Thomas Teo
York University
Published as: Teo, T. (1998). Prolegomenon to a contemporary
psychology of liberation. Theory & Psychology, 8 (4), 527-547.
This web-based
version is based on the final pre-publication manuscript that is not identical
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Address: Thomas
Teo, Department of Psychology, History and Theory of Psychology, York
University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. Electronic
mail may be sent via Internet to tteo@yorku.ca.
Abstract
This prolegomenon outlines a framework for a contemporary,
critical-psychological theory of liberation. It is argued that recent
developments in metatheory have lead to problems in both form and content for
theory construction in the domain of liberation. As a viable solution to the
formal problem, a non-foundational "conceptual network" is suggested.
As "knots" in this quasi-systematic network, and thus as a
preliminary solution to the problems of content, three critical research
programs are reconstructed to deal with different, yet complementary aspects of
power, and which are thus relevant for conceptualizing liberation: Klaus
Holzkamp, representing traditional Marxism, and reconstructed in terms of
participation in life conditions (labor); Jürgen Habermas, representing
Neo-Marxism in terms of communication (interaction); and Michel Foucault,
representing Post-Marxism, in terms of self-representation (aesthetics). From
these reconstructions the subject's possibilities against power, essential for
a psychology of liberation, are derived. Finally, it is argued that a
conceptual network that strives to cope with practical problems must entail
contextualization.
The term
"liberation" has been used in a variety of contemporary discourses
and in the service of a variety of goals. It has been used in commercial
advertising for selling beauty products, by born-again Christians to inspire a
particular spiritual vision, and by armies in subjugating (in the name of
"liberation") their own people. In political contexts, the term is
used by the left as well as the right: both challenge the status quo, but with
different intentions and for the sake of different utopias. Within the North
American cultural domain, a personal, individualized liberation is a central
theme, most evidenced in popular film. Liberation is thus portrayed as
tantamount to getting rich, which would then open the door to all possible
worlds and all possible opportunities for the individual.
Historically, all social
movements have been motivated by some kind of liberation concept, whether the
movement's goal is ultimately judged to be ethically wrong (eugenics) or
morally right (equality, freedom). Among those movements motivated by goals
that are likely to be considered ethically right, some of the most well known
are the labor movement, the feminist movement, the anti-imperialist movement
(of so-called third-world countries), the antiracist movement, and the civil
rights movement. Despite its impressive history, however, contemporary
liberation in the industrialized world finds itself in a state of crisis, as
local and particularized issues have become more dominant than global and
universal ones, and as the ideology of individualism, so pervasive in the
Western industrialized world, has allowed for mainly limited thought-models of
liberation.
In psychology, liberation is
a widely unexamined but important topic, especially in the clinical and applied
contexts. Every clinical psychologist has implicit ideas about liberation, that
is, liberation from psychological suffering, or about where a patient's or
client's liberation should ultimately lead. These implicit ideas, in turn, are
explicated in terms of therapeutic goals. For example, in psychoanalysis, an
explicit therapeutic goal is that the ego should prevail over the id (Freud,
1940), whereas in behavioral therapy, the therapeutic goal is expressed in
terms of modifying individual behaviors (cf. Thorpe & Olson, 1990).
Liberation, thus, is implicitly construed as achieving individual, personal, or
intrapsychic end-states. In community psychology, liberation in terms of
individual empowerment has played an important role (cf. Rappaport, 1981).
Within critical frameworks,
whose impact on mainstream ideas of liberation can be considered negligible,
liberation (or emancipation) has been addressed as a central topic (recently,
e.g., by Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; and Parker & Spears, 1996). Liberation
in the critical psychological discourse entails the notion that an individual's
psychological suffering is inextricably linked to their position within the
societal status quo. Thus, within such a framework, practices of liberation
have been conceived from a societal perspective.
The view taken here is that
the term "liberation" is not self-evident, but rather requires
critical examination, as human beings are involved in a myriad of daily
practices that are difficult, if not impossible, to transcend individually. But
beyond these immediate practices, human beings can and do dream of a better
world. In the individualized utopias of the western world, such dreams of
liberation may entail such goals as being able to afford a house, and thus
being independent from a landlord; choosing a successful career; landing a
particular job; achieving a satisfying marriage; successfully losing weight; or
even being able to afford cosmetic surgery. In contrast, in a third world
country, a personal utopia of liberation might include the dream of having
daily food or clean water. But a critical reflection on liberation reveals that
the issue is much broader than individualized notions or realizations of
dreams. Thus, a theory of liberation must address such broader domains -- those
in which social, economic, and political inequalities (viz., racism, sexism,
classism, imperialism) make it necessary to think about liberation. Yet, a psychology
of liberation must emphasize the
individual's possibilities in these domains -- even when goals can only be
achieved in cooperation with others. Thus, a psychological theory of liberation
must do justice to both domains: the individual as well as the societal.
In this prolegomenon, a term
which refers in philosophy to the introduction, preamble, or prologue to a
larger theory or research program, I outline a contemporary psychology of
liberation that takes several levels of liberation quasi-systematically into
account. The term prolegomenon is necessary as developments in the area of epistemology,
metatheory, and cultural studies have shown that systematic theory
development in a domain such as
"liberation" is highly problematic, in both form and content. These
theoretical developments make it necessary to reconstitute a theory of liberation
from its very "foundations."
In addition, the term
prolegomenon outlines a new approach in critical-theoretical thinking, as the
proposed psychology of liberation, intended as part of a critical theory of
subjectivity, underlines the conceptual-empirical possibilities of
a subject. By focusing on these conceptual-empirical possibilities, I am aware
that the suggested psychology of liberation is very much reflective of a
European, continental, critical tradition of thinking. This tradition has
produced remarkable insights; still, I am aware that insights developed in
other contexts must not be neglected. Having a certain perspective does not
exclude -- at least in the program that I am suggesting -- perspectives that
are lesser known than the mainstream critical European approaches.
As well, I use the term
"psychology" in an admittedly idiosyncratic way when I argue that it
is necessary to reflect upon the conceptual-empirical possibilities of a subject. The term
"conceptual-empirical" emphasizes that conceptual possibilities
derived through theoretical reflection are not merely hypothetical, but can be
realized and revealed through human experience. A psychology of liberation
entails reflection upon the possibilities of a subject with regard to power
structures, a theoretical task
usually neglected in mainstream psychology. The term subjectivity refers to
these psychological, namely, action possibilities, of a subject. Thus, I will
explore the contexts in which a subject might ask him or herself in which
dimensions of social reality, especially power structures, he or she might
become active; these are domains of liberation. Due to this conceptual focus, I
will not talk about traditional psychological subjectmatters such as
motivation, emotion, or cognition that might go along with liberation. Too, I
emphasize that a focus on the subject's action possibilities does not imply
individualism, as the possibilities of the subject might be realized through
participation in a social action or larger group process (e.g., a worker
engaging in strike actions in solidarity with other workers).
As the prolegomenon
incorporates criticisms of postmodern theoretical discourses, yet grounds its
concepts within a modern tradition, it might be labeled neo-modern. It provides
an informed reconciliation of certain modern as well as postmodern ideas.
At this point it must also be
said that the nature of this article is academic and philosophical-psychological, and thus, its application is not immediately
explicated. This may be disappointing for activists or practitioners, but it is
necessary from an intellectual point of view. In general, my goal is to provide
a framework that allows for the conceptualization of a theory that can
withstand recent challenges to theory construction in the natural and human
sciences, and which is able to reconstruct Marxist, Neo-Marxist, and
Post-Marxist theories in such a way that they complement rather than exclude
each other.
Developments in both the
philosophies of knowledge and metatheory reveal theoretical problems that are
relevant for any attempt to elaborate a quasi-comprehensive contemporary
psychology of liberation.
In the metatheory of the
traditional sciences, we find an unblemished retreat of claims and assumptions.
While Popper (1959) challenged Hume's principle of induction, as well as
logical empiricist attempts to provide a rational basis for this principle,
Kuhn (1962) identified irrational moments in the development of the natural
sciences, and banished Popper's "rational" falsification principle
into a kind of neverland. Since Kuhn's pivotal work, the logic of research, the
nature of science, and the dynamic of scientific theories -- only to mention a
few problems -- are as uncertain and controversial as ever before, and
normative claims with regard to concepts such as truth, reality, and
objectivity have become remarkably "soft."
Within the past two decades,
authors such as Feyerabend (1978), Goodman (1978), and Rorty (1979) in North
America; French postmodernists and post-structuralists such as Derrida (1976)
and Lyotard (1984); feminists such as Harding (1986), Keller (1984), and Alcoff
and Potter (1993); black feminists such as Collins (1991); and philosophically
oriented cultural theorists such as Toulmin (1990), have argued that the
foundations of Western science are neither strong nor fundamental. This
contemporary post-empiricist critique has taken the concept of theory-ladenness
further. The concept not only applies to a paradigm (Kuhn, 1962), or to a research program (Lakatos, 1970 ); it is also relevant to social
characteristics such as gender, class, race, culture, and ideology, and to
personal idiosyncrasies.
The social sciences are in an
even more vulnerable position than the natural sciences, since the human and
social sciences have immunized their ambiguous position (cf. Koch & Leary,
1985) with a seemingly rigorous antidote -- a traditional philosophy of science.
Thus, the criticisms against the traditional philosophy of science hit the
human and social sciences that much harder than they did the natural sciences.
Too, developments within the
human and social sciences have always been accompanied by a critical discourse,
which in its Marxist version confronted the social sciences with their
ideological affiliation with the political-economic system. Too, Michel
Foucault has become the theoretical counterpart of Thomas S. Kuhn in the human
sciences, in arguing that a true
discourse in the human sciences is not possible, since any discourse is
determined by an historical a priori,
and in claiming that the human sciences are understandable solely within a
given episteme (Foucault, 1970).
Foucault (1977) demonstrated the relationship between knowledge and power, and
argued that a liberation discourse, whether within a Freudian or traditional
Marxist framework, reproduces the oppressive outcome against which it fights,
as the framework is itself part of the discourse (Foucault, 1978).
If one looks carefully at the
basic and specific arguments against attempts to develop a quasi-comprehensive
theory and psychology of liberation, one may extract core issues that must be
addressed in a prolegomenon. But as soon as a psychology of liberation attempts
to address elementary topics of liberation, it is confronted with the problems
of a grand, systematic, and foundational theory. This issue refers to the formal problem of theory development. Secondly, although not
independent from the first problem, the concept or notion of the liberation of
a subject itself has been challenged in many ways. This issue refers to the content problem. Both issues will be discussed in some detail
below.
Within the postmodern
discourse (cf. Docherty, 1993; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988; Kvale, 1992a;
Natoli & Hutcheon, 1993; Nicholson, 1990; Rosenau, 1992; Welsch, 1995), the
idea of a grand theory, and the possibility for a global, universal, and
inclusive theory, have been challenged systematically. Hegel's (1986) statement
that "truth is totality" (p. 24) is turned in the postmodern
discourse to the idea that totality never can do justice to the truth. Thus, in
the postmodern discourse, one refers to the demise of large projects, and to a
departure from meta-narratives, while favoring instead affirmation,
multiplicity, plurality, difference, anti-fundamentalism, and local truths (see
Welsch, 1992).
Revealing the social context
that underlies postmodern thought (Harvey, 1990) does not imply that there is
no rationality in postmodern ideas. Studies into the history of thought and
practices demonstrate the relativity of truth (regarding psychology, see
Danziger, 1990). Thus, it seems reasonable -- particularly within the social
and human sciences -- that every holistic claim for an understanding of reality
must fail, due to the historicity and contextuality of claims, and to the logic
of research.[1] The
complexity of the subject matter of the social and human sciences and the
reality of different paradigms suggest that a universal and systematic
foundation is prone to failure. The history of philosophy shows that
foundational and universal theoretical approaches either ignored parts of a
reality that were not represented in a given system or simply assimilated such
parts within the framework while distorting and misrepresenting the specificity
of an object or event.
Not surprisingly, theories of
liberation are cultural, historical, and social events. Understandable from a
practical viewpoint, but unfortunate for practices, traditional left liberation
discourses maintained exactly the idea of a grand theory, while criticizing
small "reformist" attempts at change, as well as the fragmentation of
social reality. In traditional Marxism (e.g., Autorenkollektiv, 1982) social
reality was viewed under the core concept of "capital," while other
problems of domination were interpreted as secondary contradictions of the
class struggle. Psychologies that worked within the framework of traditional
Marxism, such as German Critical Psychology (Holzkamp, 1983), maintained these
assumptions, by proposing an inclusive and systematic-hierarchical
psychological theory.
Yet, a contemporary
psychology of liberation must not only cope with formal problems; it must also
address content problems. The goals and methods of emancipation and liberation
are nowadays criticized widely as part of the deconstruction of
"enlightenment" and the idea of progress through rationality.
Especially in the German
tradition, critical approaches kept exactly to the moments of emancipation or
rational enlightenment, and to the idea that the use of theory might allow
societies (Habermas, 1971, 1988) and subjects (Holzkamp, 1972) to emancipate
from individual and societal dependencies. Thus, it followed, science should
connect theory to practice. Marx himself argued that a theory in the hands of
the masses has a huge practical value (Marx & Engels, 1970).
Interestingly, the idea of
the "Frankfurt school," that rational emancipation must be a core
concept of the social sciences, has been criticized within the traditional
"positivist" discourse (cf., Adorno, Albert, Dahrendorf, Habermas,
Pilot & Popper, 1969), but also within the contemporary, seemingly
progressive, postmodern discourse (e.g., Kvale 1992b). As a reminder, the
critical-theoretical concept of emancipation was developed in opposition to the
assumption that social sciences and psychology are empirical endeavors, which
discover in a "value-free" way objects and laws within an objective,
empirical reality; which examine hypotheses using objective methods; and which
interpret results in a "neutral" way. In the critical discourse, it
has been argued that both the context of discovery as well as the context of
justification are determined through societal relations, and thus, there are
ideological influences on theory construction and application (cf. Wiggershaus,
1994).
Finally, proponents of these
developments within metatheory criticize the idea of a subject as a center of meaning, consciousness, speech,
action, or intentionality. The traditional critical-emancipatory discourse
within psychology has emphasized the notions of subject and subjectivity as
essential but excluded concepts within mainstream social sciences. In doing so,
the critical discourse (German Critical Psychology or Freudo-Marxism) never
shared traditional assumptions of subjectivity, but rather maintained the
subject as socially, culturally, and historically mediated. The term
"subjectivity" was even used to attack mainstream psychology as an
alienating psychology, one without subjects, and interested only in
distributions and central tendencies or in irrelevant tests of significance
(Holzkamp, 1972). It was argued that such a psychology failed to understand the
ontological difference between the objects of research in physics and in
psychology (Holzkamp, 1972).
As a psychology of liberation
deals -- within a psychological
approach -- explicitly with human subjectivity, or with the subject's
possibilities, it is my view that human subjectivity is the genuine
psychological subject matter, and one which requires no further justification
in terms of its relevance. This does not mean that the nature of subjectivity,
or the subject's conceptual-empirical possibilities are already known. This
will be the topic of the following argumentation.[2]
While keeping to the concept
of a subject, this prolegomenon must solve the problem of a grand and
systematic theory, as well as the problem of the content of liberation. I see
at least five possible ways to deal with these problems.
Let's go back to a
psychology as a natural science! In
following this slogan, issues of liberation are no longer an appropriate topic
of inquiry for a scientific psychology. One then must admit that mainstream
psychology was right after all, and that such topics cannot be dealt with in a
scientific psychology.[3]
Psychology in this sense explores small, defined, "local" areas, free
from any emancipatory rhetoric, in which the subject itself is of no interest.
Back to the roots! If one understands the old as being the true or
genuine, and thus would rather ignore the problems raised by post-empiricist
contemporary discourses, then one could always retreat to psychoanalysis or
phenomenology. One might well consider such a romantic longing for the
apparently proven, clear, and solid, in the thicket of diversity of problems,
as an understandable response, since psychoanalysis and phenomenology are the
most important theories and practices with regard to concrete subjects.
However, although they might include personal perspectives of liberation, one
might doubt that psychoanalysis will be able to address the complexity of
liberation, due to the non-societal nature of its basic categories.
History of psychology: As an historian of psychology, one might challenge
research practices and psychological concepts, reveal the social underpinnings
of research, and even argue for an understanding of the status quo as only one
of many possible. In my view, however, such a position is insufficient for a
critical psychology and for progressive theory construction.
Postmodern psychology: This approach is confronted with a series of
contradictions, as soon as the goal of criticism is gone (cf. Teo, 1996). A
prominent proponent such as Gergen (1994) argues that the postmodernism implies
"sterner stuff." But this sterner stuff leads to a "rapprochement"
with the mainstream, by demanding that mainstream psychology reduce its
universal claim, become more reflexive, and less narrow, and not fear the use
of multimedia in research. The issue of liberation, as far as I can see, is not
addressed adequately.[4]
Finally, it seems obvious
that psychology and the social sciences require a new type of theory in the
field of liberation. The one proposed here is future-oriented, and one might
call it neo-modern, as it keeps to certain aspects of modernity. As I will
describe, its aim is to both develop a quasi-systematic theory and to uphold the goals of emancipation,
liberation, and freedom, while at the same time taking into account justified
criticisms and thus avoiding foundationality.
As the present prolegomenon
outlines a theory of liberation,
it seems necessary to emphasize the importance of theory construction for those
who view liberation as essentially a practice, and not a theory. First, I
suggest that the post-empiricist discourse is correct in arguing that research
and other practices are theory-laden. Thus, theory is needed anyway. Second, if
the borders of my theory are the borders of my world (paraphrasing
Wittgenstein, 1968), then we will need broad theories. Third, if theory
provides the basis for practical actions, then we require not only a broad
theory, but a useful and good theory. The proposed psychology of liberation
intends to address all of these problems.
How can one conceptualize or
formulate a theory that transcends a rigid systematic foundation? And how will
it be possible to include contemporary criticisms while simultaneously
grounding a psychology of liberation within modern tradition? The basic idea
proposed here is to use a "postmodern" solution for the formal problem,
while at the same time using an integration of some modern ideas to address the
content problem.
A basic error relevant to
theories of liberation was the idea that there is one concept or one theory
that encompasses all relevant aspects of liberation. Given the above arguments,
it becomes evident that a broad theory of liberation may be realized only as a
conceptual network that is able to
incorporate different liberating traditions. Nevertheless, such a conceptual
network must possess certain qualities or characteristics. To meet this
requirement, it seems to me that the best notion developed so far is the
concept of a "rhizome," as described by Deleuze and Guattari (1987).
The authors distinguish among
three forms of book writing or thought in the history of philosophy, and to
describe them they use the metaphor of a "root" (cf. Welsch, 1995).
Metaphysics can be characterized through a "root-tree"
in which everything is derived from a single source. Thus, multiplicity is
differentiated from a single unit. Descartes' (1960) "method" may be
considered the most important exemplar of such an approach; binary logic and
Chomsky's linguistic approach are mentioned as contemporary examples. However,
Deleuze and Guattari argue that this metaphysical model does not do justice to
multiplicity, as it underestimates its specificity.
In contrast, modernity may be characterized by a "fasciculated
root," a system of small roots whereby one finds many sources. Within this
conceptualization, modernity appears to take many autonomous sources into
account and plurality is acknowledged. Yet, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue
that while on the one hand multiplicity is considered, on the other, a
different kind of unity is established. Thus, James Joyce breaks up the unity
of the word while producing a unity of text; Friedrich Nietzsche's aphorisms
break up the unity of philosophical knowledge while introducing the unity of
eternal return. Thus Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is insufficient to
demand multiplicity because multiplicity must be produced.
As a way out this problem,
they suggest the rhizome, which I
will use as a metaphor for the proposed conceptual network of liberation.
A rhizome is a stem organ, in
which branches in the air can grow again into the soil, where old parts die
out, and where new branches are formed elsewhere. A rhizome has many branches
with many separate roots and appears differently over time. As there is no
basic or central point, one may call it a network. The rhizome might be
considered a vivid network that allows one to bridge differences and to
consider non-parallel developments. It allows one to think in terms of dynamics
instead of statics, complexes instead of monoliths, and multiplicity instead of
unity. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), even evolution may follow this
model.
Accordingly, a conceptual
network for liberation may be much like a non-foundational rhizome, a
quasi-system, where certain integral concepts might die out over time, and new
concepts formed at different knots. Thus, a psychology of liberation, and its
basic conceptual knots, might appear differently in the course of their
existence. Further, there is no basic knot in a network, and the network may be
applied differently by different people in different contexts. The quality of
the concepts may be evaluated in terms of practical-reason (cf. Teo, 1996;
Febbraro & Chrisjohn, 1994; and Prilleltensky, 1994). Although the term
practical reason has a broader meaning, one may refer at this point to
Foucault's idea of theories as practical tools (see Lotringer, 1996), or
Vygotsky's (1962, 1978) emphasis on scientific concepts as central tools for
human activities. The emphasis on concepts as empowering instruments is derived
from the idea that concepts enable us to develop our perceptions and analyses
of the world and thus can open or lead the way to practices (cf. Haug, 1987).
It is difficult to deny the
existence of exploitation, humiliation, degradation, and injustice in the
world. Psychology can either ignore or care about these facts. If psychology
chooses to care, then it would seem necessary to develop a psychological theory of liberation, whereby the term psychological
refers to the subject's conceptual-empirical liberating possibilities with
regard to power, and whereby an emancipated subjectivity refers to a
subjectivity that is conscious about these possibilities.
A network consists of knots,
and one must begin somewhere to build a conceptual network of liberation.
Taking the above characteristics into account, these knots must nevertheless be
considered a preliminary first step.
From an historical point of
view, it makes sense to study those theoretical traditions that have taken
issues of liberation as their theoretical center. A significant critical
tradition and thus a "strong knot" in this conceptual network is Marxism. Social and theoretical changes lead to Neo-Marxism, another strong knot, as it maintains the notion of
emancipation. Other traditions that went beyond Marxism nonetheless have their
roots in Marxism, and thus I will refer to this strong knot as Post-Marxism. These traditions are psychologically and
theoretically well-represented (see my justification below) by the theories of
Klaus Holzkamp (1927-1995), Jürgen Habermas (born 1929), and Michel
Foucault (1926-1984), respectively. In this prolegomenon I will reconstruct some of their ideas and will introduce them into the
proposed conceptual network as momentary knots.
Worth mentioning first,
however, is one commonalty and one difference among these authors, each of whom
has taken subjectivity, power, liberation, and possibilities of the subject
into account.[5] If
one looks at the biographical-historical dimension of these authors, one
realizes that for each of them Marxism played a different role in their lives.
Marxism played a role for the young Foucault in the early 1950s when he was a
member of the Communist Party of France (cf. Eribon, 1989), for Habermas in the
1960s when he introduced Marxist theories into his thinking (cf. McCarthy,
1978), and for Holzkamp in the 1970s when he developed a Marxist psychology
(cf. Teo, 1993; Tolman, 1994). Yet, one might describe their relationship to
Marx in reverse sequence: Holzkamp, the latest, is Marxist, Habermas is
Neo-Marxist, and Foucault is Post-Marxist.
The idea of a conceptual
network allows for different frameworks as they offer different insights. Thus,
in formulating a psychological theory of liberation, it is not necessary to
compare these approaches in terms of their different world views. From a
pragmatic point of view, it is only relevant to compare how each of the authors
might contribute to a psychology of liberation. Comparisons, analyses of
contradictions, and analyses of categories are theoretical tasks that might be
neglected within a conceptual network. Nevertheless, it is helpful to suggest
certain reconstructions. Thus, I argue that the Marxist labor paradigm played the central role for Holzkamp, while Habermas
considered this concept outdated and introduced the interaction paradigm. Foucault, who focused on topics traditionally
rejected and excluded in critical research, such as body, insanity, and
delinquency, will be reconstructed in terms of an aesthetical paradigm.[6]
If one understands liberation
as the subjective or psychological side of a dialectical process, and in my
view psychology's subject matter is indeed this subjective side, it would still
be misleading to think that one can develop concepts of liberation (or
empowerment, the traditional psychological term) by focusing on only the
subjective part. The subjective side is -- to turn a dialectical event
metaphorically -- only one side of a coin in which power simultaneously
reflects the other, contextual side. Indeed, how shall one derive adequate
notions of liberation, if one does not understand the context, structure, or
logic of power?
It is my position that an
adequate theory of liberation can only be realized by referring to concepts of
power. Only then will psychologists understand the possibilities and limits of
liberation. Interestingly, however, the psychological literature on
"empowerment" hardly mentions the work on power in social philosophy.
Thus, empowerment is seen primarily as an individual competence; an ability or
capacity; a form of self-control; an individual skill; a personal growth goal;
a capability to speak in one's own voice; and so on (cf. Friedmann, 1992;
Gershon & Straub, 1989; Rappaport, 1981). Although it would be unfair to
suggest that empowerment in psychology is exclusively discussed in terms of
personal, internal, private, or subjective experiences, for psychologists have
been increasingly incorporating contextual aspects, there remains a focus on
the individual (cf. Riger, 1993), largely due to an inadequate
conceptualization of the interaction of contexts such as power and individuals.
For a theoretical slogan, it seems appropriate to paraphrase Kant (1982):
Liberation without a concept of power is ignorant. And as a psychologist one
might add: Analyses of power that do not take into account concrete liberation
are vain.
If one agrees with such a
position, then it becomes obvious that one must turn to social-philosophical
concepts of power for a more adequate conceptualization. Power has been an
ongoing philosophical topic since ancient Greek times, but most remarkable from
a modern point of view is Hegel's (1986) idea of a master-slave dialectic, one
which inspired Marx and Engels (1970) to develop their concept of class
struggle within bourgeois society (see also Althusser, 1984). Although Marx's
political-economic concept of power is limited, it remains nonetheless a point
of departure for many social philosophers, either in its further development,
or in its strict demarcation.
Holzkamp (1983) draws on the
classical Marxist tradition in which power is conceptualized as the material
and intellectual domination of people over people (Marx & Engels, 1970).
The emphasis is on material domination, a domination derived from a class
society in which unequal access to the means of production rules. In terms of
historical materialism, it is argued that in slave-holding societies, power is
defined as the direct personal dependence of a slave on a slave-holder; while
in feudalist societies, power represents the dependence of a farmer on a feudal
master; and in capitalist societies, power refers to the economic power of the
class that controls the means of production, and thus the participation in the
conditions and goods of life. Holzkamp (1983) argues from within this tradition
that the majority of humans are excluded from control over the societal process
(p. 361). Power in this sense is a supra-subjective concept, one which refers to control over objective
life conditions.
Habermas (1984, 1987a) refers
to power as a disturbance in the sphere of interaction and communication, while
at the same time denouncing the traditional Marxist interpretation of power as
imprecise, due to the welfare-state character of Western industrial countries
(Habermas, 1979). Power appears in Habermas' work as a problem of interaction;
power thus refers to purposive-rational action, which is defined as a strategic
social action coordinated through egocentric calculations of success, and in
which other people are used as means. With such a concept, Habermas comes
closest to traditional definitions of power. Power is the antithesis to
consensus- oriented, communicative action, which is oriented towards
understanding. In his theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984, 1987a),
power is also mentioned in the context of the colonialization of the lifeworld
(i.e., the interactive sphere), through imperatives of the system: money and
power. And if power regulates the discourse of a given community, but not
communicative exchanges, then a lifeworld will encounter severe problems.
Interestingly, power as such is not a problematic topic for Habermas, as power
may have normative legitimation, and normative legitimation is a prerequisite
for the acceptability of power. Finally, it is possible to return to Habermas'
(Habermas & Luhmann, 1971) concept of an ideal speech situation. In this
case, power is associated with a speech situation in which only certain persons
have the right to begin a discourse, to pose questions, to provide
interpretations, and to offer statements, explanations, and justifications.
Thus, Habermas' concept of power can be reconstructed as an inter-subjective concept.
The most influential
Post-Marxist concept of power has been provided by Foucault. Foucault's (1977)
power is a disciplinary power that targets the body. Thus, one must study
mechanisms of discipline in schools, prisons, hospitals, the military, and
other institutions. For example, the architecture of a building, or the way in
which rooms are organized, leads to learning processes of the body. Power in
Foucault's terms is not "negative" as it is in traditional Marxism;
rather, it engenders a positive function (similar to Nietzsche).[7]
Bio-power directs life via sexuality and the management of people in a
"productive" way, as it is important for the administration of life.
This productive form of power is intertwined with knowledge and the human
sciences. Important for a psychology of liberation is Foucault's intra-subjective notion that power is constitutive for the subject,
that power constructs the self, and that the body is a central object of power.
This idea has also proven helpful for many feminist analyses.[8]
A psychology of liberation
takes the side of the subject into account. Interestingly, the three central
authors whose work is the focus of this paper are not just theoreticians of
power, but rather, they emphasize the active role of the subject and its
possibilities to challenge power.
Holzkamp's (1983)
elaborations are pre-structured through the concept of labor (see also Tolman
& Maiers, 1991). Thus, the subject may fight to participate in determining
life conditions; the subject has the ability, in cooperation with others, to
overcome a class society, and thus a ruling and dominating class; and the
subject has the possibility of recognizing that his or her personal arrangement
with the powerful, a typical coping strategy within class societies, may
perpetuate the status quo. Too, the subject can overcome anxiety in
understanding its connection with societal realities. Within a general
"action competence," the subject can work against his or her
arrangement with power-laden contexts, for example, with regard to means of
production, but also in the areas of employment, housing, and health care.
Habermas' (1984, 1987a)
reflections are pre-structured through the basic category of communication. The
subject can participate in the formation of his or her lifeworld and fight
against deformations of the lifeworld through demands of the system, for
example, by intervening in the public sphere. Taking part in social actions and
movements could be considered an activity directed against power. In all
communicative situations the subject might demand egalitarian processes of
communication. Too, the subject can examine individual or societal goals under
normative points of view, and either confirm or reject them (when its normative
legitimation is unacceptable; Habermas, 1984, p. 285). Finally, the ideal
speech situation can be turned psychologically (and thus avoid its sociological
problems) by using it as a criterion by which to identify deformed interactions
in contexts of communication and as a tool for defining power-laden interaction
situations.
Foucault, who rejected in his
early works the idea of a subject (e.g., Foucault, 1970), and thus preferred to
use concepts such as experience structure, episteme, and dispositive, returned
later to subjectivity in introducing the idea of a subject who is able to
install his or her life as a piece of art. Acting against power means to define
one's own life as art. Thus, the subject has the possibility to develop an
aesthetics of existence; an individual lifestyle becomes possible in the areas
of sexuality, body, and other forms of self-expression. The subject's
resistance is conceptualized in terms of technologies of the self. Thus
Foucault is able to theorize even sado-masochistic practices as liberating
(cf., Kögler, 1994) -- an unthinkable idea for Holzkamp or Habermas.[9]
One might now ask, how these
philosophical-psychological analyses translate into so-called real-world problems.
First of all, it must be emphasized that the concrete possibilities of the
subject depend on the context and on the relationship of the subject to this
context (e.g., in terms of gender, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and
personal aspects). Although the subject has in situations of "labor,"
"interaction," and "aesthetics" the choice to challenge
power in several ways, the means may be different, for example, in North
America for a woman or a man, a "black" or "white" person.
The conceptual network (thus the metaphor of a rhizome) is capable of being
changed according to these specific contexts.
The proposed psychology of
liberation (the knots of the conceptual network) suggests only that one might
want to think about one's possibilities in power-laden situations of labor,
interaction, and aesthetics, for which Marxism, Neo-Marxism, and Post-Marxism,
and their suggested representatives Holzkamp, Habermas, and Foucault, have
provided useful ideas.
For example, if "I"[10]
am confronted with racism, and "I" want to fight against racism then
"I" have to analyze "my" context, as racism has a different
meaning in Europe, in the United States, or in former South Africa (as well,
its meaning may differ within Europe, depending on the legal, political, historical,
and economic specificity of a given country).
The conceptual network
suggests to "me" that "I" relate "my" actions to
the dimension of labor and ask "myself" about concrete action
possibilities in this dimension. Thus, "I" consider labor one dimension
in which "I" may become politically active. "I" might want
to fight racism in labor-related domains such as concrete working conditions,
housing, health care, welfare, and so on. "I" might organize or take
part in an action that objects to salary inequities for different ethnic
groups, or even more radically, challenge the fact that the means of production
do not belong to all people (issues that are usually discussed within Marxism).
Yet, the conceptual network,
as proposed, suggests not only to think about labor, but also to reflect upon
liberation in the dimension of interaction. "I" might find that an
important part of a fight against racism is deconstructing the symbolic and
communicative representations of those people oppressed by racism. "I"
might expose and criticize racism in school books, talk about the difference
and similarity between traditional and symbolic racism, racism in the mass
media, and so on (cf. Teo, 1995b). "I" have the concrete possibility
to challenge someone who is making a racist remark.
And finally, the conceptual
network suggests, with regard to liberation in the dimension of aesthetics,
that "I" think about or learn to define "myself" as a
person worthy of self-expression; to take pride in "myself" as an ethnic
minority person and in "my" physical appearance; to reach for a
personal lifestyle and self-definition beyond the constructions of a racist
discourse; and to appropriate aesthetical judgments in the service of
"myself" ("I am a person of color and I am proud of it, and
there is nothing wrong with my nose").
The three knots of the
conceptual network (Marxism, Neo-Marxism, Post-Marxism; or Holzkamp, Habermas,
Foucault; or labor, interaction, aesthetics) are an heuristic guideline, a
scaffolding, that suggest in which dimensions "I" might wish to think
about power and liberation. The conceptual network (rhizome metaphor) also
suggests to focus not only on one dimension of power or liberation; it
demonstrates that it may be adapted and changed totally according to different
social-historical contexts, as power and liberation may have new meanings in
new contexts.
The openness of the
conceptual network becomes necessary when one realizes that means and goals of
liberation in Western countries may be different from those in developing
countries (the term "may" is used because it might turn out that
power structures in inner-city areas in the US are very similar to those in
developing countries), especially since liberation practices in advanced
capitalist countries have focused in recent years more on the dimension of
interaction and aesthetics, and to a lesser extent on the dimension of labor.
This includes the fact Continental-European authors as incorporated in the
network, with their strengths in addressing problems of power and liberation
from a philosophical perspective and involved in specific Western issues of
liberation, require the experiences and reflections of people who have been
involved in other (maybe more basic) practices of liberation. A conceptual network
is open for the works of Freire (1985), Hooks (1990), or Martin-Baro (1994),
and is open to the ideas of activists who have had no academic voice.
Liberation is much too complex a field to allow itself to exclude the
experiences of people concerned.
The proposed conceptual
network for a psychology of liberation allows the support of subjects in the
enlightenment of societal and individual dependencies and possibilities -- a
traditional critical-theoretical goal. To avoid its foundational fallacies, a
conceptual network has been proposed that, by definition, is mutable, and that
entails its own suspension as soon as the knots are of no value to people
oppressed by power.
Still, at this juncture, it
is important to emphasize the position that power or liberation cannot be
sufficiently analyzed in social constructionist terms. A focus on written and
spoken "texts" is important but leads to deficits in understanding
the complexity of power, domination, and liberation. Power is an objective social reality. Thus, psychology must include
"structural-societal" concepts in its theories in order to convey the
idea that power is not only a personal relationship between individual persons
but a structural phenomenon (see Febbraro, 1994; Teo & Febbraro, 1997).
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[1] Postmodernists
did not originate the idea of the relativity of truth. Already Lenin (1962) --
usually considered a representative of a "simple" correspondence
theory of truth -- had argued about the historical relativity of knowledge. The
difference is that Lenin believed that science would approximate truth over
time, without ever reaching absolute truth.
[2] The
emphasis on theoretical aspects for understanding the decline of the concept of
liberation is due to the course of the present argumentation. Certainly,
however, one would need to take so-called external aspects into account for an
understanding of the "loss of liberation."
[3] Also
worth noting is Foucault's positive evaluation of the natural sciences in
comparison to the human sciences (see Rouse, 1987).
[4] I
know that I am not doing total justice to K. Gergen given his enormous
theoretical output. Still, I am amazed about his abstemious statements in the
"American Psychologist."
[5] I am
ignoring in this context the reconstruction of different developments in these
authors' scientific biographies as well as the theoretical changes these
authors made (for details see Teo, 1993, 1995).
[6]
Derrida (1993) might also be considered a Post-Marxist contributor, but
he does not provide psychological insights as Foucault does (see Kamuf, 1991).
[7]
Comparative analyses of power as conceptualized by Foucault and Habermas
have been provided by McCarthy (1991), Honneth (1986), and by Habermas (1987b)
himself. A comparative analysis of Habermas and Holzkamp has been performed by
Teo (1995a).
[8]
Foucault's theory entails much more sophistication than I have been able
to sketch here. In addition, his theory of power went through many different
stages (cf. Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). The notion of power as the compulsion
to confession (Foucault, 1986), for example, is not be included here.
[9] The idea that resistance can be turned
aesthetically is also evident in Peter Weiss' (1975) novel.
[10] The "I" form is used to convey that the
conceptual network can be used as a very concrete tool.