Developmental psychology and the relevance of a critical metatheoretical reflection
Thomas Teo
York University
Published as: Teo, T. (1997). Developmental psychology and the
relevance of a critical metatheoretical reflection. Human Development, 40 (4), 195-210.
This web-based
version is based on the final pre-publication manuscript that is not identical
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Address: Thomas
Teo, Department of Psychology, History and Theory of Psychology, York
University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. Electronic
mail may be sent via Internet to tteo@yorku.ca.
It is argued that
developmental psychology can profit by incorporating ideas not only from other
sciences but also from recent developments in the philosophies of knowledge. A
resulting learning process with possible consequences for research practices is
mediated by the self-reflective cognitive processes of developmental
psychologists. To demonstrate the conceptual and intellectual possibilities of
metatheory, the following three critical families are delineated and their
potential for developmental psychology discussed: The German
critical-theoretical tradition (Habermas, Holzkamp); the postmodern critique of
France (Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault); and the multiple voices criticism of North
America (feminism, ethnic minorities). The significance of these approaches is
elaborated in terms of problematizations and questions posed to developmental
psychology.
Although contemporary
developmental psychology has never hesitated to embody information from other
academic disciplines such as anthropology, biology, cognitive science,
linguistics, sociology, and statistics, it has neglected to incorporate recent
developments in the philosophies of knowledge. Textbooks of developmental
psychology (e.g., Bee, 1995; Berk, 1994; Cole & Cole, 1993; Shaffer, 1996;
Sroufe, Cooper, & DeHart, 1996) underline the importance of theories,
usually in the first chapters, and are able in new editions to include recent
discoveries or trends in scientific disciplines. However, they do not discuss
"metatheoretical"[1]
developments and challenges, which will comprise the focus of this paper. Miller
(1993), one of the rare textbooks that includes explicitly metatheoretical
positions, focuses on a traditional systematization (models, deductive theory,
functional theory, inductive theory) as providing heuristics for discussing
developmental theories. However, significant philosophers of knowledge, such as
Thomas S. Kuhn and Imre Lakatos, are mentioned only in the final
"reflections."
This lack of integration of
contemporary metatheoretical thought is even more remarkable as two pioneers of
developmental psychology, Jean Piaget and Lev S. Vygotsky, were particularly
inspired by philosophies of knowledge. As is well known, Piaget (e.g., 1970,
1972) developed a genetic epistemology, merging epistemological thought with
developmental psychology, while Vygotsky (e.g., 1962, 1978) adopted a
dialectical-materialistic philosophy of knowledge as the basis for his
cultural-historical psychology.
The reasons for this lack of
integration of recent developments in philosophies of knowledge may be found in
the history of science, at the time when psychology and philosophy, originally
one discipline, separated from each other as two distinct approaches (cf.
Fancher, 1996). In North America, behaviorism is, so to speak, a "troubled
child" of this divorce, and has engendered the belief that traditional
sciences are more significant to psychology (and to developmental psychology)
than is philosophical thought. Thus, a scientific self-understanding
characteristic of developmental psychologists, and a science-oriented academic
socialization, both make it difficult for developmental psychologists to
translate metatheoretical concepts and arguments into psychological terms and
research practices. But it is not only developmental psychology that is
responsible for this missing communication. A sometimes anti-psychological and
anti-empiricist attitude of some proponents of philosophy of knowledge (see
below) challenges developmental research as such, a situation that is certainly
not helpful for mutual learning processes.
Admittedly, the level of
impact of metatheory is different from that of other research disciplines.
Arguments, concepts, and results from the philosophies of knowledge do not have
immediate or necessary consequences for theory and method in developmental
psychology, whereas, for example, discoveries in biology or anthropology affect
developmental knowledge directly. Metatheoretical relevance is mediated through
the self-reflective, cognitive processes of the developmental psychologist.
These reflections may eventually lead to the incorporation of novel questions,
the inauguration of new problems, and the construction of different meanings,
and may also guide further research.
From an ideal point of view,
metatheoretical reflections and empirical developmental research form a
dialectical relationship. They represent a unity, ascertaining results or
producing information that can be helpful for each other. Yet, they also
represent a contradiction, for problems appear differently from an empirical
and from a theoretical point of view. Unfortunately for both, from a factual
point of view, empirical developmental research and philosophical approaches
ignore each other, work without each other, and are able to exist without each
other. Nevertheless, from the perspective of developmental theory, the
integration of arguments of contemporary philosophers of knowledge, especially
in terms of critical approaches, can be advantageous, and may allow a
challenging yet positive stance on the future of this discipline.
Contemporary developmental
psychology understands and defines itself, as most developmental psychologists
would agree, as an empirical science. According to the traditional
hypothetico-deductivist approach, this discipline discovers issues and
processes in empirical reality, tests hypotheses with objective methods,
interprets or discusses results in a more or less neutral way, and tries to
identify general laws or rules of human development. Yet, from the perspective
of contemporary philosophies of knowledge, the nature of an empirical science
is rather vague. Reconstructing the dominant developments in the philosophies
of knowledge, it becomes apparent that all traditional normative claims and
demands with regard to concepts such as objectivity, truth, empirical reality,
and induction, have been reduced remarkably.
Popper (1959, 1972) has
argued that the concept of induction and the search for a rational basis for
this principle as developed by logical empiricists such as Carnap (1945) is
untenable, and has replaced it with the rational principle of falsification.
Kuhn (1962), however, identified irrational and anti-inductive moments in the
development of the sciences, and demonstrated that the principle of falsification,
applied in research, is nonessential.
Since then, the logic of
research, the nature of science, the dynamic of theories, only to mention a few
problems, have become uncertain and controversial as never before in
metatheoretical discussions. In this retreat of claims by the philosophy of
knowledge, authors such as Feyerabend (1978), Goodman (1978) and Rorty (1979)
in an Anglo-American context, Derrida (1976), Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and
Lyotard (1984) in France, Harding (1986) and Keller (1984) from a feminist
position (see also Alcoff & Potter, 1993), and Collins (1991) within black
feminist studies, have argued that the apparent foundations of
"Western" science are neither fundamental nor strong. The emerging
post-empiricist discourse argues that empirical research is theory-laden and
that this characteristic not only applies to a paradigm (in the sense of Kuhn,
1962) or to a research program (in the sense of Lakatos, 1970), but also to
social categories such as gender, class, ethnicity, culture, ideology, and
personal idiosyncrasies. On this view, the concept of a dominance of
"theory" implies that such aspects, and not the pure empirical
reality, determine research.
The human sciences and
psychology are in an even more vulnerable position than the traditional
sciences, because the human and social sciences adopted the very metatheory of
the traditional sciences, now criticized widely, to legitimate their ambiguous
scientific status (cf. Koch, 1985). Thus, the criticisms put forth hit the human
and social sciences much harder than they did the traditional sciences, placing
them under further legitimation pressure. Further, psychology and the human
sciences must deal with specific philosophical criticisms, such as those
presented within a "left" discourse that has criticized the human
sciences as serving the interests of certain groups (Althusser, 1984; Holzkamp,
1983), or for colluding with power (Foucault, 1977).
Given advances in the philosophies
of knowledge, there are several ways in which developmental psychologists may
deal with arguments that challenge the idea of developmental psychology as an
empirical enterprise. Developmental psychologists may ignore these arguments as
irrelevant for their discipline and continue to do their research as usual,
abandon doing empirical developmental psychology, participate in
metatheoretical discussions without giving up empirical developmental research
(e.g., Chandler, 1995), or try to "assimilate" and
"accommodate" these arguments in an effort to improve developmental
theory, research, and practice.
The position taken here is
that there are many reasons for developmental psychology to assimilate and
accommodate metatheoretical thought. Due to the nature of philosophical ideas,
this position cannot refer to nor be substantiated by empirical evidence, but
must refer to essential problematizations, information, and the use of
questions that allow reflection and understanding of the impact of critical metatheoretical
considerations. Such reflection and understanding should enable a
(re)conceptualization of where and how developmental psychology could improve
its "investigative practices" (Danziger, 1990).
Discourses of philosophies of
knowledge are rather heterogeneous and difficult to summarize. For the purpose
of "translation" it is heuristically useful to delineate within the
philosophies of knowledge different "communities," and, within each
community, different families.
The community discussed here
can be labeled critical as it
shares a distance from "internal" problems of knowledge production,
and emphasizes external factors; it is critical in challenging the
"context of justification" (i.e., the ways in which arguments, theories,
and data are justified), while underlining the importance of the "context
of discovery" (i.e., why and how certain arguments, theories, and data are
selected). It is further critical in having a distance from empirical
developmental research, yet it is qualified to allow a reflection of contexts
of development as well as of developmental psychology.
Despite, so to speak, an
underlying "critical" factor that unites different critical
approaches, such critical frameworks possess different "internal" (theoretical)
and "external" (socio-cultural-historical) backgrounds. It is useful,
thus, to distinguish three families within the critical metatheoretical
community, classified geographically. The first family refers to
critical-theoretical approaches developed in a German context; the second
family refers to the critical postmodern (or poststructuralist) approach
developed in a French context; and the third family refers to North American
multiple voices, which emphasize the impact of gender, ethnicity, and culture.
This classification must be seen as a simplified heuristic, for these
approaches are overlapping and have influenced each other.[2]
Yet, as philosophical commonalties and differences, that may lead to metatheory
mediation or comparison are not the goal of this article, confrontations
between families and within each family will not be discussed here.
Further, one must bear in
mind that there are theoretical and critical reflections within developmental
psychology itself. One could argue, for example, that every criticism of a
certain approach in developmental psychology is a critical endeavor. From an
extended developmental-theoretical point of view, one must mention Vygotsky's
(Wygotski, 1985) discussion of the crisis of psychology; the reflections of
Reese and Overton (1970), showing that not only an empirical reality but also
metatheoretical worldviews influence research; Riegel's (1975) introduction of
ideology-critical arguments to developmental psychology; Broughton's (1981)
critical endeavors that lead to the publication of an entire book on critical
developmental psychology (Broughton, 1987); Kessen (1990) who declares the
"fall" of developmental psychology; or Goodnow (1990) who promotes
sociology in developmental theory. No doubt, there has been an increase of
(meta)theoretical discussions in developmental psychology (see also van Geert
& Mos, 1991), ranging from the integration of systems theory (Ford &
Lerner, 1992), to detailed theoretical problems such as the pseudo-empiricist nature
of developmental psychology (e.g., Smedslund, 1994). The journal Theory
& Psychology has dedicated a
whole issue to developmental psychology (see Bradley, 1993). Yet, the focus
here is not on elucidations emanating from the discipline itself, but on
criticisms that proceed on the basis of a philosophy of knowledge in the narrow
sense.
Contemporary German
critical-theoretical thought draws on a long, remarkable tradition, relying on
philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Georg F. W. Hegel, and Karl Marx. The first
generation of the Frankfurt school (see Wiggershaus, 1994) sought to establish
a social science beyond the "positivist" tradition, and thus
criticized the status, structure, and goal of the traditional social sciences
(cf. Adorno, Albert, Dahrendorf, Habermas, Pilot, & Popper, 1969).
With regard to
critical-theoretical thinking in Germany after 1945, the social philosopher
Jürgen Habermas and the theoretical psychologist Klaus Holzkamp must be mentioned. Both theorists
criticized and developed concepts in the field of epistemology, ontology,
ethics, and methodology (see McCarthy, 1978; Teo, 1993; Tolman, 1994).[3]
These German authors went beyond the traditional Marxist position that a ruling
idea is biased by the interests of a ruling class by discussing the problems of
non-reflected presuppositions in investigative practices.
(a) The
"relevance" of developmental psychology. In one of his early writings, Habermas (1971) sought
an epistemological foundation for a theory of society. He introduced the
concept of "interest" and argued that cognitive interests are
fundamental orientations necessary for the reproduction and self-constitution
of the human, as they have their basis in the natural history of the human species.
He differentiated three categories of sciences characterized by a specific
underlying cognitive interest that guides their knowledge. Empirical-analytical
sciences have a technical
cognitive interest and seek to produce nomological knowledge in order to
achieve technical control. Historical-hermeneutic sciences have a practical interest of interpretation and understanding of
social meanings. Critical theory has an emancipatory interest with the fundamental principle of
self-reflection, which liberates the subject from dependencies, powers, and
constraints. Holzkamp (1972a), inspired by Habermas, argued that in psychology,
the sophistication of experimental design and measurement methodology and the
progress in statistics leads to a particularization and reduction of reality in
research. Thus, psychology loses technical and practical relevance. For
psychology however, technical relevance would imply working for the hegemonial
structure of society, if it is not tied to emancipatory relevance, which is
accomplished when research helps individuals obtain enlightenment of their
psychological and societal predicaments (cf. Teo, 1995).
Although these ideas are no
longer new in the context of the rapid development of theories today, and
although one can both challenge the notion that emancipation is a basic human
interest that can be derived from evolution and doubt its status as a
transcendental category, developmental psychologists still must ask themselves
if they neglect the practical and emancipatory aspects of developmental
psychology -- legitimate and meaningful topics when dealing with the
development of human subjectivity. Even if one argues that there is already an
applied developmental psychology, developmental psychologists should ask
whether their research is in fact emancipatory, or whether it legitimizes the
status quo. Perhaps the focus on methodological sophistication and the choice
of "variable-oriented" types of research, which are unable to
represent the complex societal reality of human development, has indeed lead to
a greater gap between academic and applied psychology. From the basis of the
concept of emancipation, developmental psychologists might even investigate new
questions: How can one understand intra- and interindividual differences in the
development of emancipation? How can one reconstruct the development of a
liberated subjectivity cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally? How do
degrees of personal liberation in a given socio-cultural context change during
the lifespan? And finally, within an emancipatory framework, one cannot avoid a
personal question regarding our motivation as developmental researchers: Are we
more motivated in our research endeavors by the desire to contribute to the
emancipation of people, or by the wish to be published in a prestigious
journal?
(b) Ontology and
methodology: Habermas (1988) and
Holzkamp (1972b) argued that there is a difference between the subject matters
of the social and the natural sciences. Holzkamp (1972b) showed that psychology
makes inadequate anthropological assumptions, taking for granted that human
behavior within an experiment reflects human behavior in the concrete
socio-cultural world. He also demonstrated that, from an ontological point of
view, research in physics can be characterized by a subject-object
relationship, whereas empirical research in psychology is performed by a
subject-subject relationship. Consequently, Holzkamp (1983) held that
psychology in general demands a different methodology, while the concept of intersubjectivity
(subject-subject relationship) lead Habermas (1990) to develop a discourse
ethics.
These ideas are also testable
statements, and from Piaget we know that one should not take philosophical
elaborations for granted. How and in which way does the concept of
intersubjectivity between a researcher and his or her research participant
change over time? Holzkamp's (1983) notion that human behavior is not caused
because humans have "good reasons" for their actions can also be
turned developmentally, allowing one to answer the important question of at
what age, in which context, and at what level it makes sense to assume that
human subjectivity can be characterized through the concept of "having
reasons", and when and where as
being caused (cf. Wright, 1971). And from a
methodological point of view, the specific ontological intersubjective
relationship between researcher and participant leads consequently to the idea
that research questions and methods must be co-constructed by participants. The
role of participants could be defined as ones of co-researchers (see Holzkamp,
1983), who are able to challenge developmental theories, models and research
practices. This idea has been incorporated into fields related to developmental
research (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991) and in feminist methodology (see
Reinharz, 1992).
(c) The conceptualization
of the relationship between the individual and society. Both Habermas (1984, 1987a) and Holzkamp (1983)
emphasize the idea that "society" and "subject" are
interrelated. This idea has been discussed in contextual and ecological
approaches within developmental psychology (e.g. Bronfenbrenner, 1979).
However, the more interesting question may be how one might elaborate this
interconnection. Arguing from the positions of both Habermas and Holzkamp, I
have concluded elsewhere that to conceptualize a subject without the society in
which it lives, and without reflecting on its developmental status, is
problematic (Teo, 1995). An abstraction from these contexts in factual research
leads to problems in understanding behavior, the content of cognition, emotion,
and motivation.[4] To
say it in a positive way: To understand the subject as a developing subject in a developing society opens new horizons for the work of developmental psychologists.[5]
Holzkamp (1983) developed a
method to identify the relationship between the individual and society (see
Tolman & Maiers, 1991; Tolman, 1994). In the evolutionary reconstruction
Holzkamp identifies a "societal" nature of human beings, and
demonstrates that there is no opposition between subjectivity, sociality, and
nature. According to his reconstruction, human societal life production and the
development of human societal nature have reinforced one another, as this
implied a selective advantage. But in contrast to biological evolution the
societal-historical development allowed a different and higher magnitude of
effectiveness and rate of progress. The societal nature of human beings
consists of the developmental potential to change natural reality at each
societal-historical stage of development. The specific and determining
moment of the human consists of the participation of the individual in determining
the societal conditions of life. To cite an example from Holzkamp (1991):
"Humans are not satisfied when they merely reduce particular momentary
need tensions, such as hunger or sexuality; rather, they achieve a
fulfilled, satisfied state only when they can anticipate the possibility of
satisfaction of their needs within the prospect of a provisioned and secure
individual existence" (p. 60).
Is the conceptualization of
the relationship between developing individuals and developing societies in
developmental research accurate? Is it not a basic problem to think that the
individual is concrete while
society or the notion of the societal mediatedness of the individual are
abstractions (see Holzkamp, 1972b)? Think it the other way round: Is not the
idea of a developmental research subject beyond context (e.g., class, gender,
culture) a highly artificial abstraction? If one agrees with this premise, such
an idea implies methodologically that contexts are not merely conceptualized as
"variables" but as essential parts of subjectivity. Holzkamp (1993)
demonstrated the heuristic value of such an approach for "learning"
by developing a theory of learning that takes subjectivity into account, and by
analyzing and explaining the traditionally excluded but important question of
why pupils show resistance and opposition to learning and even develop
strategies to avoid learning.
In summary, the
critical-theoretical approach has a challenging but also a highly heuristic
developmental value by providing sophisticated concepts that allow to discuss
the relevance of developmental research, to reflect implicit assumptions, to
understand the specificity of developing persons in changing contexts, combined
with the possibility to open theoretical concepts to developmental research.
While German critiques were
motivated by the goal of inaugurating "better" approaches, postmodern
or "poststructuralist" approaches, such as those developed by the
French philosophers Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault
would challenge such an attempt as "modern" and doomed to failure
(see also Habermas, 1987b, for a critical-theoretical evaluation of postmodern
approaches). The French authors focus, more or less in their specific ways, on
a critical analysis or a "deconstruction" of Western-type knowledge.
This includes a criticism of basic assumptions of Euro-American forms of
self-understanding, such as the contradiction between subject and object,
logocentrism, the belief in technology, the neutrality of scientific
communities, and the dominance of the principle of rationality or reason in
research (cf. McCarthy, 1991).
Observers of this context may
have noticed that the term postmodernism is of course "a mine-field of
conflicting notions" (Harvey, 1990, p. viii), and that it is impossible to
talk about postmodern discourse in a precise way (Teo, in press). The terms
"postmodernity" in the sense of an age, cultural
"postmodernism," and "postmodern" thought (cf. Kvale, 1992)
are used differently in philosophy, architecture, literature, feminism, and
politics. Lyotard (1991) himself emphasizes that postmodernism is a fuzzy
concept, and that postmodernism is implied in modernity (see also Toulmin,
1990). Derrida (1993) considers himself a descendent of enlightenment,
referring to Marx as a necessary step that makes "deconstruction"
possible. Foucault (1985, 1986), often counted as a postmodern philosopher, can
only ambiguously be subsumed under this category, for in his later works he
rehabilitates "subjectivity" and "enlightenment" - core concepts
criticized within postmodern thought. Thus, so-called postmodern thinkers
cannot catapult themselves out of their context, which is modern philosophy.
Postmodern thought has been
brought into psychology, especially into social psychology (Gergen, 1990, 1991;
Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988; Parker & Shotter, 1990; cf. Smith, 1994;
see also Rosenau, 1992). Some developmental psychologists have also tried to
integrate postmodern ideas (e.g., Bradley, 1989; Burman, 1994; Morss 1992;
Walkerdine, 1993).
Due to the multiplicity,
complexity, and heterogeneity of postmodern discourses, I will focus here on
three central French figures: Lyotard, Derrida, and Foucault.
(a) Developmental
psychology in a postmodern age.
Lyotard (1984) brought the term "postmodern condition" into
philosophy and made it popular for the social sciences. Although Lyotard's main
focus was philosophy, it is possible to transfer some of his ideas to
developmental psychology. Within Lyotard's framework, theories are understood
as social constructions, merely appropriate to work within a given community.
Is developmental psychology more
than a social construction? Do theories, methods, results, and discussions of
developmental psychologists make sense beyond the "language game"
(Wittgenstein, 1968) of developmental psychologists? For example,
information-processing oriented developmental psychologists speak a different
language than psychoanalytic oriented ones, but both refer to empirical
evidence, both have a coherent system of thinking, both have made theoretical improvements
in the course of their history. Yet, progress in developmental psychology seems
to happen only within these
paradigms, research programs, and schools, and a unification of significant
theories seems an impossible goal. But what is the value of a result if it
makes sense only within a certain language game, while at the same time it
claims universal and exclusive objectivity (see also Febbraro & Chrisjohn,
1994)? And going beyond developmental psychology one can paraphrase
Wittgenstein (1968) by asking: Are the borders of the empirically driven
developmental psychological language the borders of the developmental world?
If "we" are in a
postmodern time, meaning that, for example, the idea of progress through
cumulative scientific research must be relinquished, and there is no linear
progress in developmental psychology, then it is logical and consequent to
challenge empirical developmental research as such. Under the postmodern
assumption that the search for truth, objectivity, and scientific law is not
the core of an empirical research program, does developmental psychology as an
institution become part of the "entertainment industry" (cf. Baer,
1987)? This would imply a shift from epistemological to commercial-related
criteria, and the question would be whether developmental psychology is a
successful or unsuccessful branch of the entertainment business.
In his writings, Lyotard
(1984) goes beyond Wittgenstein by arguing that games of research are not
focused on consent or truth but rather on fighting -- fighting to win or
fighting for the pleasure of the invention of a "move" (p. 10). Does
not some of what goes on at conferences or in journals of developmental
psychology resemble more a fight than it does the search for truth or emancipation?
Consequently, Lyotard (1977) reminds developmental psychology to concern itself
much more with the marginalized, with the patchwork of minorities, and thus to
produce local instead of global theories and avoid generalizations of the
particular to general domains.
(b) Deconstruction, arts,
and ethnocentrism. Derrida's term
"deconstruction" (Derrida, 1991) refers among other things, to the
idea of reading a text from many different perspectives, focusing on their
differences without trying to coordinate these perspectives into one dominant
one, while admitting that no perspective is better than the other, and to look
for blind spots. Derrida suggests (cf. Habermas, 1987b) that there is no
categorical difference between literature and philosophy (and one could include
science). If this is the case, then one could interpret empirical research as
texts with many possible interpretations and many blind spots. Thus, one must
ask, is developmental psychology really distinguishable from literature, and a
research report different from a novel? It is "common sense" in
mainstream psychology to suggest that psychoanalysis is like literature, but
can developmental psychologists be sure that contemporary research will be
considered scientific in the next millennium? Is it unrealistic or speculative
to think that the way we conceptualize and investigate now the nature-nurture
interaction will be considered "primitive" or absurd one day?
Derrida (1976) also
criticized philosophy and science in a subtle way for their extreme ethnocentrism
(he uses Rousseau as an example), using arguments which have become relevant
for the multiple voices discourse to be discussed. Derrida's analyses, and the
postmodern idea that one can find truth in the arts (cf. Welsch, 1995),
suggests that the enterprise of developmental psychology is too focused on
written and spoken language, instead of seeking different forms of expression,
for example, in the fields of aesthetics, such as film, theater, music, and
painting. One could argue that Derrida's ideas are too remote from what made
developmental psychology a rational enterprise, but this is exactly what
Derrida would suggest in such a radical science-relativizing attitude.
(c) Knowledge and power. Most remarkable for psychology and for developmental
psychology, from a French perspective, are the analyses of Foucault (see also
Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Foucault (1970) showed in the 1960s with his
historical reconstructions that the establishment of the human sciences are
determined by an ulterior historical a priori. With his archaeology (Foucault, 1970), he demonstrated that the emergence
of the subject and the human sciences are understandable only within a certain
"episteme." By taking this stance, developmental psychologists would
be able to look in a different way at the history and roots of developmental
psychology, a way which transcends a listing of great persons, and which avoids
a presentism that interprets the past in terms of the present (cf. Danziger,
1990) -- the usual (cf. Parke, Ornstein, Rieser, & Zahn-Waxler, 1994) but
not necessary approach in the history of developmental psychology.
In the 1970s, Foucault (1977)
showed via a genealogy how and
that power and knowledge go hand in hand, and distinguished between
non-discursive and discursive practices of power. Using as an example Jeremy
Bentham's model prison "Panopticon" in which the prisoner can be seen
from a guard possibly at all times without knowing when he or she is observed,
Foucault demonstrated how a non-discursive practice as surveillance leads to a
disciplining of the body. These non-discursive practices form a marriage with
the discursive practices of those sciences that produce knowledge about humans.
From an historical point of view, Foucault revealed that power that used
punishment as a means has changed into power that disciplines and surveys.[6]
Additionally, the human sciences have their own practices of
"discipline" by examining students, by controlling the channels of
knowledge, by adapting people to norms and standards of a given body of
knowledge, and by teaching practices. Developmental psychology is explicitly
mentioned (Foucault, 1977) as one discipline that helps to distribute this new
kind of power. Foucault suggests that the science-external factor discipline is part of the origin and development of
developmental psychology.
The resulting question for
developmental psychologists is straightforward in its scope: Assuming that
knowledge and power go hand in hand, do developmental psychologists support
power in their production of knowledge? Are they part of power, and is this
power legitimate? Of course, detailed studies would have to examine this close
connection. There have been historical studies of the emergence and function of
intelligence tests (Gould, 1996), as a good example of the bond between
knowledge and power, but no systematic studies about the consequences for the
development of the individuals (e.g., what happened to the lives of people who
were sent back from Ellis Island?).
From a liberation point of
view, Foucault (1985, 1986) turned later to subjectivity, and discussed the
subject's possibility to install his or her life as a piece of art. On this
view, the subject has the possibility to develop an aesthetics of existence,
and thus, it becomes possible to develop an individual lifestyle in the area of
sexuality, body, and other forms of self-expression. Subjective life can be
constructed as a piece of art; resistance can be turned aesthetically. Could
this not be a meaningful research topic for developmental psychology?
In summary, the postmodern
approach has primarily a challenging value for developmental research, by
focusing on its deep-rooted biased and limited assumptions. Nevertheless, it is
possible to derive research questions for developmental psychology. But taking
it to its limits and looking at its very intention, a postmodern stance would
mean giving up empirical developmental research as such.
Feminists, members of ethnic
minorities, and other marginalized groups have had -- as far as I can judge --
the greatest impact in a North American context. Psychologists have already
considered the claims of these groups, for example, that their reality or voice
(cf. Sampson, 1993) is not represented in psychology, and that the universality
claim to truth made by dominant research programs should be reduced (see also
Fowers & Richardson, 1996). This critical family is also the most
influential of the three families in developmental psychology; developmental
psychologists have tried to do justice to such questions (e.g. Greenfield &
Cocking, 1994).
Most well known (cf. Howard
& Day, 1995) is Carol Gilligan's (1977) feminist criticism of Kohlberg's
theory of moral development. But there have been other criticisms: Piaget's
cognitive stage theory has been criticized as being socio-economically biased
(e.g. Buck-Morss, 1975); Freud's psychoanalytic theory was challenged from
feminist points of view (e.g., Benjamin, 1988); Vygotsky's theory has had to deal
with ethnocentrism (cf. Miller, 1993); and there have been attempts to limit
Bowlby's attachment theory from an African-American point of view (Jackson,
1993).
Feminist philosophers of
knowledge such as Harding (1986, 1987) and Keller (1984) have presented
meta-theoretical arguments, useful for all neglected groups, to show that the
question of "difference" should not to be limited to the empirical
aspect, but should address much more the point that the context of discovery
and/or the context of justification are biased. The assumption that there are
gender or race differences in moral, cognitive, or emotional development is an
empirical question, and might be right or wrong; but more interesting is the
idea that the formulation of a theory is biased in terms of which problems or
questions and which types of descriptions and explanations are chosen by
researchers and in terms of how research practices are justified.
Harding (1986) makes the
following distinction among three feminist epistemological approaches. First, feminist
empiricism argues that sexism derives
from a bias that is nested in society, and that empirical studies can correct
such biases. Thus, it makes sense to prove that there are no differences in one
area of developmental psychology, and that there are differences in another
area. Maccoby and Jacklin's (1974) studies on sex differences can be subsumed
under this approach. Second, feminist standpoint thinking argues that the truth can only be found if
it stems from the oppressed group. This would mean that a true developmental
psychology of oppressed groups can only be performed by these relevant groups.
Collins (1991) argues that "because elite white men and their
representatives control structures of knowledge validation, white male interests
pervade the thematic content of traditional scholarship" (p. 201), and
favors a black feminist epistemology with a focus on concrete experience,
dialogue, caring, and personal accountability as core concepts. Finally, postmodern
feminism would challenge the whole
enterprise of developmental psychology, as discussed above.
Still, from a less radical
perspective, developmental psychologists could ask themselves whether or not
the development of such groups is indeed represented by mainstream theories of developmental
psychology, and why it happened that many of psychology's theories have been
built on the study of "white" boys or men (see Wallston & Grady,
1985). Indeed, does developmental psychology represent the development of
women, of ethnic minorities, of marginalized groups, of gay and lesbian
persons? Is developmental psychology biased by a white, male, Euro-American
point of view?
For example, one could ask
whether the identity development of "biracial" people can be
represented by traditional concepts of identity development (e.g. Erikson,
1959; Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993). And even if
their identity development can be represented, do the traditional concepts address the specific character of their experiences? Does the
identity development of such persons not require concepts that are appropriate
for their identity development (see Root, 1992; Teo, 1994)? Indeed, does the
existing research, reconstruction, and knowledge not show that developmental
psychology needs new concepts to do justice to these groups?
If one agrees with such a
position, then one must conclude that the development of such groups must be
mentioned, that a dominant theory must be characterized as a special theory
that is applicable to only a given group within a given context (Febbraro,
1994), and that traditional considerations of normality and development are
limited and probably narrow-minded constructions. Of course this would have to
be demonstrated conceptually and empirically for each case. Evidently, the
constructive point of this argumentation is its openness to empirical
investigations.
In summary, the multiple
voices discourse has a challenging but highly empirical value for developmental
research, by showing that developmental psychology has to be made more
applicable to usually neglected groups of people and cultures. A huge variety
of empirical questions can be derived.
The presentation of the
critical "families" also shows the constraints of metatheory in
developmental psychology. On the one hand, developmental psychology is
confronted with more questions but with no immediate technology that would
enhance the research process. This is not the intention of metatheory, and
cannot be its purpose. While this may be disappointing, one could argue that
critical problems and questions such as those posed here, and which are
abstracted from an immediate empirical process, should not be neglected if
developmental psychology seeks to broaden its horizons and do justice to the
plurality of subjectivities. A so-to-say introspective approach towards research, in which researchers pose
such critical questions, would allow developmental psychology to become a
self-reflective discipline that understands better the possibilities and limits
of developmental knowledge. Given the emergence of separate scientific
disciplines in the history of knowledge and the rationality behind this
differentiation, it does not mean that developmental psychology must walk
together with the philosophies of knowledge to their radical limits.
Based on the idea of
dialectical, mutual learning processes, it is also possible to translate
knowledge from developmental psychology into philosophy (e.g. Habermas, 1979,
was influenced by developmental psychology). Thus, it seems appropriate to
paraphrase I. Kant (1982), by arguing that developmental empirical research
without critical research might turn blind, and on the other hand, that critical reflection without empirical
material turns vain (to become
more practical itself, critical reflection has to incorporate empirical
knowledge).
Critically it must be said
that neither the contradictions of these critical approaches nor their specific
weaknesses were mentioned. In fact, the three critical approaches refer to
different ideas regarding truth claims and can also be differentiated in terms
of their normative-practical consequences. If one thinks that the ethical,
moral, and pragmatical aspects of theories (cf. Teo, in press) should become
more important criteria by which to evaluate these different approaches, then
one must look at the ethical possibilities of these families (see also
Prilleltensky, 1994), while theoretical analyses must distinguish useful and
substantial concepts from idiosyncratic and arbitrary ones. To put it boldly:
In the critical-theoretical line of thinking, such consequences could be
summarized as "let's change the world." The postmodern critique's
ethical imperative could be formulated in terms of "let's deconstruct the
world." And the multiple voices discourse could formulate the ethical
consequences in terms of "let the world hear our voices."
Developmental psychology can be changed by critical reflection and by raising
one's marginalized voice. From the perspective of a unified critical conceptual
network (Teo, 1996), which integrates constructive elements of all these
critiques and eliminates negative ones, these simplified statements are of
course not mutually exclusive. All three critical families allow to analyze
structures and functions of power, a neglected research topic in psychology, as
well as in developmental psychology.
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[1] The term "metatheoretical" is used in this
context with regard to critical philosophies of knowledge. Thus, the paper will
discuss the issue of knowledge production and usage, but not basic theoretical
issues within developmental psychology, such as the concept of development,
nature versus nurture, continuos versus discontinuous development, and so on.
[2] Feminist thought may include postmodern thought (e.g.
Nicholson, 1990); German thought includes developments from France and North
America; there are feminist philosophers of knowledge in Europe, and so on. In
contrast to one reviewer's comment that the organization of the paper is based
on "outmoded categories of the 18th and 19th century nationalism" I
think that the organization of this paper is adequate for several reasons: (a)
It is important to accentuate the socio-cultural background, making specific
differences and essentials in theory-development understandable (but discussing
social history in detail is beyond the scope of this paper); (b) The heuristic,
introductory, and systematic nature of this article suggests that
"reduced" categories maybe more appropriate than a philosophical, intellectual-historical
reconstruction (e.g., Nietzsche played a pivotal role for the development of
French postmodernism); (c) The intention of the paper is certainly not
nationalism but inter-nationalism, and an emphasis on the unity of the critical discourses.
[3] Furth (1983) discussed Habermas' theory from a
developmental point of view.
[4] In contrast, an abstraction from contexts may
not lead to problems if one deals with unspecific levels of human subjectivity,
such as "sensation."
[5] This was also the goal of Vygotsky (1962, 1978), who
shares with Holzkamp similar philosophical ideas.
[6] Foucault (1978) adds later
"bio-power."