Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and Eduard Spranger (1882-1963)
on the developing
person
Thomas Teo
York University
Published as: Teo, T. (2003). Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)
and Eduard Spranger (1882-1963) on the developing person. Humanistic
Psychologist, 31 (1), 74-94.
Address: Thomas Teo, Department of Psychology, History and
Theory of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J
1P3, Canada. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to tteo@yorku.ca.
Abstract
At the end of the 19th century most psychologists
conceptualized psychology as a natural science. However, a few
philosopher-psychologists, including Wilhelm Dilthey, envisioned psychology as
a Geisteswissenschaft with understanding as its core method. It is less known
that Dilthey also promoted ideas for developmental psychology. This paper
addresses the views of Wilhelm Dilthey and his student Eduard Spranger on the
human mind and developmental psychology. While Dilthey provided general
guidelines for studying mental life, Spranger promoted a holistic
characterization of adolescence gained through the method of understanding. It
is suggested that a geisteswissenschaftliche psychology may offer relevant,
yet, neglected insights for contemporary developmental psychology.
I suggest that most developmental psychologists consider
their field of study to be scientific, and that they know what the concept
"scientific" means. The term is even understood as self-evident, and
there is no further need for reflection, as it refers to the research practices
of the present scientific community who share an unquestioned paradigm (see
Kuhn, 1962). Science in developmental psychology is understood as emulating the
natural sciences and not the humanities (see Miller, 1993). It means that a
researcher should formulate hypotheses within theoretical frameworks, formulate
relationship between variables, use objective and reliable measurements and
observations, base explanations on statistics, discover universal laws and
processes, and consider the experiment to be the right path to knowledge. But
as critics have pointed out (e.g., Holzkamp, 1972): In this process reality is
fragmented and research is limited to parts, details, and elements, but
psychologists are not able to study the whole person.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) perfected the philosophical-scientific version of research at the beginning of the 19th
century. It influenced many philosophical psychologists including Wilhelm
Dilthey. The natural-scientific
model was executed by most researchers on nature and found its philosophical
reflection in John Stuart Mill's (1806-1873) empiricism and the positivisms of
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and Ernst Mach (1838-1916). One important feature
that distinguished the two versions, important for my argument, is the
association of philosophical science with totality, wholeness, Gestalt, and the
"larger picture," and the focus of natural science on elements,
atoms, parts, and the "detailed picture." Indeed, Hegel's (1807/1986)
idea that "truth is the whole" (p. 24) contrasts sharply with an
experimental version of science that attends to parts and not to totality.
Within a dialectical perspective (see Hegel, 1807/1986) one
could reconstruct the philosophical-scientific version of research as the thesis. Rightly the natural-scientific version of research
criticized the speculative character of this type of study (Lange, 1865/1950).
In consequence only its antithesis,
namely natural scientific psychology, was endorsed. In the course of this
process the Gestalt of the psyche has been completely lost, and it seems
necessary that a synthesis take
place that does justice to issues raised in both programs. Given that there are
only a few methodological reflections on what such a synthesis should look
like, I suggest reflecting on ideas of two authors, situated at the end of the
19th and at beginning of the 20th century, who tried to do justice to this
totality: Wilhelm Dilthey, Eduard Spranger, and Karl Jaspers developed a
psychology as a Geisteswissenschaft
(i.e., as a human science; literally: mental science), with understanding as
its core method. Two of these three "most important representatives"
(Pongratz, 1984, p. 253), namely Dilthey and Spranger, outlined ideas that are
relevant to a developmental psychology that does justice to the Gestalt.
The German philosopher Dilthey (1883/1959), the founder for
the systematic reflection on the methodology of the human sciences, did not
originate but elaborated on the distinction between the natural sciences
[Naturwissenschaften] and human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] (see also Teo,
2001). The latter include history, political science, law, political economy,
theology, literature, and art. Psychology may not be counted as a
Geisteswissenschaft in a categorical sense as it is the basis for all human
sciences. However, as psychology is also based on understanding, as all the
other sciences that deal in some way with the historical-social reality, it is
a Geisteswissenschaft in a methodological sense. Dilthey himself was not
completely content with the term Geisteswissenschaft, as the term Geist (mind)
draws the focus away from the emotional and the motivational sphere of humans which
are as important as the cognitive aspects and completely interconnected.
Dilthey differed from the mainstream psychology of his time
in his conceptualization of the psychological subject matter and methodology.
First, he emphasized the socio-historical character of the mind and suggested
that mental life is influenced by the objective mind, the mind of a social
community or era, as expressed in law, morality, ethics, and institutions.
Second, he promoted understanding as the core methodology for psychology.
Dilthey was discontent with natural-scientific psychology because of its
formalism, and argued that the focus on the forms and processes of mental life
prevented an examination of the content of the mind. In contemporary words: He
was less interested in a curve of forgetting than in the content of what
concrete subjects are forgetting: "Psychological contents are not
explained by advancing processes and their laws" (Dilthey, 1977, p. 6)
because "if man contemplates the meaning of his life, it is the very
content through which meaning is formed" (p. 182).
Dilthey (1957) promoted the concept of a descriptive
psychology as an alternative to the
explanatory experimental psychology of his time. In his view, descriptive
psychology should focus on a depiction of the parts and connections of mental
life as subjects experience them in their totality. The unity and totality of
the mind and the unity and totality of the person distinguish mental life from
the physical world. He did not oppose the traditional division of mental life
into cognition, emotion, and volition but he objected to their opposition:
"It is common to oppose thinking, feeling, and desiring as three separate
notions, as if feeling and desiring contain no thinking. That is wrong"
(Dilthey, 1990, p. 354).
Dilthey (1957) also emphasized the significance of the
concept of structure: "A life-unit
is determined by and determines the milieu in which it lives. This leads to an
organization of internal states. I label this organization the structure of
mental life" (p. 200). According to Dilthey, it would be the task of
psychology to study this structure and the knots that bind the psychological
strings to the totality of life. In addition, the concept of structure had
theoretical implications: "Mental life does not grow from its parts; it is
not built from elements; it is not a composite, not a result of interacting
atoms of sensation or emotion: it is originally and at all times an overarching
unity" (p. 211).
Challenging a psychology that focuses on these elements,
Dilthey (1957) put forth the notion of the "Gestalt of mental life"
(p. 220), a term he already used in the 1860s when he referred to the
"Gestalt of our mental life as an unexplained synthesis of ... mental
functions" (Dilthey, 1990 p. 27). This concept of a "mental
connective structure" which contains a "stable system of relations of
its parts" (Dilthey, 1958, p. 324) represented an alternative to the
concepts of natural-scientific psychology. In literature, according to Dilthey,
there exists an intuitive understanding of the whole structure. However, a
descriptive psychology would have to clarify these ideas in a general way
(Dilthey, 1957, p. 153). The most adequate method for psychology, according to
Dilthey, is understanding: "We explain nature, but we understand mental
life" (p. 144). However, he did not exclude other methods of psychology
and acknowledged, besides understanding, a variety of approaches to psychology,
including introspection, comparative methods, experimentation, the study of
abnormal psychology, and the study of the products of mental life (p. 199).
It may be less known that Dilthey (1957) also promoted ideas
for developmental psychology and dedicated a short chapter in his Ideas to the "Development of mental life
[Seelenleben]" (pp. 213-226). He emphasized that the study of the
structure of mental life and the study of the development of mental life demand
each other (p. 213) and that both are accomplished in his proposed descriptive
psychology. Any description of the mental life of an adult must be complemented
by his or her biography. Each biography is situated in a connective structure
which is "organized from the inside and connected to a unity"
(Dilthey, 1958, p. 325).
In order to understand Dilthey, one must realize that he
attempted to disclose and propose abstract concepts, in the tradition of a
philosophical version of science, which should conceivably grasp the meaning of
development. This would not be done from the perspective of an observer but
from the perspective of a developing subject. In this sense Dilthey can be
reinterpreted as proposing a psychology from the standpoint of the subject (see
Holzkamp, 1993). He suggested that development finds its origin in the activity
of the following moments: structural connection, teleology, value of life,
psychological articulation, formation of a nurtured psychological connection,
and creative processes (Dilthey, 1957, p. 218).
Structural connection:
Development has its origin in the activity of the structural connection of
nature, nurture, and culture. Thus, developmental psychology must study the
development of the body, the influence of the physical environment, and the
surrounding mental world (Dilthey, 1957, p. 214). Each of these conditions
"influence the structural connection of mental life" (p. 214). Even
further, "development is only possible where a structural connection
exists" (p. 218). This structural connection is at the center of development.
It is the foundation for all development and differentiation is derived from
this structure. Development cannot be explained by an atomistic play of
psychological particular forces (p. 214).
Teleology: From the
perspective of the subject the "final cause" (in the sense of
Aristotle) of development will not be found, as later suggested by Piaget
(1970), in cognitive equilibrium, which refers to an organismic model of human
nature. From the perspective of the subject the structural connection aims at
the richness of life, satisfaction of drives, and happiness (p. 215). This
teleology is objective and immanent as it relates to the preservation of the
individual and the species (p. 216). But it is also subjective and immanent (p.
215) as it is given to our inner experience. The fact that development relates
to the meaning of development for the subject is of course a question that is
systematically excluded from contemporary developmental psychology.
Value of life: From the perspective of human subjects, the value of life is constituted from the richness of life that humans experience, from the richness of the reality of life that humans feel, and from the fact that they are able to realize what lies in them (p. 216). The value of life is also influenced by the life conditions [Lebensverhältnisse] in which humans live. These values depend on our emotions but this does not mean, according to Dilthey, that the value of life consists of emotions.
Articulation: The
conditions and influences to which the subject is exposed lead, according to
Dilthey, to an increasing articulation of psychological life in the course of
development. The subject evaluates in the course of development impressions and
interests, attentions, perceptions, and ideas. Experiences tell the developing
subject to judge the value of various options of life and to develop principles
and life ideals (p. 217). Thus, according to Dilthey, the adult person becomes
more realistic, and the articulation of drives and emotions, performed under
the influence of volition, come to a completion: "In a fierce fight life
ideal and dream of the future of the adolescent are adapted to the power of
things" (p. 217).
Together with this articulation Dilthey identifies the formation
of a nurtured psychological connection that
dominates particular conscious processes which continue into old age. In old
age, however, the nurtured psychological connection of the past is victorious
and excludes new realities. Thus, memories reign in very old age. Finally, it
is a characteristic of development to create new values that have not existed
before. Dilthey calls them creative processes.
Besides these moments Dilthey abstracted progression, understood as the spontaneous change in a living
being, continuity, and teleological
connection as basic features of development
(p. 218). He emphasized that each age has its own value, but that in its
development a more articulated Gestalt of mental life emerges (p. 219). This
process continues into old age when the body declines. However, the mass of
ideas may still increase until death. The result of development is the
dominance of a nurtured psychological connection, which influences all actions
and thoughts. A true psychology should describe these moments of inner
experience of a subject's experiences in its totality.
Natural-scientific psychology is, according to Dilthey,
unable to grasp the subject of development. In fact, natural-scientific
psychology is unable to predict psychological development. He used the
following comparison: "It is as hopeless to depict the velocity of a body
as the sum of the velocities of its parts, as it is to derive the unitary
achievement of comparison, judgement, preference, and the formation of an
ideal, from the inner conditions of particular unchangeable units and their
interaction" (p. 223). Dilthey suggested a fourth dimension besides
nature, nurture, and culture that determines developmental outcome: The
individual meaning that a subject forms
throughout development.
Dilthey distinguished between elementary forms of
understanding, which are ubiquitous in
everyday life in the form of immediate processes (p. 207), and higher
forms of understanding should something
contradict our everyday experience. In higher forms of understanding human
beings start with an examination of the problem, the involved context, and
finally reach understanding. From empathy arises the highest form of
understanding, in which the totality of
mental life is effective, or the re-experiencing [Nacherleben] of other
people's experiences (pp. 213-216). This is another feature of a
geisteswissenschaftliche psychology, as "re-experiencing of the
psychological world … distinguishes all mental operations … from
the knowledge of nature" (Dilthey, 1977, p. 95). The scientific
form of understanding and interpretation
leads to hermeneutics (Dilthey, 1958, p. 217), with the final goal being
"to understand the author better than he has understood himself"
(Dilthey, 1957, p. 331).
Although Spranger called his framework a psychology of
understanding [verstehende Psychologie] of adolescence, he did not share
Dilthey's highest form of understanding as the essential method for his
studies. His goal "is to enable a deeper understanding through a complete
portrayal of the psychological organization of adolescence" (Spranger,
1924, p. 2). This portrayal was not targeted towards concrete individuals as
performed in autobiography and literature because psychologists will never be able
to exhaust concrete individuality (p. 3), but rather sought to provide a typical picture of adolescence. As a human scientist
Spranger was interested in a general perspective and in laws of development
while being aware that this typical picture is limited to a certain cultural
stage, and cannot transcend time and space. Spranger's motivation for his
psychology came from the intention to help adolescents who are in psychological
need. Spranger believed that "help can only be achieved through understanding"
(p. 1). Spranger discussed four features of his psychology of understanding:
understanding, structure, development, and types.
Understanding:
Spranger (1924) identified (as does Dilthey) understanding as the core method
for knowledge of the human sciences (p. 3). But for Spranger understanding was
not just re-experience, sympathy, or empathy with another subject.
Understanding penetrates the mental connection, and seeks to "comprehend
mental connections as meaningful in the form of objective valid knowledge"
(p. 3). Something has meaning if it can be "subsumed as a constitutive
part into a totality of values" (p. 4). This is easier from an outside
perspective. Thus, an understanding of the other is less limited than an
understanding of oneself and one can understand people of the past better than
they have understood themselves (this is a basic hermeneutic principle).
Two methodological statements are involved in this idea: (a)
True understanding requires knowledge of the objective-mental connections,
which transcend immediate life consciousness. Spranger implied that one can
understand a person of the past better because one knows the historical
context. One can understand a child better than he or she can understand
himself or herself because one knows the developmental background. One can
understand adolescence better if one understands the "historical and
societal conditions" (Spranger, 1924, p. 5). "The totality from which
the human being must be understood, is much larger than the totality of his
individual world of experiences" (p. 6).
Spranger (1924) gave the example of the play of a child (p.
8): Why does a child play? A simple answer would be that a child plays because
it is fun to play. Even if you ask a child, she might say because she likes to
play. If somebody answers that the child plays in order to practice future
activities relevant to her life, then developmental psychology has a theory of
understanding that goes beyond the subjective experience of the child. In
addition, the questions of "why do we think as we think, why do we
evaluate as we evaluate, why do we act as we act" (p. 8) cannot be
answered by looking into the individual. To answer these questions one must
understand broader connections of meaning and trans-individual mental
realities. Similarly, a psychology of adolescence must grasp the larger
connections of meaning. An understanding of adolescence must go clearly beyond
what is experienced by the adolescent (see p. 19) and certain expressions must
be understood as developmental expressions.
Structure: According
to Spranger (1924), a structure is a whole "in which each part
accomplishes an achievement for the totality while the achievement of the part
is determined by the whole and can only be understood from the whole" (p.
9). The psyche is a structure and a formation that is designed to realize
value. Thus, a psychology of adolescence must be a structural psychology (p.
9). It attempted to understand "particular psychological phenomena from
their position in the unitary whole and from their meaning in such connections
of performance" (p. 10). Structures appear differently at different ages.
"It should be the basic statement of each psychology (in contrast to
epistemology) that reality is no constant for experience, but that it changes
with the psychological organization of beings, with the very developmental
stage. The child, we must say firstly, lives in a different world than we do"
(p. 32). This sounds very Piagetian as it suggests that the child has a
different experiential relation to space and time than the adult (p. 34).
Development:
"Mental development is the growing of the individual mental life from an
inner point of view to a larger inner structure and the growth of value of the
psychological unit of performance" (p. 18). Development is structural
development. Adolescents themselves do not experience the objective meaning of
their development (p. 17). A developmental psychology of understanding has the
task of not only understanding development but also of understanding certain
expressions as developmental expressions - even when they are not experienced
as such by the adolescent. The adolescent's perspective is also limited, according
to Spranger, because he or she may experience their adolescent psychological
structure as final. Spranger addressed the problem of achieving an
understanding that goes beyond the subjective contributed meaning. He pointed
out that from an evolutionary point of view one could understand the meaning of
development in terms of the survival of the individual and that development
contributes to this goal. But if one considers the meaning of development as a
development that allows participation in the objective mind (in Hegel's sense),
psychological development refers to the development of a personality and
becomes much more complicated.
Types: Spranger
(1924) clearly envisioned his psychology of adolescence as a typological psychology
(p. 19). As each individual is unique, science will not be able to reach each
individual. According to Spranger, one needs concepts that represent something
in a general way while at the same time these concepts are very concrete (p.
20). A concretization of the general is realized in the concepts of a type.
Spranger suggested that he incorporated the average type (gained by induction)
as well as the ideal type (gained by deduction as an a priori construction).
Self-critically he pointed out that the psychologist is part of a culture (p.
27) and that such a typology is very limited.
As the development of human beings is not only a function of
nature, a typology is part of the historical-societal reality, based on the
concrete culture and cultural society. Therefore, it is impossible to develop a
psychology of adolescence in general. Spranger provided, according to his own
account, a psychology of the German adolescent of his cultural time (the last
150 years). He added that some features identified in this context may be valid
for the English, French, and American adolescent, but that this is certainly
not the case for all features. He also pointed out that class, gender, and
education play a role and that his focus was on the educated male adolescent.
In this context Spranger (1924, pp. 21-30) was also critical
of physiological psychology. For example, any explanation of development that
focuses on the change in the human glands from childhood to adolescence cannot
solve the psychological problem of development. He argued that such an
explanation is as successful as one that says that Socrates was in prison
because his muscles moved him into prison. If an individual is hit by
lightning, then changes in the individual's plans, mood, and attitude towards
life must also be explained by the individual's interpretation of this
experience. Similarly, the psyche of the adolescent male cannot be explained by
the production of semen. Physiological psychology, according to Spranger, is
not without relevance, but it does not add to psychology proper. Anatomical
facts are interesting, but they do not contribute to an understanding of
adolescence. Spranger challenged that one can explain the feelings of isolation
or loneliness, radicalism, or tendencies to idealization through understadning
the activity of genital glands. For Spranger, anatomical-physiological changes
of structure represent one realm of facts and psychological-mental changes of
structure a second realm of facts.
Spranger started out with a holistic characterization of
adolescence (pp. 31-51). As one can understand particularities only from the
totality, a psychology of adolescence must start with a holistic
characterization and therefore it is discussed at the beginning of the book.
From a methodological point of view it is interesting to note that he
characterized adolescence by discussing middle childhood, which allowed him to
understand the distinguishing features of adolescence (p. 36). Spranger
suggested three basic characteristics of adolescence: discovery of an identity;
emergence of a life-plan; and growth into different domains of human life.
Discovery of an identity.
Spranger (1924) pointed out that the discovery of a self in adolescence does
not mean that children do not have experiences of the self c children have a
sense of self. Spranger meant that the perspective of the adolescent is turned
inwards in reflection, and the self is discovered as having its own reality and
world. More precisely, the adolescent is in search of the self. Part of this
process is self-reflection in
which the adolescent becomes entrenched within his or her own emotions or
philosophical contemplation: "Why do I live?" "Why is there more
than nothing?" (p. 41). This self-reflection is accompanied by inner
restlessness. Adolescents, according to Spranger, may use diaries, and letters
to peers are sent not in order to talk about things but to mirror one's self in
writing and receiving. Friendships serve the purpose of subjective self-understanding.
In the process of finding one's identity the adolescent shows sensitivity. As adolescents have the problem of not being taking
seriously, their peer relationships express the desire for respect and the need
for love and guidance. The search for identity is also accompanied by an urge
for autonomy. Even more so, it is a sign
that a new self is emerging. Therefore, desires for emancipation are necessary
and not the product of disobedience or lack of caring.
Emergence of a life-plan.
It would be shortsighted, according to Spranger, to think that life-plans refer
only to vocational choices. Spranger included here the direction that the inner
life takes. The life-plans that emerge in adolescence can impact one's whole
life until old age. The perspective of the adolescent is directed towards the
future and ideals are formed. Among the many identities that the adolescent can
choose, a main identity must be chosen (p. 45). In order to understand
"aberrations" of adolescent life-plans one has to understand the
connections of motivations. Spranger pointed out that inner tensions could
reach so far as to lead to suicide based simply on the imagination of pain that
another person suffers.
Growth into various life domains. Different life domains are not merely assimilated
but rather, according to Spranger, are filled with the adolescent's own
experiences. They impact the adolescent's creativity in art, reflection, and
contribution to society. In this sense the adolescent achieves cultural, not
only biological, reproductivity. Using material from history, literature, and
the method of understanding, Spranger described, in a detailed manner, fantasy
and creativity in adolescence, pubertal eroticism and sexuality, the ethical
and social development of youth, and the legal, political, ideological,
work-related, and religious consciousness of young people. Similar to his
personality psychology (Spranger, 1928), Spranger identified different types of
adolescent life and ego affection.
Spranger also differentiated between basic forms of
developmental rhythm and basic forms of adolescent individuality. Types of
developmental rhythm are based on the character of personal experiences. He
discriminated (a) rich and stormy developmental types (p. 336) where experiences
take the form of revelation and reincarnation. Experiences tend also to be
without a border and sect-like behavior may be observed. For example,
adolescents in this category may have personal experiences in which they feel
like a totally new person. In contrast there is the type of (b) slow silent
growth (p. 337). Adolescents work consciously on themselves without major
disasters, continuously, and are goal-oriented and energetic. A third form can
be characterized through (c) self-conquest (p. 338). Adolescents in this
category control themselves and can be understood by the attempt to discipline
their mind. This typology is informative as Spranger argued that each person
does not experience adolescence in the same way and that there are individual
differences in the rhythm of adolescence.
Spranger also portrayed the formation of individuality
through pairs of attributes. He depicted in detail sober-minded versus
ardent-minded adolescents (p. 345), susceptible versus creating personalities
(p. 346), and melancholic and cheerful natures (p. 349). He also characterized
forms of intellectual direction in adolescence (pp. 353-363). Some adolescents
thrive on the physical dimension, by focusing on sports, and show a lack of
intellectuality. Other adolescents devote themselves to the aesthetic domain.
Spranger called them Hölderlin types, in reference to the German
existential poet. He also pointed out problematizers, adolescents for whom each
experience and emotion is turned into a problem. Again other adolescents are
interested in acquisition. According to Spranger they can be depicted in the
context of Americanism, according to which all goods are seen in terms of
success, business, and personal progress. Other adolescents are driven by
action and by the need to dominate. He also included the devoted adolescents
who are, for example, devoted to the welfare of their parents. Some adolescents
are ethical enthusiasts who follow an "all-or-nothing" mentality. And
finally there is the religious type who is oriented towards transcendence.
I suggest that the methodology of understanding - in
contrast to explaining - offers relevant, yet neglected insights for
contemporary developmental problems. However, it must be pointed out, that
understanding in Dilthey's framework and in Spranger's conceptualization is
limited by the social and historical context of the researcher. Spranger was
aware of this problem and admitted that his typologies do not transcend time
and space. Thus, it becomes important for an evaluation of human-scientific
psychology to understand the person of the researcher and his context. This is
not only valid for human-scientific psychology but also for the natural
sciences (see Harding, 1998). Spranger, for example, was trapped in his own
conservative political orientation and the German Zeitgeist. This becomes
evident with regard to gender and ethnicity.
In an enlightened manner Spranger (1924) accepted the limits
of his approach to a certain group of adolescents and states that his
psychology is not valid for all adolescents. He was fully aware that
understanding has historical constraints (see Schnädelbach, 1984). Thus,
Spranger admitted that his main concern is the German male adolescent. He
argued that "of course we know that the psychological development of the
female adolescent is different, and her psychological structure is different
from the male one" (p. 21). However, it is instructive to see how
Spranger, who emphasized the socio-cultural context when it comes to the mind,
rejected the idea that, for example, female sexuality of his time is a product
of his time's morality. He suggested that "nature is more powerful than
each artificial societal system" (p. 127) and he called attempts for new
conceptualizations of femininity as intellectual constructions: "Eternal
femininity in its weakness and greatness is untouched by such sociological
ideas; its roots are not to be found in the sociological, but in the
natural-metaphysical world" (p. 127). It seemed that Spranger understood
male change as socio-cultural but female development as biological.
This stream of thought becomes even more questionable when
Spranger (1924) referred to Jewish and Russian adolescents in Germany of the
1920s: "Already the Jewish adolescent shows essential deviating traits -
what is usually not seen c and for the Russian psychological type we have the
urging feeling of far-reaching strangeness" (p. 28). The focus on
difference versus the focus on universalism is a problem that is still discussed
in contemporary thought (see Ernst, 1999; Malik, 1996). A focus on difference
to acknowledge the historical and social situatedness of knowledge and to see
the specificity of the development of various groups and individuals does not
necessarily lead to an enlightened position. It can lead to the construction of
strangeness of marginal groups and, in its worst form, to a construction of
inferiority (see Teo, 1999b).
Psychological theories are part of the society and history in
which they emerge. Even my own criticism and understanding of Spranger must
suffer the same fate. But are Spranger's studies based on understanding more
involved in the Zeitgeist than those of natural scientific psychologists? Are
they more biased than the ideas of G. Stanley Hall (1884-1924), the father of
American developmental psychology, who suggested, based on empirical
"evidence," that so-called lower races are not in a state of arrested
development but in a state of adolescence? According to Hall (1907), "most
savages in most respects are children, or, because of sexual maturity, more
properly, adolescents of adult size" (p. 649). Hall also complained about
Islam as being more effective than Christianity in subjugated parts of the
world: "The reason is that Mohammedanism has been elastic and adaptable
… its very inferiority as a religion has caused its success" (p.
675). It is clear for Hall that non-European groups are inferior: "The
fact of mental inferiority according to the established standards of measuring
culture and civilization is unquestionable" (p. 676). Hall's ideas
provided the rationale for segregation and separate education for Whites,
Blacks, and American Natives in the United States.
I am not challenging Spranger for his ideas by quoting Hall
but rather seek to emphasize that all of developmental psychology has to be
understood from a historicist
perspective in the context of time and space. From a presentist point of view we are allowed to judge and evaluate
these statements ethically. Beyond such a focus, one should look at the
substance of ideas and methodologies proposed in order to grasp development. It
may allow for the fusion of various horizons (Gadamer, 1960/1997) and
contribute to understanding important psychological issues. Contemporary
developmental psychology is a patchwork of ideas, theories, research programs,
and empirical results. It has accumulated a vast amount of information on a
variety of developmental problems. One should ask: Has it not lost its
understanding for the wholeness of the developing subject? I do not suggest
that developmental psychologists must necessarily subscribe to Dilthey's or
Spranger's ideas on understanding, but I think that one can learn from such
approaches in order to develop a more comprehensive description of development.
Maybe it is time to rediscover and understand the Gestalt of development again.
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