ences as, not in, modernity. In the process, these chapters embed the history of science fully in modern history. So much has this theme been present in the early parts, however, that there is some overlap and repetition. (This may be positive, as one imagines readers picking out particular chapters according to need, not reading through.)

The editors have done wonderfully well to assemble so much comprehensible writing over such a range. Where else, for example, could one learn, in a few short clear pages, about the structuring effects of accounting practice? But there is one absence, or silence, that raises interesting questions. There is no chapter on the history of linguistics. The point can surely be made that language or symbol systems generally are the medium of human sociality and that the history of what language has been understood to be is therefore constitutive of social science. The absence of attention to language leaves one modern dimension of the social sciences historically adrift. It also inadvertently reinforces a historiography that stresses the management rather than the culture, the methodology rather than the expression, of modernity, if I may make this distinction. In this sense, these chapters reinforce a historiography linking the social sciences to the natural sciences, rather than to what Anglo-Americans call the humanities. There is also no discussion of social psychology (and here one might include psychoanalysis), the area that most obviously ties together the modern shaping of the individual and society, and this leaves chapters on sociology and psychology unrelated. Nearly all chapters focus on historical rather than philosophical and conceptual questions, except to a degree in Part I in relation to the shaping of the subject matter of social science. However, a number of chapters explore the epistemic, not only practical, consequences of particular methodologies (statistics, financial control, social surveys), political events (the Cold War, mass unemployment, colonization and decolonization), and social experiments (the religion of humanity, education, welfare).

The volume is a major contribution to communicating a contemporary understanding of science as integral to the life of the modern world. Both general historians and historians of science, not to mention scientists themselves, who think science is something apart may find this weighty volume hard to ignore. Readers who already work in one of the many branches of this protean field will find most helpful and interesting ways into related areas. Students and teachers alike will surely find it a major resource.

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We tell psychological colleagues unversed in historiography that presentism and historicism are two basic and independent perspectives—with the latter being more scholarly and objective. Yet a short reflection on methodology suggests that rather than distinguishing two
types of historiographical attitudes, it would be more adequate to distinguish between naïve presentism, in which past performances are described and evaluated in terms of contemporary standards, presentist historicism, and historicist presentism. The distinction between these last two stems from the insight that a pure historicism is not workable because it is impossible to completely eradicate current horizons from research or because questions and interests emerge from the present. Thus, in presentist historicism, one is aware of the fact that historical studies are motivated by contemporary interests, but, in choosing such a perspective, one intends to do justice to historical circumstances. In historicist presentism, one uses historical material in order to elucidate current topics. Because of the dialectical relationship of these two programs, the line of separation lacks precision.

Such methodological distinctions become significant when we deal with issues such as “race” and racism. Did racism exist in the eighteenth century even when researchers did not use a biological concept of race? Can we refer to racism only when we talk about the nineteenth century, during which “race” was studied systematically and eventually informed our contemporary meaning and practices? Bindman chooses to refer to human variety instead of race and uses terms such as prejudice, stereotype, or biological nationalism instead of racism. He emphasizes repeatedly that his book is not about “race,” because the eighteenth century did not have a coherent, static, and consistent usage of the term, and “race,” from a conceptual point of view, was a “fragile and unstable” (p. 8) concept with little theoretical foundation. He argues convincingly that Kant’s definition of “race” in the second half of the eighteenth century was not widely accepted in academia and that “race” was one category, no more important than “variety” or “nation.” Accordingly,Bindman is required to suggest that racism did not generally exist prior to the nineteenth century because racism “must have as a foundation a theory of race to justify the exercise of prejudice” (p. 13). Yet, he does not see that it is possible to discuss racism without a developed concept of “race”—for example, when contemporary genetics demonstrates that the biological concept of race is untenable, a fact that does not wipe out racism. We are aware of the historicist-presentist implications of such a position but we suggest that Bindman, in his attempt to do justice to eighteenth-century discourses, cannot evade a presentist historicism: his research questions emerge from current concerns, his examples only make sense within a presentist horizon, and the title of the book has a presentist meaning for his readership.

If there is (or is not) a connection between concepts of human variety in the eighteenth century and later meanings of “race,” we can know that only in hindsight and this knowledge cannot be excluded. When Bindman chooses to discuss Winckelmann’s theory of aesthetics, in which this influential expert of Greek art described the horizontal eyes of the Chinese as being “an offense against beauty” (p. 89), it may not have been racist because Winckelmann did not have a nineteenth-century concept of “race”—and as Bindman so efficiently points out, “Winckelmann’s Greeks... did not constitute a ‘race’ but a ‘Nation’” (p. 91). But why else did Bindman choose to describe those ideas? He cannot leap back into the eighteenth century, ignoring current horizons, and it is impossible—as Bindman tried—“not to read back later attitudes into the eighteenth century” (p. 11). He selects quotes that are labeled as racist now and argues that these statements were not racist because there existed no theory of “race.” However, one could argue that these quotes may not have been particularly significant to individuals during the eighteenth century but are of relevance to us today precisely because of their seemingly racist connotations. Bindman can escape a naïve presentism but he cannot escape a presentist historicism, and it is not sufficient, methodologically, to explain that some issues can appear appalling in retrospect and take a “dispassionate tone” (p. 7) toward them throughout the book.
The importance of the presentist dimension also appears in the title of the book. Although the book “is about ideas of human variety in the eighteenth century and their relationship to ideas of beauty” (p. 11), the book is not subtitled “Aesthetics and the Idea of Human Variety in the 18th Century,” but “Aesthetics and the Idea of Race in the 18th Century.” Implicitly, Bindman (or the publisher) acknowledges continuity between human variety and “race” and, in order to promote the book, uses the term “race” to attract a larger readership (or, to speak in economic terms, a larger market). Of course, Bindman is aware that human race has become one of the great topics of the social and human sciences and, in his epilogue, he even draws a legitimate continuity of racial aesthetics to Leni Riefenstahl’s films and the neoclassicism of Nazi sculptures.

That historiographical issues emerge is due to the repeated accentuation by the author. Yet, they should not detract from the academic achievements of the book. In each chapter, an extensive overview of the literature on the history of “race” and aesthetics and an analysis of illustrations that complement and corroborate the written material is provided. In fact, Bindman successfully integrates the fields of “race” and aesthetics, and any person interested in the history of “race” will find the chosen paintings extremely useful; indeed, the focus on aesthetics represents a unique strength of this book. Bindman’s scholarship is excellent, particularly when he reconstructs the theories of Winckelmann, Lavater, the Forsters, Kant, and Camper.

For example, he points out that Winckelmann was influenced by climatic theory, whereby the concept of climate not only involved the seasons, but also the social climate of a country and even nutrition. Winckelmann made the case that classical Greek art was superior to any other and suggested that an ideal climate was responsible. He claimed that the perfect temperate conditions caused the people of Greece to have “a natural good taste” (p. 82), which led to “harmonious and mutually respectful social relations between philosophers, poets and artists” (p. 82) and to the production of superior art. Well aware of, and discontent with, the theory that Greek culture originated in Africa, Winckelmann compared Egyptian to Greek art and argued that the former was more bizarre than beautiful, certainly less beautiful than that of the Greeks or even the Etruscans. Winckelmann argued that beauty itself was not subjective and the lack thereof, caused by climatic conditions, led to deformities, which can be best seen in the case of Africans who have “the mouth swollen and raised, such as the Negroes have in common with the monkeys of their country” (p. 89). Bindman also argues that Winckelmann shifted between hope and anguish regarding whether the superior state of the Greeks could be revived and points out that his vision of the “resurrection of the spirit of ancient Greece in the modern German body” (p. 226) was attempted in Nazi Germany.

*Ape to Apollo*, a phrase referring to the illustrations of skulls and profiles that indicate a chain of being from apes to the classical Greeks, contains information and analyses previously not published and provides the reader with an interesting and well-illustrated, informed, knowledgeable, and wide-ranging book on the history of aesthetics and race.

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