and the humanities today? Turner does not really make a strong case that boundaries against insubordination are enforced in a more authoritarian way in sociology when understood from a comparative disciplinary perspective. And surely the European social theory and academic establishment that serve as a counterpoint hero to Turner’s villain of the professionalized American mainstream sociologist are hardly free from careerism, elitism, and an aggressive approach to accumulating resources and academic status. Nonetheless, the issues Turner has raised are important, and can and should be explored in sociological context through intellectual history and the empirical sociology of ideas.

Saskia Sassen’s essay “Always a Foreigner, Always at Home” also illustrates the value of intellectual work that comes from the professional margins. As a University of Chicago and London School of Economics professor, Sassen has produced numerous writings on global cities, the Internet, immigration, and political economy that are essential for anyone interested in how globalization is reshaping the world around us. Yet Sassen was once a young scholar, we learn here, who had her PhD thesis rejected at Notre Dame and was told by her chair that she should not even bother attempting to go up for tenure at the City University of New York’s Queens College.

In many ways, Sassen did everything wrong. Originally a young Dutch woman who lived in Latin America and Italy, she came to the United States as an illegal immigrant, spent an enormous amount of her time working on music and political activism, and rejected the intellectual orthodoxies of both sociology and economics. Showing little interest in traditional academic career strategies, Sassen worked on developing a political economic perspective that was forged partly out of her experience of working with both radical activists and elite intellectuals such as Richard Sennett. A dangerous strategy, perhaps, for young scholars today who lack the networks Sassen was born into and created for herself, but this kind of scholarship from the margins exemplifies the intellectual excitement and creativity that is the best legacy of the social theory that we have inherited from the generation of the 1960s.

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Humans perceive the world through concepts, and the introduction of new conceptualizations enables the discovery and understanding of previously unknown or incomprehensible features of the social world. The term internationalization may connote the propagation of Americanized psychology around the world, but it also could mean a move away from an American to a genuine global psychology. A global psychology involves a process of assimilation, by which mainstream psychology incorporates non-Western concepts into the discipline; but more importantly, it involves a process of accommodation, by which the very nature of mainstream psychology changes based on ideas from around the world. For a long time internationalization meant the distribution of American psychology to the rest of the world, and the
globalization of psychology meant a process that ended with assimilation. Yet, if one assumes that any local psychology (and that term includes American psychology) could learn from other local perspectives, then an international psychology requires more than a process of incorporation.

The editor Adrian Brock has the full complexities of the problem in mind for this book, and thus it contributes to the program of a genuine internationalization of psychology. His theoretical position and the framework for this book are well articulated in his Introduction as well as in his Postscript. Being a historian of psychology, he argues that the international history of psychology is “an essential basis for a more international psychology” (p. 7). He provides historical, theoretical, and anthropological arguments for why American psychology is not a universal science.

Any reader of this book will come to the question: Why should we assume that American psychology is (not) an indigenous psychology? Some traditionalists might argue that psychology is not indigenous because it is based on scientific study. But certainly many of the psychological concepts involved in scientific study are indigenous, and more radically, the methods used in psychology could be indigenous. Even if one does not agree with this argument, the time has come for psychologists to demonstrate that American psychological concepts are universally meaningful. Brock points out that cultural familiarity with concepts makes them appear natural when they are indeed social. One could argue that psychologists are greater inventors than discoverers (to use a Kantian distinction) and much in psychology is not discovered but created for socio-historical purposes. Once these creations are accepted, they appear as natural to members of a socio-historical group. Many chapters in this book provide insight into these theoretical problems of psychology from a historical perspective.

It has become a cliché but edited books are often cursed with unevenness (and the editor is aware of this problem in his book). Internationalizing the History of Psychology also shows unevenness in historical times, historiographic quality, and theoretical expertise, which is at least partially required if one not only presents a neglected perspective but also reflects upon the reasons for the exclusion of a marginalized perspective. The contributors to the book do not share the same ideas about history but, of course, one could make the argument that this is part of the internationalization of the history of psychology itself. However, only 4 of the 13 contributors live outside Western Europe and North America, and all of them should have been aware of the discussions surrounding the old versus new histories.

Indeed, the majority of contributors address the methodological discussions surrounding history and internationalization, and thus they provide theoretically informed histories that allow for an informed critique of mainstream psychology: Johann Louw discusses the problem of the construction of subjectivity in South Africa; Anand Paranjpe reflects on the history of psychology in India from a postcolonial perspective; Aydan Gulerce investigates the history of psychology in Turkey from the perspective of globalization; Adrian Brock discusses whether psychology has an affinity with a particular political system; Fathali Moghaddam and Naomi Lee specifically challenge the unbridled spread of American psychology around the world; Irmingard Staeuble provides a postcolonial social history and critique of the Eurocentric nature of the social sciences; and Kurt Danziger pleads for a polycentric history of psychology.

The book also contains an enlightening but more traditional history of the reception of Wundt and Freud in Argentina (Cecilia Taiana) and a highly informative history of the origins of psychology in China (Geoffrey Blowers). But it also includes a chapter on the internationalization of behavior analysis (Ruben Ardila), the goal of which seems to be to promote it, in pointing out that “behavior analysis as an area of scholarship and professional applications
exists on five continents and in most of the countries of the world” (p. 128). For Ardila, behavior analysis has provided “a science of great development” (p 113). This celebratory chapter is somewhat in contradiction to the postcolonial chapters that challenge the very idea of a universal psychology. The fact that a psychology is practiced in all continents does not make it a universal psychology, as the theoretical analyses of many contributors emphasize. Another outlier in the book is the chapter by John Hogan and Thomas Vaccaro, who explore the European origins of developmental psychology, which is pretty much an accepted notion for historians familiar with the history of developmental psychology. Certainly, for the idea of internationalization as developed by Brock, it would have been more interesting to analyze the historical ideas of Asian, African, South American, and aboriginal populations regarding the development of children. Again, this chapter fits less with the theoretical model of the editor and would have been more appropriate for a traditional history of developmental psychology.

Indeed, it is unclear from a theoretical perspective why the editor—given his critical theoretical framework—has included some of the chapters. It also would have been useful if the editor had addressed and laid out the complex relationship between the history and theory of psychology so that the reader understands the importance of an international theoretical framework for international historical research. Unfortunately, even enlightened historians of psychology still believe, sometimes hesitantly, that the history of psychology is the history of experimental psychology as outlined by E. G. Boring. Thus, the importance of the book lies in having inaugurated a historical project that, strangely enough, seems crucial for the future of psychology. There should be no doubt that the publication of this book is a highly significant event in the history of psychology.

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This book is one of those types of histories on scientific topics that are all too uncommon, a history of a laboratory. This is particularly unfortunate because, as Dewsbury’s history of the Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology demonstrates, such histories provide often important and sometimes unique perspectives on scientists, scientific inquiry, and the politics of science where science really takes place, in the laboratory. In some ways the history of twentieth-century science is the history of laboratories and their funding, the sources of the funding, and the influence of funding on the nature of research. Nowhere is that more clearly shown than in the history of the Yerkes Laboratories.

The Yerkes Laboratories are important because they were scientifically significant, existed over a long time span, and made use of a number of funding sources. The laboratory was founded as the Laboratories of Comparative Psychobiology of Yale University. While Dewsbury emphasizes the Orange Park years, 1930–1965, he also reviews early primate research at his