On Wuzhili’s ‘false alarm’

By way of introduction

The United States use of biological and chemical weapons during the Korean War (1950-1953) remains one of the most closely-guarded Cold War secrets of the American government. Generally speaking, though, its denials have worn increasingly thin.

Recently, however, defenders of the United States innocence in this matter believe that help has come to their cause. It is in the form of a posthumously published essay or memoir by an important Chinese participant in that conflict – namely the director of health services for the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army which fought in Korea. This person was Dr WuZhili (d. 2005) whose essay is titled ‘The Bacteriological War of 1952 is a False Alarm.’

The English translation of this essay is currently being distributed on the advice of three centers in the United States National Defense University in Washington, D.C. It has been sent to Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, authors of The United States and Biological Warfare: secrets of the Early Cold War and Korea (Indiana University Press, 1998) by a third party seeking their opinion. Their reaction to this request is the subject of the following article, ‘False Alarm? The Bacteriological War of 1952.’

1 June 2016

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False Alarm? ‘The Bacteriological War of 1952’

Comment on Director WuZhili’s Essay

by

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In the summer of 1997 Stephen Endicott made a trip to Beijing in preparation for writing the manuscript of The United States and Biological Warfare: secrets of the early Cold War and Korea (Indiana University Press, 1998) with co-author, Edward Hagerman.

As part of our research plan in Beijing that summer we requested an interview with WuZhili who was head of health services for the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) in Korea early in the Korean War. He agreed over the telephone to meet but said that (to avoid misunderstandings with his unit) we should first get in touch with its foreign affairs office. We did this through our host, the State Archives Bureau, but without result.

After our call, Dr Wu, a graduate of Shanghai Medical College in 1937, apparently sat down at his desk to compose a short essay about events of 45 years earlier under the title ‘The Bacteriological War of 1952 is a False Alarm.’ His essay was dated September 1997.
If this document is genuine, it appears to offer a markedly different account of the bacteriological warfare, one that challenges the consensus of the volunteer army’s commander at the time, Marshal PengDehuai, as well as of the acting chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army, Marshal NieRongzhen, the government in Beijing led by MaoZedong and Premier ZhouEnlai, and the judgement of the ‘International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China (1952) led by the famed British scientist, Dr Joseph Needham.

In his essay Dr Wu says many things and among them are the statements that ‘our preliminary investigations could not prove that the U. S. military carried out bacteriological warfare,’ and that ‘for the entire year [1952-1953] no sick patient or deceased person was found to have anything to do with bacteriological warfare.’ He said it was ‘a false alarm.’ In later years when friends urged him to speak out now that the relation between the US and China was ‘not bad’ he declined, saying that he ‘always recommended conveying that we were “threatened” by bacteriological warfare thus taking a more defensible position.’

Instead of showing his essay to us, Wu put it in a drawer where it apparently lay for sixteen years, long after his death in 2005. Then the Yanhuang Chunqiu, (sometimes translated as ‘China Through the Ages’), which Wikipedia describes as a dissident or ‘liberal reformist monthly journal’ in the People's Republic of China, (created in 1991 largely through the effort of retired senior general Xiao Ke), published Wu’s essay in its November 2013 issue. This was followed up with an English translation by a research intern at the United States National Defence University, Drew Casey, in Washington D.C. which has appeared in the spring of this year – 2015. It has recently come into our hands.

Supporters of United States official denials about employing biological weapons in the Korean War are asserting that the question is now resolved, the US exonerated, and the top leaders of China are said to be guilty of lying and spreading a falsehood.

After carefully reading the English translation we have come to the conclusion that although the essay suggests a blip in the historical narrative and gives a strong hint about different currents of opinion among Chinese senior military and political leaders on the topic, (whose origins and reasons will undoubtedly become clearer with the passage of more time) it does not change our understanding about the existence of a large-scale field experimentation with bacteriological weapons by the United States in Korea and China during the Korean War years 1952-1953 – an action which we continue to believe the world, for its own sake, should recognize and condemn as a grievous international war crime.

Our understanding of what we consider to be the truth of the matter comes mainly from two layers of information and their interaction: (1) the archival evidence and our interviews in the United States, and (2) the archival evidence and our interviews in China. The correlation between these two layers is the subject of our book (see above) and therefore only a brief reminder of the context will be given here.

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For us the 1990's was a propitious moment to be conducting research at the US National Archives, because, invoking laws regulating the transfer of documents to the public archives, Bill Clinton, who became United States president in 1993, ordered all government departmental records over 20 years old and not subject to national security restrictions, to be opened for the public to view. This allowed us to read the somewhat still censored 40-year old files relating to the Korean War era.

Especially valuable were the ‘secret’ and ‘top-secret’ materials of the Department of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Army Chemical Corps encompassing such matters as doctrines governing usage of biological weapons, emergency war plans, command structures, public relations ‘cover and deception’ plans, networks of research centred on Fort Detrick, Maryland, and university science departments scattered around the country and in Canada and Great Britain, where weapons, vectors, and pathogens were being actively developed. (The window of opportunity to see these files was short-lived because when George W. Bush became president in 2001, his administration quickly closed them again.)

These secret and top-secret files are voluminous and show that the U. S. germ warfare program, which was raised to A-1 level in 1951, and its deployment subject only to presidential approval (the same as with atomic weapons), was still in the process of development.

But they also show, in briefer outline, a covert program in place whereby US Air Force and C.I.A. units could carry on biological warfare using a variety of means readily available: 4-compartment leaflet bombs, cardboard cylinders with parachute, spraying etc.; vectors such as infected insects--fleas, flies and mosquitos, feathers, leaves and other vegetation; deadly or debilitating pathogens and viruses such as those causing bubonic plague, anthrax, encephalitis, cholera, brucellosis, tularema, and salmonella poisoning – more than a dozen.

In its efforts to develop bacteriological warfare the United States had the help of former members of the Japanese Army’s notorious Unit 731– a connection that the United States government denied for thirty years. To acquire their knowledge, the United States shielded these ruthless killers, the leaders of this unit, from war crimes prosecution after the Second World War even though the U.S. knew the unit had murdered thousands of Chinese and other allied prisoners of war in live bacterial experiments.

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The U.S. government documents of the Korean War era show that the impetus to conduct field experiments with biological weapons occurred at the mid-point of the war, when negotiations for a cease fire, which had started in July 1951, had not progressed far as each side tried to improve its bargaining position. The United States strategy had been to use its superior air power in ‘Operation Strangle’ to cut off the supply routes and thus weaken their enemy. But by now the Chinese army had received some Soviet-built, radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns and the newest model MIG-15 jet fighters. They were able to fight back.

By the third week of October 1951 some of the ‘greatest air battles of history,’ according to an American military historian, were being fought over northwestern Korea: in a short period of time nine American jet fighters and five B-29 flying fortress bombers were shot down and eight more were damaged.
The Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg, made a quick trip to the Korean front in November 1951 and returned home with a gloomy report. ‘Almost overnight,’ he said, ‘Communist China has become one of the major air powers of the world.’ At the same time the US Fifth Air Force operating in Korea believed that the Chinese still had 500,000 people working to counter the effect of ‘Operation Strangle,’ and that the CPVA had strengthened its position at the Main Line of Resistance by adding almost 100,000 fighting men to the 200,000 already in place.

US military leaders worried that if this trend continued the Chinese would be able to launch and sustain another general offensive. The United States was stymied. This was the impetus to try some ‘novel weapons.’

In these worrying circumstances President Truman flew back from his winter house in Florida, a week ahead of schedule, to meet with his top officials over the deteriorating situation in Korea. A few days later Secretary of Defence Robert Lovett issued his pivotal, top-secret directive of 21 December 1951 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that actual readiness in chemical and biological warfare ‘be achieved in the earliest practicable time.’ The Joint Chiefs followed up shortly with a formal order to the Services to implement a ‘strong offensive BW capability without delay’ to be used ‘without regard for precedent.’ The United States government at the highest level had taken a top secret decision to employ germ (and chemical) weapons on an urgent basis in its war with China and North Korea.

Five weeks later, on 28th January 1952, units of the 42nd Army of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army in Korea, encamped near Pyonggang in the ‘Iron Triangle’ as the Americans called it, scene of some of the most bitter fighting of the war, began sending telegrams to their headquarters reporting that American aircraft were dropping strange objects, including live insects, on to the snowy ground near their trenches. Similar reports from other army units soon followed.

It took several weeks for the Chinese army and their North Korean allies to figure out for certain what was really happening in this new development and their governments as a result didn’t make any official statement for almost a month – not until the last week of February 1952.

On 18th February Acting Chief of Staff, NieRongzhen, reported to the Central Military Commission and the Central Party Committee that insects – spiders, flies and fleas – had been spread over a large area at the front line. In addition to sending specialists to do field investigations,’ he wrote, ‘we have also brought all kinds of insects back to Beijing to cultivate and to test. Two days later we will be able to find out what germs were carried by these insects. In the specialists’ estimation cholera, typhoid, plague, relapsing fever are most likely involved. If confirmed by our inspection, immunization and elimination efforts will have to be made as soon as possible (being prepared by the logistics department, health section), which will need support in human and material resources from the Soviet Union.’

Three days later, on 21st February, based upon the latest information, the Central Military Commission and the Central Party Committee reached the conclusion that the
Americans were indeed conducting germ warfare whose purpose was ‘to terrify and threaten and to test the performance of their biological weapons.’ Premier Zhou Enlai issued a directive on the urgency of the situation and the next day the foreign ministers of North Korea (on February 22nd) and China (on February 24th) issued statements ‘protesting the germ war crimes of the American invaders.’

At his headquarters in Songchou County, situated about 75 miles north of the Main Line of Resistance and 30 miles northeast of Pyongyang, the capital city, Director Wu says he responded quickly to the news and ‘formulated anti-bacteriological warfare measures (strengthening individual health measures, giving more types of vaccinations, requiring everyone to pin their trouser leg and sleeve openings tight and wear scarves around the neck, setting sentries to watch the sky, developing methods for collecting and submitting specimens for examination, on-the-spot swatting of insects dropped from the air, sprinkling sanitizer...) and promulgated them throughout the whole army.’

This was part of the massive nation-wide public health campaign under Premier Zhou Enlai’s personal leadership that engaged the army along transportation routes and in residential areas of the war zone, medical workers and virtually the entire population of China in exterminating flies, catching mice, safe guarding water resources, sanitizing living quarters, carrying out mass inoculations.

Director Wu also dispatched men (including himself) to the reporting units to ascertain the situation – investigations which concluded that ‘there were insects and other objects dropped on the snow,’ but which never discovered people who had died suddenly or suspiciously fallen ill.’ Since no epidemics had ensued (something that top-secret US documents show American generals were disappointed and puzzled about, see below), he sent his conclusion, that ‘preliminary investigation’ could not prove the U.S. military carried out bacteriological warfare, to Marshall Peng Dehuai who passed it on to acting chief of staff, Marshall Nie Rongzhen, in Beijing. Then Peng requested Wu to give an in-person report at the PVA headquarters which was located in nearby Hoechang county in a bunker deep in the mountainous spine of Korea.

Wu says that after listening to his report Peng gave him a cold reception using words that implied he was an American imperialist operative. Whereupon Wu said he would no longer act as Health Director. ‘I have no other request,’ he said, ‘except please let me stay in Korea and fight.’ In this tense atmosphere commander Peng declared the meeting temporarily in recess for the standing committee to consult. When the meeting resumed Peng stated that the standing committee wanted Wu to continue as deputy director to do ‘a proper job,’ with General Deng Hua, deputy commander of the PVA, as the director.

Marshall Nie, who had other sources of information from armies located north of Pyongyang, was also dissatisfied with the slowness of testing and seeming lack of expertise that made the experts in Songchou unable to identify the kinds of bacteria. Nie told premier Zhou Enlai that he had mobilized forty-four experts from Shanghai, Tianjing and Beijing (entomologists, bacteriologists, pathologists, poisonous chemicals experts etc) to fly to Korea and go to the front.
The Health Division at Songchou received these experts and Wu divided them into four teams, the largest at a place near his headquarters and the other three in the health departments of the Eastern, Central and Western fronts. The number of specimens received was large - several hundred - and Wu writes in his essay that ‘some had bacteria cultured from them.’ Most of these were salmonella-type (which was one of the debilitating pathogens favoured in the US BW program). Some snow fleas ‘seemed to have bubonic plague’ but they showed to be gram-positive where as bubonic plague is gram-negative.’ ‘A few times anthrax was found on tree leaf specimens,’ a significant finding of a biological warfare technique upon which Wu makes no further comment, except to say that ‘there were all kinds of so-called “dropped-objects,” but it was difficult to link them to bacteriological warfare.’ The dropped objects included ‘dead rats, flies and large mosquitos, vessels with insects (which were U.S. Army iron 4-compartment ammunition cases and paper parachute tubes used for spreading propaganda material), tree leaves and snakes.’ (These were exactly among the kinds of weapons, vectors and pathogens being developed in the US Biological Warfare Laboratories at Camp Detrick in Frederick, Maryland.)

Wu’s essay ends with his lament over some lapses in moral judgement brought on by the pressure to have important evidence ready to present to the much-publicised International Scientific Commission inspection group due to arrive in Korea mid–summer 1952. ‘This has been my silent regret for decades,’ he writes.

His North Korean counterpart, who was also preparing for the commission’s visit to Pyongyang, told him that he had no exhibits to present. Together with his Soviet advisers he had cooked-up scenarios – one with cholera and one with plague – but they had no plague pathogens on hand to implement it. Wu agreed to help them out by sending a courier to Shenyang in China to get the required ingredient. There was also a story where two members of the CPVA allegedly came upon a hillside with a mass of plague-infected fleas that ‘darkened the ground.’ This exhibit was introduced to the commission by Woo Dji-Lee (WuZhili) himself, complete with photo and map. But it too, he says, was false. In his essay, Wu wished to express his unceasing apology to the international scientists for deceiving them and now that he was an 83-year-old man who knew the facts and was no longer on duty, ‘it is fitting to speak out.’

Two years to the day after negotiations to end the war began, a truce was signed on 27th July 1953 by an American and a North Korean general. It was at Panmunjom, a small village near the 38th parallel that continues to divide Korea into North and South. The fighting was over, the carnage stopped, and both sides began summing up their experience of the germ war.

Historians compiling a history of the war in the Academy of Military Science in Beijing gathered veterans of the war to form an advisory board and began to collect materials. They interviewed a wide spectrum of people, including WuZhili. Starting to write a first draft in 1982 they said their aim was to ‘try objectively to represent the historical truth of the Resist America,
Aid Korea War and thus make the book become a faithful historical account that can stand the test of time.’ A first edition of their book appeared in 1987 and after receiving ‘criticisms and corrections,’ was followed by a second edition in 1990. Chapter 3, Section 3 on germ warfare was written by Colonel QiDexue whom we interviewed in Beijing.

The chapter takes the view that as contaminated areas gradually extended into seven provinces and 44 prefectures of North Korea the enemy’s germ war ‘once endangered the Chinese and Korean army and the Korean people to a certain extent,’9. During this period it says that ‘384 Chinese soldiers were infected ... among whom 258 were healed.’

The biological warfare was something new for the army and this preliminary experience had shown four things:

- to fight imperialist countries, who are aggressive by nature, we have always to be alert for all kinds of mean tricks;
- BW is against humanitarianism and international law, therefore used secretly, and we have to be even more alert to discover it and to take strong measures to defeat the enemy’s purpose;
- germs of all kinds were used, at the front and in the rear, so we had to mobilize all forces;
- the enemy’s use of BW was experimental as well as aimed at destruction. We have to organize scientific personnel to conduct effective inspection work and grasp accurately the epidemic situation and take proper measures. As long as we found and treated the problem in a timely way the enemy’s BW could be completely defeated.

The Americans were more prompt in making their assessment. In a lengthy appraisal dated 31 August 1953, American military leaders signed off the crash program to develop biological weapons, a decision that was endorsed by the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford. To his boss, the United States secretary of defence, Radford wrote that ‘the events of the past two years’ had demonstrated the germ warfare program ‘suffered from over-optimism and consequent attempts to get a job done quickly.’ He added that the US military proposed to keep the existing capability in ‘the operational use of biological agents,’ perhaps putting GB (nerve gas) agents into the munitions mix, but at a more measured pace. The US Air Force had already informed its Canadian and British partners that it had been unable to achieve a ‘highly lethal, stable, viable, easily disseminated, low cost, epidemic-producing BW agent.’10

Dr Wu was right in thinking there had not been a full-blown bacteriological war epidemic; wrong in declaring it a false alarm.

He was offering from memory a first-hand account of his experience. Perhaps had he been aware of the many facts revealed about the germ war program in the United States archives (especially when matched with the Chinese archives held in the Liaoning Provincial Archives), as well as the declarations of American leaders cited in this commentary, such knowledge would have led this singularly cautious man to a more scientific, factual interpretation of what he was seeing.
The failure of the American bacterial weapons to kill a lot of people in mass epidemics in China is no proof that such a war crime was not attempted and successful in some measure.

United States use of ‘novel weapons’ sixty-five years ago speaks to us of yet another era when the culture of impunity, the doctrine of plausible denial, and disregard for international law in the conduct of its foreign policy was prime time for the world’s most powerful nation.

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Endnotes

1 We say ‘appears’ because the skills of a translator may make big differences to the nuances of text. In this case the editor of Yanhuang Chunqiu says that with the exception of a few sentences the journal ‘did not permit alterations in order not to influence the understanding of its contents.’ Nevertheless we noted some questionable items. For example the mis-identification of the leader of the commission of investigation sent from Beijing as Otto Braun, former Comintern advisor to the Chinese Communist Party when in fact it was Madame LiDequan, former YWCA Secretary and China’s Minister of Health.

2 Cited in Robert Futrell, The USAF in Korea (1983), pg. 412; see also Endicott and Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (1998), 101-104


4 US National Archives, RG218, Joint Chiefs of Staff. ‘Decision on JCS 1837/29, 26 February 1952, pg. 307, and ‘Note by the Secretaries’ (Top Secret), Decimal file 385.2; JCS 1837/26 as amended on JCS 1837/29 Feb 25 and 26, 1952

5 History of the Resist America Aid Korea War (in Chinese), QiDexue, (editor in chief), (Beijing, Military Sciences Press, 2000), 202, 205

6 NieRongzhen Junshi Wenxuan (Selected Military Writings of NieRongzhen), PLA Publishing House, Beijing, 1992, 365-366

7 Marshall NieRongzhen, in Beijing was receiving additional reports from a variety of sources that WuZhili in his headquarters at Songchou may not have been aware of: i.e. ‘Daily Reports’ and ‘Research Group Reports’ from the Northeast Epidemic Disease Prevention Committee and the Northeast Patriotic Health Campaign Committee of the Northeast Administrative Committee, reports which are preserved in Volumes 38 and 43 of the relevant permanent collections at the Liaoning provincial archives (of which we read more than fifty and discuss in chapter 1 of our book); reports from the Logistic Departments along the transportation routes, and from the headquarters of the CPVA in the combat zone. An example of the latter is excerpted and attached to this commentary.

even if true it fails to ‘resolve’ the question of the use of BW in the Korean War, as claimed by some observers. See Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, ‘Twelve Newly Released Soviet-Era “Documents” and Allegations of U.S. Germ Warfare During the Korean War,’ Asian Perspective, vol. 25, No.1, 2001, 249-257 for our discussion of the relevance of these incidents which we believe still stands.


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APPENDIX

PLA Archives
Concerning the Comprehensive Situation of the Enemy’s Bacterial War and Use of Poisonous Gas, 28 January to 31 March 1952.’
By the Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army.
Date: 5 April 1952

Concerning the Comprehensive Situation of the Bacterial War I. A summary of the enemy spreading insects and poisonous objects:
From 28th of January the enemy spread three kinds of insects ticks, spiders and small black insects in the defense area of the 42nd Army southeast of Yichuan in the Yuandi and Jingu area. At that time the weather was still very cold, a large number of insects (among them cibianzhao [ticks] are considered as domestic insects appeared on the snow in the wild. On 12
February the enemy in many areas of our battle front spread a large number of fleas, flies etc. Before and after 20 February, both south and north of Pyongyang near Sangu and Mazhuanli, they spread all kinds of poisonous insects and objects. Up until 31 March, according to incomplete statistics, this occurred 347 times involving 79 kinds of poisonous insects and objects. See the Appendix (list).

II. The disease situation of the Army:

(1) After the enemy started bacterial war until the end of February, serious contagious diseases of plague cholera etc., were not found among army personnel or civilians. In this period, only among civilians, there was relapsing fever, smallpox and typhus, these kinds of contagious disease were found. The above were only found in some individuals in the army, there was no epidemic.

(2) During March we found sixteen plague cases or similar to plague cases (among them the Logistic Department of the Volunteer Army diagnosed nine cases of plague and the Army Divisions made a preliminary diagnosis of seven cases of plague.) Plague was found in the 2nd and 4th Divisions of the 20th and 27th armies (including a civilian woman in the army area), in the 39th and 26th armies, altogether in six locations the areas are located in the north and south, in Mazhuanli, Yangde, Dechuan, Tushan west of Tieyuan, northeast of Pingkang area preliminary diagnosis of similar to plague occurred at the 40th, 26th, 12th and 67th armies, four units in the area south of Pyongyang and north and east of Jinchen. At the same time many areas discovered dead rodents (rats, some of them died suddenly, while still in motion. Through the Logistic Department of the Volunteer Army’s laboratory autopsies they found plague and similar to plague bacilli in three cases among the dead rats. In the history of Korea they have never discovered plague before. This demonstrates that the bacteria the enemy spread is starting a contagion in our army.

(3) In March there were 44 cases of encephalitis and meningitis in the army, among them 16 died.

(4) According to the Korean Army Medical Bureau’s notice: On March 7th near Pyongyang, four cholera patients were found of which 3 died. Through laboratory tests, diagnosed as cholera. On 29th March in the 47th army one patient was vomiting and with diarreaha, and through the Division’s preliminary diagnosis it
was cholera.
(5) Aside from the above several kinds of diseases, there were 43 people with acute diseases of which 20 died. Among these some died after 30 hours of falling ill, some after 8 hours, 6 hours and 2 hours. As to what this illness was we cannot make an accurate diagnosis, and whether or not it was related to the enemy’s spreading bacterial war is under further investigation.

III. Since February until now, the enemy used poisonous artillery shells 16 times, 103 people were poisoned and 17 died.

(1) On February 27th the enemy fired 20-odd shells at our 67 Army front among them were some poisonous gas shells and ten of our men were poisoned.
(2) At midnight of March 9th the enemy fired poisonous gas shells at our 26th Army front and eight of our men were poisoned, two seriously.
(3) At 10 o’clock March 3rd the enemy fired ten-odd shells towards our 12th Army front, among them two shells had yellow smoke and two of our men were poisoned
(4) At 16 hours March 12th enemy planes dropped bombs and gas bombs at our 801.8 m. high point location of our 3rd Group Army front. Seventeen of the Volunteer Army were poisoned and 7 died.
(5) On March 10th the enemy fired poisonous gas shells with red, yellow, white, green smoke at our 42nd Army front. Due to the direction of the wind it blew in the direction of the enemy and none of us were poisoned.

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IV. Summing up the Confessions of POWs

Recent confessions of POWs from various units relating to bacterial war questions are as follows:
(1) Situation of enemy army inoculations:
(I) According to the confession of Cpl. James Chambers, No. 123621632 of the US 2nd Division, 38th Regiment, captured by our 26th Army on February 8th: aside from vaccination for smallpox, typhus, tetanus etc., he also had ‘Japanese Insect Vaccination (Riben Jiacong) and Glandular plague vaccine (Xianshuyu).
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(4) Sending spies to collect information on epidemic disease situation.
(I) During the evening of March 13th, the enemy dispatched nine agents divided into three groups. They took off from Seoul and
they landed respectively at the 39th Army front located at Xiongdifeng, northwest of Yichuan, at Shifeng and at the 67th Army front located at Xinggaoshan area. Except for four who escaped, the remaining five were all captured by us. The 39th Army got two, the 67th Army captured two and the 3rd Branch captured one. This batch of spies were formerly our soldiers who surrendered and were taken prisoner by the enemy and trained by the American imperialists and then assigned to intelligence work. They can tell each other’s names and appearance and their confessions are generally consistent. They all wear the Volunteer Army uniforms which were made by the enemy, and the colours are a little too deep. They carried carbon rifles or Soviet rifles, Japanese 14th-year brand pistols, binoculars, radios and instruments to tap telephones. They carry military pigeons. They pretend to be staff officers of our army. They had been tattooed on the arms with anti-communism and defeat the Soviets. Then their tattoo was changed to flowers, birds, snake characters. Their main task is to know the effect of the bacterial war, the army and civilian epidemic disease situation, how many days does it take for people to die and the deaths, and the proportion between old and young casualties, what kind of medicine was injected that was effective, whether there were epidemic diseases in the army, did they see any dead rats inside the residences, how many fleas and lice etc.

Starting from January 28th through to March 31st, the enemy dropped bacteria poisoned insects and special objects that reached 347 places. According to incomplete statistics the area affected is about 200 sq. kilometres. The minimum density was 8 to 3,500 per square metre, also piles were two inches thick on the ground. For the kinds of poisonous insects an objects dropped by the enemy see the following chart:

Appendix: ‘Various Kinds of Poisonous Insects and Objects’

Note: the appendix listed 29 insects and 50 objects. The insects included house flies, fleas, snow fleas, large mosquito (damawen), locusts (mazha) bees, ants.... The objects listed such items as sugar, pork, dead crow, chicken feathers, tree leaves, fragrant leaflets, chopsticks, empty can, toad, wild bird, excrement, white powder...