Thomas Teo
York University
Published as: Teo, T. (1999). Methodologies of critical psychology:
Illustrations from the field of racism. Annual Review of Critical
Psychology, 1, 119-134.
This web-based
version is based on the final pre-publication manuscript that is not identical
with the published version. For access to published version please contact your
library or contact author.
Address: Thomas
Teo, Department of Psychology, History and Theory of Psychology, York
University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. Electronic
mail may be sent via Internet to tteo@yorku.ca.
It is argued that critical psychology
can be discriminated meaningfully into critical theoretical psychology,
critical theoretical psychology with a practical emancipatory intention,
critical empirical psychology, and critical applied psychology. According to
the differentiation of the general methodologies of critical theoretical
psychology into deconstruction, reconstruction and construction, the uses of
these methodologies in the field of racism are illustrated. Thus, some of
Immanuel Kant's anthropological statements are deconstructed as racist. In
addition, they are reconstructed as part of Euro-American cultural-historical
identity. Finally, a psychologically useful concept of racism is constructed,
one that allows for a differentiated application of the term in communicative contexts
and one that is formulated in the interests of the oppressed. Traditional
racism, neo-racism, diffuse racism, and reactive racism are defined. Some
consequences for critical psychology are discussed.
Forms of critical psychology
It is useful for an
exposition and reflection on methodologies of critical psychology to
discriminate at least four forms of critical psychology: (a) critical
theoretical psychology, (b) critical theoretical psychology with a practical
emancipatory intention, (c) critical empirical psychology, and (d) critical
applied psychology. Within and among forms, which are not mutually exclusive,
one detects a variety of frameworks on which to base critical psychology.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)
criticized natural-scientific psychology and challenged the
“explanatory” approach to the psyche as unable to grasp the
specificity of human mental life (Dilthey, 1961). His analyses must be
considered part of critical theoretical psychology. However, Dilthey did not base his reflections on a practical
emancipatory viewpoint. Thus, critical psychologists who demand that the
political-emancipatory perspective should be a core concept of critical
psychology might not consider him a critical psychologist. Nevertheless, it
must be emphasized that many critical theoretical studies without an
emancipatory background are significant for practically and politically
interested psychologists.
The critical work of Klaus
Holzkamp (1927-1995) provides a good example of a critical theoretical
psychology with a practical emancipatory intention. His historical-theoretical analysis of psychological
categories (see Teo, 1998a) should help individuals to understand societal and
personal dependencies, to realize restrictions and solutions, and to allow them
to improve their quality of life through informed practices. Similar to
Holzkamp, many academic psychologists who work and publish in the area of
critical psychology can be subsumed within this branch of critical psychology.
Moreover, some psychologists
base their empirical studies (in its narrow psychological meaning) on a
critical framework and thus work towards a critical empirical psychology. Many clinical, community or social psychologists and
practitioners who apply psychology within the contexts of different
institutions are still guided by an emancipatory perspective, and therefore
perform critical applied psychology.
The important distinction, however, is one between theory and practice (i.e.,
critical theoretical psychology vs. critical applied psychology). This factual
division of labor within the community of critical psychologists is
conflict-laden.
Critical applied
psychologists accuse critical theoretical psychologists (both forms) of living
in an ivory tower and producing irrelevant reflections. Critical theoretical
psychologists, on the other hand, suggest that many critical practices have
been unsuccessful, that they support the status quo, or that they are often on
the wrong side of the political spectrum. Critical theoretical psychologists
also suggest that critical practitioners or empiricists do not understand the
significance and function of theory, nor the dialectics of the theory-practice
problem. Because of the theoretical weaknesses and ideological functions of
traditional psychology, and because recent theoretical developments at the
margins of mainstream psychology (such as postmodern psychology) have gained
widespread attention -- despite their theoretical weaknesses (e.g. Parker,
1998; Teo, 1996) -- it becomes particularly crucial to emphasize that there is
not only a place for critical theoretical psychology but a necessity for it.
The division of critical
labor is understandable in the context of the contemporary Euro-American
organization of academia. The idea of a unity of theory and practice (e.g., Gramsci, 1971) is part
of a utopia that may motivate the practical emancipatory intentions of critical
psychologists. However, there exists no reasonable argument why practice (in
its everyday meaning) should determine the activities of critical theoretical
psychologists. Indeed, there is a place for theory in and for itself in
critical psychology, and "interpreting" a problem in a new way is a
justifiable objective of critical theoretical work (especially in the Western
world). This perspective contradicts traditional demands for practice stemming
from radical philosophy. Marx's (Marx & Engels, 1983, p. 7) thesis that the
goal of philosophy is not to interpret the world but to change it still
occupies huge parts of the critical superego.
This perspective also
contradicts the Zeitgeist of
Euro-American societies, according to which theory alone has no value.
Conservative politicians and members of research funding agencies increasingly
demand that research proposals have practical implications for society. Only
practical or practice-promising projects receive public consent, whereas purely
theoretical endeavors, and among them critical analyses, are considered obscure
and unworthy of funding. It is strange that both the market-oriented Zeitgeist
and critical applied psychologists demand practice. However, one must point out
that critical applied psychologists' understandings of practice differ from
system-supporting understandings of practice. For the former, critical practice
often implies social change.
Obviously, the term practice requires critical reflection. The concept of practice
is not self-evident, and an everyday understanding of it is not sufficient to
do justice to the problem. On some perspectives, theory is a form of practice,
while on others practice does not require theory. In my view, critical theoretical psychology is a necessary
part in this dialectics, while mutual learning processes may take place.
Feedback from practice is significant for critical theoretical psychology with
a practical emancipatory intention, while theoretical analyses may inspire
practices. Critical psychologists should consider the idealistic notion that if
theory does not work in practice, then it is too bad for practice (not for
theory). In addition, although I agree with Gramsci (1971) that knowledge as
a result is not a form of doing, I
also believe that the production and dissemination of knowledge is a form of practice.
The goal of this article is
to present general methodologies for critical theoretical psychology (both
forms). It does not attempt to outline a methodology (or methods) for critical
applied psychology or critical empirical psychology. In order to achieve this,
the distinction suggested above, as well as a reflection on the theory-practice
issue, is important. It is also critical to point out that the theory-practice
problem is not a static dilemma that can be discussed beyond specific
cultural-historical contexts. Thus, the formulation of theory as revolutionary
theory and of practice as revolutionary practice in the 19th century
cannot be translated simply into contemporary issues of oppression.
Indeed, the theory and
practice problem assumes a different character in the politics, philosophy, or
psychology of Latin-America as compared to Euro-America. In Euro-America, to be
critical could mean, for example, to distance oneself from the traditional
practices of the mental health care system even when one is not able to provide
concrete alternatives. It could mean to resist the compromising of radical
theories for the sake of a status quo that does not allow for radical
interventions. On the other hand, in the context of Latin America, one might
agree with Martín-Baró's (1994) concept of liberation psychology,
his criticism of the ivory tower, and his demand for the primacy of practice.
The problem becomes even more
tangled if one takes Dussel (1985) seriously when he suggests that a critical
framework should provide theories and practices for the oppressed. I agree that
a critical theoretical psychology with a practical emancipatory intention
should provide theories for the oppressed. However, given the plurality of
subjectively expressed feelings of oppression in Western societies, questions
are raised regarding who should be counted “objectively” as
oppressed. Class, gender, and "race" must be considered core
categories for identifying oppression in critical psychology. However, there is
oppression related to sexual preference, physical and mental disability, age,
body size, food preferences, attractiveness, and so on. Power, oppression, and
even terror can also be experienced by white, male, upper-class professionals:
Medical doctors who provide abortions in North America (and who may fall within
these categories) risk their life and are threatened by anti-abortion
activists.
Habermas (1987), who
differentiated social movements in terms of their emancipatory, resistance, or
withdrawal potential, provides only a rough scanning device to make adequate
decisions about this issue. My own view is to consider claims of oppression in
terms of classism, sexism, and racism as relevant to critical psychology, but
not to consider claims of individuals who feel oppressed because they pay too
much income tax as falling within this category.
Although classism, sexism,
and racism are central concepts for analyzing psychology, I do not think that
these issues determine the character of critical theoretical psychology with a
practical emancipatory intention. Further, it is inappropriate to apply the
term critical psychology to only one approach, such as German Critical
Psychology (see Teo, 1998a). From a factual point of view critical theoretical
psychologists have studied many issues from within many different paradigms.
They have analyzed theories of mainstream psychology and have pointed out the
epistemological, ethical and political shortcomings of psychology, and how it
serves the interests of powerful groups. They have focused on topics such as
exploitation and alienation, and on concrete issues such as unemployment,
poverty, and abuse of power in schools, prisons, and the psychiatric
establishment (cf. Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997).
I suggest understanding
critical theoretical psychology (with or without a practical emancipatory
intention) not by the topics covered, nor by specific research programs, but by
the three general methodologies of deconstruction, reconstruction, and
construction. I hope to show that critical theoretical psychology, especially
with a practical emancipatory intention, occupies a rightful place within a
critical worldview.
Critical psychology is an
essential branch of knowledge production in psychology. As a theoretical discipline
critical psychology produces critical knowledge that monitors and challenges
traditional psychology, but also provides alternative views on psychological
topics. Critical psychology as a theoretical discipline has used the
methodologies of deconstruction, reconstruction, and construction (cf. Teo, in
press). The term methodology, which refers to a general way of studying an
object or event, is used here, as opposed to the term method, which refers to a
specific set of techniques (such as discourse analysis).
Deconstruction is a widely used general methodology in critical
theoretical psychology. It takes a psychological-theoretical or practical
construction apart and lays open its elements. Deconstruction refers to a pure
critique of psychology, and provides, for example, concrete evidence of
psychology's racism, sexism or classism. Critical theoretical psychologists
(without a practical emancipatory intention) have nourished the literature on
the crisis in traditional psychology by using many deconstructive arguments
(see Teo, 1993). Deconstructive works explicitly criticize areas of traditional
psychology such as social psychology, developmental psychology, clinical
psychology, and cognitive psychology. A sophisticated body of criticism has
focused on traditional and non-traditional methods, psychology's basic
methodology, psychology’s assumptions regarding human nature, the
mind-body relationship, and psychology's epistemology, philosophy, and ethics
(see Teo, in press). Deconstruction may be based on philosophical or
meta-theoretical paradigms, and critics of psychology may adopt a Marxist,
feminist, post-structuralist, hermeneutic, anti-racist, or eclectic perspective
for the deconstruction. In terms of psychology's racism, which is used as an example
in this article, the methodology of deconstruction identifies and describes
those biases.
Reconstruction is a general methodology that critically reconstructs
psychological theories, methods, and concepts by theoretical, logical, or
historical means. Essential for a critical reconstruction of contemporary
psychology with a practical emancipatory intention are critical historical
works. Issues such as how gender, class, race, or more generally power,
influences psychological theory and practice are part of critical
reconstruction. Reconstructions also focus on the impact of society, culture,
or modernity on the psyche. Other works attempt to translate critical concepts
into specific areas of psychology, or to analyze pseudo-empirical research in
psychology (see Teo, 1997; Teo, in press). Reconstruction as a general
methodology of critical theoretical psychology renders events in psychology
understandable. With regard to racism, the methodology of reconstruction has as
its purpose the understanding of racist bias.
Construction as a general methodology of critical theoretical
psychology refers to the development of critical theories, methods, and
concepts. Traditionally, emancipation, liberation, alienation, oppression, and
exploitation have been considered significant concepts that require further
development. Analyses that allow for a new perspective on racism, sexism, and
classism are subsumed within this category. A critical construction of
traditional concepts such as learning, perception, cognition, and emotion are
also included within this methodology, as is the goal of rehabilitating the
ethical domain in psychology under the broader objective of an emancipatory
psychology (see Teo, in press). With regard to racism, the methodology of
construction may provide concepts that help subjects to identify racism.
Construction often
accompanies deconstruction and reconstruction, and several works have used all
three simultaneously (see books in Routledge's Critical Psychology Series; Parker & Spears, 1996; Prilleltensky, 1994;
Sloan, 1996). A good example of the critical construction of a concept is
Holzkamp's (1993) theory of learning. Holzkamp deconstructs mainstream learning
theories by identifying their weaknesses; he reconstructs traditional learning
theories by showing their limitations and by suggesting which elements of
existing learning theories should be incorporated. Finally he constructs a new
learning theory by providing a framework that explicates the meaning of
learning from the standpoint of the subject.
Obviously, the division of
theoretical critical psychology's methodologies into deconstruction,
reconstruction, and construction is idealtypic. This division represents a conceptual scaffolding
that allows one to grasp the investigative practices of critical theoretical
psychologists. Although critical works suggest that critical psychologists use
deconstruction, reconstruction, and construction in a parallel mode, it is also
possible to identify the dominance of one of the three in specific works. This
division should make critical psychologists conscious about their work. It
constitutes a heuristic for reflecting upon the theoretical activities of critical psychologists in academia, and it should
guide one's own critical studies. However, it does not provide a framework for
labeling a critical psychologist as deconstructionist, reconstructionist, or
constructionist.
In my view, critical
psychology (with a theoretical or empirical focus) has no inherent connection
to qualitative methods or to any other method for that matter. Indeed,
deconstructive and reconstructive studies (that include empirical work) can use
either quantitative or qualitative methods. For example, to determine whether
women workers in a factory or women faculty at a university are paid less than
their male counterparts, quantitative analyses are necessary; to document
women's perceptions, thoughts, and feelings regarding their workplace
environment, qualitative methods may be essential (see also Febbraro, 1997).
Deconstruction, reconstruction,
and construction may not only reflect general methodologies of critical
theoretical psychologists, but may also represent a developmental pattern. Some
critical psychologists, myself included, began critical endeavors with deconstructive arguments, identifying eagerly the many weaknesses of
mainstream psychology and its role in serving the interests of the powerful.
With the acquisition of more critical knowledge, reconstructive studies that allowed for a more historically and
theoretically sophisticated understanding of the problem became possible. And
last but not least, I have tried to use construction as a methodology (see Teo,
1998b).
From a perspective that is
concerned with the future of critical psychology, it must be emphasized that critical
psychologists should strive not only for deconstruction and reconstruction but
also for construction. It seems that the constructive part has been largely
neglected in critical psychology. It is my hope that critical psychologists
will attempt more profoundly to contribute to the constructive part of critical
theoretical psychology and thus contribute to the progression of critical
thought in advanced industrialized countries. Although the suggested
distinction may deepen our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of
critical psychology, readers may ask for concrete examples of these
methodologies. Thus, I have selected some examples to illustrate these
methodologies in the field of racism.
Several critical theoretical
studies have identified psychology’s racism in the past and present
(e.g., Cernovsky, 1995; Gould, 1996; Guthrie, 1998; Richards, 1997; Winston,
1998). For an illustration of deconstruction I have chosen the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) whose racism is typically not mentioned
in psychology. Kant is one of the most important figures of modern Western
thought. In his epoch-making critiques, critique of pure reason (Kant, 1977, WA III/IV), critique of practical
reason (Kant, 1977, WA VII), and critique
of judgment (Kant, 1977, WA X), he
covered epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, and demonstrated that all three
domains are located within the authority of human reason.
Although a pure
deconstruction would be limited to a description of Kant’s racist
statements, I have included contextual information which requires
reconstructive research but which provides information useful to the reader.
However, the deconstructive parts should be identifiable easily. Textbooks on the
history of psychology often mention Kant as a pioneer of psychology (e.g.
Watson & Evans, 1991). Historians of psychology are mainly familiar with
Kant's philosophy of mind, according to which concepts make certain perceptions
or experiences possible. Kant is also known for articulating the view that
psychology will never be a true natural science.
Kant co-constructed different
races and discriminated among the White race, the Negro race [Negerrasse], the
Mongol race, and the Hindu race in his anthropology (Kant, 1977, WA XI, p. 14).
He evaluated these races and associated certain characteristics with them. For
example, in analyzing emotions of beauty, Kant (1977, WA II) concluded:
"The Negroes of Africa have by nature no emotion that would transcend the foolish,"
(p. 880). The "Blacks are very vain, but in a Negro way, and so chatty,
that they have to be scattered by using clobbers" (p. 880). Kant (1977, WA
XI) further identified a "strong smell of the Negro which cannot be
avoided through any hygiene" (p. 79), and stated that "all Negroes
stink" (p. 22). He co-constructed the prejudice that the "Negro"
is "strong, fleshy, agile, but under the rich supply of his motherland,
lazy, indolent, and dallying" (p. 23). Indeed, can we still agree with
Habermas (1997) who suggested that Kant is "the only philosopher in the
German tradition who is truly devoid of ambiguities" (p. 84).
Kant as quoted here is the
same Kant who examined the conditions and limits of knowledge and who advocated
treating humans as ends, not means. But it is even possible to deconstruct Kant
as a master of epistemology when considering his explanation for the skin color
of the Africans, which he based on phlogiston theory. This theory was popular in the chemistry of
Kant's time and was used to explain why certain materials burn while others do
not. The theory suggested that all combustible materials contain a substance
called phlogiston. Materials with a large quantity of phlogiston burn well,
whereas materials that do not burn do not contain any phlogiston (cf. Bernal,
1969). Kant used this theory to explain the dark skin of Africans. According to
Kant, blood that is loaded with phlogiston turns black. He further added that
one can see this blackness at the bottom of blood pudding. Due to the environment
of the Africans, the skin of Africans must remove a great deal of phlogiston
from the blood. Since blood that is laden with phlogiston turns black, and the
skin is translucent, the skin of the Negro appears black (Kant, 1977, WA XI, p.
79). Kant was also against the intermarriage of nations "which gradually
extinguishes the characters, and is, despite any pretended philanthropy, not
beneficial to mankind" (Kant, WA XII, p. 671).
A deconstruction of
Kant’s anthropological statements has no immediate applied consequences.
However, a critical theoretical deconstruction of Kant, who interestingly never
left his immediate environment of Königsberg, may have a practical
emancipatory significance when people oppressed by racism and people who fight
racism challenge Kant as a general universal mastermind. On the other hand, a
deconstruction that results in (among other things) an inventory of Kant's
racist statements should not be used to disclaim Kant’s significance in
other areas of study. The issue of whether or not Kant changed his views over
time, of whether or not he put his constructions into practice, or of how he
influenced Europeans and European-Americans (who based slavery upon such
constructions) is already, however, part of reconstruction.
Reconstruction illustrated: Why was Kant a racist
and what are races anyway?
A reconstruction aims at understanding the reasons for Kant’s racism. Such reconstructions start with research questions: How is it possible, from an epistemological point of view, that Kant, who asked about the possibilities of the conditions of the mind to achieve knowledge, did not see the epistemological limits of his anthropological statements? How, from an ethical point of view, could Kant, the founder of an ethical system, not see the practical implications of his statements? Why did he not attend to the racist context of colonialism in which the anthropological research of his time was conducted? Why did Kant not hesitate to teach his racist ideologies to others, despite a lack of information and evidence on different ethnic groups? How is it possible that Kant wrote many of his racist remarks while simultaneously writing about human emancipation?
These questions require
detailed reconstructive answers; here I can provide only a general perspective.
As far as my own reconstructions go, Kant did not have an immediate racist
agenda. Kant did not deliberately promote something that had horrendous
consequences on those who were constructed as inferior. He did not understand
his own role as an academic ideologist, as a person who taught something that
was epistemologically and ethically wrong. In my view one can reconstruct Kant
as possessing a cultural-historical identity that is unreflective and
unconscious when it comes to the cultural-historical mediatedness (cf.
Holzkamp, 1983) of the mind. Kant's individualistic conception of the mind did
not allow him to reflect upon the cultural-historical limits of the mind,
including his own mind. He never questioned his intellectual identity, an identity
that saw the European mind as superior to the minds of the other
"races."
The often heard
counter-argument in defense of racist remarks, that such ideas reflected the Zeitgeist and that only a very few individuals in Europe were
able to transcend such thinking, confirms the hypothesis that the construction
of the other as inferior was -- and I think still is -- central to European and
North American identity and practice. Zeitgeist and Ortsgeist, an identity of superiority, and an inappropriate understanding of the
mind have co-contributed to the inhuman practices of domination and
exploitation in Asia, Africa, Australia, and America (see also Dussel, 1995).
Given that racism is a large part of the Euro-American cultural heritage, it is
not surprising that racism was and is part of psychology's repressed identity.
It is possible to reconstruct psychology as an Euro-American invention, and as
an indigenous psychology of Western culture.
Kant's statements on the skin
color of Africans are psychologically enlightening as he obviously tried to
cope cognitively and emotionally with the unknown. The dark skin of Africans
presented a research problem for Kant, and thus he theorized and rationalized
difference in terms of a scientific theory. Obviously, the "other"
must be constructed by all means, even when only insufficient and inadequate
information to construct the other is available. The example of Kant
demonstrates that racism has nothing to do with good personal intentions, as
Kant might have had good intentions in his writings. Nevertheless he acted irresponsibly, even through the lens
of his time.
Again, I must emphasize that
such a reconstruction has no immediate applied consequences. However, there
should be no doubt that a practical intention motivates my own studies, even if
this intention is simply to support people oppressed by racism in being able to
handle such statements. Thus, I think that an a priori evaluation of critical theoretical reflections as
lacking practical consequences is inappropriate. This does not mean that
theoretical analyses should not benefit from anti-racist practices, from
experiences derived from anti-racist projects, or from critical empirical
studies reporting how racism is experienced and expressed.
Before I move to the
methodology of construction in the
field of racism, let me address some deconstructive and reconstructive thoughts
on the term racism, and on the relationship between racism and race. People
oppressed by racism, and also critical psychologists, should prefer the term
racism to concepts such as xenophobia or ethnocentrism (see Teo, 1995). If we
talk about identities (which is of course not sufficient to understand the
complexity of racism), the concept of racism is more appropriate in describing
the Euro-American reality than is xenophobia or ethnocentrism. Both contain
naturalistic connotations; they suggest that racism is part of our nature and
that it may be vain to eliminate these tendencies. However, racism cannot be
explained or excused by reference to a biologically functional hostility
towards foreigners. These terms neglect who was constructed by whom as inferior
and who held the power to support these constructions.
The conceptualization of the
relationship between race and racism has lead to some confusion. Some critical
researchers avoid the term race and prefer the notion of racism without
races because biologists have been
unable to provide a scientifically sound definition of race (see Kalpaka &
Räthzel, 1990). In this case, the avoidance of the term race emanates from
an emancipatory interest or from a critique of biological essentialism. Some
right-wing intellectuals, especially in German-speaking countries, avoid the
term race [Rasse] due to the historical connotations of the term within this
particular context. They hope that by avoiding the term race, the critics who
might expose and challenge racism will be silenced. But avoiding the term race
does not end the fact of racism.
The morphological discourse
in biology suggests nearly as many race systems as there are theorists. Indeed,
biological systems theories suggest anywhere between 2 and more than 200 races
(Teo, 1995). The genetic discourse in biology is also controversial; respected
contemporary geneticists have rejected the idea of human races because of an
arbitrariness of systems and because of the inability to distinguish human
groups genetically, as the variance within any particular group is greater than
the variance between groups (Levin, 1991). The geneticists Cavalli-Sforza and
Cavalli-Sforza, for example, argue that the concept of race is absurd when
applied to humans (see Cavalli-Sforza & Cavalli-Sforza, 1995).
But for a deconstruction and
reconstruction of the term race, one must leave the biological discourse. More
interesting is the question of why, within the context of particular
cultural-historical and economic formations, race systems were developed, and
how these constructions were used to promote exploitative interests. An
examination of the context of discovery of the concept of race shows that race
systems have never solely focused on the phenotypic diversity of humans. The
biological discourse on race cannot be separated from historical, political,
economic, and military discourses (see Banton, 1987). On the contrary, an
understanding of racism requires an understanding of the social construction of
biological races. The modern concept of race was constructed
pseudo-scientifically within the context of European colonization and conquest
in order to justify, within a systematic ideology, inhuman practices (Geiss,
1988; see also Mosse, 1978).
From a biracial perspective
(Teo, 1994) it is worth mentioning that the concept of race is formalized as an
exclusionary category: Black and White are alternatives, but not additive or
continuous. Thus, biracial people often have no political or cultural
representation, and the biological discourse often constructs them as
"exotic" and problematic cases (Root, 1992).
I cannot give an example of
construction in the context of Kant. Based on the idea of a critical
theoretical psychology with a practical emancipatory intention, and on Dussel's
idea of critical theories for the oppressed, I intend to construct concepts of
racism that are useful to individuals who experience racism or think that
racism is an important concept for critical psychology. As a visible minority
person, I am interested in racism as a social phenomenon, but I am also
interested in a concept of racism that fulfills the following needs:
A critical concept of racism
should be able to challenge frivolous statements in which the prejudice and the
practice of racist perpetrators are put on the same level as those of victims
of racism. In a postmodern world, one finds a conceptual (ideology-laden) chaos
within the mass media, politics, academia, and everyday interactions. Users and
supporters of affirmative action are labeled racists in the same manner that Ku
Klux Klan members or Neo-nazis are considered racists. Thus, I require a
concept of racism that helps me to differentiate between the racism of
perpetrators and the "racism" of victims. I also want to be able to
identify differences and similarities between contemporary racism and racism as
it was expressed in the 19th century. I want to be able to realize
differences between an ideologically saturated racism and diffuse forms of
racism expressed by individuals who would not consider themselves racist.
Finally, I want to be able to use a tool that allows me analyzing and
reflecting upon historical and contemporary texts of racism.
Construction in the field of
racism should begin with needs of individuals confronted by racism. The goal of
my conceptualization of racism is not to specify the essential nature of racism
(i.e., ontology or social theory of racism), or to argue that racism is a set
of beliefs in contrast to a set of practices (or vice versa), but rather to
provide a heuristic that helps people who are oppressed by racism (including
myself) to identify and understand racism within written and oral texts. The
conceptualization of racism is a tool
for identifying different forms of racism in various texts as well as for
understanding aspects of the racist mind and behavior. This construction is
inspired by what Holzkamp calls the perspective or standpoint of the individual
(cf. Holzkamp, 1993). A subjective or psychological perspective does not imply
that racism should not be linked back
or understood in its connection to society, culture, institutions, history, and
lifeworld. On the contrary, individual racism cannot be understood without an
understanding of societal racism or racism's embeddedness in daily practices
and effects. Racism must be analyzed, for example, in connection with the
implementation of laws, in daily communications and practices, in popular
culture, and in systems of power (see Mecheril & Teo, 1997). But the goal
of the following construction is not a sociological analysis of racism but a
conceptualization that is helpful for subjects confronted with texts of racism.
In this meaning, the suggested constructed concepts are not right or wrong, but
useful or useless. Persons oppressed by racism provide the final criterion for
this decision.
The concepts of racism
articulated here did not descend from heaven. They have been nourished by my
own experiences and by the literature in this field (e.g., Jones, 1997; Kalpaka
& Räthzel, 1990; Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993; Memmi, 1987;
Miles, 1989). First, I wish to distinguish between a discursive-ideological and a behavioral part. Some individuals have promoted the first part (e.g., Kant),
others the second, and still others have combined theory and practice by
applying their racist ideology in concrete actions. As the focus of the
construction are written and spoken texts emphasis will be put on the discursive-ideological part.
I have heard the argument
that to label someone a racist is to mirror essentialist thinking and personalize
a societal problem. Although I tend to agree with such a theoretical position,
I must also point out that it may be psychologically adequate for a victim of
racism to employ such labels. In my view, it is inappropriate for critical
academics to lecture victims about the correct usage of terms. This does not
exclude the claim that reflections on the embeddedness of racism in the
socio-cultural context are also necessary. The proposed four forms of racism
reflect the development of my thoughts on racism, which are based on Teo
(1995).
Traditional racism. Traditional racists (a) construct an ensemble of
differences or meanings of uniformly constructed human races with a constructed
or a real shared origin. (b) They evaluate this ensemble of differences or
meanings in terms of superiority or inferiority (as members of the dominant
"white race" they considers themselves as belonging to the superior
race). (c) They naturalize the ensemble of differences or meanings (i.e., they
are convinced that differences are due to the different nature of races). (d)
They use or apply this discursive-ideological part of racism to legitimize, to
recommend, or to enforce actions on dominated races or members of dominated
races. A precondition for accomplishing this practice is that they are members
of the dominant race and thus they have the power to use or apply these
discursive ideologies.
(a): When members of a
dominating ethnic group co-construct an ensemble of differences or meanings of
uniformly constructed human races, they have entered traditional racism. The
construction of an ensemble of meanings includes the notion that real or
imagined physical features are associated with certain intellectual, moral, or
behavioral characteristics. In the construction of meanings, unspoken
differences are imputed. For example, when Kant argued that Africans stink,
which is a construction of meaning, he also implied that they stink in contrast
to him as a member of the "white race." Moreover, human races such as
Blacks, "Gypsies," Jews, Asians, and so on are constructed as uniform
groups with a shared origin.
(b): It is a very short
distance from the construction of an ensemble of differences or meanings to the
evaluation of these differences or meanings. Kant's statement that blacks are
lazy implies that they are lazy in contrast to the "white race." This
is not just a report of difference but also a statement of evaluation. The
statement that Africans are lazy sets the "white race" as the
standard against which to measure the real or imagined activities of other
races. Members of the dominating race propose the evaluation of differences or
meanings in such a way that they are members of the superior race while the
other is member of the inferior race.
Understanding that an ensemble of differences or meanings is important to this
definition can easily be demonstrated. Single constructions might be made in
favor of the other race but the ensemble might not be. Someone might say:
"I am not a racist. I believe that African-Americans are the best
basketball players in the world." This single statement is not racist, but
it is based on a stereotype.
Moreover, the ensemble of constructions and meanings might include the
idea that Blacks as a race are good athletes but nothing else. Similarly the
statement: "Orientals are very industrious and not lazy" might be
part of an ensemble of constructions that imply that East Asians are
industrious but not creative. Positive statements are not racist per se, but
thinking in terms of naturalized positive differences turns easily into the
contrary when an ensemble of differences or meanings is concerned.
(c): Naturalization is an
important part of traditional racism. The constructed ensemble of differences
and meanings is attributed to biological nature (including God, morphology,
genes, evolution, etc.). Thus, real (cultural-historical) or imagined
differences or meanings are founded upon the biology of the races. Of course,
differences in the economic development of nations or individuals are interpreted
as natural rather than cultural-historical. Naturalization is often not clearly
expressed but is an unspoken substantive assumption. Kant's statement that
Blacks are vain is simultaneously a construction of meaning, an evaluation, and
based on a naturalization.
(d): Kant clearly fulfilled
the criteria of the discursive-ideological part of the definition of racism,
and although he did not have the chance to use his constructions for
exploitative purposes, he certainly contributed to exploitative practices.
Racist discursive-ideological constructions have been and still are used for
legitimizing, recommending or enforcing actions against certain ethnic minority
groups. One may look at the colonial practices of European states, slavery in
North America, or German anti-Semitism that led to the Shoah. Of course, the
destructive use of action is not always as obvious as it is in the Shoah.
Actions might include not only physical harm to human life but also
psychological damage. The ongoing verbal devaluation of minority groups that
allows the minority individual to assume an identity that has negative
connotations in mainstream culture is part of such actions, as is the fact that
members of the dominant group are given advantages and privileges denied to the
dominated group.
Neo-racism: Although traditional racism can still be found in
contemporary society, more subtle forms of racism have also emerged.
Neo-racists construct an ensemble of differences or meanings of uniformly
constructed groups. Such groups may no longer be labeled as races but as
cultures, ethnicities, peoples, nations, foreigners, immigrants, and so on.
Neo-racists evaluate this ensemble of differences or meanings while attributing
superiority to themselves/their group and inferiority to others. In neo-racism
the naturalization of the ensemble of differences or meanings takes on a
different look. They might not
argue that these differences or meanings could be found in the biology of
"these people," but in their culture. In neglecting the historical
dimension of culture, however, they naturalize the concept of culture. Thus
neo-racists employ the concept of culture in the same manner as the concept of
race has been employed. They do not refer to racial purity anymore, but to the
dangers of a multicultural society. They do not consider a particular race but
the unemployed immigrant as parasitic. These neo-racist ideological-discursive
constructions are used to legitimize, recommend, and enforce actions over other
ethnic groups. The power might be expressed in the denial of political rights
for immigrants, for example, that are routinely enjoyed by members of the
dominant culture.
Diffuse racism: It is important to point out that racism is not an
ideology stemming from the so-called bottom of society. On the contrary: Elite
groups, including politicians, scientists, and journalists, are extremely
important to the dissemination of racism as an ideology and practice (cf. van
Dijk, 1993). Diffuse racism is displayed
when people construct differences and meanings of ethnic groups. This is less a
cognitive process than an affective one. Diffuse racists do not support an
ideology or think about an ensemble of differences or meanings. Rather, they
focus on superficial differences and meanings. However, they still evaluate
these differences and meanings such that they feel superior to the other
constructed ethnic group. They no longer refer to an ideology of genetic or
cultural differences, but somehow they believe that these differences and
meanings are unchangeable. Finally, they use this diffuse racism to legitimize,
to recommend, or to enforce actions, such as demanding their daughter to never
marry a member of a particular "other" ethnic group.
Reactive racism: Groups and individuals oppressed by racism may
regain a positive concept of their race and may construct the oppressors as a
race, too. The power of thinking in races shows that victims of racism are not
beyond racism themselves. Yet, I want to emphasize theoretical caution here, as
there might be good reasons to challenge reactive racism as a concept.
Conceptual caution is required as one takes the societal power of construction
and action into account. Who, within a given society, has the power to propose
constructions and meanings that gain acceptance? Who has the power to evaluate
these constructions? Who has the power to put these constructions into
practice? Victims of racism rarely have the cultural or political power to make
their constructions dominant.
Moreover, the phenomenon of
reactive racism has been abused to render everyone equally a racist, so that
the victims appear no better than the perpetrators. If everybody is racist,
then why should there be a special effort to challenge the racism of any one
group? However, this political strategy is used to maintain structural and
societal forms of racism. Of course the basic error in such thought is the
individualistic neglect of societal power. Yet, despite the danger that the
dominant group imposes reactive racism as a concept, it seems appropriate --
from a psychological point of view -- to include this type of racism, while
being aware of the problems associated with this concept.
Reactive racism can be
identified when I, as a victim of racist constructions and acts, construct an
ensemble of differences and meanings of uniformly constructed human races with
a constructed or a real shared origin. In reactive racism, I evaluate this
ensemble of differences and meanings in favor of my own oppressed race against
the other, the perpetrator race. Moreover, the victim race is constructed as
superior while the perpetrator race is constructed as inferior. In reactive
racism I naturalize these differences and meanings by suggesting, for example,
that Whites will always be racists. In reactive racism I use and apply these
constructions to legitimize, recommend or enforce actions against perpetrators.
The power in this case is not societal or cultural, but sub-cultural and
interpersonal, and must cope with the full counter-power of the mainstream.
The proposed
conceptualizations are, as I pointed out, a tool for understanding certain
textual situations of racism. However, it must be emphasized that the
definitions do not constitute a mechanism that renders reflection useless. On
the contrary, a great deal of reflection is required beyond this heuristic in
order to classify textual written or spoken statements as racist. One needs to
reconstruct the latent ideology, the context, and the person to understand the
racist statement. For example, caricatures can be racist by emphasizing a
prejudice, but through their comical appeal might be able to challenge racist
ideologies. In any case, victims of racism must be consulted. In this sense the
definitions suggested here serve as basic tools that must be explicated through
concrete case examples and should be modified where necessary. Again I want to
point out that individual racism can only be comprehended in connection with
societal, cultural, and institutional racism. Racism is no trait or disease of
the individual, but is a result and dimension of Euro-American culture. Racism
is the objective mind of Western
societies. Further, critical psychologists may ask about the functionality of
racist thinking for different subjects (Holzkamp, 1995), or explore the narcissistic
dimension when the other is devalued and left outside.
The methodology of
construction was performed within the ivory tower of academia. It raises once
again questions about the relationship between theoretical critical psychology
(with a practical emancipatory intention) and applied critical psychology. Is
it justified to use the term applied or practical when an individual uses the
suggested conceptualization of racism as a tool to identify racism in
historical writings? Is it a practice when persons begin to ask themselves,
based on the proposed concepts of racism, if they construct differences between
ethnic groups, if they evaluate these differences, if they attribute these
differences to nature, and if they base actions upon such constructions? In my
view, a reflection of that type is a form of practice, not in a narrow sense --
nor in a revolutionary or political sense -- but in a sense that might be
captured by the idea of a “practical emancipatory intention.”
There is a place and necessity
in critical psychology for the utilization of critical theoretical methodology.
Critical psychologists should be careful not to submit themselves to the logic
of an ideology that measures results in terms of their exchange value, or assume that, because psychology has become a huge
commodity, reflections must be marketable. Further, the use value of critical theoretical psychology with a practical
emancipatory intention should no longer be measured in terms of its
revolutionary impetus (in Euro-America). The use value of these methodologies
is much more modest, and perhaps should be so, considering the mistakes that
have been made in the name of radical thought. Alternatively, the use value of
deconstructive, reconstructive, and constructive methodologies may be measured
in many ways. Such methodologies may illuminate the pathologies of the status
quo; inspire further analysis; provide an heuristic for challenging the
mainstream or a means for mediating one’s own behavior; or constitute a
tool for analyzing a problem. Ivory is something precious. It may be worthy of
protection.
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