction of Shidane Arone's murder in Somalia when the Airborne was deployed there almost ten years later), Major R.W.J. Wenek wrote in 1984:

The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence, so that individual aggressiveness is, or should be, a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units. This is implicitly recognized in the aggressive norms of behaviour permitted and encouraged in elite units, such as commandos, paratroopers, and special service forces. Particularly in units such as these, but also in other combat units,

behaviour which may be considered verging on the sociopathic in peacetime becomes a prerequisite for survival in war. Aggressiveness must be selected for in military organizations and must be reinforced during military training, but it may be extremely difficult to make fine distinctions between those individuals who can be counted on to act in an appropriately aggressive way and those likely at some time to display inappropriate aggression. *To some extent, the risk of erring on the side of excess may be a necessary one in an organization whose existence is premised on the instrumental value of aggression and violence.*⁵⁴

Or, as a paratrooper in the newly-recreated Light Infantry Battalion at Petawawa noted: 'People worry we're too aggressive. But that's what soldiers are supposed to be. You don't go out and give the enemy a kiss. You kill them.'⁵⁵

Conclusions

The observations presented here about the Somalia Inquiry and the peacekeeping mission in Cambodia are intended, first, to call into question the very comfortable assumptions about peacekeeping which prevail in both national and international contexts. They are intended secondly, to outline some of the ways in which peacekeeping politics - like all politics - depend upon gendered

and racialised hierarchies. Soldiers are not born, they are made; and the training of soldiers depends in part upon notions of militarized masculinity which privilege violence, racism and sexism. This is true whether those soldiers are trained for warfare or for peacekeeping, and indeed, many proponents of peacekeeping argue that soldiers must be trained in the arts of war in order to be able to perform their peacekeeping duties.⁵⁶ The cases presented here, however, suggest that if there is a future for peacekeeping, then at a minimum we need to rethink the automatic response found in most quarters that soldiers make the best peacekeepers: for many women in Cambodia and for the Somali men killed by Canadian peacekeepers, it is quite clear that soldiers trained well in the arts of militarized masculinity can by far also make the worst peacekeepers.

End Notes

1. I am grateful for the research assistance of Suzanne Baustad, V. Elaine Brown, Leslie Jeffrey and Nicole LaViolette; and for financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

2. See for example Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992) ch. V and *passim*; and, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, (A/50/60), 25 January, 1995.

3. Cited from R.M. Jennar, 'UNTAC: "International Triumph" in Cambodia?', Security Dialogue, Vol. 25(2) 1994, p. 145. See also Judy L. Ledgerwood, 'UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia,' Analysis from the East-West Center No. 11, (Honolulu: East-West Center, March 1994); Janet E. Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994) pp. 1-8. Peter Utting also notes the way in which 'world opinion has been quick to label the United Nations operation in Cambodia 'a success'', and contrasts that view with the research presented in his volume on the social consequences of UNTAC. See Peter Utting, 'Introduction: Linking Peace and Rehabilitation in Cambodia,' in Utting Between Hope and Insecurity: The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994) p. 3 and *passim*.

4. Cited in The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995 (New York: UN, 1995), p. 55; see also 'What the United Nations learnt in Cambodia,' The Economist, June 19, 1993, p. 36.

5. Ker Munthit, 'Akashi: Election "Free and Fair",' Phnom Penh Post, June 6-12, 1993, p. 3; Nate Thayer and Rodney Tasker, 'Voice of the People,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 June 1993, p. 10. See also Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), ch. 4 and *passim*; Michael W. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, 'The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping,' International Peacekeeping, 1(2), Summer 1994, pp. 117-147.

6. The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, p. 54; see also Grant Curtis, 'Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process,' in Utting, Between Hope and Insecurity, pp. 56-58.

7. 'Report from the National Women's Summit,' Phnom Penh, March 5 - 8, 1993. See also Mang Channo, 'Women's Day Highlights Gender Inequalities,' Phnom Penh Post, March 12-25, 1993.

8. Interviews, March 25-April 1, 1996. Another way in which UNTAC was cited as having contributed in a positive way to women's lives concerned domestic violence: the Project Against Domestic Violence in Phnom Penh reported that in a context where few cases of domestic violence are ever reported to authorities and fewer still are prosecuted, one provincial judge described the only criminal case of domestic violence she had ever presided over as one in which UNTAC officers had brought in a man caught beating his wife in a marketplace, (Cathy Zimmerman, Sar Samen and Men Savorn, 'Plates in a Basket Will Rattle: Domestic Violence in Cambodia,' (Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation, 1994), p. 140 fn. 99 and pp. 137-142 *passim*).

9. Ramses Amer, 'The United Nations' Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia: Overview and Assessment,' Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 15(2), September 1993, pp. 211-231; Curtis, 'Transition to What?' p. 59; Doyle, UNTAC's Civil Mandate, ch. 4; Doyle and Suntharalingam, 'Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping,' pp. 124-127.

10. In addition to other sources cited above, see also Jarat Chopra, John Mackinlay and Larry Minear, Report on the Cambodian Peace Process, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1993), ch. 3 and *passim*; Jarat Chopra, 'United Nations Authority in Cambodia,' Occasional Paper #15, (Providence: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1994), Part 2 and *passim*; Amitav Acharya, 'Cambodia, the United Nations and the Problems of Peace,' The Pacific Review, 7, 3 (1994) 298-308.

11. Curtis, 'Transition to What?' p. 60; Peter Eng, 'Little Sympathy for Vietnamese Victims,' Phnom Penh Post, August 7, 1992, p. 4; Kevin Barrington, 'Massacre Condemned But ...' Phnom Penh Post, March 26 - April 8, 1993, p. 1.

12. Jennar, 'International Triumph in Cambodia?,' p. 148.

13. An important exception here is an excellent collection organized through the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, see Utting, Between Hope and Insecurity.

14. Mang Channg, 'Sex Trade Flourishing in Capital,' Phnom Penh Post, February 12-25, 1993, p. 6; 'The Problem of Prostitution,' Phnom Penh Post, February 12-25, 1993, p. 6; Andrew Nettie, 'Cambodia: UN Mission cited as sex slavery spreads,' Sunday Age (Melbourne), June 25, 1995; Eva Arnvig, 'Women, Children and Returnees,' in Utting, Between Hope and Insecurity, pp. 166-169; Kien Serey Phal, 'The Lessons of the UNTAC Experience and the Ongoing Responsibilities of the International Community for Peacebuilding and Development in Cambodia,' Pacifica Review, 7(2), 1995, pp. 129-133; Gayle Kirshenbaum, 'Who's Watching the Peacekeepers?' Ms., May/June (1994) p. 13. Interviews conducted in Phnom Penh from March 25 - April 1 1995 as well as numerous reports by NGOs within Phnom Penh confirm these observations; see for

example, Mona Mehta, 'Gender Dimensions of Poverty in Cambodia: A Survey Report,' (Phnom Penh: Oxfam, 1993), p. 7.

15. Jon Swain, 'UN losing battle for Cambodia in the brothels of Phnom Penh,' Sunday Times, December 27, 1992; Asian Recorder, May 21 - 27, 1993, 23144. Indeed, the Cambodian Women's Development Association indicated in 1994 that the majority of prostitutes working in the Toul Kork area of Phnom Penh were likely Cambodian, (Cambodian Women's Development Association, "Prostitution Survey Results," 1994), and interviewees in Phnom Penh indicated to the author that the ethnic origin of prostitutes in Cambodia has always varied, depending on the location of the brothels.

16. Interviews, Phnom Penh, March 25-April 1, 1996.

17. UNICEF, 'The Trafficking and Prostitution of Children in Cambodia: A Situation Report,' (Phnom Penh: UNICEF. 1995), pp. 1-2; Krousar Thmey, 'Child Prostitution and Trafficking in Cambodia: A New Problem,' March - October 1995 in Appendix 2 of UNICEF, 'The Trafficking and Prostitution of Children in Cambodia; Keo Keang and Im Phallay, Human Rights Task Force on Cambodia, ' Notes on the March - April 1995 Rapid Appraisal of the Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia on Child Prostitution and Trafficking,' in Appendix 2 of UNICEF, 'The Trafficking and Prostitution of Children in Cambodia; Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia, 'Combating Women Trafficking and Child Prostitution,' March/April, 1995, in Appendix 2 of UNICEF, 'The Trafficking and Prostitution of Children in Cambodia.'

18. Swain, 'UN losing battle for Cambodia in the brothels of Phnom Penh.'

19. Ledgerwood, 'The Lessons from Cambodia,' p. 7.

20. Swain, "UN losing battle for Cambodia in the brothels of Phnom Penh," and Asian Recorder, February 5 - 11, 1993, 22903. Most observers note that while UNTAC was not responsible for bringing HIV and AIDS to Cambodia, it did contribute to its spread.

21. Katrina Peach, 'HIV threatens to claim UNTAC's highest casualties,' Phnom Penh Post, October 22 - November 4, 1993, p. 4.

22. Noted in Asian Recorder, April 16-22, 1993, 23060. Ledgerwood, 'The Lessons from Cambodia,' p. 8 and Arnvig, 'Women, Children and Returnees,' p. 165.

23. The Reuters Library Report, November 18, 1992.

24. Jennar, 'International Triumph in Cambodia?' p. 154.

25. Interviews in Phnom Penh, March 25-April 1, 1996. See also Kirshenbaum, 'Who's Watching the Peacekeepers?' p. 13.

26. Interviews in Phnom Penh, March 25-April 1, 1996.
27. 'An Open Letter to Yasushi Akashi,' Phnom Penh Post, October 11, 1992, p. 2; 'Allegations of sexual harassment hit U.N. Peacekeeping forces in Cambodia,' Business Wire, January 11, 1993.
28. Sara Colm, 'U.N. Agrees to Address Sexual Harassment Issue,' Phnom Penh Post, October 11, 1992, p. 1; Swain, 'UN losing battle for Cambodia in the brothels of Phnom Penh.'
29. Colm, 'U.N. Agrees to Address Sexual Harassment Issue," and "Akashi Responds to Community Concerns,' Phnom Penh Post, November 20 - December 3, 1992, p. 2.
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31. Kien, 'The Lessons of the UNTAC Experience,' p. 132.
32. Cited from Kirshenbaum, 'Who's Watching the Peacekeepers?' p. 15.
33. Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia, 75-76, 129.
34. A.B. Fetherston makes a similar argument in 'UN Peacekeepers and Cultures of Violence' Cultural Survival Quarterly, 19, 1 (1995) 19-23.
35. Joseph T. Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping, (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 1.
36. David Pugliese, 'Somalia: what went so wrong?' The Ottawa Citizen, October 1, 1995, p. A6.
37. Christopher Dornan, 'Scenes from a scandal,' The Globe and Mail, January 21, 1995, p. D1 and Corporal Christopher Robin, Testimony to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, October 12, 1995, Ottawa, Canada.
38. Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping, p. 33.
39. Carol Burke in 'Sex, G.I.'s and Videotape,' a work in progress, nd., makes the same observation.

40. Romeo St. Martin, 'Guilty of conduct unbecoming of an officer on TV,' XPress: The Capital's Newspaper, February 15, 1995.
41. See for example Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) especially chs. two and three; V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) pp. 81-91 and *passim*.
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44. 'Soldier confirms Airborne held massacre party,' The Ottawa Citizen, November 9, 1995, p. A3; 'Army commander probes report of Lepine dinner,' The Ottawa Citizen, November 10, 1995, p. A3; 'Racist soldier with criminal past allowed to rejoin the army, inquiry hears,' The Ottawa Citizen, November 3, 1995, p. A5.
45. Major General (retired) Lewis Mackenzie, Testimony to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, February 1, 1996, Ottawa, Canada. It is important to note also that the incidents about which Mackenzie was asked to comment took place some two months before the Somalia mission was upgraded to a Chapter seven, making it a thin excuse indeed.
46. For an excellent introduction to this type of feminist work, see Francine D'Amico, 'Women as Warriors: Feminist Perspectives,' Paper presented at the Annual General Meetings of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, British Columbia, March 20-23, 1992.
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48. The Hewson Report, p. 17.
49. The Hewson Report, p. 61.
50. The Hewson Report, p. 61 and p. 19.
51. The Hewson Report, pp. 27-28.
52. The Hewson Report, p. 29.

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54. Major R.W.J. Wenek, The Assessment of Psychological Fitness: Some Options for the Canadian Forces, Technical Note 1/84, Ottawa: Directorate of Personnel Selection, Research on Second Careers, July 1984, p. 13 *cf.* The Hewson Report, p. 46.
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