

# Canada-Japan Security Cooperation Study: Broadening The Agenda

By Brian L. Job and Masashi Nishihara  
March 1997

## Background<sup>(1)</sup>

In 1996 the Canadian and Japanese governments agreed to sponsor jointly a review of the current state of their relationships, bilateral and multilateral, in the areas of peace and security. The overall objective of this initiative is, to enhance their cooperation and consultation and to put in place mechanisms that are appropriate to promoting their mutual interests and in balance with other aspects of their respective international relationships. Several years ago the Canada-Japan Forum 2000 report suggested that the current agenda of common interests and concerns on security may be broader than that which is currently at play between the two countries. Global, and particularly regional, developments have reinforced this feeling, as Canada and Japan have increasingly found themselves confronting situations where their interests and goals are similar and where their joint consultation and cooperation could be mutually beneficial and productive.

This study was commissioned as a first step towards this overall objective. Its mandate is to review the principal security interests and preoccupations of Japan and of Canada; to summarize their common bilateral, regional, and multilateral concerns and interests; to survey the current state of their cooperative activities on such matters, particularly noting areas and issues where both countries would benefit from enhanced cooperative activities; and to provide an agenda of actions involving governments and/or non-government institutions, groups, or individuals that could be undertaken to go beyond existing patterns and habits of cooperation.

Phase two of this process will be a review of this study by the two Governments and the initiation of consultations on security matters, as noted in the *Canada and Japan: Agenda for Cooperation* statement issued by the Prime Ministers of Japan and Canada in November 1996.

The study document is organized as follows: Section I briefly reviews the post-Cold War context of global and regional peace and security concerns. Section II discusses the similarity of Canadian and Japanese outlooks, challenges and opportunities concerning peace and security (broadly conceived) and discusses the rationale for their cooperation on such matters. Section III provides an overview and assessment of the current state of Canadian-Japanese cooperation in peace and security areas. Section IV sets out recommendations, including a Program of Action on Peace and Security Cooperation.

## I. The Post-Cold War Context

The end of the Cold Wars in Europe and Asia saw the collapse of the ideological frameworks that underpinned the global economic and security orders, a dramatic easing of tensions among the major powers, and a remarkable opening of previously frozen interstate relations.

Canada and Japan, along with other states, have had to rethink and redesign their foreign and defence policies to account for new realities. This has not proved an easy task. Regional and intrastate conflicts, fueled by enduring communal rivalries and challenges for power, have become more frequent and highly virulent. The world, as viewed from Tokyo and Ottawa, is unstable and unpredictable.

A broadened notion of human security is necessary to encompass concerns about the disruptive aspects of economic, political, and environmental change to individuals and groups, as well as to states. Issues concerning the illegal trafficking of money and drugs, the exploitation of ocean resources and the degradation of the environment, the migration of people within and across borders, and the spread of disease are all viewed as potential threats to national security. However, traditional international security concerns have not disappeared. Concerns over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have risen, countries are modernizing their armies and seeking to acquire quantities of more sophisticated weaponry. Conventional weapons, including land mines, continue to cause great human destruction.

With few exceptions, most notably regarding Europe and the former Soviet Union, multilateral mechanisms either do not exist or have proven inadequate to peacefully manage conflicts and to respond to crises of human security.

Developments in the Asia Pacific region are of critical importance to Japan and Canada. For both, maintenance of a peaceful and stable regional order is essential to sustaining the climate and the conditions for economic growth that gave rise to the Asian economic miracle of the last decade. Relations among the major powers are at historically favorable levels. However, critical geopolitical security concerns persist, most notably on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Straits, and in a series of mainly maritime, unsettled territorial disputes. There are troubling prospects of weapons proliferation and of increased power projection capabilities of key states. Protection of the sea lanes is of central importance to trade and resource dependent states, especially Japan.

Uncertainties about the domestic political situations and government strategies of key regional powers, including China, the US, and Russian, underlie continuing, longer-term concerns about regional security. Maintaining key bilateral relationships is viewed as necessary, but not sufficient, to sustain regional stability and human security over the long run. The establishment and support of Track 1 and Track 2 mechanisms to promote habits of dialogue, consultation, and peaceful settlement of disputes are important. While significant steps have been made with regional initiatives, (the APEC forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Council on Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific), progress towards an inclusive Northeast Asian/North Pacific security dialogue has been slow.

### ***Canada's Peace and Security Concerns***

Canada has recently completed an extensive rethinking of its outlook and priorities in foreign and defence policies. These are set out in the Defence White Paper and the government's

Statement on Foreign Policy. While maintaining its partnership with the US and its membership in the western alliance remain central elements to its security interests, a broadening of vision and accompanying policies are demanded. Canada can no longer view its security interests exclusively through a Euro-Atlantic lens. The importance of the Asia Pacific to Canadian economic interests and attendant political/security interests has become increasingly apparent to Ottawa.

Accordingly, Canada has sought to become a more active player in the region. Ottawa has promoted and pursued both official (Track 1) and non-governmental (Track 2) initiatives for establishing effective regional economic and security institutions (APEC and the ARF). It has focused particular efforts on the Northeast Asia/North Pacific subregion, seeking to establish and sustain a dialogue process among all the players. Its efforts to set up a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue in the early 1990s were an important first step in this direction.

Canada has increased the visibility of its defence forces in the region, by addressing the balance of its naval assets on its Pacific coast, by undertaking a regular series of ship visits to NE and SE Asia, and by increasing the number of Canadian personnel participating in regional Track 1 and Track 2 fora. On the economic front, the current government has sought to attain a larger presence through the staging of Team Canada initiatives, i.e., high-profile bilateral demarches to Asian states.

### ***Japan's Peace and Security Concerns***

Japan's security policies, an important component of which is its alliance with the US, are established within the framework of its Constitution.

Changing realities of the international and regional orders have led to a reexamination of these policies in light of the perceived need by Japan to assume new roles and greater responsibilities. Thus, several years ago, pathbreaking PKO legislation was passed, facilitating Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping missions and humanitarian relief activities abroad. In April 1996, after intense study, US and Japanese leaders reaffirmed their security alliance, emphasizing its role in contributing to regional security in Asia Pacific. A year prior, the National Defense Program Outline noted the need for Japan to develop plans for its role in responding to certain contingencies in its surrounding areas.

In overall terms, Japan is emerging as a more engaged player in international and regional security matters. It is expanding its participation in multilateral fora, like the ARF. It is expanding its network of bilateral and multilateral connections by increasing the numbers of staff talks, visits, and seminars with other regional players.

## **II. Canada and Japan: Similar Outlooks, Challenges, and Opportunities**

Canada and Japan have maintained close and productive relations in the last half-century. Although the two countries have different historical and cultural backgrounds, they have successfully participated together in international society, in their own ways. Both, as

democracies, share basic political values of free and open civil societies, of responsible governance, and of the rule of law. Both, as successful market economies, share understandings of the benefits of expanding and sustaining the stability of open national, regional and global economies and of the necessity of advancing equitable and sustainable development practices.

Both have comprehensive security arrangements with the US. Both are committed non-nuclear weapons states.

Japan and Canada are among those countries most committed to the principles and practices of the United Nations Charter, as concerns the control of weapons of mass destruction, the restraint of the use or threat of force in international relations, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the provision of assistance for peacebuilding and development.

### ***The Rationale for Closer Security Cooperation Between Canada and Japan***

- Canada and Japan each seek to exercise a constructive voice in international affairs and to advance their roles as responsible actors in global and regional peace and security matters. Both countries are committed to reforming and enhancing conventions and institutions for arms control and disarmament, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, environmental protection, sustainable development, and humanitarian assistance.
- As trading nations, Canada and Japan have mutual interests in acting together to ensure the global and regional security environments necessary to sustain the trade and investment patterns on which their respective economies depend.
- It follows, therefore, that engagement in multilateral institutions and advancement of multilateralism are key components of both countries' foreign economic and security policies. At the global level, this engagement is seen in the UN and its supporting agencies, the G-7 Summit, the OECD, the GATT, and WTO, and international arms control agreements including the NPT, CWC, and CIBT. As noted above, at the regional level, Canada and Japan participate in the APEC forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as the CSCAP and related Track 2 processes.
- The United States is both Japan's and Canada's predominant international partner. For each, management of this relationship provides substantial benefits but also brings challenges. Canada and Japan have a mutual interest in ensuring that the US remains an engaged participant in multilateral economic and security contexts.
- The Asia Pacific region is undergoing transformation. Ongoing processes of globalization, modernization, political reform, economic development, and environmental degradation ensure that the status quo, in all dimensions, can not be maintained. It is in Canada and Japan's joint interests to look ahead, plan, and to take steps together to attempt to influence the direction of change in the region in positive directions.

- Finally, policy makers in Ottawa and Tokyo find themselves in similar positions at the moment. Political leaders and publics are calling upon them for new policy agendas and for program of action to demonstrate that their countries are playing a positive role in global and regional affairs. But, at the same time, governments are making available fewer human and fiscal resources for such purposes. Through combining their efforts, at both Track 1 and Track 2 levels, Canada and Japan could achieve a "multiplier effect', thus accomplishing more than either could individually.

As set out below, there are ample opportunities for Canada and Japan to cooperate in practical and effective ways in bilateral, regional, and global contexts. By working together, our countries can achieve greater results than by acting separately.

### ***Rationales for Canadian Cooperation with Japan***

- Canada's largest Asian trading partner by far is Japan, and current relations between the two countries are heavily oriented toward trade and investment issues. However, while the bilateral relationship is a very positive one, as noted by our Prime Ministers, there is a need to broaden the bases of mutual understanding of our two societies and to expand the agenda of cooperation. Engaging in dialogue, information exchange, and practical cooperation on matters concerning peace and security could be a key dimension in such a larger agenda.
- Japan holds similar views on many issues that are high on Canada's international security agenda: extension of the NPT, advancing a CTBT, control of land mines, and peacekeeping. Japan's support can be an important asset to advancing Canadian initiatives on these matters towards realization - witness progress towards international agreement concerning the restriction of land mines.
- Canada wants to be viewed as a relevant player in the Asia Pacific security area, in particular as a promoter of an effective multilateral, regional security framework. Support from Japan for Canadian endeavors will prove important, if not essential to their success. Indeed, Canada is finding that co-chairing multilateral initiatives with Japan is of significant (mutual) advantage. For Canada, Japanese co-participation provides reassurances to Asian players that Canada does not just reflect a North American or US influence agenda in the region. For Japan, Canadian involvement can allay concerns about Japanese regional intentions.
- What occurs within Asian countries is of increasing importance to the Canadian society and government, given both growing commercial ties to the region, and continued heavy immigration levels from the region. In dealing with Asian political developments, such as in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China, the understanding and support of key Asian states, such as Japan, will prove important to Canada, as it wishes to influence such events or international responses to them.
- The current (and previous) Canadian government has sought to raise both official and

public awareness of the importance of the Asia Pacific to Canada. On the official side, DFAIT, DND, and CIDA have focused their attention more clearly towards the region. Expanding the agenda of Track 1 and Track 2 activities with Japan will further engage Canadians in the public, private, and academic sectors-with important payoffs in terms of initiatives such as Canada's current Year of Asia Pacific.

- For Canadian government counterparts agencies and departments, such as DND and the Canadian forces, CMA, and Environment Canada, cooperative planning, training, and implementation with Japanese counterparts should lead to improved performance and more broadly effective results.

### ***Rationales for Japanese Cooperation with Canada***

- Japan presently seeks to advance its role in peace and security matters through engagement in multilateral fora. It can benefit from observing and working in global and regional contexts with Canada - a country with a long track record of sophisticated multilateral diplomacy.
- Canada is a member and active participant in more international institutions than Japan. Thus, Canada can provide a voice for issues of mutual concern to Japan in NATO, the OSCE, the Commonwealth, OAS, Francophonie, etc..
- Considering its history of difficult relations with East Asian countries, Japan can utilize the support of stable and non-threatening partners in advancing multilateral regional security initiatives. By working in concert with Canada, Japan can provide a degree of reassurance to other players.
- Should tensions rise in East Asia, Japan might benefit from Canada's involvement in preventive diplomacy and conflict management, either acting alone or as a motivator of a multilateral solution, e.g., to ease tensions in the US-China-Japan triangle. Should more serious crises erupt, especially in Northeast Asia, Canada could be counted on to be an active participant, through the contribution of troops or other relevant assets, in virtually any international response activity.
- Finally, personnel from Japanese agencies could profit from Canadian experience and expertise in a number of practical areas: organization and conduct of peacekeeping activities (both civilian and military); training of peacekeepers; environmental monitoring; emergency and disaster response; delivery of foreign assistance; and planning and conduct of joint and combined operations.

### **III. The Current State of Canadian-Japanese Security Cooperation**

In recent years the Canadian and Japanese governments have increased their defence and security related contacts. As discussed above, in the aftermath of the Cold War both countries have been confronted with broader and more complex regional and global security concerns. This has encouraged the two governments, especially the Japanese, to widen their multilateral

defence and security contacts beyond their traditional partnership relationships. Canada and Japan have undertaken cooperative initiatives on peace and security matters at bilateral, regional and global levels.

A detailed listing of the record of Canadian-Japanese activities that directly or indirectly concern peace and security is provided in the Appendix to this study.

The current agenda of activities involving the two countries will be summarized below, roughly organized as to bilateral, regional, and global levels. This is followed by an assessment of the overall condition of Canadian-Japanese security cooperation.

### **III A. The Recent Record of Canadian-Japanese Activities**

#### **1. Bilateral**

**High-level meetings:** The Prime Ministers of Canada and Japan find themselves in the same meetings at least twice a year - at annual G-7 Summits and, since 1993, at the APEC leaders' meetings. They have almost regularly held bilateral meeting at the G-7 sites, but not at the APEC meetings. Since 1988, the Canadian and Japanese Prime Ministers have visited each other's capitals twice: PM Takeshita and Kaifu to Ottawa in 1988 and 1989 respectively, PM Mulroney and Chretien to Tokyo in 1991 and 1996 respectively.

Foreign Ministers engage in bilateral meetings during the annual G-7 Summits and APEC meetings. There have been six bilateral visits since 1988 on an irregular schedule.

Meetings of the Canadian Defence Minister and the Japanese Minister of State for Defence have been very infrequent, with Minister Ikeda visiting Ottawa in 1991 and Minister Collenette visiting Tokyo in 1996.

**Foreign ministry officials meetings:** Over the last several decades, the Canadian and Japanese foreign ministries have conducted a series of bilateral meetings on matters of mutual concern, including the UN, atomic power, ODA, and disarmament and arms control. Policy Planning Staff talks have been held since 1972. All of these have been at the Director-General level or above. While most of these meeting series have been annual, in recent years, there appears to be a less regular and more ad hoc pattern emerging.

Note should be taken of the recently implemented arrangement for the exchange of personnel between the Canadian and Japanese foreign ministries.

**Defence ministry and military meetings and activities:** High-ranking military officers of Canada and Japan, i.e., at the head of defence forces and head of service levels, have met irregularly since 1988. The Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, on the Japanese side has been to Ottawa twice; the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff has not

visited Tokyo.

The highest level of regular consultations that are taking place are referred to as Staff Talks. These annual meetings commenced in 1993, alternating between the two countries. Usually four to five persons from each side, led by a brigadier-general or major-general rank officer, attend to compare assessments of the regional security environment and brief each other on their respective defence policies. In 1996, their agenda also included more specific items such as exchanging experiences of UN PKO, sharing of intelligence information, reserve force systems, and bilateral defence cooperation.

A Canadian Forces Attaché is stationed in the embassy in Tokyo. On the Japanese side, a representative of the Japanese Defense Agency serves as a 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup> Secretary in the Ottawa embassy.

The Canadian Maritime Command and Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force exchange ship visits on what has become a regular, biennial schedule. The JMSDF training squadron visits the East or West Coast of Canada. The Canadian Navy has begun making regular ship visits to Japan, taking a Task Group in 1988, 1994, and 1996. When in Japanese waters, Canadian ships conduct small-scale joint naval exercises with their Japanese counterparts.

Interaction between Canadian and Japanese Institutions of military education and training is limited. Until 1994, the Canadian National Defence College sent a large group to Japan for a short tour each year. There are visits by Japanese National Defence Academy and Royal Military College cadets to their each other's institution-annually by 6 Japanese cadets, less regularly by RMC cadets. There are, however, no programs that involve officers or cadets attending service schools or civilian universities in each other's country, (although Canada and Japan both participate in such programs with other partner states).

**Interaction of security studies communities:** In the last several years, attention to peace and security matters among experts and academics appears to have increased considerably in both countries, in particular as concerns issues of human security. In Canada this is most notable in the growth and success of the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security network. Canadian and Japanese experts are interacting more often at conferences in their respective countries and throughout the region. Invitations to conferences, academic leaves, and individual research projects provide the mechanisms for this valuable communication and consultation.

However, the security studies communities in the two countries are not well-connected. There are no institutionalized linkages between think-tanks or university institutes in Canada and Japan that support on a regular basis the exchange of students, experts, and faculty, or that currently sponsor joint policy research projects. This contrasts sharply with the nature of institutionalized and informal linkages that



exist for the two countries with other countries.

**Canadian-Japanese relations in general terms:** Various organizations and associations exist in Canada and Japan with mandates to promote better understanding between the two societies, e.g., Canada-Japan business councils, the Japanese Association of Canadian Studies and the various Japanese-sponsored programs promoting Japanese studies and Japanese language training.

Of particular note is the Canada-Japan Forum 2000. Established in 1991, the mandate of this panel of leaders from private and public sectors was to formulate recommendations on strengthening Canadian-Japanese relations in all areas. The subsequent Canada-Japan Forum 2000 Report (1992) and Follow-Up Report (1995) advocated expanded cooperation on peace and security matters. While their general recommendations in these areas, such as the devotion of more attention to global security issues at summit gatherings, have come to pass; their specific recommendations concerning Canadian-Japanese initiatives by and large have not.

In their Agenda for Cooperation in 1996, the Prime Ministers announced various initiatives to further relations between their countries, including establishment of a permanent Canada-Japan Forum the Japanese government's establishment of a Japan-Canada Fund.

## **2. Regional**

Canada and Japan share basic outlooks on regional security including the importance of establishing confidence building measures, promoting military transparency, resolving peacefully the divisions of the Korean Peninsula, regulating the proliferation of weapons, achieving a smooth transition for Hong Kong, and bringing China into constructive relations with the rest of the region. Accordingly, both Canada and Japan are active participants in regional fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the APEC forum, and various other Track 1 and Track 2 mechanisms whose goals are the promotion of regional security (broadly conceived).

For their respective navies, a key event is the biennial RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercises organized by the American Pacific Command, in which Japan has taken part since 1980. Japanese and Canadian service representatives attend various seminars and workshops for Asia Pacific officers in the region. Of note are two recent Japanese sponsored initiatives: the Asia Pacific Security Seminar (sponsored by NIDS) and the Forum for Defence Authorities in the Asia Pacific Region (JDA).

As the ASEAN Regional Forum agenda has expanded, Canada and Japan have actively engaged in its programs of Senior Officials' Meetings, Inter-sessional meetings and Inter-sessional Support Groups. These activities could best be characterized as Track 1.5 activities, in that they are officially organized and directly supported by governments.

At the Track 2 level, i.e., activities organized by non-governmental institutions and involving

government officials only in private capacities, the regional agenda is burgeoning. An important Canadian Track 2 initiative was the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue inaugurated by Foreign Minister Joe Clark and coordinated through York University (Toronto). Its initial meeting in 1991, and following series of workshops through the next two years, involved participants from all countries, including North Korea and Mongolia. One of these workshops was jointly organized by the University of British Columbia's Institute of International Relations and the Research Institute of Peace and Security of Japan.

Canada and Japan were among the founding members of the Council on Security Cooperation for the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) - an organization designed to promote regional Track 2 activities, specially in support of the ARF. CSCAP has several active working groups. Its North Pacific Working Group is co-chaired by Japan and Canada. In February 1997, the two co-chairs successfully brought together all parties in the Northeast Asia/North Pacific subregion for dialogue. This venture is thus doubly important as an example of effective regional leadership by Canada and Japan, and as a vehicle for instigating and sustaining a security dialogue in this critical subregion.

### **3. Global**

Canada and Japan have contributed to global security issues through many international organizations, particularly the United Nations. Their interests most directly coincide on matters related to:

- arms control, disarmament, and weapons proliferation - Canada and Japan are active participants in promoting the NPT and the CWC, strengthening the regime of the IAEA, advancing the cause of the CTBT, and controlling the proliferation of weapons (including small arms, land mines, and missiles).

- reforming and enhancing the United Nations - Canada and Japan support reform of the UN's institutional and financial structures, and particularly wish to advance development of enhanced UN Headquarters' capabilities to anticipate, plan for, implement, and assess peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations.

- peacekeeping operations - including, as discussed below, responses by Canadian and Japanese forces, but also civilian peacekeeping activities, such as training local police and election monitoring (e.g., both countries participated in the OSCE mission to monitor elections in Bosnia).

- provision of relief in complex humanitarian crises and natural disasters- note that Japanese legislation facilitates responses to humanitarian emergencies, such as in response to the UNHCR request for assistance in the refugee crisis in Zaire in 1994.

- environmental protection and sustainable development - Canada and Japan consult regarding the delivery of foreign assistance. Both countries advocate sustainable development practices, realizing that long-term human security depends upon their implementation. Protection of their land and maritime environments are critical issues

to the Japanese and Canadian publics. The two countries collaborate in environmental monitoring and surveillance, e.g., in controlling the drift-net fishing in the North Pacific, and are being drawn into closer cooperation in sharing technology and information concerning environmental disasters, (such as the recent oil-spill on Japan's west coast).

In the global context, the most successful and visible bilateral cooperation between Canada and Japan is in the area of peacekeeping. With Japan's decision to participate in UN PKO in 1992, the two countries began a series of cooperative activities involving briefings, observation of missions, and visits to training centres. Canada and Japan both participated in the UNTAC in Cambodia. Binational cooperation has culminated in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, with some 40 JSDF members replacing a contingent within the Canadian mission team.

### **III B. An Assessment of the Current Level and Scope of Canadian-Japanese Security Cooperation**

A critical review of the current state of Canadian-Japanese cooperation on peace and security matters leads to the following assessment, namely that such cooperation is less frequent, less coordinated, and less productive than is warranted. Although there have been recent positive developments such as the Staff Talks and the advancement of Track 2 activities, the overall relatively low levels of Canadian-Japanese security cooperation strike us as quite surprising.

This is especially so because both countries see a need to reorient and broaden their security policies in light of post-Cold War regional and global realities, and because there exists substantial complementarity in Canadian and Japanese interests, resources, and capacities across the spectrum of peace and security issues. While senior officials in both countries have articulated a desire for enhanced Japanese-Canadian security cooperation, progress to date has been slow, especially when compared to the relationships that the two countries have developed with other partners in and outside the Asia Pacific.

The current situation appears to be influenced by the following factors:

There is no overall framework for Canadian-Japanese security cooperation. Without a clear articulation of objectives and priorities and without direction and coordination of efforts, both within and between governments, the levels and results of activity will remain generally as they are now, i.e., lower than they could or should be.

In effect, the two governments need to come to agreement about the nature of their cooperation. To date, both sides have tended to shy away from engaging each other. On the Japanese side, there have been concerns about diverting attention from relations with the US and disturbing constitutional limitations. There is a sense that security cooperation with other partners, if pushed too quickly, could create political difficulties. On the Canadian side, one finds a reluctance to redirect efforts from relationships that are well-known and have been well-developed over the years. Thus, despite a clear shift in articulated interests, Canada remains heavily Euro-Centric in

its thinking on security. Lack of knowledge of the Japanese system has tended to mean that both the limits and the opportunities for security cooperation have not been fully appreciated.

Canada-Japan security cooperation receives only episodic attention by officials. As a result, there is no regular pattern of bilateral security contacts. There are no regular, combined political/military talks at senior levels. Except for a few cases, such as Staff Talks, the general trend has been towards less regular and more ad hoc scheduling of meetings. Attention is not given to ensuring that reciprocal relationships are maintained, e.g., at the Chief of Defence Staff/Chairman of the Joint Staff Council level. Meetings at working levels thus lack continuity and do not sustain productive momentum.

There remains in both countries: (a) an almost exclusive attention to the economic component of Canada-Japan relations; and beyond that (b) a preoccupation within sectors of the bureaucracies with what were primarily Cold War security priorities and the countries and institutions that dominated them. On both sides, such sentiments appear quite entrenched. This is despite the fact that both governments in their recent foreign and defence policy statements articulate goals and priorities that call for broadening their respective security horizons, particularly to increase linkages with like-minded states in advancing regional stability.

Legal and political constraints have limited to some degree the scope for Canadian-Japanese cooperation. Because of constitutional limits and the interpretations of them that have pervaded the domestic political context, Japan has been hesitant to embark on new policies and or activities in security area. Establishing certain types of agreements, such as those related to status of forces and defence industrial cooperation, pose greater difficulties on the Japanese side than on the Canadian side. Japanese military forces are restricted in their abilities to visit and train with other countries; the recent PKO legislation carefully circumscribes the nature of missions eligible for Japanese participation. However, these limitations do not block all forms of security cooperation and political climates are changing to facilitate new avenues of Japanese security cooperation.

Some difficulties arise because Canada and Japan do not have similar sets of institutions, thus complicating questions of linkages and matching of resources. For instance, Japan (like most other countries) has a set of government-supported and independent thinktanks and foundations that undertake policy research on security and defence matters. They provide an important resource base, of funds and personnel for both domestic and internationally-partnered policy research and dialogue. Canada unfortunately does not. However, it does have a relatively well-established set of university-based research institutes of international security, something not found in the Japanese context.

Human and fiscal resources on both sides are limited to the point of being inadequate.

This is particularly true of staffing levels in the relevant components of government agencies. Individuals are required to assume such broad mandates that they are understandably reluctant, or unable, to take on any new activities. Declining budgets have seriously restricted the capacity of both private and non-governmental sectors in both countries to maintain even minimal levels of travel and support for projects. Without a combination of additional resources, and/or significant redirection of existing resources, undertaking new programs and initiatives will be difficult.

Language skills are an important aspect of facilitating effective relationships. To date, lack of sufficient numbers of individuals at working levels with the ability to function in both languages hampers the pace and quality of communication. This has been more of a problem on the Canadian side, effectively precluding such activities as cadet and officer exchanges. However, we also note progress on this front, with the development of a larger cadre of officers in DFAIT and the increase in the number of Canadian researchers and faculty members with functional Japanese.

#### **IV. A Program of Action For Expanded Canada-Japan Security Cooperation**

Canada and Japan should have a more comprehensive action program for cooperation in peace and security matters. Certainly, the extent of common interests and potential for mutual benefits suggests the merits of arrangements for greater security cooperation. Senior Canadian and Japanese leaders have focused attention on expanding binational cooperation, as evidenced in their *Agenda for Cooperation* statement and the commissioning of this study. This is an opportune time to take new steps forward.

We set out below a series of recommendations. First are those concerning the establishment of a framework for Canadian-Japanese security cooperation. Second are a series of recommendations for a Program of Action of specific activities, some of which could and should be undertaken immediately, others of which have longer-term horizons.

##### ***A Bilateral Agreement on Peace and Security Cooperation***

The general priority during the phase two review process following this study should be to establish a Program of Action. Besides setting out an agenda for specific activities and initiatives, this Program of Action should set in motion joint consultations that lead, within two or three years, to the conclusion of a Canada-Japan Agreement on Cooperation in Peace and Security Matters. (The most appropriate title and form of this "agreement" remains to be worked out.)

This agreement would be a declaration for Canada and Japan to work together to promote their mutual interests in regional and global stability and security. The purposes of such an agreement will be:

- to focus attention and resources within the relevant official and unofficial communities in both countries upon a range of programs and activities to be implemented and sustained; and

to achieve an impact, particularly within the Asia Pacific regional context, by demonstrating Japan's and Canada's willingness and ability to exercise positive, joint leadership on regional and global security issues.

### ***A Program of Action***

This discussion proceeds first to set out the goals and related substantive components of an agenda for security cooperation and second to outline possible specific programs and activities that might be undertaken to fulfill these goals. Neither of these listings should be considered as exhaustive. We note those matters that have come to our attention; we include items that, while very positive and necessary for the longer-term Canada-Japan relationship, may prove difficult to act upon in the immediate future.

### ***The Substantive Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation***

#### **1. At the Bilateral Level**

There needs to be a broader base of knowledge and understanding of Canadian-Japanese relations as a whole, and particularly concerning peace and security related matters. In both our countries, the attentive publics, academic communities, private and public non-governmental groups need to become better informed concerning each other's:

- history of foreign and defence relations, contemporary security interests, foreign and domestic policies, governmental structures, and constitutional frameworks;
- understandings of key concepts such as peace and security, cooperative security, comprehensive security, human security, etc.; and
- attitudes and practices regarding multilateralism and multilateral institutions.

This need for better understanding and knowledge also applies to those in our two governments, agencies, departments, and armed forces. In general terms, our respective foreign and domestic policies, global and regional security interests (broadly conceived), and defence doctrines need to be better appreciated, especially as they have been evolving over recent years. Systematic attention needs to be given to the implications of critical trends in the demographics, immigration flows (especially re Canada), generational changes, resource demands, environmental concerns, and fiscal and trade policies of our two countries for our longer-term mutual security interests.

In more specific and operational terms, there are a variety of security-related issues about which Canadian and Japanese counterparts could/should begin joint consultation, sharing of information and planning. Examples that have been brought to our attention include:

- planning for, and response to, domestic emergencies (such as natural disasters) by civilian and defence agencies;
- development of policies and regulations to prevent and respond to environmental damage, especially maritime incidents, such as oil spills;
- monitoring of changing environmental conditions and resource exploitation activities (land, ocean, and atmospheric), especially in areas of particular shared mutual interests, e.g., the North Pacific;
- consultation on management of domestic nuclear energy programs; and
- consultation involving each countries' defence agency/department and armed forces concerning;
  - education of junior and senior level military officers;
  - training practices for land, sea, and air forces;
  - planning and preparation for responses to natural disasters, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian crises; and
  - defence procurement policies and practices.

## **2. Concerning Regional Security**

We recommend expanding the substantive agenda of Canadian-Japanese cooperation on regional security matters in areas, such as the following:

- regular sharing of information and intelligence on current Asia Pacific security issues, e.g., the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, Hong Kong, the South China Sea;
- strategic reviews concerning developments within the region, e.g., increased force projection capabilities of certain states; conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation; alternative approaches and modes to ensure the positive involvement of China, the US, and Russia in regional affairs; territorial disputes; open skies and sea lanes; domestic instability in key states, etc.;
- attention to the implications of the expansion of regional and subregional security contexts, e.g., the involvement of South Asia, the expansion of ASEAN and ARP membership, the inclusion of Mongolia in Northeast Asian/North Pacific dialogues, or the potential role of Central Asian states in regional security;
- attention to the linkages between economic and security regionalism, and between states' economic and security policies, including the emergence of new issues on regional institutional agendas;
- support for multilateral mechanisms that effectively promote regional stability and

security through functional economic means, e.g., KEDO;

- consultation concerning planning for response to regional humanitarian crises and to other contingencies that might arise in the regional context, involving refugees, safety of nationals, etc.;
- joint support for multilateral security mechanisms - regional (ARF), subregional (e.g., ASEAN and any that might emerge for the Korean Peninsula), and bilateral processes, and agreements (e.g., India-Pakistan, Russia-China) that stand to advance inclusive dialogue, confidence-building measures, transparency, and dispute settlement; and
- joint sponsorship and leadership in Track 2 processes, especially concerning the North Pacific.

### **3. Concerning Global Peace and Security**

We recommend that Canada and Japan join efforts more directly to advance their common concerns regarding peace and human security, including, but not limited to, action in the following areas:

- reform and strengthening of the United Nations, especially regarding:
  - a reform of the Security Council;
  - fiscal and organizational reform; and
  - the capacity of UN agencies, particularly the UNHCR;
- peacekeeping, particularly joining efforts to:
  - enhance capacities of UN Headquarters in United Nations for early warning;
  - bolster UN Headquarters' communication, command and control capacities for operating peacekeeping missions; and
  - expand the level and scope of civilian peacekeeping activities, including policing, management of critical civilian infrastructures, monitoring of elections, etc.;
- arms control and disarmament, especially cooperation on:
  - advancement of the NPT review process (for 2000);
  - strengthening support for the Chemical Weapons Convention;
  - alleviation of the human destruction caused by landmines;
  - countering the spread of small arms; and



- enhancing the effectiveness of the LTN arms control register;
- international action on critical issues of human security, including the welfare of children, the sex trade, the illegal trafficking of persons, creation of refugees, and more effective action concerning war crimes;
- promotion of human security through peacebuilding (in the medium term) and sustainable development initiatives (in the long term), through the coordination of efforts by development agencies; and
- responses to transnational crime involving drugs, money, and persons.

### ***Recommendations for a Program of Action on Peace and Security Cooperation***

**1. High level visits and meetings of Canadian and Japanese officials:** Such meetings are important because they direct public attention to the relationship, they develop rapport between leaders and officials, and they focus the efforts of bureaucracies, both within and between countries. We look, therefore, to the continued relatively regular bilateral meetings of Prime Ministers in the context of G-7 and APEC summits, as well as to their visiting each others' capitals as domestic and international circumstances warrant.

We look to Foreign Ministers sustaining a pattern of regular bilateral meetings, but with more direct attention to peace and security cooperation matters.

Defence Ministers should meet at least once during their respective terms in office. Their not having done so does send a signal concerning the perceived mutual relevance of the binational relationship.

Meetings of senior military officials, at the CDS/CJSC and chiefs of service levels, should be undertaken more frequently, (perhaps once during their respective terms), and with greater attention to maintaining balanced and symmetrical relationships.

Meetings of the members of the Canadian Parliament and the Japanese National Diet on binational, regional, and global peace and security cooperation would be similarly useful should be encouraged.

**2. Senior level political/military talks:** The establishment of regular, high-level P-M talks, in our view, is critical to effective Canadian-Japanese security cooperation. Such talks, involving both foreign ministry and defence ministry officials, at the Asst. Deputy Minister (Canada)/Director-General (Japan) level, are essential to provide the overall framework of priorities for bilateral engagement and to sustain momentum on agendas of activities at working levels. Both countries currently hold such talks with partners besides the United States. Our recommendation is that the first Canada-Japan P-M meetings should be held within a year, and continue thereafter on a 12 to 18 month basis. The P-M sessions should be organized around a three-part agenda that considers:

- the medium-term future (3-5 years), i.e., a sharing of views regarding developments that will impact upon mutual global and regional security interests (this portion of the meetings may involve selected outside experts);
- the present, i.e., a review of the current global and regional situation and a reporting on the status of ongoing Canadian-Japanese activities and initiatives; and
- the short-term future, i.e., an agenda of activities and initiatives to be undertaken by various components of their respective sides by the next set of P-M meetings.

### **3. Joint defence activities:**

**Staff Talks:** The program of bilateral Staff Talks should be continued. They will function more effectively than in the past by virtue of their relationship to the P-M talks. Given what is likely to be a larger and more energized agenda, increasing slightly the number of persons involved on, each side might be warranted. Also, it may prove useful to alter the current format of the Staff Talks so that, following a meeting of the whole for general briefings, separate subgroups are constituted to consider specific topics in greater detail (e.g., protection of Asia Pacific sea lanes) and to engage in working sessions on particular projects (e.g., organizing logistics for peacekeeping or humanitarian missions).

**Exchange of ship visits and joint exercises:** The current biennial schedule and level of Canadian ship visits to Japan should be maintained, as it has effectively raised the Canadian profile in the region. To the extent possible, the scope of bilateral exercise activities when Canadian ships are in Japanese waters should be expanded. Although probably not in the near future, joint training for participation in multilateral responses to UN-mandated missions can be contemplated. The current schedule of Japanese training ship visits to Canada should be maintained.

**Exchange of defence personnel:** The present levels of exchange between Canadian and Japanese defence personnel should be built up. A variety of options should be explored to increase the numbers involved and the time spent in each others' military education institutions, training centres, regularly scheduled conferences, seminars, and training sessions; special conferences and seminars; and relevant university institutes or thinktanks.

On the Canadian side, this might involve instituting regular cadet exchanges between RMC and the NDA, extending the scope of the existing defence fellows program to include Japanese officers, inviting Japanese defence personnel to participate in the newly-established Defence Management Studies program arranging tours of JDA and JSDF personnel to visit military and civilian sites in Canada increased participation in Pearson Peacekeeping Centre activities and in courses or seminars (such as the Army Logistics Seminar).

On the Japanese side, similar and reciprocal efforts could be undertaken, e.g., continuing and expanding the numbers of Canadian personnel involved in seminars sponsored by NMS and NDA, serving representatives to Canadian-sponsored courses and seminars, etc.

Efforts should be undertaken to implement a personnel exchange program between the DND and JDA, analogous to that recently established between DFAIT and the UTA.

**Agreements concerning visiting members of forces and defence information:** The level and variety of contacts involving Canadian and Japanese defence personnel is increasing and will continue to do so in the future, both within our two home countries and abroad, e.g., working together in LIN or humanitarian missions abroad. To facilitate such relationships, in terms of questions of status and functional efficiency, countries enter into agreements concerning the status of visiting force personnel and cross-service logistics arrangements. The provisions of Canada's Visiting Forces Act, for instance, apply to members of Japanese forces while in Canada. When abroad, either on ship visits or as participants in peacekeeping missions, servicing of Canadian equipment is less complicated and less expensive in countries with which Canada has established previous agreements. However, for Japan, consideration of such agreements has entailed severe complications. While not, therefore, suggesting that the unfeasible be attempted on the Japanese side, consideration may be given to working together to devise formulae so that Canadian force members, when in Japan, could be covered by reciprocal arrangements.

**Agreements concerning defence industrial information and cooperation:** Issues related to defence industrial production have been discussed by the two sides and were included most recently on the agenda of the Staff Talks. As a first step, it would be useful for there to be bilateral arrangements covering the sharing of data and information. Movement towards reaching a defence information security agreement with Japan would be regarded as very useful on the Canadian side. This could establish a basis from which progress towards understandings on defence industrial cooperation, such as MOU'S, could begin.

**4. Security cooperation initiatives: Track 1, i.e., official activities:** As noted above, there is a rich agenda of substantive issues on which units of the Canada and Japan governments could collaborate. On some, like landmines, collaboration is already well advanced. On others it is less far along or is simply not occurring. An important aspect of the follow-on phase to this study should be to identify and assign priorities to five or six topics for joint consultation and collaboration within the next two years. Matters such as joint preparation for the review of the NPT in 2000, sponsoring of initiatives within the ARF context, and greater joint engagement on issues concerning regional arms control or naval cooperation, (e.g., through fora like the North Pacific Arms Control Workshop or WPNS), are possible candidates.

**5. Canadian-Japanese cooperation on Track 2 activities:** Canadian and Japanese involvement in Track 2 activities has grown up over the last five years, as the utility of this approach for advancing habits of dialogue and building of trust among regional players has been proven. Networks of experts, including governmental officials functioning in their private capacities, have become established in both countries, these individuals being drawn into more and more regionally oriented activities, staged at home and abroad. This momentum needs to be sustained, especially as the security environment of the North Pacific is entering into a particularly delicate phase. Track 2 activities could also involve relevant members of parliaments in both countries.

Doing so will require a variety of efforts: first, maintenance of an adequate domestic resource base in each country to support activities; second, sustaining ongoing joint Canadian-Japanese initiatives, especially the successful co-chairing of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group; third, exploring possibilities for further collaboration within regional and global contexts, e.g. developing and coordinating a jointly-sponsored program of Track 2 activities oriented around the North Pacific analogous to the successful ASEAN ISIS program for Southeast Asia; and fourth, undertaking bilateral Canadian-Japanese policy research projects and activities on peace and security issues, e.g., through joint meetings of our respective Member Committees of CSCAP.

**6. Promotion of linkages between security studies communities:** The dearth of regular and institutionalized arrangements linking universities, institutes, and institutions for military education in our two countries needs to be addressed. A key task for the follow-on consultations to this study should be establishment of such linkages. One priority should be to devise arrangements to establish cadet and officer exchanges and tours. Another priority should be arrangements to facilitate graduate student and postdoctoral fellows to do study and research in each other's university security studies institutes and thinktanks. The Security and Defence Forum program of DND, with its network of Canadian university centres, could well prove an important vehicle for such arrangements.

The Internet and worldwide web are revolutionizing communication among professional communities around the world. Access to resources necessary for policy research, such as databases, newspapers, periodicals, and government documents, can be greatly facilitated at low cost through these technological means. Curricular materials and research work in progress can be easily disseminated to large audiences. The possibilities for Canadian-Japanese linkages and cooperative development of teaching and research resources concerning peace and security studies need to be investigated.

**7. Strategies to promote broader understanding of the Canada-Japan relationship:** A variety of initiatives and programs exist to promote in each country greater understanding of the other's language, culture, and system of governance. Some of these are targeted at elite audiences, such as the Canada-Japan Forum and Canada-Japan business associations. Others like the Japanese Studies Association of Canada, the Japanese Association for Canadian Studies and the JET program are oriented towards academics and/or students. It is our

impression that relatively little of their content is oriented towards issues relevant to Canadian-Japanese cooperation on peace and security matters. We look to ways to increase attention to consideration of such topics in these programs.

**8. Capacity-building to support Canadian-Japanese security cooperation:** Programs and initiatives, can not be sustained without adequate human and financial resources. It is unfortunate that the current climate in both countries, especially concerning government programs and agencies, is one of restraint and cutbacks. New priorities and agendas have to be supported through reorienting existing resources and utilizing them more efficiently. Both of these strategies will be required to advance a proactive agenda of Canadian-Japanese security cooperation. It is our presumption that both governments understood this would be necessary when they undertook this study. We recommend, therefore, action along the lines described below.

**Regarding human resources:** The number of personnel in both governments' units which would have some responsibility for Canadian-Japanese security cooperation relations in particular, and for regional security matters in general, in our opinion is not adequate. Increased staffing is required on both the Canadian and Japanese sides. To a certain extent, our bureaucracies in the foreign and defence ministries have lagged in reallocating staff to achieve a realignment with their governments revised, post-Cold War priorities. While not wishing to single out specific divisions and bureaus, we recommend that this situation be studied and addressed in the follow-up phase of this study.

**Regarding fiscal resources:** Present levels of funding, apart from those devoted directly to government personnel, are sufficient only to support current levels of activity. This is particularly true on the Canadian side, which as stated above, does not have either publicly or privately funded institutes or thinktanks for policy research and Track 2 activities.

In conclusion we offer several ideas regarding new funding sources to underwrite components of an expanded agenda of Canadian-Japanese security cooperation:

- allocation of some of the funding allocated to Canadian and Japanese studies and to language training and the promotion of cultural understanding towards programs and individuals concerned with matters of peace and security (broadly conceived);
- targeting of selected amounts of funding for security studies programs at universities and institutes to support joint Canadian-Japanese projects, exchanges of students, etc.;
- development of joint CIDA-JICA program initiatives concerning questions of human security and peacebuilding; and
- undertaking a new initiative, the establishment of a Canada-Japan Security Cooperation Fund - to promote studies by Canadian and Japanese scholars on security questions, to facilitate the study and research of junior scholars and senior graduate students, and to underwrite partially seminars, workshops, and conferences on issues

relevant to Japanese-Canadian security interests.

**1.** An alphabetic ordering is applied to the listing of authors and to the ordering of countries, thus, Canada-Japan has been adopted throughout.