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**THE ROLE OF IDEAS
IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER:
THE INTERNATIONAL INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT.
1975-1990**

Bice Manguashca

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THE INTERNATIONAL INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT.
1975-1990**

Bice Maiguashca

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Abstract

This paper considers the International Indigenous Movement as part of a growing trend of oppositional movements unfolding at the international level. Chapter I provides the theoretical framework, emphasizing Cox's approach to international relations. Chapter II examines how this movement emerged onto the international scene in the mid-seventies as a consequence of global changes at the level of production relations, forms of state and world order. Chapter III observes how this Movement has since developed into a truly global phenomenon in which indigenous peoples from North and South America, the Arctic, Northern Europe, Asia, the Pacific and even Africa are now involved. Chapter IV focuses on the indigenous counter-hegemonic project and examines how the worldview of indigenous peoples contrasts with that of the dominant social forces of today's world order. Throughout, it is argued that there remains a pressing need for international relations scholars to redirect their attention to non-dominant, non-hegemonic social forces which may well contribute in an unprecedented way to the reconstitution of a new, more pluralistic world order.

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INTRODUCTION

The role of ideas in the field of international relations has not been the subject of either extensive empirical research or in depth theoretical discussion. The reason for this omission has to do with the prominent position that the "realist," and later the "neo-realist," paradigm has had in this field for over the last four decades. According to these paradigms, international life is analogous to Hobbes' state of nature, a dangerous and hostile world, in which nation-states are pitted against each other in an endless struggle with the most powerful prevailing. Accordingly, as models designed to explain the dynamics of international life, realism and neo-realism emphasize the nation-state as a unit of analysis and concentrate on international security, power capabilities and economic concerns as their primary areas of interest. In such circumstances normative considerations - such as the role of ideology, culture and ethics - are deemed secondary.

One consequence of this is that few studies have been done by scholars of international relations on the recent emergence of various social movements which are playing an important role in shaping the dynamics of world affairs today. I am referring mostly to the peace movement, the feminist movement and the ecological movement as well as to a number of other struggles revolving around ethnicity, religion and race. Since the mid-1960's onwards, a number of these movements have become internationalized and have presented stinging critiques of the existing international order. By challenging the prevailing meaning of such concepts as "progress," "development," "nation-state," "self-determination," "human rights," "peoples" and "international order," these new social movements are challenging the normative foundations of today's international system and, hence, the way in which international elites are thinking about future world order alternatives. Thus, as the realm of ideas (ideology and culture) has become an important battleground for competing social groups at the global level, there appears to be a need for students of international relations to explore this subject both empirically and theoretically.

The purpose of this paper will be to study one of these social movements, the International Indigenous Movement, with the aim of showing how it presents a challenge to the contemporary international system and offers an alternative vision of a future world order.

Some clarification of the term "indigenous peoples" is needed at this point. According to the United Nations, these peoples are:

the existing descendants of the peoples who inhabited the present territory of a country wholly or partially at the time when persons of a different culture or ethnic origin arrived there... over came them and, by conquest, settlement or other means, reduced them to a non-dominant or colonial situation... (cited in J. Burger 87: 6).

The United Nations has also defined as "indigenous" isolated and marginal groups which have maintained a separate identity from the national society in which they live and whose customs are similar to those which are usually characterized as "indigenous." Some of these traits include nomadic and semi-nomadic economic activities, decentralized political institutions, different cultural traditions from the dominant society, including language and religion, and, finally, the awareness of having an "indigenous" identity (J. Burger 87: 9).

Perhaps the most important criterion for defining indigenous peoples is the subjective dimension, that is, self-identification. In effect, indigenous peoples have chosen to emphasize this aspect when defining themselves. The World Council of Indigenous Peoples, for example, has proposed that:

Indigenous peoples are such population groups as we are, who from old-age times have inhabited the lands in which we live, who are aware of having a character of our

own... with a language of our own and having certain essential and unique characteristics which confer upon us the strong conviction of belonging to a people, who have an identity in ourselves and should be thus regarded by others (cited in J. Burger 87: 8).

Evidence for the existence of a shared world view that is different from that of non-indigenous peoples is the very fact that, despite their vastly dissimilar experiences and traditions, indigenous peoples have united in an International Movement and have put forward a coherent counterhegemonic project. The fundamental core ideas of this project have been expressed both in joint declarations and in separate statements issued by various indigenous movements across the globe. It can be seen that, despite their differences, indigenous peoples have adopted a strikingly similar position with regards to the nature of the oppression to which they are subjected and the means for their liberation. It is this common world view, embodied in their counter-hegemonic project, that permits me to treat the International Indigenous Movement as a single phenomenon.

In this paper I will use a theoretical framework which has been formulated recently and which, unlike the realist or neo-realist paradigm, allows for the conceptualization of the role of ideas in international life. I am referring to the theoretical work of Robert Cox, the author of Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (1987). His "historical-dialectical" approach, which is inspired by Gramsci's concept of "hegemony," integrates objective factors (socio-economic forces), subjective factors (ethical, cultural and ideological forces), and institutional factors (organizations) into a single theoretical framework. Using this paradigm I will bring to light the fundamental role played by ideas within the context of the International Indigenous Movement and, more generally, within international relations.

The paper will be divided into five parts. In the first I will describe Cox's conceptual framework while placing it into the context of contending

paradigms in the field of international relations. In the second I shall characterize the global context out of which the International Indigenous Movement emerged. In the third I shall offer an analysis of the development of this movement over the past fifteen years in order to identify the principal actors and institutions involved. The fourth part will discuss the content and form of the Movement's counter-hegemonic project. Having little economic power and hardly any political clout, indigenous leaders have relied on the power of ideas to mobilize both their own people and non-indigenous sympathizers around their cause. Accordingly, the International Indigenous Movement can be seen as a cultural/ideological force which has emerged onto the international scene today and which has a potential role in shaping the outlines of an alternative world order. In the last part of the paper I shall situate the indigenous counter-hegemonic project within the context of other ideological challenges to the present international order and then comment more generally on the role of ideas in today's changing world order.

Given the dearth of academic literature on the International Indigenous Movement, I have had to rely on a number of different sources for my research. For the development of the Movement, apart from a few books dealing with the subject, I have relied mainly on reports issued by nongovernmental organizations (NGO), especially the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, and by the United Nations. In order to document the counter-hegemonic project, I have used academic articles written on the subject, declarations and statements made by various indigenous organizations, transcripts of interviews with indigenous leaders published in NGO reports and, finally, a personal interview with a representative of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples.

1) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Overview

Since its inception after World War One, the field of international relations has been wrought with internal debate. Prior to the 1940's the debate centred around the conflict between "idealists" and "realists" with the former holding the foreground. The central premise of the idealist or utopian vision of international relations was a belief in the efficacy of change through human agency and of the possibility of building a peaceful and just world order. Furthermore, the idealists saw the role of the international theorist not as a neutral observer, but as an active participant responsible for putting forward alternative visions of world order toward which humankind could strive. In this way the idealist attributed an important role to ideas as a means of bringing about qualitative change. .

The eruption of the Second World War shattered the hegemony of the idealist doctrine and by the late 1950's a new paradigm was firmly entrenched. Contrary to utopian theory, realism, as the new orthodoxy came to be called, repudiated the idea that the international system could be changed for the better and assumed that international life was by its very nature amoral, with war being an inevitable occurrence. Within this context, the role of the theorist was to be a neutral observer whose aim was to help statesmen by studying the dynamics of the international system (R. Holsti 84: 340). In order to identify these processes, the realist focused his/her efforts on the historical analysis of inter-state relations, with a particular emphasis on political-military relations. In this regard, the realists believed in the autonomy of the political sphere and in the importance of understanding the subjective perceptions of statesmen (R. Ashley 84: 231).

The realist school came under attack in the 1960's by a number of scholars who, although trained in the realist tradition, were no longer satisfied with its principles. The neo-realist scholars, as they were called, argued that their predecessors had given undue importance to the political realm. As a consequence, their analysis

allowed too much room for subjective interpretations and failed to recognize the importance of objective factors in international life. According to the neo-realists, economic rather than political factors were crucial in determining power relations and as such had to be the main concern of students of international relations (R. Ashley 84: 231).

For the neo-realists the task of the international relations theorist was to construct an objective, scientific framework for the study of inter-state relations. Within this framework the state would remain the main protagonist, but now the economic underpinnings of political relations would be brought to the fore while the ideological dimensions of international life would be pushed into the background. It is important to note here that in terms of economic factors the neo-realists focused primarily on economic policy issues rather than on the production process per se.

The distribution of emphasis of the neo-realists led yet again to a disregard of the ram of ideas, particularly culture and ideology. It also led to a commitment to positivism as the epistemological basis for the analysis of international relations. From the positivist point of view, the realms of the subjective and objective are separate spheres of reality with the former being a reflection of the latter. By proposing that it is within the realm of objective structures that the subjective is generated, positivists deny the interplay between ideas and material forces as well as the possibility that ideas can shape "objective" reality within which social action takes place. Moreover, by making ideas subject to scientific laws positivists "objectify" the subjective and transform it into quantifiable, observable variables which can be causally linked to certain kinds of behaviour (R. Ashley 84: 234).

Although the neo-realists continue to hold sway within the field of international relations to this day, their dominance has been challenged by new paradigms, two of which appeared in the 1970's. The first is known as "world order approach" and the second as "international political economy approach."

Conceiving the world as a community of moral beings bound together by common material and spiritual needs, "world order theorists," such as Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, argue that any analysis of international relations must begin with the world being conceptualized as a global society. Unlike realists and neo-realists, "world order theorists" tend to emphasize the importance of non-state actors - such as the human rights movement - over the nation-state system. Apart from offering a conceptual framework, "world order theorists" also seek to inject normative concerns onto the international agenda. To this end, they attempt to bring global problems such as the depletion of natural resources, the increasing incidence of human rights abuses, malnutrition, poverty, inequality etc., to the attention of both the public and the politicians and to present plausible alternatives to the present world order system. This belief in the importance of ideas as a guide for political action can be seen as a revival of the "idealist" or "utopian" tradition.

Their efforts to draw attention to new social actors in international relations notwithstanding, "world order theorists" have been more concerned with description and prescription, rather than theory. As a consequence, despite a variety of interesting articles on the importance of culture and ideology in world politics, particularly in the area of international law, "world orderism" as a *school of thought* has not generated a theoretical construct which addresses the role of ideas at the global level.

The second paradigm which emerged in the 1970's to challenge the hegemony of the neo-realist model is the "international political economy approach." Inspired by Marxist analysis, this approach concentrates primarily on economic structures and the way they determine human action and historical change. Like the "world order theorists," international political economists tend to take a holistic view of their subject in that they see the world system as their reference point and global class formations as their main unit of analysis. Unlike them, however, international political economists pay little or no attention to the "moral needs" of the world community. Furthermore, while

neo-realists have virtually ignored the production process as a source of potential change in the international system, most international political economists concentrate almost exclusively on the production process arguing that it is within this realm that all other forces, political and ideological, are generated.

One variant of the international political economy approach is the "dependency school." According to Andre Gunder Frank, one of its representatives, economic relations between industrialized and developing nations are unequal and entrap the latter in relations of dependence which cause poverty and oppression. It is only by dismantling these structures through revolutionary action that developing nations can hope to liberate themselves and begin their quest for autonomous development. While normative ideals would be part of revolutionary action, on the whole the realm of ideas is not considered a central factor in the structuring and reproduction of the international system.'

Yet another group of international political economists represented by scholars such as I. Wallerstein engage in the so called "world-system analysis." Like dependency theorists, Wallerstein identifies the dominance of international capitalism as the main factor in determining the dynamics of inter-state relations, in general, and the exploitation of the poor nations, in particular. Unlike dependency theorists, however, he explicitly allows room for the inclusion of ideology and culture. According to Wallerstein, the construction of culture is not a neutral, valuefree exercise through which different social groups express their identity, but it is rather a highly charged, politicized process in which ideas and values are used as a rationale to cover up for the structural contradictions within the capitalist system. For Wallerstein, therefore, culture is the ideological battleground of competing global interests (I. Wallerstein 90:39). Although there is a great deal that can be learned from Wallerstein's analysis of the role of ideas in the international system, in the end his argument remains bound to conventional Marxist logic which tends to interpret the subjective as merely epiphenomenal.

This is an overview of the main paradigms of international relations from the 1920's to the present. As we have seen, with the exception of idealism and the "world orderism," the dominant schools of thought in international relations have diminished the importance of ideas in world politics. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is necessary to have a theoretical framework that accounts for the role of ideas and for their interaction with political, social and economic forces. Cox's *historical-dialectical approach* provides such a framework.

Cox's Historical-Dialectical Approach

Although Cox's "historical-dialectic approach" owes much to international political economy, it differs from it some significant ways. Whereas traditional political economists, give primacy to economic structures in international life, Cox concentrates on the *dialectical* relations between economic and non-economic factors. Moreover, implicit in Cox's "historical-dialectical approach" is the view that there is an interplay between human agency, on the one hand, and structure, on the other. In other words, human actions at once shape and are shaped by the structural framework in which they occur. Finally, as we shall see below, the Coxian paradigm allows ideas to play a substantive role in the shaping and reproduction of the international system and it is for this reason that we have decided to use it for this paper. The remainder of this section will be devoted to a fairly detailed account of it.

Cox's main unit of analysis is what could be called "world order configurations," that is, systems which emerge, develop and decline during particular historical periods. They can be classified into hegemonic and non-hegemonic "world order configurations." They are hegemonic when one national society gains prominence in the *international system* and is, thereby, able to set the parameters within which inter-state relations occur. As Cox states:

A world hegemony is thus in its *beginnings* an outward expansion of the internal (*national*) *hegemony*

established by a dominant social class. The economic and social *institutions*, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad (R. Cox 83: 171).

Thus a world order hegemony can be described as a configuration of economic, social, political and cultural structures which reflect those prevalent in the *dominant nation-state*. It is important to note that hegemony in this context must be understood in the Gramscian sense, that is, as a power based on *consent* rather than force. Indeed, once the hegemonic structures lose legitimacy either within the hegemonic state or abroad, the world order correspondingly begins to disintegrate. Accordingly, the structures which make up a given hegemonic "world order *configuration*" are essentially *historical*.

The dialectical dimension of the Coxian approach has to do with the interaction of inherent opposing tendencies within a "world order *configuration*." *Although* the nature of the conflict depends on the particular historical period, Cox does suggest that one source of conflict concerns the *continuing interaction* and tension between subjective notions of the world held by groups of people and *changing material* circumstances. In this connection he states that:

There is always *tension* between a widely held conception of the world and the realities of existence for particular groups of historical people. Gaps develop between *changing material* conditions and old intellectual schemata. Such gaps suggest latent conflict, the actualizing of which depends upon a change of *consciousness* on the part of the potential challengers and their adoption of a *contrasting image* of society (R. Cox 76:183).

Accordingly, "*historical change is a result of conflicts, in which the emergence of a new form o*

consciousness leads to a shift in power relations which makes this newfound form of consciousness supreme over the erstwhile dominant form of consciousness" (R. Cox 76: 195). It is important to note that this conception of change is not based on a mechanistic, teleological formula which serves to dictate the direction of history, but rather on the indeterminate, conscious action of people.

Having identified in a general manner Cox's main unit of analysis and the basic premises of the "historical-dialectical approach," we shall now turn to a more substantive treatment of Cox's conceptual framework.

As stated earlier, a "hegemonic world order configuration" reflects the economic and social institutions as well as the culture and technology of the hegemonic power at a given time. One could identify the components of this "world order configuration" in terms of economic, political, social and ideological-forces. Cox, however, finds these labels inadequate and proposes a different way of conceptualizing world order. For him the "world order configuration" is composed of what he calls "historical structures." There are three types of "historical structures": *modes of social relations of production, forms of state, and world orders*. The first, modes of social relations of production, refers to the way in which social groups organize themselves politically, culturally and economically around the production process. The social groups themselves are referred to as *social forces*. The second, that is, forms of state, refers to state/society complexes and concerns itself with the relationship between civil society and the state. The liberal welfare state, for instance, is one example of a form of state. As for the third, world order, it concerns itself with a particular correlation of forces that defines certain global issues such as the East-West conflict during the Cold War period or the North-South dialogue (R. Cox 81: 138).

According to Cox, "modes of social relations of production," "forms of state" and "world orders" have four characteristics in common. The first concerns the fact that they each have local as well as national origins. This is important for Cox because it affirms his view that fundamentally,

it is actual people, rather than anonymous structural forces, which push history forward. Moreover, the recognition that "historical structures" have local and national origins allows us to study how national social movements which appear to be insignificant are able to develop into transnational and supranational forces which, at times, present a formidable challenge to the international status quo. The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism is a case in point. Finally, the connection between national and international levels of activity suggest that international movements can shape and be shaped by local and national developments.

The second characteristic of "historical structures" is that they interact in a dialectical fashion without giving privilege to a predetermined causality. Cox argues that "forms of state," for instance, cannot be understood in a vacuum, but must be considered *in relation* to the prevailing "mode of social relations of production" (global production processes and transnational social forces) and the prevailing "world order" (international institutions and the particular form of world order) in which they exist. In short, in accordance with his "dialectical approach," Cox puts forward a framework which forces the analyst to study the parts in terms of the whole and vice-versa.

The third feature of "historical structures" is that they change over time. Cox's framework allows and indeed requires the analyst to study international relations from a diachronic perspective. By identifying tensions in the interaction of these historical structures, the analyst not only brings to light forces which are currently shaping the international system, but can also identify the factors that may contribute to the demise or the emergence of new "world order configurations." As Cox argues:

In reaching for a political economy perspective, we move from identifying the structural characteristics of world orders as configurations of material capabilities (objective dimension), ideas (subjective dimension) and

institutions to explaining their origins, growth and demise in terms of the interrelationships of the three levels of structures (R. Cox 81: 141).

The fourth and final characteristic of "historical structures" concerns their composition: they all have objective dimensions, subjective dimensions and institutions. As we shall see in more detail later on, the objective dimension refers primarily to the organization of the production process in both economic and political terms. The subjective dimension concerns the role of ideas and lastly, the institutional dimension, refers to organizations that have been created to support the other two dimensions.

So far we have dwelt on the characteristics that the three historical structures which make up any "world order configuration" have in common. Let us now take a closer look at each one of them and examine their component parts, that is, their subjective, objective and institutional dimensions. For the sake of brevity and clarity, I shall illustrate my analysis by making reference to one "historical structure": the "world order" structure of today's "hegemonic world order configuration" which Cox and others have christened with the name of *Pax Americana*.

The objective dimension of a historical structure concerns not only its economic and organizational capabilities and natural resources, but also the way in which these resources are organized into a functioning production process. The objective dimension of *Pax Americana's* 'world order' structure, for example, includes among other things the development of nuclear technology - particularly in the United States - and its impact on East-West relations. Another objective aspect of the "world order" structure is the contemporary international division of labour which has conditioned North-South relations.

Turning to the subjective component of historical structures, we see that it makes reference to ideas which, according to Cox, can be conceived of in two ways: first as "inter-subjective meanings," which are broadly shared ideas about the nature of

social relations and second as commonly held beliefs which serve to guide behaviour and define expectations. Although the former may appear to be timeless truths, they are in fact historically conditioned and change, albeit slowly, over time. When *Pax Americana* was at its height, for instance, the belief in deterrence as the best way to secure peace was held universally.

The second way in which Cox conceives of ideas is as "collective images" of social order. These images *specific to particular* groups are also historically conditioned and consist of different and often opposing world views. At the national level unionized workers, for instance, will think differently about their lives from un-established workers and both these groups will hold world views which are at variance with those of farmers or bureaucrats. These collective images also exist at the international level. Within the framework of *Pax Americana* the East-West conflict as well as North-South conflict reflect the clash of different "collective images" of the international system.

The third and last component of a "historical structure" is *institutions*. Institutions can be seen as the convergence point for the objective and subjective factors discussed above. They reflect the correlation of power relations at any given time and they have the important function of stabilizing, legitimizing and perpetuating a particular order at the international level. During the early years of *Pax Americana*, the United Nations and its agencies played an important role in legitimizing the dominant position of the industrialized western nations in the new international order by providing a forum where poor nation-states and marginalized social groups were able to air their opposition to the policies of the dominant powers. Thus potentially divisive international conflicts were neutralized.

Having described Cox's theoretical framework, we can now discuss some of the problems which we have encountered when making use of it in our analysis of the role of ideas in the International Indigenous Movement which, as we shall see, is *sui generis* and in many ways different from other contemporary social movements. The

problems in question arise at the level of each of the Coxian "historical structures."

With regard to the first, that is "modes of social relations of production," the concept of social force has been difficult to apply. As mentioned earlier, according to Cox, this concept refers to a social grouping of people organized around a particular process of production. As such, social forces are understood to arise only within the framework of the historical structure of "modes of social relations of production." As we shall see later on, this "production-centred" definition of a social force is too narrow to capture all the various dimensions of the International Indigenous Movement².

This is not to say that the concept is totally inapplicable. In effect the International Indigenous Movement can be seen as a social force *a la* Cox to the extent that indigenous peoples do share a common mode of production, that is, they engage in subsistence production. Moreover, the emergence of these peoples as a politicized social unit can clearly be traced, at least in part, to changes in the global production process. The expansion of capitalism to peripheral regions in First and Third World countries over the last three decades has affected indigenous peoples in at least two ways. On the one hand, indigenous communities partially incorporated into the capitalist system (as in the case of most Latin American indigenous peoples), became increasingly proletarianized. On the other hand, those indigenous communities that had remained relatively autonomous and untouched by outside forces were now displaced and taken over by multinational corporations in search of new raw materials or energy resources. This has been the experience of indigenous peoples in northern Canada, certain areas of Brazil and many parts of Asia. In either case, the expansion of capitalist relations of production to the periphery has disrupted their traditional subsistence modes of production and has forced them to be either wage labourers or displaced, landless peoples.

Turning to "forms of state," the problem here has to do with what appears to be an

economistic interpretation of this "historical structure." For Cox the production process is the key element that shapes any "form of state." In the case of *Pax Americana*, for example, he focuses on how the globalization of production has led to the internationalization of the state. To give a full account of the origins and development of the International Indigenous Movement, however, we shall need to examine other factors that influence the nature of "forms of state."

It is important to underscore that while Cox's theoretical or empirical work does emphasize production relations even within the context of "forms of state," it does not preclude other lines of investigation. Once again it must be remembered that "forms of state" are composed of objective, subjective and institutional dimensions. While Cox has paid attention to the first dimension, consideration of the subjective and institutional aspects can help explain the increasing politicization of civil societies and the organization of national grassroots movements around the world. In effect, to understand the mobilization of various social groups against the state one must look beyond the economic into the relationship between the state and civil society. One must examine the increasing *bureaucratization* of the state, for example, and the numerous ways in which the expansion of the state into everyday life has generated new forms of tension and conflict. In addition, one must also consider the role of ideology and how it can be used to take away from oppressed groups certain protections which have permitted them to exist as collective entities. When it comes to social movements which are *sui generis*, such as the International Indigenous Movement, "forms of state" conceived in terms of their institutional and ideological dimensions can help explain, at least in part, the rise and development of these movements.

We have also had difficulty with "world order," the third historical structure. At this level too we encounter Cox's emphasis on production relations. It is not surprising, therefore, that when he turns to explore the role of ideology in the "world order" of *Pax Americana* he concentrates primarily on economic belief systems. Clearly, for the

purposes of this paper, this will not be enough, as I shall have to pay close attention to evolving conceptions of liberty, equality, human rights, aboriginal rights, self-determination, development and the like in an effort to make sense of the inception and the growth of the International Indigenous Movement. Once again, however, despite the productionist bent of Cox's praxis, his concept of "world order," composed as it is of objective, subjective and institutional elements, is comprehensive enough to permit us to study non-economic belief systems.

In the remainder of this paper we shall give an account of the role of ideas in the International Indigenous Movement. More concretely, in Chapter Two, "**The Global Context**," we shall bring to light by means of Cox's historical structures the context in which the Movement came into being. In Chapter Three, "**The International Indigenous Movement**," we shall look at the social actors that propelled the Movement onto the international scene and the main stages the movement itself has gone through so far. Chapter Four, "**The Indigenous Counter-Hegemonic Project**," shall be devoted exclusively to the ideas of the Movement. In this connection we shall analyze the counter-hegemonic project the Movement has produced over the years, again in terms of Cox's historical structures. Finally, in Chapter Five, "**The Role of Ideas in a Changing World Order**" we shall attempt to place the counter-hegemonic project of the International Indigenous Movement in the context of contemporary ideological challenges to the world order configuration. We shall conclude by making some general remarks concerning the role of ideas in international relations today.

II) THE GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE RISE AND FALL OF *PAX AMERICANA*, 1945- 1990

Although indigenous peoples have been struggling against colonial forces for centuries, it was only after World War Two that they began to mobilize politically in order to resist oppression.

Evidence of this trend is to be found in the rise of national indigenous movements and a proliferation of institutions aimed at supporting these national struggles. By the mid-seventies, indigenous resistance had acquired transnational dimensions as indigenous peoples carried their struggle to the halls of the United Nations. 'Which are the global factors that contributed to their increasing mobilization at the national level in the 1950's and '60's and to their recent emergence as an international social force in the last two decades? As stated above, we shall attempt to answer this question by bringing to light changes in the international system through the use of Cox's historical structures: "modes of social relations of production," "forms of state" and "world order." Given the vast scope of the subject, I shall only give a selective, impressionistic account of *Par Americana* in an effort to identify those factors that had the greatest impact upon indigenous peoples.

A. *Pax Americana*: 1945-1970

After the Second World War there emerged a new hegemonic world order configuration under the leadership of the United States. This world order was characterized by the promotion of a neo-liberal international economic regime, the consolidation of the welfare state in the West, the establishment of newly independent states in the South, and by the Cold War.

It is important to remember in this connection that the nature of US hegemony over the international system at this time was one based mainly on consent and influence as opposed to coercion. As the only nation-state to emerge from the Second World War stronger than when it joined it, the United States was in a unique position to realize its vision of world order. American influence over the countries of Europe and Japan was ensured by their dependence on the massive aid programs the US launched for their economic recovery. Although the Third World was largely ignored during this period, many of the developing countries were influenced by the economic, political and social policies of the newly established hegemonic power.

1. *Industrialization in the North and The Imperative of "Nation -Building" in the South*

The functioning of the international economic system after World War Two was based on at least three main assumptions. The first was the "trickle down theory," according to which development in lesser developed countries depended on the increasing demand for raw materials in the more developed countries and, therefore, on the consolidation and expansion of western industrial economies. The second was that each state would have to follow its own natural course toward industrialization and that it was useless to expect underdeveloped countries to take the same path as the developed west. The third assumption, corroborating the second, was the principle of "comparative advantage," which proposed that each state concentrate on trading the commodities that they were best suited to produce. In the case of most Third World countries the implementation of this theory implied the production of one or two agricultural commodities and the continuation or establishment of mono-export economies (L. Miller 85:132). Summarizing the overall ideology of this international economic regime, Cox states:

The central premise of the hegemonic order was that the world economy is a positive-sum game in which some businesses and some national economies may benefit more than others, but in which all have the opportunity to gain (R. Cox 87: 217).

Given the above economic outlook, it is * not surprising that the World Bank gave all of its attention to the reconstruction of western nations and that Third World countries were left to their own devices to become active participants in the world economy.

The rapid expansion of the industrial base in the First World, especially in North America, and the process of urbanization that followed, created an urgent need for energy resources. The main agent of industrialization and the key actor in the search for

energy resources was the multinational corporation (MNC). This search led MNCs to explore the peripheral regions of their own countries, thus making the acceleration of mining and other resource exploration the single most threatening event for indigenous peoples in industrialized countries during the last four decades (J. Burger 87: 178).

In the United States, for example, 40% of all uranium deposits and 15% of surface minable coal are located on Indian reserves. During the 1950's, Peabody Coal, Utah International and other US MNCs negotiated leases on Navajo land with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which allowed the prices for coal paid to the Navajos to be fixed at low rates with no allowance for increases in market prices. In 1981 Navajos were still being paid 25 cents per ton when the market price had reached 70 cents US (ICIHI 87: 24).

The mining activities of the MNCs not only caused the economic exploitation of indigenous peoples, but it also wrought severe environmental damage to their land and created serious health problems for those communities living near the mining sites. Statistics show that uranium mining has been responsible for an increase in the number of deaths of native peoples between 1971 and 1980, with Navajos working on the Kerr-McGee uranium mines suffering a rate of cancer death 400% higher than the national average (ICIHI 87: 48).

The frantic search for mineral and oil deposits also occurred in Canada, especially after the 1960's, when oil and natural gas were discovered in Prudhoe Bay. During this time a growing number of MNCs became interested in mineral extraction activities in northern Canada and plans for the construction of a northern pipeline were drawn up secretly by the Canadian government and a number of oil companies. The pipeline, designed to carry natural gas, was to be the largest private enterprise project in Canadian history. Not surprisingly, the Canadian government did not consult with the native peoples living in the North and proceeded with the plans to construct the pipeline without their consent. After several years of bitter struggle between the Indians of the North

and the Canadian government, a scaled-down version of the originally proposed pipeline was built.

In North America, therefore, the search for energy resources has meant the invasion and exploitation of Indian lands and the complete disruption of the Indian's traditional way of life. Despite the growing efforts on the part of Indians to protect their land and communities from the onslaught of "modern progress," they have been unable to do more than slow down the process.

Despite the general lack of economic aid from Western industrialized states, the early post-war years were a period of "nation building" for Third World countries. There were two dimensions to this process. To begin with, there were the Latin American states which had been independent for a long time, but had not been able to break the hold the export sector had on their economies. "Nation-building" for them meant industrialization, something which required among other things a greater availability of energy resources. In addition, the U. N. sponsored decolonization process had spawned a growing number of independent states, all of which faced the difficult task of national formation.

One of the crucial aspects of this task was economic integration. To achieve this end, however, newly formed governments needed to create national markets and formulate state policies which would incorporate their peripheral regions into the capitalist system of production. As in the case of Latin America, the new states discovered the need for affordable energy resources to implement their economic agendas.

Thus began a new search for energy resources throughout the Third World. In the end, hydroelectric power was generally favoured, as it proved to be cheaper than the generation of thermal energy. Two other advantages were that it also reduced the dependence on fossil fuels imports and created a store of irrigation water. For these reasons dams became a core component of development strategies in Asia, Latin America and Africa during the 1960's and beyond (ICHI 87: 52).

The quest for hydro-electric power and the construction of dams also brought many states into direct conflict with indigenous peoples. Arguing that the building of dams meant the loss of their agricultural lands and forests, the certainty of displacement, and the possibility of illness due to the creation of artificial lakes that bred malaria and schistosomiasis, the indigenous peoples mounted strong resistance.

Despite indigenous opposition, however, governments persisted in their constructions of huge dams. In the early 1960's, the Kaptai Dam in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh submerged 250 sq miles of prime agricultural lands equal to 40% of the cultivable area of the region with the consequences that 100,000 tribal peoples, 1/6th of total population, were displaced (ICHI 87: 53). In the Philippines, the Chico River Irrigation Project was due to submerge the smallholdings of most of the Kalinga and Bontoc indigenous peoples, thus displacing 90,000 human beings and destroying 16 villages (ICHI 87: 53). The militant reaction on the part of the tribal peoples against the project forced Robert McNamara, the President of the World Bank at the time, to postpone the project as the Bank was unable to ensure the safety of the construction teams. In this case the use of force on the part of indigenous peoples proved successful.

The international economic regime of *Pax Americana* was also responsible for a rapid increase in the process of proletarianization of indigenous populations, particularly in some parts of the Third World such as Latin America. Government development programs, the growth in demand for raw materials and energy resources on the part of national and international markets and the growing intervention on the part of MNCs in agriculture, caused an increase in the need for cheap labour. As a result, indigenous peasants were either lured or coerced, directly or indirectly, into becoming wage earners, something which deeply disrupted traditional indigenous societies. The reaction to this disruption was swift. Referring to Latin America, R. Stavenhagen writes as follows:

The decade of 1960's and 1970's witnessed a reawakening of Indian ethnic consciousness... A number of local Indian ethnic organizations arose in different countries, side-tracking the more traditional class-centred unions, syndicates and political parties... step by step regional and national organizations, composed of different ethnic groups, have been built up. Meetings were held, groups and parties were sought (R. Stavenhagen 84: 33).

In sum, the international economic regime of *Pax Americana* can be characterized by a new expansion of capitalism in western countries and by the initiation of development programs in Third World countries. The consequences for indigenous peoples were two-fold. In some cases they were forced to abandon their traditional homelands and seek refuge in cities or in the peripheral regions of their countries. In other cases, they became part of an exploited labour force. In response to these developments, by the 1960's and early 1970's, national indigenous movements rose across the globe.

2. Forms of State and National Integration

Since World War Two the size and jurisdiction of the state in both industrialized and underdeveloped countries has expanded at an incredible rate. In the industrialized west, the consolidation and growth of the welfare state has meant not only improvements in standards of living, but also the creation of new social tensions. In the underdeveloped world, on the other hand, the state has remained for the most part an appendage of the ruling elites, a vehicle for their political and economic interests. In both cases, however, as we shall see presently, indigenous peoples have increasingly become the target of assimilationist policies.

The incorporation of indigenous peoples into the national welfare state of Canada and the United States began during the 1940's and 1950's and had a corrosive affect on their traditional way

of life. The introduction of family allowance payments, of old age pensions and other cash benefits to assumed male heads of individual families elevated the nuclear family as the self-sufficient unit of production and, thus, undermined the traditional role of the local native communities. Furthermore, welfare payments served to individualize poverty and in this way conspired against the traditional responsibility of the Indian community to ensure equal distribution of wealth.

Despite the aid extended by the welfare state, North American Indians still lived well below national standards. As for those Indians who preferred not to integrate into the welfare society and remain within their traditional social units, life was, and still is, very bleak. In the United States, Indians on reserves faced extremely high unemployment rates and even today 60% of all reservation Indians live in absolute poverty. Those who did attempt to become integrated into the national mesh were often unsuccessful. Discriminated against on the basis of their race and culture, most were unable to assimilate into white society and were thus forced into a marginal existence, more often than not dominated by alcohol, drugs and crime. Today Indians still face-daunting odds. Of the Indians in the United States who do attend high school, less than 50% graduate and in rural areas 80% of those who do, face unemployment (IWGIA 87: 13).

In Canada, the situation has not been much better. During the 1960's all native children were subject to compulsory schooling. Instead of equipping these children with the tools to strengthen their cultures, the Canadian education system came to represent a slow, but thorough process of deculturation and assimilation into white society. The traditional role of the Indian elders as teachers of the Indian way of life was progressively usurped by white school teachers who taught the children to be ashamed of their race and their heritage. Although Canada's multiculturalism has permitted the manifestations of many cultures, it has never worked for the recognition of Canada's "*multi-national*" composition and for the political empowerment of these ethnic tonations."

Turning to the Third World, the decolonization process of the 1950's and 1960's led to the creation of a multitude of new states, most of which were culturally, ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous. In an effort to consolidate their control over their recently acquired areas and to safeguard national borders from opportunistic neighbours, most of these newly created states concentrated their attention on establishing political centralization and fostering national integration. While most indigenous peoples had enjoyed a relative degree of autonomy during the colonial period, they now found themselves under the authority of local elites who were driven by the imperative of "nation-building" and who sought to consolidate their precarious hold on power through any means available to them (J. Burger 87: 51).

In many of these countries, the drive toward national unification included the extension of universal suffrage to minorities, some of which were indigenous peoples. It was felt that citizenship would replace their local loyalties with a national one. Governments also sought to promote cultural homogeneity in an effort to neutralize ethnic attachments and to prevent the emergence of secessionist movements. Given the need for haste, the process of standardization was more often than not violent and repressive.

One example of this is the case of the Karen people of Burma. Burmese national elites obtained independence from Britain in 1948 and sought to bring into one fold the various ethnic groups living in the country, including the Karen. The Karen, however, wanted their own independence and to this end started one of the most long-standing rebellions in Asia. In 1976 the Karen sought to modify their stance by giving up the notion of independence and by adopting a federalist platform. The fighting, however, is still going on today as the repression of the Burmese state has continued undiminished. The toll of forty years of war is about 300,000 civilian casualties and tens of thousands of internal and external refugees (J. Burger 87: 120).

A second of countless examples of national unification policies resulting in further repression of indigenous peoples can be found in Indonesia. This

country is today waging a war against indigenous peoples on two fronts. In 1975 Indonesian troops invaded East Timor in order to prevent it from becoming a separate state. Since then an independence movement, FRETILIN, has engaged in a bitter war for independence. Over the last fifteen years more than 200,000 Timorese, one-third of the total population in East Timor, have been killed by the Indonesian army (J. Burger 87: 142).

As can be seen, both in politically "developed" nations such as the United States and Canada and in Third World countries, indigenous peoples have had a common socio-political experience: they have been given the option to assimilate into the national society or else face marginalization and in some cases even genocide. Given that national societies reflect the culture and values of the dominant group, assimilation for indigenous peoples means the loss of a way of life and their individual and collective identities.

The process of assimilation or standardization developed along parallel lines with the processes of proletarianization and displacement described in the previous section. Just as indigenous peoples resisted the latter trends, they have also rebelled against the former. The ethnic reawakening that took place in the 1960's and 1970's the world over, therefore, cannot be seen solely in economic terms and must be understood as a movement against political and social integration. In this case then, the mobilization of indigenous peoples at the national level can be traced, so far, to changes in two of the Coxian historical structures: "modes of social relations of production" and "forms of state."

3. World Order. Pax Americana and the Cold War

The nuclear arms race and the ideological battle between capitalism and communism brought about by the Cold War militarized the international system and divided it into two opposing camps.

Two aspects of this complex phenomenon directly affected the lives of indigenous peoples: the nuclear testing in strategic areas (specifically the South Pacific) and the advocacy of local and national struggles in Third World countries by

either the US or the Soviet Union. Let us look very briefly at each of these developments.

Since World War Two, but especially during the 1960's, the territories of indigenous peoples in the Pacific and in the Pacific Rim were targeted for military exercises and nuclear testing on the pretext that they were uninhabited. Since 1964 over 250 atomic and hydrogen bombs have been detonated in the region and intercontinental missiles have been regularly launched from the US mainland into the KwaJalun Atoll in the Marshall Islands (ICHI 87: 78). In addition, every two years the United States and its NATO allies have engaged in "war games" (RIMPAC exercises) which in 1986 involved the continual bombardment of the sacred Hawaiian island of Kaho'olawi.

The effects of these military exercises have been two-fold. First, the health of some 500,000 indigenous peoples of the region has been put in jeopardy. Radiation induced diseases such as leukemia, thyroid cancer, still births and fetus malformations have increased significantly in test areas, especially near Bikini Island and Mururoa (ICHI 87: 79). Although the peoples of the Pacific have been affected the most, Indians of the American South West are also reported to be suffering from serious health problems as a result of the nuclear testing done around their territories.

A second consequence has been the displacement of indigenous peoples. In effect, the construction of military bases has caused the relocation of thousands of tribal peoples in the Philippines for instance. A similar situation has occurred in Canada where the Innu Indians of Labrador have been pushed off their lands by constant supersonic aircraft and weapons testing over and on their hunting grounds. By causing caribou migration and feeding patterns to change, these military exercises have become a huge threat to the traditional economic practices of the Innu and thus a threat to their survival as a people.

The advocacy of local and national struggles in Third World countries by the Superpowers has led to the internationalization of these conflicts which in turn has served to embroil many

indigenous peoples in brutal civil wars. Prior to the French occupation of Vietnam and Laos, for example, tribal peoples of both countries were relatively isolated and unaffected by global developments. During the Vietnam War, however, French, Vietnamese and Americans recruited the Hmong tribal peoples of Laos to fight for their side in exchange for promises of autonomy once the war was won. Victory, however, was never attained and today over 200, 000 Hmong are in exile or in refugee camps (ICHI 87: 80).

Turning to Latin America, Indian peoples of both El Salvador and Guatemala have suffered tremendous persecution as suspected communist insurgents. Between the years of 1979 and 1983, 30,000 Pipil Indians were killed in El Salvador, while the Guatemalan Indians have been subject to policies of extermination since the late 1950's (R. Ryser 88: 308).

We would like to conclude our account of *Pax Americana* as it relates to the International Indigenous Movement by reiterating the fact that the mobilization of indigenous peoples during the 1960's took the form of local and national movements through which indigenous leaders began to penetrate the power systems of their respective countries by means of political lobbies, unions and legal representation. Moreover, the rise in these national movements can be traced to pressures generated at the level of all three of Cox's "historical structures." It was only in the mid-1970's, however, when "cracks" began to weaken the cohesion of *Pax Americana*, that an International Indigenous Movement was born.

B. The Decline of *Pax Americana*: 1970-1990

Only some twenty odd years after its establishment, changes at the level of all three historical structures have altered the dynamics of *Pax Americana*. The purpose of this section is to describe these changes so as to better understand the internationalization of the indigenous movement.

1. Tensions in the Neo-Liberal International Economic Regime.

Starting in the 1970's, the neo-liberal international economic regime begun to weaken under a variety of different pressures. One of them originated in the Third World. By the mid-sixties it had become increasingly clear that underdeveloped countries were not "catching up" to the First World and that, on the contrary, the disparities dividing the rich and poor nations were getting wider. Furthermore, the principle of comparative advantage was also coming under criticism by Third World administrative elites as agricultural commodity prices began falling in the mid-1950's. In response to their weakening position, underdeveloped countries began to mobilize in an effort to secure a higher share of the world's resources. One example of this was the OPEC crisis of 1973, which shocked western nations into the realization that their economic future depended on events and conditions outside their borders. It also served to remind some that the world's supply of resources was finite and that there was a need for world's leaders to devise a new economic approach in order to ensure continued economic growth. Concern about the limitations of the world's resources, although not widespread, brought to the fore the question of whether the world would be able to sustain the development model that had been formulated at the beginning of *Pax Americana*. As Cox states:

To question the possibility of indefinite economic growth was in effect to question the basic assumption on which the US concept of world order was based (R.Cox and H. Jacobson unpubl: 23).

Another source of strain came from the increasing globalization of production and the emergence of transnational corporations (TNCs). As opposed to their counterparts (MNCs, which remained as appendages of national governments), TNCs became independent entities using the international arena as their economic playground. Unlike most MNCs, TNCs operate by drawing the components necessary for modern production from more than one country, with capital and technology coming from the First World and raw materials and labour from the Third World. Finding the resources

and markets of their countries of origin too constraining, these corporations now sought to expand their reach to the last unexplored regions of the world (L. Miller 85: 140).

The failure of the Third World to "catch up" with the West and the internationalization of production were responsible for an ideological shift in the minds of the intellectual and administrative elites of *Pax Americana*. The ideal of "**nation-building**" as something Third World countries could achieve on their own terms and at their own pace quietly faded away while that of "**global interdependence**," and hence foreign aid, became the new panacea.

The idea of helping developing countries, however, was not entirely new. As early as 1956 the International Finance Corporation had already been established as a World Bank affiliate to promote growth in the Third World. Moreover, in 1960 the International Development Authority was added as the "soft loan" affiliate of the World Bank in a move that finally acknowledged the need to grant to loan recipients concessions in interest rates and pay-back schedules unavailable before. It was only in 1968, however, that the World Bank, under the leadership of Robert McNamara, expanded its lending almost 12 fold and explicitly directed the funds to developing countries (L. Miller 85: 132).

Third World leaders, for their part, sought to resuscitate their stagnant economies through policies of economic diversification. To achieve this, however, the finances and technological know-how of TNCs were often needed and solicited. The TNCs responded to the demand and the 1970's saw the unprecedented growth of large-scale development projects in the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

As stated in the previous section, during the "nation-building" period (1950's-1960's), indigenous peoples were pushed to the most peripheral regions of their respective countries. It is precisely these regions that became the chosen sites for the new developments projects in the 1970's. Illustrations of this phenomenon are manifold. Due to lack of space, however, we shall offer only a few.

In the mid-sixties, in an effort to diversify Brazil's economy, the government opened up the Amazon region to prospectors and cattle ranchers. Ten years later, with the same object in mind, it launched The Great Carajas Project. Financed by the World Bank, Rio Tinto Zinc, ALCOA, and Royal Dutch Shell, the EEC, Japanese and US investors, this project ostensibly involved the development of hydro-electricity, agriculture, forestry and ranching in the Amazonian basin. In fact its main purpose was and continues to be the extraction of iron ore for export. The mining activities of the project alone threatens to displace 10,000 Gavião and Guayajara Indians. Moreover, the influx of white single men has brought into the area a host of other problems such as gambling, prostitution, drugs, crime and venereal disease. Despite the protests of Indian leaders, The Great Carajas Project is scheduled to continue (J. Burger 87: 107).

Similar events are taking place in Asia. Let us look at the case of Indonesia. With the blessing of the Indonesian government, TNCs from all over the world have flocked to the small island of West Papua, attracted by its vast resources of oil and mineral deposits. Companies like Shell, Texaco, Total and, Chevron -have obtained important drilling concessions, while US Steel and Philips have competed for the rights to mine nickel, copper, and silver. The expansion of mining, however, has done little to create employment opportunities for West Papuans since most workers have been imported from the Indonesian mainland, South Korea, Australia and the United States. West Papua's timber resources have also brought corporations to the island and by 1980 sixty eight logging concessions had claimed more than 60% of the island's forests. Unlike mining, timber extraction has employed Papuans, but as forced labourers (J. Burger 87: 146).

One of the world's largest development projects is the Narmada River Valley Project in India, supported jointly by the Indian government and a number of TNCs. In total the project includes the construction of 30 large dams, 133 medium-size dams and 3000 small ones. The two largest dams

will submerge 130,000 hectares of land of which over 51,000 hectares is forest. As a result 1 million tribal peoples are scheduled to be relocated with minimum compensation. So far, the Indian government has not been able to find alternative lands for these peoples. Even so, the World Bank has recently renewed its loan of 450 million US dollars for the construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam, one of the two largest to be built in the Valley (IWGIA 89: 125).

Up to this point, we have dealt with the experience of indigenous peoples in the Third World, but the situation of North American Indians was quite similar during this period. Take the case of Canada. We have indicated earlier that in the late 1960's the Canadian government, together with TNCs, became interested in the energy resources discovered in the Northwest Territories and that their efforts to build a pipeline were initially halted by the resistance of the indigenous peoples in the area. Ten years later, however, the Canadian government and the TNCs went ahead with the pipeline, albeit with a scaled-down version of it and thereby expanded their reach to the "last frontier" of Canada. Where the experience of Canadian Indians differed from that of Third World indigenous peoples is in the fact that their economic defeat has been to some extent redressed in the political arena. In effect, as a result of their political mobilization, the Indians of the Canadian North have been able to gain some measure of political control over their territories.

In many respects, over the past twenty years indigenous peoples the world over have become "development refugees." In effect, indigenous peoples today, unlike those who lived in an earlier period, have no alternative areas to which they can retreat. Faced with the possibility of extinction, they have been more willing than ever before to go on the offensive. In addition, there has also been a change in the scope of the mobilization of the indigenous peoples. The fact that today their main antagonists are transnational forces, outside the control of national governments, has made indigenous peoples realize that is not enough to struggle at the national level and that the launching of an international movement is necessary.

2.7be Nation-State Under Seige

Pax Americana was and continues to be based on the concept and reality of a strong nationstate. In both First World and Third World countries three tendencies that have weakened it considerably during the 1970's and 1980's.

The first of these tendencies has been a reaction on the part of minority peoples against the centralizing efforts of the state. Although this tendency is visible in First World countries, it is particularly noticeable in the Third World. As stated in the previous section, the quest for development led many Third World governments to "open up" the last frontier in their countries in an attempt to discover new sources of raw materials and minerals. In order to incorporate these last remaining peripheral regions into national territories, it was necessary for the state to gain administrative control over the region. Furthermore, there was the need to assimilate the peoples living there into the national society. As D. Brown states:

... one of the most widespread and obvious features of the Third World since World War II has been the expansion of the state, in terms both of the spatial and the policy range of its activities. Regimes which formerly attained only spasmodic and limited control outside their core regions and capital cities have sought increasingly systematic control over peripheral regions through the expansion of their administrative bureaucracies, armies and educational systems (D. Brown 89: 8).

Not all Third World states have attempted to assimilate minority peoples under a plan of national integration. Some have preferred exclusionary practices instead, thus establishing "monoethnic" states. This racist approach, in which the identity of the state is closely associated with the dominant cultural group, has the advantage of keeping the "core society" united and the minority groups

powerless and politically marginalized. In both of these cases, however, the process of centralization has been very strong, something which has provoked an ethnic resurgence on the part of peoples on the periphery, many of whom are indigenous.

The ethnic revival across the globe has been well recorded by the press and by reports from national and international organizations during the last two decades. The phenomenon has been endemic in Asian and Latin America countries. It has also been visible in Europe and North America. To the extent that the ethnic rebellion has developed into demands for autonomy and outright independence, the liberal conceptions of the state as a unified homogeneous political community has been seriously challenged.

The second tendency that has affected the state in developed and underdeveloped countries alike concerns the increasing "internationalization" of the state. During the early post-war years the scope of state action and policy-making was the national economy and society. With the increasing globalization of production, however, and the internationalization of problems, such as famine, the environment etc., the range of state action and decision-making has gone beyond national boundaries. As a result, there has appeared within national bureaucracies "special sectors" which have become increasingly interconnected as states attempt to create common policies in order to respond to the needs of the world-economy and other global matters (R. Cox 87: 257). One consequence of this has been the "fragmentation" of administrative elites into internationally-oriented sectors and nationally-oriented ones. Another has been the propensity of the "international sectors" to be influenced and indeed tied to transnational interest groups, thereby creating a conflict between "national" and "international" bureaucrats.

This last problem has been particularly acute in the field of economic decision-making as it relates to development strategies. The international capitalist elite has gained enough power to dictate, through the "international" bureaucrats, the conditions under which development will take place

in both First and Third World countries. Thus, today the public has less say than ever before about economic issues. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that petitions of indigenous peoples concerning unwelcome development projects have been either dismissed or heard without sympathy.

The third tendency affecting the state has been the mobilization of "core" sectors of industrialized societies in the First World. During the last twenty years the increasing bureaucratization of the state and its growing intervention at all level of social life has generated an unprecedented reaction on the parts of certain sectors of civil society. As a result, there has been a proliferation of social movements in the 1970's and 1980's which have challenged the legitimacy of the state and have proposed a variety of new agendas for the restructuring of social relations. This generalized state of insurgency has provided an important "political resource" for indigenous peoples in the West to the extent that it has allowed for alliances with "core groups" (environmentalists, feminists, peace activists) in industrialized societies.

The growing distrust of the state in industrialized societies has also manifested itself in the creation of "citizen" tribunals which have taken up issues that have not been adequately addressed by the state. It is this type of civil initiative that has had the most direct impact on indigenous peoples. Both the Permanent Peoples Tribunal of the late 1970's and the Russell Tribunal of 1980 directly addressed the concerns of indigenous peoples and went on to make recommendations in this regard. Despite the fact that these tribunals had no legal jurisdiction, they were both international in scope and attracted considerable media attention. To this extent they served the function of publicizing the situation of indigenous peoples and of creating a forum for them and other interested individuals to meet and to exchange ideas. Thus, both the proliferation of new social movements and the emergence of citizen tribunals has served to create supportive social environment for indigenous movements.

In conclusion, the state has come under attack by social forces in both developed and

underdeveloped parts of the world. The rise of ethnic nationalism, the "internationalization" of the state and the mobilization of civil society in western countries has served to undermine the legitimacy of the state and its ability to function as a unifying force in today's world order. It is not surprising that in the 1970's national indigenous movements, denouncing the inefficiency, corruption and bad faith of the state, articulated "self-government" as one of their most cherished aspirations. Moreover, the diminishing legitimacy of the state has inspired indigenous peoples, along with other disaffected groups, to take their grievances and demands to the international arena where they can appeal to international law and to the sympathy of independent experts.

3. Changes in World Order. The Development of International Law

In the 1950's and 1960's western hegemony, with the United States at its centre, was at its peak. Since then it has been challenged in the battlefields of Vietnam, in the factories of Japan, and perhaps most importantly, in the halls of the United Nations. In this section I shall illustrate this shift away from U.S. hegemony by making reference to the development of international human rights law.

Until World War Two the question of human rights had always been conceived as a concern falling under national jurisdiction. The genocide of Jews during the war, however, shocked the world into the realization that the greatest violators of human rights were often governments and that the protection of these rights had to be placed under some form of international control. Despite the theoretical tensions between the imperative of national sovereignty, on the one hand, and the necessity of international control, on the other, the idea that governments should be accountable for their policies both to their own people and to the world at large was reinforced by the Nuremberg Trials of 1945 and the Tokyo Trial of 1946. Referring to these trials, A. Cassese writes:

For the first time the basic principle was proclaimed that, faced with the alternative of complying with

national legal commands or international standards, State officials and individuals should opt for the latter (A. Cassese 86: 65).

Thus, not only were state officials not protected by state sovereignty, but they were punished for choosing to uphold national laws at the expense of basic human rights.

On December 10, 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was ratified and it has since become "the moral touchstone for all claims at the international level that justice has not been done at the national level" (N. Rodley 83: 264). The provisions that the Declaration put forth represented fundamentally the political philosophy of western states on the issue of human rights. Generally speaking this philosophy privileges civil and political rights as the most important. More concretely, it puts special emphasis on freedom of thought and religion. This conception of human rights received only a lukewarm response from socialist and Third World countries, who argued that not enough attention had been paid to economic and social inequalities. Being in a minority position in the General Assembly, however, they were unable to challenge the West successfully (A. Cassese 86: 297-9).

The next step in the development of human rights legislation took place in 1960 when the General Assembly adopted, by an overwhelming majority, the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." The significance of this declaration is that, while reiterating the importance of protecting political human rights for all peoples, it declared that among them was the right to self-determination. This declaration gave new impetus to the decolonization process, which had started in the 1950's and which, by the mid-1960's, had increased the U. N. membership nearly three-fold (L. Miller 85: 132).

The rapid expansion of the U. N. membership put the United States and its western allies in a minority position within the General Assembly. The consequences of this for human rights legislation became evident in 1966. In this

year the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" and the "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" were passed. Whereas the first Covenant elaborated, once again, the rights of individuals to political and religious freedoms, reflecting the position of the West, the second Covenant put forward a new set of rights representing the recently formulated "socialist doctrine," heralded by the Soviet Union, and supported by its satellite states and a majority of Third World countries (A. Cassese 86: 303). This new doctrine gave rise to provisions declaring the right to work, to social security, to food, to education, to equal pay and to fair wages, to establish unions, to health care and to an adequate standard of living. The second Covenant, in addition, reiterated the right to self-determination and, for the first time, spelled out the right to non-discrimination.

Increasingly aware of their power, socialist and developing countries exerted pressure to ensure that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights excluded the right to property and included the right to self-determination. Yet another example of their power can be seen in the fact that, a few years later, two Conventions supported by Third World and socialist countries (one dealing with racial discrimination and the other on apartheid) were quickly passed by the General Assembly, while a proposal for a draft treaty on religious freedom, supported by western democracies, was rejected (A. Cassese 86: 303-4).

As can be seen, by the 1970's a body of human rights legislation which included both western and socialist world views had developed. Although most of this legislation was fundamentally oriented to individual rights, the right to self-determination, as specified in the Covenants, did serve to enshrine the concept of collective rights into international law. In addition, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to non-discrimination, were also recognized. Finally, national sovereignty, once the *sine qua non* of international relations, had been slowly eroded by the expanding jurisdiction of international law in the field of human rights.

Needless to say, the codification of these new rights presented many oppressed peoples and ethnic groups with new institutional and ideological resources with which they could legitimize their grievances and challenge the prevailing status quo. Without economic or political clout, indigenous leaders have relied almost entirely on the power of ideas and principles to launch their movement and legitimize their demands. Again, unable to appeal to national courts or legislatures, replete with unsympathetic bureaucrats, indigenous peoples have turned to international law as an alternative source of legal protection. There can be no doubt that without the development of international human rights law the internationalization of the Indigenous Movement would not have occurred.

III) THE INTERNATIONAL INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

A. The Rise of Agency 1945-75

In the previous chapter we have examined the global context within which indigenous peoples started to mobilize first at the national level and then at the international level. In this chapter we shall move on to describe the social actors of the movement and the movement itself. In this part we shall concentrate on those actors that were closely involved with the launching of the International Movement and, among those, we attempt to distinguish the national indigenous movements and leaders from advocacy groups.

1. National Movements

There are over 200 million indigenous peoples in the world today representing about 4% of the total global population. They live in all five continents in both the East and the West, the North and the South (J. Burger 87: 11)¹. In all these regions over the past two decades indigenous peoples have become politicized to a greater or lesser extent. Latin America for example has become the site of numerous indigenous uprisings and movements which have made their presence felt in the domestic politics of states such as Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Chile and

Brazil. In Colombia, for instance, a national indigenous movement has existed since 1971 when the Regional Indian Council of the Cauca (CRIC) was formed. This organization includes Indians such as the Paez and Guambiano peoples who have been fighting for the restitution of their lands illegally occupied by big landowners. At the Sixth Congress of CRIC in 1981 over 2000 Indians were in attendance. Although a new national constitution was passed in 1991 which enshrined the rights of indigenous peoples to their land, government forces continue to label CRIC as a subversive organization and to terrorize its members.

Another example can be found in Chile. Here in the late 1970's the Mapuche Indians formed the ADMAPU, a national organization which brings together 1,350 communities and aims at resisting government efforts to divide up their lands and communities. Like in Colombia, its members have become the targets of the police and right-wing death squads. In 1983 ADMAPU issued the Alternative Project for the Mapuche People which declared their desire for self-determination and for cooperation with other peasant and workers organizations in the creation of a new national constitution. In this way the Mapuche people have allied themselves with various forces fighting for democracy in Chile.

Beginning in the 1960's, Indians in Ecuador also began to organize themselves in an effort to defend their rights. The Shuar people of the Ecuador's Amazon Basin, for example, have organized themselves into the Shuar Federation which was founded in 1964 and which advocates self-determination by means of economic self-sufficiency, land rights and bi-lingual education (M. Becker 93:7). With the formation of a national indigenous organization in 1986, called the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE), a pan-Ecuadorian Indian movement was born. In 1990 this movement led to the largest indigenous peoples uprising ever and to the paralysis of the country for a week.

Another country in which a strong Indian movement has recently emerged is Brazil. At the turn of the century Indian affairs were handled by

the Service for the Protection of Indians (SPI) founded in 1910 by Candido Mariano Rondon with the aim of protecting the Indians and allowing them to maintain their own customs. This form of benevolent paternalism was terminated during the 1960's and SPI was replaced with the National Indian Federation (FUNAI), an agency of the Ministry of the Interior. Given that the director of FUNAI was to be an appointee of the President, it soon became clear that the new agency would be subject to political pressures and have little power to adopt an independent policy towards Brazilian Indians. The extent of the collusion between FUNAI and other branches of government became apparent during the mid-1960's which saw the launching of "Operation Amazon," a series of programs designed to integrate this region both socially and economically into the national fold. The proposed development projects included extensive road construction, hydro-electric schemes, mineral exploitation, timber-felling and deforestation for cattle rearing (J. Burger 87:106). Instead of representing the interests of the Indians, FUNAI took up the task of trying to integrate the Indians into national life as quickly as possible.

In response to this policy of assimilation, Brazilian Indians began to organize themselves in an effort to resist the encroachments of ranchers and lumberers onto their lands and to defend their way of life. During 1970's chiefs began to meet and in 1978 twenty three leaders representing thirteen nations met in Brasilia and agreed to unite to demand land rights (J. Burger 87: 110). Two years later the Union of Indian Nations (UNI) was formed by nine Indian leaders and by September of that year the organization had grown with the joining of thirty other Indian leaders. The main aims of UNI are to represent the interests of all the country's Indian nations to FUNAI, to promote cultural autonomy and self-determination, and to advise Indians on their rights (V. Heftler 89:5). In May 1987 UNI presented a proposal for an amendment to the Brazilian constitution which would make explicit native people's rights with respect to land, resources and socio-cultural determination (V. Heftler 89:6). Intensive lobbying resulted in an impressive Indian victory. The revised Brazilian Constitution included the recognition of their

original rights to their lands and offered them special protection against forced removal. In addition, their cultural rights were recognized and the National Congress became the guarantor of a new indigenous policy. Despite these victories, the Congress still voted down the article proclaiming Brazil a multi-ethnic state and Indian lands were not protected against mining interests, although it was stipulated that they could only be mined under special circumstances (D. Maybury-Lewis 89:4). In addition, Indians continue to be the subjects of violent attacks on the part of government forces, land speculators and ranchers. The attack on a Ticuna Indian meeting in March 1988 in the vicinity of the Sao Leopoldo area in which 14 unarmed Indians were reported dead and missing and 23 wounded is just one of the many examples of the violence that continues to be perpetrated against the Indian peoples of Brazil.

The type of uprisings described above is not exclusive to Latin America. In all regions of the world similar movements can be found. The launching of a trans-national movement, however, has been the result primarily of the efforts of Indians in liberal democratic nations, specifically in North America. Perhaps the most important factor which explains why North American Indians took the lead in the organization of the international movement has to do with the nature of civil and political society in this part of the world as compared to countries in the Third World. While it is true, as noted in the previous section, that the liberal welfare state had detrimental effects on the lives of indigenous peoples, breaking their communities, individualizing poverty and otherwise atomizing a way of life that was fundamentally communal, one must also recognize the fact that marginalized peoples in North America have had at their disposal social, ideological and political resources not available to their counterparts in other areas of the world. The emphasis of liberal welfare states on the protection of civil liberties, including the right to assembly, has permitted North American Indians a considerable degree of political freedom. In addition, health and welfare policies have served to redistribute funds to indigenous communities so that they have had access to financial resources which have aided them in their

organizing efforts. Finally, the mobilization of other sectors of civil society within industrialized nations, such as church groups, trade unions, student organizations, women's groups and peace and environmental activists, has not only inspired indigenous peoples to united action, but has also provided a network of support groups.

For these reasons it was in Canada and the United States that the momentum was generated for the launching of the indigenous struggle onto the international scene. Let us now take a closer look at the national movements in these two countries.

In the previous chapter we have characterized the Canadian situation in the late 1960's as one in which the national government, along with TNCs, made a concerted effort to gain effective economic and political control of the Canadian Northern regions, while provincial governments did likewise with Indian territories within their jurisdiction. In response, the Canadian Indians formed the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) in 1968. As a loose federation of provincial and territorial organizations, the NIB emerged during this time as the national spokesman for Canadian Indian concerns and interests. It also emerged as an effective organization gaining important victories by securing native representation to the Department of Indian and Northern Development, by obtaining a significant increase in federal funding for research on aboriginal rights and by improving Indian education.

The launching of an International Movement started in 1971 when George Manuel, president of NIB, announced his intention to organize a world conference of indigenous peoples. After holding a series of organizational meetings in Guyana and Denmark, which were attended by representatives from Latin America, Scandinavia and the U. S., it was decided that the conference should be hosted by the NIB in British Columbia. To expedite matters the NIB was granted for the occasion temporary NGO status by the United Nations with the understanding that should an international organization be created from this conference, the

NIB would transfer its status to the new organization (D. Sanders 77: 13).

In October 1975 fifty two delegates, one hundred and thirty five observers, twenty five members of the press and fifty four staff members gathered in an old government-run school for the first international indigenous conference ever held. At the end of the four day conference the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) had been created, with George Manuel as its first chairman. The jurisdiction of the organization was divided into four regions: Central America, South America, Europe-Greenland and South Pacific and a board was elected consisting of a representative from each area. The WCIP took over the NGO status granted to the NIB two years earlier. In this way the Canadian Indian Movement, represented by the NIB, played a crucial role in establishing the institutional foundations for the internationalization of the indigenous struggle (D. Sanders 77: 15).

Inspired in part by the black civil rights movement, the American Indian Movement was launched in July 1968. Unlike the Canadian, however, the movement was less centralized. Also, in the early years of the movement it was more confrontational. In November 1968 a group of Indians seized the abandoned island of Alcatraz in San Francisco Bay and occupied it for 18 months. Four years later, in 1972, Indian activists marched on Washington (the Trail of Broken Treaties). Government offices were occupied and the proper enforcement of treaties was demanded. Again a year later, a serious clash occurred at Wounded Knee when a group of Indian demonstrators occupied the village to commemorate the 1890 massacre of 300 unarmed Sioux people. Troops surrounded the village and at the end of the 71 day seige two Indians had been killed and many wounded. Wounded Knee has since become a symbol of the American *Indian* struggle for social justice and self-determination (J. Burger 87: 202).

In 1974, in an attempt to get Indian treaties with Canada and the United States recognized, the First International Indian Treaty Conference was organized. It attracted a large audience of approximately 5,000 North American *Indians and*

by, the end of the conference the International *Indian Treaty* Council (IITC) was formed and the "The Declaration of Continuing Independence" was signed. The declaration mandated that offices be opened across the country with the express purpose of internationalizing the indigenous struggle. The idea was to send representatives to various world conferences, sponsor seminars to educate traditional Indian leaders in international law and create an international network of political contacts. One step towards the internationalization of the Indian struggle was taken by the declaration itself when it proclaimed an alliance between the American Indians and the Puerto Rican people in their struggle for independence (R. Ortiz 84: 33) In 1977 the IITC gained NGO consultative status at the United Nations.

Thus, by 1975, two internationally-oriented indigenous institutions, the WCIP and the IITC, had been created in North America. Of these two institutions it was the first that, in due course, would spearhead the International Movement.

The increasing mobilization of indigenous peoples at the national level during the 1960's and 1970's did provoke a response from church groups, social activists and academics and as a consequence a number of organizations did emerge during this time with the aim of supporting the efforts of indigenous peoples. In the next few pages I shall describe some of the most active of these advocacy groups and in what ways they contributed to the formation of the International Indigenous Movement.

2. Advocacy Groups

The first group of people to rise in support of indigenous peoples were academics, most of whom were anthropologists. Through their efforts, a number of organizations were founded which today collectively seek to bring to the attention of the international community the plight of indigenous peoples through the publication of reports and the mobilization of interested individuals in their defence. These organizations also attempt to put pressure on international institutions that have anything to do with questions pertaining to

indigenous peoples and to look for funds to assist indigenous peoples organizations, both national and international (J. Bodley 90: 205).

The most famous of these organizations is the Anti-Slavery Society founded in 1839 by anthropologists. It was originally organized to fight the slave trade. As early as 1909, however, the Aborigines Protection Society was incorporated into the Anti-Slavery Society. Since then the Society has developed a program of research on indigenous peoples, issued numerous publications on the topic and organized international lobbying campaigns on their behalf. Having consultative status in the United Nations, the Anti-Slavery Society has done a great deal to bring the question of the indigenous peoples to the attention of the U. N. Sub-Commission's Working Group on Slavery (R. Ortiz 84: 58, J. Burger 87: 276).

The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), formed in 1968, is also the brainchild of anthropologists and it is led by the Norwegian Helge Kleivan. It is primarily a human rights organization which focuses exclusively on the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their independent way of life. Over the years its strategy has changed from pressuring governments to supporting indigenous organizations in their own lobbying efforts (R. Ortiz 84: 58, J. Burger 87: 276). It has produced a wide-ranging collection of documents and articles, in English and Spanish, dealing with indigenous peoples the world over: Central America, South America, Australia, India, the Philippines and Canada. It is also interested in sponsoring conferences and offers funds and logistical advice to indigenous leaders. Helge Kleivan played an important advisory role in the establishment of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples in 1975 and later, in the formation of the South American Indian Council, CISA. In 1989 the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs acquired non-governmental organization (NGO) status in the United Nations (IWGIA 88: 30).

There are two more organizations created by anthropologists worthy of mentioning. The first is Survival International founded in 1969 in London, England. Its main area of interest is South America

and the small unassimilated tribal communities that live there. It too has acquired consultative status with the United Nations and participates at international conferences.

Cultural Survival is the second organization. Founded in 1972 by Harvard University anthropologist David Maybury it is one of the most prominent pro-indigenous organizations in the United States. It seeks to inform the public about the problems facing indigenous peoples around the world and to influence at the national and international level policy-makers to undertake actions favourable to them. It also conducts research projects on indigenous issues, finances indigenous community projects and publishes a quarterly magazine, Cultural Survival, well known for its activist standpoint.

Although the intervention of the Church in favour of indigenous peoples has not been as systematic and constant as that of advocacy groups, it has taken initiatives on their behalf which have contributed significantly to the internationalization of the indigenous movement. We are referring here to the Protestant Church which, unlike the Catholic Church, has paid attention to the question of ethnicity in the Third World. The World Council of Churches (W.C.C.), an umbrella organization for Protestant dominations, organized a symposium on inter-ethnic conflict in Latin America. Held in Barbados in January 1971, this conference was attended mainly by anthropologists and church workers who ended the proceedings with the drafting of a document which called for the liberation of Indians in Latin America. The "Declaration of Barbados," as this document was called, accused national governments, missionaries and anthropologists, of oppressing and de-humanizing the indigenous peoples of Latin America. It called upon the governments of the region to create "a truly multi-ethnic state in which each ethnic group possesses the right to self-determination and the free selection of available social and cultural alternatives" (cited in R. Ortiz 84: 60). With regards to the role of the Church, it declared that evangelism is a colonialist ideology and that missionary work should be suspended or should be redirected to support Indian

self-determination. As well, the traditional role of anthropology was condemned and anthropologists were asked to become advocates of Indian liberation and to denounce policies of genocide and ethnocide. Perhaps the most interesting and innovative dimension of the "Barbados Declaration" came at the end when it asserted that only Indians can lead their own liberation movements and that advocacy, although important, had a limited role to play in the overall struggle for Indian self-determination (R. Ortiz 84: 60-1).

In July 1977 the World Council of Churches organized Barbados II as a follow up to the first Symposium. This time 20 of the 34 participants were Indian leaders from Latin America. Although the meeting had been envisaged as a dialogue between anthropologists and Indians, it actually turned out to be a conference of Indian leaders, with the anthropologists for the most part attending as silent observers (R. Ortiz 84: 61). Land was identified as the central aspect of the Indian problem and a call for unity and political organization was made by the participants. With regards to this last point, it was decided that lobbying at the international level was crucial to indigenous strategy.

B. The Movement: 1975-1990

Having described the institutional framework for the emergence of the International Indigenous Movement, I shall now turn to the development of the movement itself. While it would be impossible for me to list all the indigenous organizations that have been created over the last twenty years, or all the international meetings that have taken place, I will attempt to explain how one of the main organizations of this network, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), has evolved over the last fifteen years as it reflects the development of the movement as a whole. In addition, I will outline the overall "strategy" that has informed the dynamics of the movement until now. Finally, I will discuss some of the most important developments at the United Nations regarding indigenous peoples.

1. The Development of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples

From 1975, when it was founded, to the present, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples has held six world congresses or general assemblies and in the process has become the most important single organization of the movement. Three phases can be distinguished in its development which closely parallel the evolution of the Movement as a whole.

In the first phase, which went from 1975 to 1981, the WCIP concentrated its attention on expanding its membership, establishing itself as an international institution, and promoting the growth of regional organizations. From the very beginning the WCIP had a strong international base since many of its original supporters, as stated above, were from North America, the Arctic and the Pacific. The official joining of the Nordic Saami Council, a regional organization representing the Saami people of Scandinavia, contributed to the expansion of this base in 1976.

In 1977 the Second General Assembly of the WCIP took place in Sweden. In that year the WCIP expanded its membership to include two regional organizations, the Coordination of Indian Peoples of Central America (CORPI) and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC). Whereas the first established formal ties, the second preferred an informal but close relationship. Three years later, in 1980, the WCIP's membership once again grew when the South American Indian Council (CISA) and the Ainu people from Japan officially joined its ranks. By 1981, the year of the organization's Third General Assembly, the WCIP had not only managed to survive as an institution, but had extended its reach to include North America, Latin America, the Arctic, Scandinavia, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

In the second phase of its development, which starts roughly in 1981 and ends in 1984, the WCIP consulted widely with local and regional indigenous organizations and, more importantly, brought their concerns together into a political project, which by virtue of the fact that it questioned fundamental tenets of *Pax Americana*, can be called a "counter-hegemonic project." This process of

"ideology-building" had already begun during the first phase. The declaration issued at the First General Assembly proclaimed the need for governments to recognize "aboriginal titles" and their right to self-determination. No attempt was made, however, to specify the meaning of these two concepts. In the Second General Assembly, in 1977, a more detailed declaration on the subject of indigenous rights was published. While more attention was given to defining each right, the provisions concerning self-determination and political rights remained vague and undeveloped.

It was only in 1981 during the Third General Assembly that there was an attempt to draft a full-length convention on indigenous rights. This document, unlike the previous two, concentrated much more on the political implications of indigenous self-determination and attempted to outline the possible forms that it could take. Although it was eventually agreed that the resulting convention was too long and convoluted to be of much use within the context of the United Nations, it was the first sustained effort on the part of the WCIP to articulate the basic premises of a counter-hegemonic project (Interview with R. Contreras, August, 1991).

The most important step in the process of "ideology-building" was taken in 1984 during the Fourth General Assembly held in Panama. It was here that a comprehensive and detailed declaration which enumerated seventeen principles covering such issues as indigenous peoples' land rights, and cultural and political rights, (including self-determination) was produced. This document has since become the manifesto of the WCIP and one of the most important declarations of the International Movement. As can be seen, by 1984 the WCIP had come of age not only in terms of its institutional linkages, but also in terms of its ability to formulate an ideological agenda which reflected the concerns of all its representatives and which captured the essence of their aspirations.

The third stage in the development of the WCIP started in 1984 and continues on today. This period has been characterized by a reaffirmation of its role as the diplomatic spearhead of the

International Movement, by its efforts to bring into the Council the indigenous peoples of Asia and by a debate concerning the internal restructuring of the Council. By the time the Fifth General Assembly was held in Peru in 1987, a number of questions had arisen concerning the WCIP's role in the International Movement. One event that brought this question into the open was a diplomatic incident. Clem Chartier, then the President of the Council, had paid an unofficial visit to the rebellious Miskitu Indians in Nicaragua while the Council was conducting negotiations with the Sandinista government. Troubled by Chartier's unilateral action, some members of the Council argued that Chartier's trip had strained the discussions between the WCIP and the Sandinistas and thus it had put the diplomatic role of the WCIP in jeopardy. Others favoured the president's actions and argued that the main responsibility of the WCIP was to relate directly to the needs of indigenous peoples and not to pursue diplomatic relations with states. When the issue was finally put to a vote those advocating a strictly diplomatic role for the WCIP won a large majority and Chartier was removed from his position as President (IWGIA 87: 105).

Another area of ongoing concern for the WCIP relates to the question of membership which has been predominantly western-oriented. During the Fifth General Assembly in Peru it was unanimously agreed that representatives from Asia should be actively incorporated into the WCIP. To this end it was decided that more attention had to be given to obtaining information about the situation of tribal peoples in this region, such as the East Timorese, the West Papuans and the Moros peoples. This commitment has been reinforced by the WCIP's recent decision to try to have its next General Assembly in India (Interview with R. Contreras, August. 1991).

Last but not least, during the last Assembly, which took place in Norway in the summer of 1990, a debate concerning the internal restructuring of the Council was started and it is still ongoing today. Until then the members of the Council had identified themselves in terms of their state of origin. Unhappy with this, many delegations

expressed the wish to adopt a system of representation according to ethnicity. Instead of being identified as Peruvian or Bolivian Indians, for instance, members wanted to be regarded as representatives of the Quechua or Aymara nations" (Interview with R. Contreras, August. 1991).

If accepted, such a proposal would have several implications. Firstly, it would involve a whole restructuring of the WCIP, which would present a host of logistical problems. Many indigenous "nations," such as the Quechua people, are dispersed over several countries and do not have regional organizations to unite them institutionally. To find leaders to represent the whole "nation," therefore, would be a difficult task. Secondly, membership based on ethnicity would imply that the WCIP no longer recognizes the existence of nation-states which in turn would put in jeopardy the role of the Council as a mediator between states and indigenous peoples. As indicated above, the debate continues.

2. The Expanding Network of Indigenous Organizations

Let me now turn to examine other indigenous organizations which have worked to advance the interests of indigenous peoples at the international level independently from the Council. In effect, while the Council went through the stages we have just described, other indigenous organizations developed to the point that by 1987 eight of them had achieved consultative status with the United Nations.

As indicated earlier, one of the first of these was the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC). Despite its erratic leadership, the IITC has provided invaluable contributions to the drafting of several joint indigenous declarations and has submitted clear, informative statements to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, a specialized body established in 1982 with the purpose of addressing the concerns of indigenous peoples.

Another organization that has been active at the United Nations is the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) established in 1977. A spin-off

from the WCIP's regional organizing efforts, it includes Inuits from Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Like the IITC, this Inuit organization has been quite active in international forums and has participated in the formulation of several seminal indigenous declarations.

Yet another organization that has worked with the United Nations is the Indian Law Resource Centre (ILRC). Founded in 1978 in the United States, it received its UN consultative status in 1981. Its main purpose is to carry on litigation for Indian groups seeking legal recourse. Although it is not as visible as the IITC in its lobbying efforts, the ILRC is the only indigenous organization to have filed communications and complaints with the UN Commission on Human Rights, the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the UN Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (R. Ortiz 84: 38).

Less important for our purposes, the remaining indigenous organizations with consultative status at the U. N. are: the Indian World Association, the Four Directions Council, The National Aborigine and Islander Services Secretariat, the National Indian Youth Council and the Grand Council of Crees from Quebec, which is the first indigenous "nation" to receive UN status as a non-governmental organization (ICIHI 87: 33).

As can be seen, all the vast majority of indigenous institutions that make up the International Movement today are of western origin with the exception of the Australian Secretariat. This state of affairs is in the process of changing however. As early as 1975 the first Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Conference (NFIP) was held in Fiji with the double aim of supporting the growing anti-nuclear movement and of demanding political independence from the United States, France and Britain for their colonies in the Pacific. Over the next few years the NFIP expanded in size, and by 1983, organized a second international conference which produced "The Charter for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific." Arguing that the peoples of this part of the world were

subject to neo-colonialism by foreign, racist powers and that the environment and inhabitants of the region were being devastated by the testing of nuclear weapons, the declaration called for the creation of a nuclear free zone and the withdrawal of the colonial powers in the region. The document also included resolutions in support of the self-determination movements of Central America, East Timor, Philippines, West Papua and New Caledonia (R. Moody 88: 84).

The tribal peoples of Asia have also become increasingly active at the international level over the last few years. As indicated earlier, the Ainu from Japan joined the WCIP in 1980 and from 1987 on they have been attending the annual sessions of the UN Working Group. The Moro and Igorot peoples of the Philippines have also been attending regularly the international meetings. In addition, by 1989, the Karen of Burma, the West Papuans and representatives of the Jana Samhati Samiti from Bangladesh had presented their case to the UN Working Group. Reacting to this activity, since 1987 the WCIP has turned its attention to the situation in Asia, and the oppression of the West Papuans and East Timorese is now firmly on its agenda (J. Burger 87: 60). Moreover, the choice of India for the WCIP's next General Assembly is further evidence of this concern. Finally, the plight of Asia's tribal peoples is now becoming the subject of attention for western NGOs. The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, for example, is now producing documentation on the cases of indigenous peoples in Burma, India, West Papua, East Timor, Bangladesh and Tibet.

This characterization of the Asian situation is not complete without reference to the First International Indigenous Women's Conference held in Australia on July 7, 1989. The meeting was organized by a group of Australian Aboriginal women and attended by 1,500 indigenous women from countries such as Japan, New Zealand, Torres Strait Islanders, Philippines, Norway, Sweden, the United States and Australia. The topics of the conference included the militarization of indigenous communities across Asia and the Pacific, the creation of nuclear-free zones, racism, lesbianism, education and land rights. Its agenda was

particularly interesting because it combined issues relevant not only to indigenous peoples, but also to women, peace activists, homosexuals, environmentalists and educators. Future plans include a second international indigenous women's conference and the creation of an Indigenous Women's Council, which would then apply for NGO consultative status with the United Nations.

Beyond the mobilization of indigenous peoples in Asia and the Pacific, there have also been signs that the International Indigenous Movement will soon be joined by indigenous peoples from Eastern Europe and Africa, two regions of the world that have so far remained outside the movement. At the end of 1989 the first indigenous institution in the Soviet Union was officially established in Moscow. This organization, called Arun, represents the 25,000 Saami people living in the Kola Peninsula and has already established links with the WCIP through the Nordic Saami Council (IWGIA 89: 228-9). Furthermore, in the same year the situation of indigenous peoples in Africa was presented for the first time to the U. N. Working Group on Indigenous Peoples by a representative of the Maasai people from Tanzania (IWGIA 89: 10).

3. The "Polycephalous" Strategy of the International Indigenous Movement

So far, I have discussed the development of the International Indigenous Movement in terms of its participants and its institutional links. At this point there is need for some discussion of the overall "strategy" that this movement has adopted to promote its cause within the global arena.

By using the term "strategy" we do not mean to imply that the indigenous leaders of various organizations have convened and consciously devised a single long-term course of action. So far, there is no evidence for this. On the contrary, apart from the WCIP, there seems to have been very little centralized, explicit planning of this type by indigenous leaders. By "strategy" then, we understand the overall mode of functioning of the indigenous organizations. To make this concept clear, it might be useful to pause briefly and consider an interesting theoretical insight put

forward by V. Hine and L. Gerlach which, although it concerns local and national social movements, seem to be applicable to the case of the International Indigenous Movement.

Gerlach and Hine have done research on a wide range of movements of the "powerless" around the world. They argue that regardless of the content of these movements - political, religious, social - they all have the same formal structure. The "segmented polycephalous network" (SPN), as Gerlach and Hine call this structure, is a multitude of "cells" of varying sizes, each linked to all the others either directly or indirectly. While some of these cells are hierarchically organized bureaucracies recognized publicly as regional, national or even international organizations, the majority of them are local groups ranging from a few members to several hundred. Some are organized in conventional ways, while others are face-to-face groups that come and go. Describing the benefits of this decentralized structure, Hine writes:

The multitude of nodes or cells within a movement structure can be loosely lumped into segments which hang together ideologically or in terms of preferred tactics. This factionalism functions to escalate the speed with which the movement grows and to bring about changed responses from the "establishment" more effectively than any one segment could do alone. In addition, factionalism prevents takeover by any one segment through the mechanism of temporary coalitions between other segments to offset attempted control by one" (V. Hine 77: 19 cited in E. Boulding 79: 266).

The key element in maintaining this rather disorderly, decentralized network of interconnected organizational units is the existence of an advanced communications technology which allows even the smallest peripheral group to keep in touch with the activities of those in the centre. This communication technology has also allowed interest groups and

movements of all types to be pulled into a global network, in which they can exchange ideas and at times build links with each other. In this way similar local movements around the world can create international linkages and different types of movements can work in concert when it is in their interest to do so.

What Gerlach and Hine call "segmented polycephalous network" is applicable to the International Indigenous Movement. On the whole the momentum of this movement comes predominantly from the activities of local and national organizations at the global level as opposed to coming from one or two centralized international institutions. In other words, we are dealing, fundamentally, with grassroots movements which have gradually acquired, through networking, international dimensions. As we have seen earlier, the WCIP is the only indigenous institution of a truly global nature. Most of the other prominent actors at the international level are local or national, issue-oriented organizations, like the International Indian Treaty Council or the Indian Law Resource Centre.

It may be argued that the so-called "polycephalous" strategy is a temporary phenomenon and that, as the International Indigenous Movement develops, it will become more centralized. This does not seem to be the case as the trend towards decentralization is growing rather than diminishing. We have already seen how members of the WCIP would much rather represent "peoples" than states. A further indication of this tendency would be that all but one of the five regional" organizations affiliated to the WCIP have now become defunct. Only the Nordic Saami Council has managed to continue as an active organization and perhaps this is only because it involves one "nation" of people, all living in close proximity. The breakdown of the regional organizational network is not, however, an indication of a disunited movement, but rather a reflection of the incompatibility of a hierarchical, bureaucratic, western-style organization with a movement grounded on diversity and pluralism.

This "polycephalous" strategy has a number of advantages. To begin with, it creates an international context in which the presentation of indigenous issues is constant and pervasive. The large number of indigenous organizations involved at present at the international level permits "a division of labour" and, as a result, a presence has been maintained in a wide variety of international forums, and conferences.

Also, by pursuing a "polycephalous" strategy, the indigenous organizations cannot be easily neutralized. At the International Labour Organization Conference in 1988, for example, there were at least three groups within the indigenous caucus. The most militant group, the Aborigines from Australia, withdrew from the Conference arguing that the ILO was not interested in reforming ILO Convention No. 107. The other groups represented by the WCIP and the ICC remained, however, and continued to negotiate. In this way two things were achieved simultaneously: the militants made a moral point while the moderates kept the negotiating process going.

Another advantage of the "polycephalous" approach is that it has lessened the chances of indigenous leaders being co-opted by 'establishment' forces. As, except for the WCIP, there are no indigenous groups or organizations recognized as more representative than others, it is impossible for governments or intergovernmental bodies to control the International Movement. A last point in favour of the approach in question is that it has prevented the Movement from becoming bureaucratized and has allowed it to retain its spontaneity and flexibility.

The advantages just described are counterbalanced, however, by several drawbacks. One of the most frequent criticisms leveled against indigenous movements is that they are disunited and disorganized. While it is true that the lack of centralized planning does create the impression that there is no coordination among indigenous organizations, it would be false to assume that they are disunited with regards to their goals. Of course, indigenous peoples, like any other group of people struggling to defend a cause, do have differing

opinions on a number of specific issues. In general, however, if one examines their declarations issued over the last fifteen years, one finds a remarkable degree of agreement on central issues. This consensus not only includes indigenous peoples from the west, but also those from Asia and the South Pacific.

A more serious drawback is that, lacking a centralized structure; the movement wastes scarce resources and routinely duplicates efforts. Often the U. N. Working Group, an organization we shall discuss below, can be overburdened with indigenous representatives from the same regions, but from different organizations, making very similar statements. This redundancy tends to create a situation in which rhetoric, as opposed to substance, dominates the proceedings.

A final problem with decentralization has to do with the fact that, in some ways the role of the WCIP has been overtaken by the UN Working Group. Although it has been difficult to co-opt the indigenous leadership precisely because there is no elite core, it has been easier for this U. N. body to usurp the position of the WCIP as an international forum in which indigenous peoples can meet to discuss their problems. Considering that the UN Working Group has no legislative power and is at the bottom of a hierarchy of bureaucracies, allowing it to become the main venue within the UN context for indigenous complaints and demands could seriously impair the momentum of the International Indigenous Movement. Aware of this problem, the WCIP is now considering ways to redirect indigenous resources and efforts along a wider number of channels at the international level.

4. The United Nations: The Battleground of International Indigenous Movement

In the course of our account of the International Indigenous Movement we have mentioned in passing a number of U. N. organizations among which is the U. N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations. We shall now turn our attention to these institutions for a while since, in a real sense, the United Nations has been

for some time now the main battleground for the International Indigenous Movement.

The event which marked the beginning of direct activity on the part of indigenous peoples within the context of the U. N. was the "International Non-Governmental Organizations Conference on Indigenous Peoples of the Americas," held in Geneva in 1977. The event was organized under the auspices of the Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Colonialism, which is a Special NGO Committee on Human Rights. More than 100 Indian representatives from all over the Americas and approximately 50 NGOs with consultative status at the United Nations and 38 member countries participated in the conference (R. Ortiz 84: 29).

The conference drew up a number of recommendations. Perhaps the most important was the proposal to create the Working Group on Indigenous Populations as part of the UN Sub Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities. Another proposal was that there should be a second international NGO conference on indigenous peoples and their relationship to the land. A third proposal was that the UN Special Committee on Decolonization holds hearings on all issues affecting indigenous peoples. Finally, it was strongly suggested that an investigation be undertaken on the role of TNCs in the dispossession of Indian lands. While the first three recommendations were acted upon relatively promptly, the last was quietly set aside (R. Ortiz 84: 30).

In addition to helping formulate these recommendations, the indigenous participants submitted a declaration of their own entitled "Draft Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere." This declaration, along with the WCIP Declaration of 1984, constitutes the core of what we have called the indigenous counter hegemonic project. We shall have the opportunity to analyze the content of these documents in some detail in Chapter Four of this paper.

Returning to our account of indigenous issues at the United Nations, the second "International NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land" was held in Geneva in 1981. Six indigenous organizations were invited: the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), the Indian Law Resource Centre (ILRC), the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Australian National Conference of Aborigines and the South American Indian Council (CISA). In addition, nearly 50 NGOs with U. N. consultative status and several non-indigenous liberation movements such as the PLO, SWAPO, FMLN and a Nicaraguan delegation were also present at the conference. Due to a call by the United States for a government boycott of the conference, only Norway attended it officially, though other countries sent unofficial representatives. Clearly the high level of attendance at the conference and the attempt by the United States to discredit it were a sign that the International Indigenous Movement was becoming a topic of global concern by the early eighties.

The conference covered five issues, which included land rights, international treaties, land reform, indigenous philosophy and the impact of the nuclear arms build up. Once again a recommendation was made for the establishment of a UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations. (R. Ortiz 84: 32).

In 1982 the recommendation of the two international NGO conferences to create a specialized organization dealing exclusively with indigenous peoples rights was implemented and the Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established. Today this UN body is the main international arena where indigenous lobbies converge.

As a subsidiary body of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, the Working Group's five members are independent experts appointed by governments and members of the Sub-Commission. While normally only NGOs with UN consultative status can speak at official meetings, the Working Group is open to all

indigenous representatives and, in fact, is the only forum in the U. N. which permits all representatives of NGOs to participate freely (J. Burger 87: 266).

The main purpose of the Working Group is two-fold: to review national developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of indigenous human rights and to develop international standards concerning those rights. In terms of the first goal, the Working Group receives reports from a variety of sources, including government representatives, specialized agencies, other U. N. bodies, regional intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and indigenous delegates, and attempts to assess existing national standards for the protection of indigenous peoples. In terms of the second goal, the Working Group has been preparing since 1985 a draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, a document which is due to be presented to the UN General Assembly for approval in 1993. Besides dealing with rights and freedoms, this document must also recommend procedures for resolving disputes between indigenous peoples and states (U. N. Fact Sheet No. 9, 90: 8-9).

Over the years, the Working Group has attracted a lot of attention from indigenous groups and sympathetic NGOs. In 1988 and 1989 three hundred and eighty to four hundred persons attended its sessions (U. N. Centre for Human Rights 90: 7). Moreover, a number of recommendations made by the Working Group have been implemented fairly quickly. In 1988, for example, on the advice of the Working Group, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities abandoned the term "indigenous populations" for that of "indigenous peoples." As we shall see later on, other UN bodies, such as the ILO, have strongly resisted adopting this term. In addition, the Working Group's proposal that 1993 be proclaimed an international year for indigenous peoples has been approved by the UN General Assembly.

Despite its usefulness as a forum for indigenous peoples, as we suggested earlier, there are a number of problems with indigenous peoples relying exclusively on the Working Group to defend and promote their rights. It is not a court of law and,

therefore, it cannot hear specific complaints with the aim of making decisions on these cases. It is, in fact, only the last link in a long bureaucratic chain of UN organizations. Any proposals made by the Working Group must first go to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities for approval, then to the Commission on Human Rights and then to the Economic and Social Council. Once the proposal is passed at all of these three levels it still needs to be discussed and voted on by the UN General Assembly.

Given the bureaucratic bottleneck, the increasing reliance of indigenous peoples on this organization as the sole protector of their rights has been a source of great concern to all interested parties. As mentioned earlier, the WCIP is presently trying to address this problem by opening new venues for the International Indigenous Movement within the international arena in general and within the UN in particular (Interview with R. Contreras, August. 1991).

In addition to being part of a formidable bureaucratic maze, the Working Group does not have its own independent source of information. It relies mainly on governmental reports which are usually biased and which generally promote euro centric attitudes towards ethnic peoples. Furthermore, the predominant role of western indigenous representatives has made it difficult for the organization to get an overall perspective on the global situation. This trend may change in the near future as more representatives from Asia are now traveling to its annual sessions.

The fact that the Working Group holds its annual sessions in Geneva has made it very difficult for all but the most financially solvent indigenous organizations to send representatives. This difficulty has been partially solved by the establishment of a voluntary fund for indigenous peoples which provides financial assistance to representatives of indigenous communities who have no financial resources. The existence of this fund has made it possible to increase the number of indigenous nations represented at the Working Group and, thus, to expand the international indigenous network. In

1988 and 1989 the fund assisted twenty-seven and thirty-nine indigenous representatives respectively from over twenty countries (U. N. Fact Sheet No. 9, 90: 10).

So far, we have focused our attention on the activities and development of the UN Working Group from its inception in 1982 onwards. Let us now turn to another development of importance, which took place within the U. N. between 1986 and 1989. We are referring to the revision of the "Convention on The Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (Convention 107) undertaken by the International Labor Organization (ILO).

The revision had to do with the original position of Convention No. 107, ratified in 1957, which had defined indigenous peoples as "less advanced" and had recommended their assimilation into the dominant society. The process went through three stages: a meeting of ILO experts in 1986, a general ILO meeting in 1988 and a second general meeting in 1989.

Very early on in the first meeting it was agreed that the integrationist terminology of Convention 107 would have to be abandoned. It became apparent, however, that there was no consensus about exactly what type of approach would be suitable to replace the old assimilationist line.

The defenders of one approach -- the ILO Secretariat, the representatives of Employers and the representatives of some Governments -- argued that it was necessary not to antagonize governments by granting excessive power to indigenous peoples, as it would be impossible to get the amendment ratified. The defenders of the second approach -- mainly the representatives of indigenous organizations -- insisted instead on the need for the ILO to proclaim the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination.

In the end, the ILO Meeting of Experts concluded with a compromise of sorts. On the one hand, it recommended that indigenous peoples

should enjoy as much control as possible over their own economic, social and cultural development. On the other hand, while stipulating that indigenous land rights be recognized and that the authority of states to appropriate their lands be limited, it nevertheless allowed the state to take over these lands in exceptional circumstances (ICHI 87: 164).

Two years later, in June of 1988, the general ILO were government delegations, employers and workers. In addition, there was a small indigenous caucus which was allowed to participate in the proceedings and two non-indigenous NGOs that had observer status. Of the three parties representing the ILO, it was the workers who were the most sympathetic to the interests of the indigenous caucus. At the other extreme were the employers who united in opposing any radical departures from the traditional convention. In between were the governments delegations which were divided into three groups. On the progressive side were the Scandinavian countries, Australia, Argentina and Peru. On the opposite end were India, Brazil and Bangladesh. Taking a relatively moderate stand were the United States and Canada (IWGIA 88: 170).

It must be noted that the indigenous caucus was not united either. As indicated earlier, the National Coalitions of Aboriginal Organizations from Australia, objecting to the conservative approach of the ILO, withdrew while the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the Four Directions Council and the Indigenous World Organization took on a more conciliatory approach and remained. In between these two positions were the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Metis National Council and the Nordic Saami Council. Although these last three groups agreed in substance with the stand taken by the Aborigines, they decided that it was important to negotiate (IWGIA 88: 175-76).

In the summer of 1989, the last meeting of the revision process took place and on June 27 of that year the ILO approved Convention 169, the revised version of Convention 107 on Tribal and Indigenous Peoples. The final product has received mixed reviews. Angry at the fact that indigenous representatives were relegated to the sidelines

throughout much of the proceedings and claiming that the so called improvements were minimal, some indigenous organizations have denounced the Convention as euro centric, paternalistic and racist. Not content with these strictures, these organizations have called upon all states not to ratify it and have requested the UN Working Group to ignore it as a precedent for the drafting of the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples Rights (IWGIA 89: 196-7). The new Convention, however, has not been universally condemned. The WCIP, for instance, considers it a step in the right direction. There are other indigenous organizations that agree with this sentiment (Interview with R. Contreras August, 1991).

Let us conclude by saying that the International Indigenous Movement, launched with the First Assembly of the WCIP in 1975, has evolved from being almost an exclusively western struggle to one that now includes parts of Asia and even Africa. While in the mid-seventies indigenous questions were an "exotic" item in international conferences and institutions, today it is difficult to find an international gathering -- be that on environmental issues, colonization, labour, children, women, nuclear arms or education -- which does not incorporate indigenous representation.

This remarkable progress notwithstanding, there remains considerable resistance to the political project of the International Indigenous Movement. While it is relatively easy for UN agencies to acknowledge that indigenous peoples have been oppressed and that laws are needed to protect them, it has been far more difficult for them to accord legitimacy to a "world view" which, while asserting indigenous identity, has challenged the fundamental values of our contemporary "world order configuration." Let us now turn to this "world view" in order to find out in what sense it does represent a counter-hegemonic project.

IV) THE COUNTER-HEGEMONIC PROJECT: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES VS. OLD "-ISMS"

Given that the bulk of indigenous peoples form part of dominated and exploited groups

everywhere, there is a danger that what we have identified as their political project is seen merely as a reactive stance, that is, only as a function of the hegemonic project of *Pax Americana*. In fact, this is not the case. Of course, indigenous peoples have reacted against domination and exploitation either through retreat or confrontation: attacks, riots, rebellions and so on. They have also, however, particularly in the last few decades, moved beyond mere reaction and have proposed a political project of their own which is counter-hegemonic in at least two ways. First, it challenges the ideological/normative foundations of all three "historical structures" of *Pax Americana*. Second, it represents an attempt on the part of indigenous peoples not simply to reject the "modern" western world, but in fact to appropriate certain western liberal concepts, (e.g. "development"), and redefine them in an effort to formulate a pluralistic, non-euro centric basis for an alternative world order."

A. "Social Forces": Indigenous Peoples vs. Capitalism and Socialism

According to Cox, as we have seen, the dominant social force today is an elite capitalist class which controls the running of inter-governmental banks and transnational corporations and which sets the parameters for the conceptualization and operation of the international economic regime. The Indigenous Peoples Movement has emerged as an opposing social force which is not only challenging existing forms of development, such as capitalism and socialism, but it is also proposing an alternative vision of economic progress.

1. The Ideological Tension Between the Indigenous World View and Capitalism

The capitalist concept of development rests on a uni-linear evolutionary model of history in which western capitalist societies are portrayed, relative to underdeveloped societies, as having reached the final stage of development. This teleological interpretation of progress leaves no room for alternative models of development and has generated its own "expert discourse," the modernization theories of the fifties, to legitimize itself.

The capitalist concept of development also means industrial capitalism, the predominance of the individual over the community, the emphasis of profit over redistribution, and the importance of consumption over resource management. The central social actor in capitalist societies is the individual entrepreneur, whose competitive instincts and incessant drive to produce new and improved commodities provide the main source of momentum needed to maintain an expanding system of production and profit. Furthermore, while the imperative of increasing profits has not completely eclipsed concerns for social welfare and the redistribution of wealth, it has certainly overshadowed them. Finally, capitalism promotes a culture of never-ending consumption that has unleashed a frenzied process of mass production while no provision has been made to protect scarce and finite resources.

This understanding of "progress" has contributed to the emergence of centralized, class-based, highly secular, homocentric and expansionistic societies, in which quantitative criteria (i.e., levels of production and consumption), rather than qualitative (i.e., degree of social satisfaction and levels of social justice), dominate the assessment of development. It is this model of progress that has been conveyed to Third World countries first through colonialism and, later, through foreign aid programs.

As opposed to a linear, teleological western model of history, indigenous peoples entertain a multi-causal, cyclical view of the world and of history. Their historical reference points simultaneously cover past, present and future to the extent that their lives in the present are directed towards preserving the spirits of their ancestors and ensuring a future for the next generations (IWGIA 86: 137).

Indigenous peoples also have a profoundly spiritual conception of the world, which tends to focus on the interrelatedness of all life, including man, land, animals and objects. Human beings are seen as linked both to the natural environment and to each other through a spiritual bond. Society is

based on a spiritual contract which is seen less as a conscious agreement between individuals than as an essential realization of man's basic human nature and of his Creator's divine purpose. For indigenous peoples, man is not the centre of the universe, but only one part of a much greater whole.

Within this cosmocentric view of the world, the land for indigenous peoples takes on a sacred quality that is absent in western thinking and it is this spiritual bond with the earth that is one of the crucial markers that distinguish indigenous societies from others. For indigenous peoples the land is at once an economic resource and a cultural base. This fundamental interconnection between the economic and the cultural dimensions of life sharply contrasts with the capitalist concept of "development" which is seen exclusively as an economic process. As J. Mohawk, a Canadian Indian, explains:

Culture and economy are inseparable. A lot of people today have come to accept the colonial definition of culture as referring to music, dress and language. But cultures are inconceivable without an economic base. Even spiritual life revolves to a considerable extent around the ways that people see their lives supported. In the absence of culture, there can be no economy. In the absence of economy, there is no culture. All that remains is the memory of culture (cited in R. Moody 88: 183-84).

In a similar vein, the First Circumpolar Conference representing indigenous peoples from Canada, Alaska, Greenland, Norway, and Sweden declared:

We are autochthonous peoples, that is, we are an integral part of the very lands and waters we have traditionally used and occupied. Our identity and culture is firmly rooted in these lands and waters. It is this relationship which constitutes the very unique feature of our cultural identity in contrast to the cultures of

other peoples within each of the countries from which we come (cited in J. Bodley 90: 174).

In general, the economies of indigenous peoples are small-scale, non-hierarchical, based on collective or mutual labour practices and usually geared to the satisfaction of basic needs. As most indigenous communities have no concept of private property, land is owned collectively and the sum total of the community's labour is redistributed among its members according to a variety of cultural mechanisms. As a result of this relative internal social equality, there is no incentive to increase economic production beyond the needs of local subsistence. This, in turn, together with the respect that indigenous peoples have for their land, permit them to conserve their eco-systems for long-term use. One Indian delegate at the 1981 NGO Conference compared indigenous economic traditions to those of western industrialized societies in the following way:

We who have tried to take from Mother Earth only what we need, and to replace what we have taken with an offering to her, have had our land base eroded and stolen by industrial societies whose way of life seems at times to be a frenzy of destruction and consumption, whose greed causes them to fight with each other over the spoils of a spoiled earth (cited in J. Burger 87: 15).

Given their very different perspectives on development, it is not surprising that there has been a long and deep-seated conflict between indigenous peoples and capitalist forces. As one of the foremost institutions involved in large scale development projects, the World Bank has been at the centre of this conflict. In 1982, as a response to the growing strength of the indigenous movement, it issued a report entitled "Tribal Peoples and Economic Development: Human Ecological Considerations." The report, which has strong paternalistic and assimilationist tendencies, argues that indigenous peoples will be eventually "developed" and that governments should implement "intermediate

safeguards" in order to allow them to adapt sufficiently (J. Bodley 90: 189). It goes on to argue that the most favourable outcome of the clash between indigenous peoples and TNCs would be for indigenous communities to become "accepted ethnic minorities" and for international capitalist institutions to respect as much as possible indigenous rights to the land. Despite its assimilationist bent the report represents the first attempt of an international economic agency to address the issue of aboriginal rights directly.

The World Bank's interest with indigenous questions was short lived, however. Two years after the publication of the document we have just described, it was reprinted with a disclaimer stating that it was unofficial. Then in 1986 a representative of the World Bank at the ILO Experts Meeting declared that the report did not express the official policy of the Bank and that in fact the official guidelines pertaining to the treatment of indigenous peoples were secret. The representative went on to reveal at least part of this secret policy by stating that it was not fair to give special privileges to indigenous peoples when other minorities did not enjoy the same consideration (IWGIA 86: 143).

The idea that indigenous peoples are an obstacle to development is also widely held by the political and administrative leaders- of ~ First and Third World capitalist states. In 1975 the Governor of the state of Roraima in Brazil, for instance, answering criticisms about prospecting companies on Yanomani Indian lands, said:

An area as rich as this with gold, diamonds and uranium cannot afford the luxury of preserving half a dozen Indian tribes who are holding back development (ICIHI 87: 44).

Confronting this wall of opposition, indigenous peoples have made some attempts to ally themselves with what we could call the capitalist underclass. In the Philippines, for example, the Igorot tribal peoples, have publicly declared their, desire to work with other national minorities and sectors in order to protect the land from the activities of big capitalist interests. Again,

in 1983, The South American Indian Council (CISA) issued a statement in which it called for an alliance of all oppressed and exploited sectors of society to join with the South American Indians to fight for national liberation and self-determination (cited in R. Moody 88: 146).

Conversely, poor landless peasants have also organized themselves in many Latin American countries and have invited the participation of local Indians in their struggles against the wealthy landowners. More often than not, however, these peasant movements have adopted socialist ideologies and, although indigenous peoples did attempt to associate with these leftist movements during the 1960's, these tentative alliances did not last long. In the next section we shall examine some of the reasons for this incompatibility between indigenous peoples and leftist-oriented movements.

2. The Ideological Tensions Between the Indigenous World View and Socialism

The main reason for the move away from socialism on the part of indigenous peoples has to do with the realization that the premises of revolutionary Marxism in many ways echo those of capitalism. Both paradigms share a teleological approach to history which upholds industrialization as the necessary precondition for economic development. In effect, as in the case of the capitalist ideology, "*the core of Marx's economic analysis, as of his theory, was an elemental belief in the superiority and hence in the necessity of large-scale production*" (D. Mitrany 50: 10). This commitment to large-scale production, however, militates against the indigenous way of life, which, as we have stated, is small-scale and oriented towards subsistence production. From the Marxist point of view the economic traditions of indigenous peoples are the epitome of inefficiency and backwardness.

In terms of social organization, both socialism and capitalism tend to generate highly centralized, materialistic, homocentric societies, the main difference being that the socialist state has the function of redistributing wealth, while the capitalist one has only the responsibility of ensuring

its generation. Moreover, both systems are expansionistic and neither is concerned with the fact that the earth's resources are finite. Once again, there is little common ground on which indigenous peoples and socialists can meet since the imperatives of industrial society, whether capitalist or socialist, clash with the decentralized, spiritual, cosmocentric nature of the indigenous way of life.

One final difficulty with indigenous peoples adopting socialism is that it neglects the agency of culture and ethnicity in the origin and development of social relations. As Russell Means, a leading activist in the North American Indian Movement, says:

Revolutionary Marxism, as with industrial society in other forms, seeks to 'traditionalize' all people in relation to industry, maximum industry, maximum production. It is a materialist doctrine which despises the American Indian's spiritual tradition, our cultures, our life ways (cited in J. Burger 87: 53).

3. An Indigenous Alternative to Western Development

Having characterized the conflict between indigenous economic attitudes and the two predominant western concepts of development, capitalism and socialism, we shall now describe in more detail the alternative economic model of indigenous peoples. As indicated earlier, we shall do so by referring to various declarations and collective statements issued by indigenous peoples over the years, of which some have been identified in Chapter Three. One such document is the "Declaration of Principles for the Defence of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere" signed in 1977. Another is the "Declaration of Principles" signed at the Fourth World Congress of the WCIP in 1984. A third is a declaration entitled "Demands of Indigenous Peoples" written by the International Indian Treaty Council in 1983. Two final sources are the "First Revised Text of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" prepared by the UN

Working Group and a written commentary by indigenous organizations on this particular text.

We have already discussed the core ideas behind the indigenous economic model, that is, the production for use and not profit, the wide distribution of goods and services and the conservation of resources for long-term use. What we need to examine now is the way in which indigenous peoples propose to apply these ideas in order to develop the natural and human resources within their territories.

The fundamental demand of indigenous peoples in this connection is that they, and not the states in which they live, should have control over their lands and territories. To this end they want their exclusive rights to their land and resources ("aboriginal title") recognized. These land rights include the following: surface and sub-surface soil, bodies of water, air, and the right to hunt, fish trap, gather and harvest. An implication of this is that no state can claim or retain indigenous territories or use the land in any way unless a valid treaty has been agreed to by both sides. Furthermore, indigenous people demand that it be unlawful for any state to take any actions that will result in the destruction, deterioration or pollution of any natural resources on their lands ("Declaration of Principles for the Defence of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere," 1977; "Declaration of Principles" (WCIP), 1984; "Declaration of Principles," 1985; "The Demands of Indigenous Peoples" (IITC), 1983).

Along with complete jurisdiction over their territories, indigenous peoples also seek control over the development of technology and its application. To this end, they demand the right to authorize all technological and scientific investigations conducted within their territories and to have full access to the results. Contrary to popular belief, indigenous peoples do not wish to return to a "golden age of nativism" and are more than willing to adapt and improve their methods of surviving. Many Inuits, for example, use the snowmobile to help them carry out their hunting. What they do want to prevent, however, is the possibility that technological development becomes

a dominating force in their communities and that, instead of helping them to carry out their traditional practices more efficiently, it would simply eradicate them altogether. The type of technology that indigenous peoples are interested in promoting is low-cost, ecologically-sound, labour-intensive, and easily applicable to production for local consumption. In addition, the technology would have to be under the control of the community and made out of locally available resources. Lastly, it is important to them that the new technologies be flexible as well as compatible with the cultural assumptions of the community (R. Moody 88: 184).

Apart from having control over their territories and technology, indigenous peoples also want control over the production process. Keenly aware that Tics have gone into their lands in search of non-renewable resources, indigenous peoples propose a strategy of economic development based primarily on renewable resources. It is only by concentrating on using resources which are renewable and exploiting non-renewable ones with great care that humankind can provide for itself and protect the eco-system at the same time.

How can these ideas contribute to contemporary conceptualizations of economic development? One obvious way refers to the need to reconsider the role of human beings in the process of economic development. Both liberal and socialist theories portray economic progress to be an inevitable, impersonal force which unfolds in stages according to some grand design. Indigenous peoples are arguing instead for a different understanding of development, which sees it as a process guided by the conscious decisions and actions of people in an effort to realize certain basic human needs. This view militates against the "growth for its own sake" models and supports a more cautious and disciplined approach to economic development.

Another contribution has to do with the environment. Reflecting their cosmocentric view of the world, indigenous peoples argue that it is impossible to consider any form of development, economic or otherwise, without taking into account the welfare of the environment. The latter, they

argue, is not simply the context in which economic development takes place, but the actual source of that development. Accordingly, there is a reciprocal relationship between land and people, a relationship which the arrogance of the western European mind has disregarded. As R. Means says:

The European arrogance of acting as though they were beyond the nature of all related things, can only result in a total disharmony and a readjustment which cuts arrogant humans down to size (cited in J. Burger 87: 55).

Finally, indigenous peoples are arguing for an approach to economic development which transcends the "right-left" ideological schism. Despite the dismantling of communist systems across Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union, there is growing skepticism as to whether capitalism can provide a long-term solution to today's economic ills. The indigenous development model suggests the possibility of combining elements from both the socialist and capitalist systems in order to create a self-sustaining mode of production. While retaining the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism in terms of its stress on technological inventiveness, its concern for the individual's autonomy within the collective and its attention to small-scale local production (reminiscent of the small capitalist business man), the indigenous model also addresses the socialist's concern for redistribution. As for its own contribution to this new model it has to do with placing human beings and the environment at the centre of any development process.

B) "Forms of State": Indigenous People vs. Democratic Liberalism.

In this section we will concentrate on the *ideology* underlying the liberal democratic state in order to examine how, on the one hand, it contrasts with the worldview of indigenous peoples and, on the other hand, it has provided them with powerful conceptual tools which they are using to challenge the status quo. We have chosen to focus on the liberal-democratic state not only because it is within this ideological context that the most dynamic

sector of the international indigenous *movement has emerged, but also because, theoretically, liberal democracy presents a formidable challenge to the indigenous worldview. After all, it is easy to understand why indigenous peoples react violently to blatantly brutal, genocidal, racist state polices. It is more difficult, however, to comprehend how a political philosophy which champions equality, nondiscrimination and individual liberty should prove to be oppressive to indigenous peoples.

1. The Liberal Mind-Set and the Liberal Democratic State.

As an ideology, liberal democracy stresses, in varying degrees, three principles: individualism, representation and equality. Let us consider *individualism* first. According to the western liberal tradition human beings are possessed of a relatively fixed human nature which is fundamentally individualistic, self-interested, power-seeking and competitive. Perhaps the political philosopher most famous for this depiction of man is Hobbes, who wrote:

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power that ceased only in Death (cited in M. Knutilla 87: 17).

Given the egoistic nature of man, the liberal democratic conception of society is that of an aggregate of autonomous, atom-like individuals, each struggling to protect his/her own self-interest. Although not naturally social or cooperative, human beings have learned to live together for the sake of collective protection and security. In this way the natural selfishness of man is seen to be best served by the creation of societies in which individuals cooperate to achieve the greatest satisfaction of their respective desires. As T. Qualter explains:

Under liberalism the individual is antecedent to, and independent of, society, creating society and

government solely for the more efficient satisfaction of the needs of atomistic beings (T. Qualter 86: 221).

This emphasis on the principle of individualism explains why liberal thinkers have given a great deal of attention to the question of individual rights. Of course, beyond the logic of the doctrine, there have been societal factors which have also contributed to the concern for these rights. One such factor was the reaction of intellectuals to feudalism which subjected the individual to the abusive power of the Church and of the aristocratic landowning class. Another factor, which gave the notion of individual rights additional relevance, was the advent of capitalism and the emphasis that this economic system placed on individual initiative and competition (M. Boldt and A. Long 85: 168).

In liberal democracies the purpose of individual rights is to protect the individual from the power of the state. Accordingly, most of them are of a civil and political nature such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of thought, etc. Furthermore, most of them are based on a negative conception of liberty. As F. Neumann says:

A political theory based upon individualistic philosophy must necessarily operate with a negative juridical concept of freedom, freedom as absence of restraint (cited in M. Boldt and A. Long 86: 169).

A second principle that liberalism stresses is the principle of *representation*. Within this context, the state emerges as an artificial creation derived from the agreement of individual wills to delegate their authority to a central body which, in turn, has the power to make decisions for the common good of society and to enforce them, if necessary, with sanctions or coercion. This ruling entity, or government, is composed of elected representatives who are expected to act as spokesmen for their electorate and to fight for its interests within a legislative body. They are

accountable to their constituencies to the extent that they must be re-elected to their post periodically.

The third basic concept which is crucial to the understanding of liberal democratic thought is the notion of *equality*. There are two dimensions of this concept that are relevant to our concern. The first is that liberals stress equality of opportunity rather than equality of condition, the latter being seen as impeding the liberty of an individual to use his abilities to accumulate wealth and property. While liberals accept that the task of the state is to ensure that all individuals approach the "economic race" from the same starting point, they do not accept that the state should interfere with the actual race or with its outcome. The notion of equality, then, is fundamentally based on an individualistic conception of social relations in which individuals are responsible only to themselves in a competitive market.

The second dimension of equality in the liberal conception is premised on the idea that the similarities among human beings are greater and more significant than the differences. This focus on the commonality of human beings, in turn, has led to the view that individual differences, although they are allowed to be expressed in private life, should not be institutionalized in form of differences in political, legal, social or property rights. As T. Qualter suggests, "[t]he egalitarian does not deny variations but does deny the extension of their *significance*" (T. Qualter 86: 110).

In other words, from the liberal point of view all members of society, although fundamentally different in a number of ways, should be *treated* as equals and accorded the same rights. Thus, to grant or recognize special rights in any way is considered to be against the liberal *conception of equality*.

So far, we have looked at some of the defining characteristics of liberal democratic thought. In the next section we will briefly describe the indigenous political world view, show how it comes into conflict with certain liberal premises and discuss in what ways indigenous peoples have attempted to redefine some of these premises in an

effort to put forward their own counter hegemonic project.

2. The Political World View of Indigenous Peoples

As opposed to the liberal-mind set we have just described, which puts the individual at the centre of the universe, the worldview of indigenous peoples is fundamentally *cosmocentric*. They believe that all things, animate or inanimate, are imbued with spiritual life and that human beings are only a small part of a much greater whole. Within this context, the social reference point for all indigenous peoples is the "*collective*"* and not the "individual." The latter is seen as a repository of responsibilities rather than a claimant of rights and the realization of the common good depends on each member of the community fulfilling his/her obligations to the group. The concept of individual rights per se does not exist in indigenous philosophy since the idea of protecting the individual from either an oppressive state or aggressive, individualistic neighbours is not relevant to the indigenous experience (M. Boldt and A. Long 86: 166). While liberal ideology depicts man as self-seeking, possessive and individualistic, indigenous peoples understand him to be social, cooperative and consensual. Furthermore, since individual self-interest is viewed as inextricably interwoven with the community's survival and the common good, the dichotomy between individual and collective rights does not pose the same problem for indigenous peoples as it does for western liberal society.

On the whole, the political systems of indigenous peoples are based on the principles of democratic participation and communal decision-making. Since the fundamental political unit for indigenous peoples is the community, power and authority can only be legitimately vested in the tribe as a whole and not in individual representatives. Communal decision-making does not mean that it is acceptable for the majority in a community to impose their views on a minority of dissenters. Rather, there is a concerted effort to build a consensus among all the members of the community and to allow each individual to have a voice in the political process.

Given this decentralized system in which no one person or set of persons has exclusive authority over the other members of the group, how is order and stability maintained? Talking about the North American Indian experience, M. Boldt and A. Long state:

In place of personal authority, hierarchical power relationships and a ruling entity, the organizing and regulating forces for group order and endeavour in traditional Indian society were custom and tradition. Put another way, Indians invested their customs and traditions with the authority and power to govern their behaviour (M. Boldt and A. Long 85: 338).

The indigenous community's customs and traditions then provide a function similar to that of a centralized political authority in western liberal societies. These customs embody their fundamental precepts of life and provide the guidelines and norms for all aspects of social behaviour, whether it be political, social, economic or spiritual. Having withstood the test of time, these customs have acquired a legitimacy for all the people of the community and each member of the group is brought up to identify his/her well-being with the continuation of these traditions (P. Nahanni 77: 21).

According to the indigenous worldview all human beings are born inherently equal. Contrary to the liberal conception of equality, however, indigenous peoples stress *equality of condition* more than *equality of opportunity*. Since most productive labour is done collectively, the issue of equality of opportunity is almost irrelevant to them. More important is how the products of this collective effort are redistributed among the members of the community. Equality of condition is preserved at the economic level by a variety of cultural mechanisms which serve to redistribute wealth and resources; at the political level, by the creation of a system based on democratic participation and consensus-building; and, at the social level, by the

institutionalization of mutual and reciprocal responsibilities.

So far we have highlighted the ways in which the indigenous world view contrasts with liberal democratic ideology. In the remainder of this section we shall see in what sense indigenous peoples have borrowed some key concepts from the dominant ideology and proceeded to reinterpret them in their own way. In particular they have appropriated two commonly accepted liberal ideas, i.e., individual rights and equality interpreted as meaning equal treatment before the law.

Let us take first the question of individual rights. From the point of view of indigenous peoples the granting of individual rights is meaningless unless it is accompanied by the recognition of collective rights.

It is important to note that indigenous peoples are not arguing against individual rights per se and that they have willingly accepted the importance of recognizing such rights in a liberal democratic system. What they are saying is that collective rights should also be recognized so that those members of the indigenous community who wish to stress individual rights over collective rights can integrate into the dominant society, while those who want to maintain their indigenous identity are also able to do so (M. Boldt and A. Long 85: 175-76). Commenting on the Canadian situation, M. Boldt and A. Long state:

By imposing highly individualistic conceptions of civil and political rights upon them (indigenous peoples), the Canadian government will destroy their collective community in the same way that the imposed democratic elective system of government destroyed their traditional tribal political structures (M. Boldt and A. Long 85: 173).

As stated earlier, the liberal democratic tradition has tended to interpret the notion of equality to mean that the majority of human beings are the same or at least similar and, therefore,

should be accorded the same type of rights. As a result of this perspective the recognition of "*special rights*" is seen as violating the principles of equality and non-discrimination. One attempt to use this argument to eradicate the special rights of Indians was Prime Minister Trudeau's White Paper of 1969. The main thrust of this document -was that the economic and social stagnation of Indians in Canada was due to their condition of "dependency" within the country. The solution, Trudeau proposed, was to *integrate* the Indian population fully and *equally* into mainstream Canadian society. By advocating the repeal of the Indian Act (a document granting Indians "special status"), the abolishment of the Indian Affairs Programme and the extension of social services to all Indians, the White Paper was the embodiment of liberal ideology and of assimilationist policy.

Indigenous peoples have sought to redefine from their own vantage point the liberal conception of equality and non-discrimination. Whereas liberals see these principles applying to a society made up of individuals, indigenous peoples apply them to a society understood as a "multinational" aggregate. In effect, indigenous peoples make a clear distinction between "minorities," on the one hand, and "peoples" or "nations," on the other. This distinction rests on the concept of *consent* (Statement by Indian Law Resource Centre, Feb. 1982). "Minorities" or "ethnic groups," such as the Chinese or West Indian communities in Canada, for instance, have voluntarily surrendered their separate status in order to join the Canadian national society and in making their wish to membership explicit they have exercised their right to self-determination. As "minorities" they are entitled to certain rights which allow them to preserve their cultural identity and which protect them against discriminatory actions. All these rights, however, exist within a general framework of rights and responsibilities which they have decided to adopt as their own, a decision which gives the state lawful jurisdiction over them. "Peoples," on the other hand, like the Indians nations of Canada, have never agreed to be assimilated into the dominant national society and, therefore, have never had a chance to exercise their right to self-determination. In a statement by the Indian Law Resource Centre, the case for

indigenous peoples with regard to self-determination was put in the following way:

The situation is different where no voluntary incorporation of peoples has occurred and there has been no free consolidation of two peoples' political rights. A people lawlessly annexed or taken from their country by force do not thereby lose their separate voice or choice of destiny, but retain it until given an unrestrained opportunity for its existence. They do not become, by force of seizure, colonization or enslavement, a minority, but remain a people still (Statement by Indian Law Resource Centre, Feb. 1982).

In short, one cannot create "minorities" by force. Indigenous peoples, therefore, remain today as they always have been: "peoples" or "nations."

We can now understand why, from the indigenous point of view, the recognition of "special rights" is not a violation of the principles of equality and non-discrimination as the liberals contend. Individual indigenous persons, who have chosen to assimilate into the dominant society, can be seen as members of a "minority" and as such are not eligible to special rights. Indigenous peoples, as "peoples," however, do not want assimilation as they want to retain their collective identity. This wish should be possible since in a society conceived as "multi-national" in nature, all "nations" should have equal rights. - All member "nations" of a "multi-national" society should have the right to their own culture, for instance, and the state should protect this right. By destroying the collective identity of indigenous peoples, assimilation thwarts the principle of equality among "nations" and is discriminatory in nature. As W. Kymlicka states:

Assimilation for the Indians, like segregation for the blacks, is a 'badge of inferiority' which fails to recognize the importance and validity of the Indian community (W. Kymlicka 88: 19).

We are now ready to complete our account of the indigenous political worldview. When it comes to their political demands, indigenous peoples have put them forward as '*nations*' and not as individuals. As it appears from all the declarations I have examined, there are at least six general demands that have been advanced. They are the following:

1. Indigenous peoples demand that they have the (*collective*) right to exist as *distinct peoples* and to be protected against genocide, as well as the (*individual*) right to life, physical integrity, liberty and security of person ("First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," 1989);
2. They demand that no state shall take actions that interfere with the sovereign power of an indigenous nation to determine its own membership. They argue that '*they know who they are*' and that any attempts on the part of the state to define indigenous peoples is culturally imperialistic ("Declaration of Principles," 1985);
3. They demand that each indigenous nation has the right to determine the form, structure, and authority of its political institutions, i.e. '*self-government*' or '*political autonomy*'. This in turn implies that the traditions and customs of indigenous peoples must be recognized by states as a fundamental source of law ("Declaration of Principles," (WCIP), 1984; "First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," 1989);
4. They demand that it be unlawful for any state to take or permit any action which will directly or indirectly result in the destruction of an indigenous nation by threatening the national or cultural integrity of such a nation. This implies that the religious practices of indigenous peoples and the right to receive education in their own language shall be fully respected. Furthermore, they

argue that no state can exercise any right of jurisdiction over any indigenous nation unless it has been agreed to in a valid treaty ("Declaration of Principles for the Defense of Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere," 1977; "Declaration of Principles," (WCIP), 1984; "Declaration of Principles," 1985);

5. They demand that they be entitled to participate in the political life of the state. This requirement is important to note because most indigenous nations are not demanding secession from the state in which they live. By seeking political autonomy or "self-government" within the state, indigenous peoples are trying to realize a compromise between their desire to achieve independence and the state's need to preserve its territorial integrity. They have repeatedly pointed out that they are willing to work with both indigenous and non-indigenous legal systems so long as they have a guarantee that, if there is a conflict between the two systems, their laws will take precedence within *their own communities*. In return they promise to make sure that their own political institutions and laws are in conformity with international human right standards ("Declaration of Principles" (WCIP), 1984);
6. They demand that treaties between their peoples and states shall be given full effect under national and international law ("Demands of Indigenous Peoples," July. 1983; "Declaration of Principles," 1985);

In sum, indigenous peoples are seeking to carve out a "political space" for themselves without jeopardizing their relationship with the states in which they live. Evidence of this attempt to compromise is given by their demand to participate in the social and political life of the state and by their constant reference to international law as a standard which they commit themselves to uphold. It is to international law and to its potential as a legal recourse for indigenous peoples that we turn to next.

C) "World Order": Indigenous Peoples and Contemporary International Law

In an effort to put forward their counter-hegemonic project, indigenous peoples have sought to formulate it within the context of contemporary international law. This task has been fairly difficult, however, since, with the exception of the ILO Convention 169 which we have already discussed, there are no international laws that address indigenous peoples specifically. Nonetheless, there are three issues which have received considerable attention at the international level and which are relevant to indigenous peoples: self-determination, racial discrimination and genocide. In the following pages we shall look at the existing international instruments regarding each of these three subjects, examine to what extent they help or hinder the indigenous cause and then see how indigenous peoples have attempted to appropriate and redefine some of these legal concepts in an effort to make them more applicable to their case. By doing so they are not inventing new concepts, but rather they are trying to infuse new meaning into old ones and thus broaden the scope of international law. In fact, the discussions of concepts such as self-determination, racial discrimination and genocide has provided them with the ideological tools to formulate their own counter-hegemonic project. As R. Falk states:

[T]he Western role has been a contradictory one in relation to non-Western societies, both hegemonic and anti-hegemonic, transmitting as a result of its dominance the very ideas that can be reinterpreted to provide the normative foundation for resistance by those victimized (R. Falk 90: 270).

1. Self-Determination, International Law and Indigenous Peoples

a. International Law and Hegemony

Despite the fact that the concept of self-determination has been mentioned in the U. N. Charter, the International Human Rights Covenants, and a number of other international instruments, it remains a vague, controversial concept that means different things to different people. Article 1 of both Human Rights Covenants state that:

All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

The ambiguity of this statement of course lies in the fact that it is far from clear who the subjects of this right are supposed to be. There are at least five interpretations that have been identified and used in legal argument and only two of these have been recognized as having the status of a legal principle (G. Alfredsson 82: 114).

The first meaning of self-determination refers to what is called "*external self-determination*" and concerns the right of peoples to determine their own international status, including the right to independence and statehood. Within the context of political decolonization, the right to "external self-determination" has been extended to colonial peoples and territories. This interpretation is enshrined in the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" of 1960, which states that '*the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, - domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.* ' Thus this notion of "external self-determination" can be seen to represent a more or less binding principle of law.

It is important to specify that "external self-determination" is made to apply only to "colonies" which have been narrowly defined as "overseas territorial entities under foreign domination." This definition of "colonies" has been vigorously defended by the newly independent states of the Third World in an attempt to safeguard

their own territorial integrity. This view was summarized in a memorandum on the Somali question by the Kenyan delegate in a 1963 conference when he stated:

The principle of self-determination has relevance where foreign domination is the issue. It has no relevance where the issue is territorial disintegration by dissident citizens (cited in Y. Alexander and R. Friedlander 80: 339).

This definition of "colonies," however, presents a problem for indigenous peoples. They see themselves as "colonized" and, as such, would like the principle of self-determination to be applied to them. Yet, given the narrow definition of colonies indicated above, they do not qualify to make this claim because most of them exist as minorities within the states that "colonize" them. (One exception to this would be the case of the Inuits in Greenland as they are separated from Denmark by sea.) Moreover, the fact that indigenous peoples so far have not been considered by international law as "peoples," but rather as "minorities," makes it even more difficult for them to argue for the right of "external self-determination." In sum, it would seem as if there were little chance for indigenous peoples to apply the concept of "external self-determination" to their case.

A second common interpretation of self-determination is the *right of a state to its territorial integrity* (G. Alfredsson 82: 115). This view of the notion is limited to the instance of "captive states" and fundamentally refers to any state's right to freedom from external interference in its domestic affairs. Although this understanding of self-determination is important because it has acquired some legitimacy as being binding in international law, unfortunately it does not apply to indigenous peoples for the obvious reason that they have been unable to achieve the status of independent statehood.

A third notion, i.e., "*internal self-determination*," concerns the right of all individuals belonging to a state to freely determine, through

elections, the form of government under which they live and to participate in the political affairs of that state. This interpretation includes the ideas of majority rule and democratic participation and, thus, could apply, at least in principle, to certain cases where indigenous peoples form a majority in their countries, such as in Guatemala or Bolivia. Unlike the first two interpretations, "internal self-determination," although a principle that most states at least pay lip service to, has not acquired the status of customary law and in fact has been violated repeatedly throughout this century.

A fourth way of interpreting self-determination relates to the granting of *special rights to minority groups* (G. Alfredsson 82: 114). These rights ordinarily include the protection of individuals' physical existence and the prohibition of discrimination against them. If the concept were to be expanded to include rights to cultural, social, and economic autonomy as a means of preserving the group's identity, then it may have some relevance to indigenous peoples. In Canada, for example, some attempt is now being made to implement this form of self-determination. Not wanting to recognize Canadian natives as "peoples" with the right to "external self-determination," the Canadian government seems to be inclining towards the idea of granting them some degree of autonomy despite its general aversion to acknowledging special status rights to any group.

One final interpretation of self-determination, promoted particularly by developing countries, concerns *the right of a state to cultural, social and economic development*. This view is put forth in the New International Economic Order proposals of the 1960's and 1970's. This conception of self-determination, however, is irrelevant to indigenous peoples, due to the fact that they have been unable to achieve the status of independent statehood.

In conclusion, out of the five interpretations outlined above, only the first three have gained some legitimacy within the international legal context. More specifically, the UN position since 1945 has been that only peoples subjected to colonial rule, defined as "foreign domination by a

power located overseas," can make a legitimate claim to self-determination (external self-determination). The second case in which a legitimate claim can be made involves a population subjected to a minority who governs through a system of apartheid (internal self-determination). Finally, the third case is when a population of a *sovereign state* is forced to live under foreign rule due to the annexation or military invasion of their territory (territorial integrity) (D. Knight 85: 260). It was this principle that justified the UN intervention in the Kuwait-Iraq conflict.

So far we have seen how the existing international instruments regarding self-determination do not seem readily applicable to the case of indigenous peoples. In the following section we shall look at some of the arguments that indigenous peoples are making in an attempt to make this concept relevant to their own situation.

b. Redefining Themselves as "Nations"

One of the basic structural problems faced by indigenous peoples in their battle to be accorded the right of self-determination is that they are not considered subjects of international law due to the fact that they are not recognized as "peoples." By being identified as "national minorities" or "populations" they are excluded from the jurisdiction of international law. Part of the problem is the fact that the very concept of "peoples," as used in the existing international instruments, is undefined and ambiguous. So far the concept has been taken to refer to the sum total of all the individuals belonging to a state and not to minority groups within it. On the whole, "state" and "people" are assumed to be synonymous concepts. This constitutes one of the major obstacles in the indigenous peoples' struggle for recognition in the context of international law.

Nonetheless, as we saw in the previous section, indigenous peoples have continued to reject being identified as "minorities" and they demand instead that they be considered as "peoples" (Statement by Indian Law Resource Centre, Feb 1982). In addition, they demand their right to be granted recognition as the proper subjects of

international law. It is important to note that, by so doing, indigenous peoples are challenging the fundamental assumption that states can be conceptually equated to peoples. As discussed earlier, according to the indigenous perspective, the difference between "minorities" and "peoples" is a matter of consent: "minorities" have voluntarily chosen to assimilate with the dominant society and, thus, have already exercised their inherent right to self-determination, while "peoples" still retain this right.

Despite the general recalcitrance with which their claim to "people hood" or "nationhood" is received, indigenous peoples have pursued this claim in a number of international forums, with some success. Although the ILO refused to use the term "peoples" in their revision of the Convention 107 in 1989, the members of a UN seminar, held in the same year, on the effects of racism on indigenous peoples did support their claim to be "peoples." In fact it went further to suggest that as "peoples" they were entitled to be subjects of international law and, as such, to the principle of self-determination (U. N. Report, 1989). Thus some progress is being made.

c. Redefining their Environment

In addition to redefining themselves, indigenous peoples have sought to re-conceptualize their relationship with the environment, specifically to the land. As mentioned earlier, within the context of the traditional worldview of most indigenous peoples, the concept of private ownership of land was meaningless. Land is not considered a material property to be owned, but rather a spiritual entity which exists as a part of a larger universe. This view is obviously radically different from western conceptions of land and nature. Indigenous peoples, therefore, have needed to reformulate their relationship to the land in terms of the western liberal discourse.

There are at least three dimensions to this formulation. Firstly, as discussed earlier, they have now appropriated the notion of "private property" and "ownership" and today they argue for their rights to the collective ownership of their traditional

lands. Secondly, they have redefined the concept of land to include not only surface soil, but also subsurface resources and surrounding nature, including air and bodies of water. To this end they demand that the term "earth" or "territories" replace that of "land," since they see the latter term as too restrictive ("The Demands of Indigenous Peoples," July 1983; "Draft Universal Declaration of Indigenous Rights," 1989). Finally, they argue that unless they are given some guarantees to protect their "territories" from environmental damage, the *granting of "territories"* to them would be meaningless. Article 13 of the "Draft Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous Nations and "Peoples of the Americas" states:

It shall be unlawful for any state to make or permit any action... which will directly or indirectly result in the destruction or deterioration of an indigenous nation or group through the effects of pollution of earth, air, water or which in any way depletes, displaces or destroys any natural resources or other resources under the dominion of..., an indigenous nation or group.

d. Redefining "Self-Determination"

By redefining themselves as "peoples" and by identifying themselves as the "owners" of their "territories," indigenous peoples have sought to establish the conceptual groundwork from which they can launch their argument for their right to self-determination.

The right to self-determination has become perhaps the most important single theme of the indigenous counter-hegemonic project. We have seen above the five existing *interpretations of* this right. Arguing that these interpretations are outdated and euro centric, indigenous peoples have put forward a stem critique of the "modem" concept of self-determination and are now demanding a *reformulation and revitalization* of this concept.

As a point of departure for their critique, indigenous peoples point out the fact that the

"modem" form of the concept of self-determination arose within the context of the European decolonization process. As such, the concept is limited and inadequate to deal with the realities of the post-colonial world. The hasty *dismantling of* the colonial empires of Europe and the hectic and rather arbitrary creation of over eighty newly independent states resulted more in the liberation of "territories" rather than "peoples." Without really thinking about alternative options or about the *multi-national nature* of their colonies, the colonial powers sought only to reproduce the western European experience through the creation of sovereign states (Statement by the Four Directions Council, August 1985). As a result of the myopic, euro centric approach, a new phase of oppression referred to as "neo-colonialism" or "internal colonialism" was institutionalized. It is this type of oppression that the indigenous peoples believe they are victims of. In a statement presented to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities on August 7, 1985, a representative of the Four Directions Council, an international indigenous *organization, stated* this view in the following way:

Existing legal boundaries, most of them established for the convenience of the *colonizing powers*, were given precedence over linguistic and cultural patterns. This has left some regions a legacy of unresolved tensions... (Statement by the Four Directions Council, August 1985).

This being the case, indigenous peoples argue that the application of the right to self-determination during the decolonization process has not really served to liberate peoples.'

Today indigenous peoples are arguing for a "second stage" of decolonization. Within the context of this new stage, they claim that self-determination can no longer be understood exclusively in terms of foreign or external domination and that the "overseas" criteria for the existence of colonialism can no longer be considered relevant. Instead, the emphasis of this new stage should be on "internal colonialism," i.e.,

the liberation of "entrapped nations" within existing sovereign states and on the establishment of constitutional arrangements between these states and the minority people involved. Not only would this type of self-determination reduce tensions and the ongoing legacy of civil strife in many sovereign states, but it would actually serve to strengthen national unity and peaceful inter-state and intra-state relations. As an Indian representative of the Four Directions Council stated:

... the traditional unitary conception of independent states is losing its practical meaning in our contemporary world. The same pragmatism that led to the original development of the principle of self-determination in the post-war world, argues for the recognition of distinct territorial communities' continuing collective right to a negotiated degree of autonomy in today's world of plural states (Statement by the Four Directions Council, August 1985).

How then do indigenous peoples define self-determination within this new context? In 1985 a group of international indigenous organizations issued the following statement regarding self-determination:

All indigenous nations and peoples have the right to self-determination, by the virtue of which they have the right to whatever degree of autonomy or self-government they choose. This includes the right to freely determine their political status, freely pursue their own economic, social, religious and cultural development, and determine their own membership and/or citizenship, without external interference (Declaration of Principles, 1985).

As is clear from the above statement, the indigenous conception of self-determination is rather open-ended and flexible. Depending on the

wishes of the particular indigenous group, there are a number of alternatives with regards to the concrete form that self-determination can take. The first and most radical option would be the implementation of "*external self-determination*" in the form of complete independence or statehood. With the notable exceptions of the East Timorese or the West Papuans, however, few indigenous peoples are demanding full statehood.

A second unlikely option would be the complete *assimilation* of an indigenous nation with the dominant society. In this case the people in question would become a "national minority" since the group would have exercised its right to self-determination by voluntarily consenting to merge with the state. As minorities they would then be subject to the protection against discrimination afforded by article 27 of both the International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966, but they would have forfeited their right to make claims to self-determination under article 1 of these same Covenants.

The third and most commonly sought alternative is the institutionalization of "*internal self-determination*." This could take a number of different forms depending on the preferences of both the indigenous nation and the state involved. The concept of "internal self-determination" in this case, however, does not simply imply the free participation of indigenous peoples in the political life of the country. It would have to include also the right to have control over their economies and political institutions, the right to ownership of a territorial base, the right to control their own education system, the right to engage in foreign relations if they so desire and finally the right to determine their own membership without external interference. For indigenous peoples then, "internal self-determination" is in fact an agenda for *regional autonomy*. As self-governing units, indigenous peoples would have control over their economic, social and cultural development, while at the same time remaining part of the dominant state.

Of the three general approaches to self-determination it is the last, i.e., the idea of "regional autonomy," that is most sought by

indigenous nations. Regional autonomy, after all, is seen as a compromise between the right of peoples to self-determination, on the one hand, and the territorial integrity of states, on the other. In cases where an indigenous people constitutes the majority in a state, as in Guatemala, for instance, indigenous leaders argue that there is no need for such a compromise and that the indigenous peoples in that country should automatically be granted "external determination" (Statement by Four Directions Council, August 1985).

Regardless of the form of self-determination chosen, indigenous peoples insist that the exercise of this right is a precondition for the enjoyment of all other human rights. So long as a people is subjected to "internal colonialism," it is meaningless and hypocritical to discuss the concepts of racial equality, political freedom or economic development as human rights. It is only through the granting of self-determination to all "peoples," and not just to states, that peace, racial harmony and equality will be ensured. In a statement by the Indian Law Resource Centre this view was expressed in the following way:

If we hope to fulfill the vision of world peace and freedom, we must abandon forever all pretence that any race of men is incapable of forming states, of conducting foreign relations as a state, or of exercising the right to self-determination as a state and as a people. ... We must bear carefully in mind that decolonization and the emancipation of non-self-governing peoples is not a problem peculiar to one or two continents, but is a problem sadly common in some degree to all continents. And we must remember that law and history, rather than cartography, determine the just boundaries of all states. We think all nations can agree that map-makers are powerless to destroy a people's right to determine its own future (Statement by Indian Law Resource Centre, February 1982).

2. Racial Discrimination, International Law and Indigenous Peoples

The principle of self-determination, although crucial to the counter-hegemonic project of indigenous peoples is not the only international standard to which they have appealed within the framework of international law. Another issue that has plagued them for centuries and which falls within the jurisdiction of international law is racial discrimination. It must be kept in mind that the modern manifestations of racism are based not so much on the notion of racial "superiority" and "inferiority" in a biological sense, but rather on the contrast between "advanced" and "primitive" cultures.

This form of racism has been institutionalized at the international level since 1919, when the League of Nations Covenant, in Article 22, gave "advanced nations" the responsibility for "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." By placing indigenous peoples, along with other minority groups, under a "sacred trust of civilization," the League of Nations gave a clear message to the world that there was a hierarchy among peoples and that the principle of equality of peoples is not universal. In 1945 the United Nations Charter in Article 73 and 74 continued this guardianship practice by allowing indigenous peoples to be considered and treated as wards under the authority of a UN trusteeship.

This attitude on the part of the UN has continued to this day, although there has been a degree of progress in the understanding of "racial discrimination" and in the legislation against it. In 1963 the UN proclaimed the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which stated the following:

Discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the principles of the Charter of the

United Nations, as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as an obstacle to friendly relations among nations and as a fact capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples.

As a follow up measure, in 1969, the "International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination" was passed by the UN General Assembly and became a binding treaty. It commands that all states undertake policies in order to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms. In addition, a special Committee consisting of 18 independent experts, was established to examine reports submitted by state parties on the measures they have taken to eradicate racial discrimination.

Although the convention makes no specific reference to indigenous peoples, its implications for the latter are positive to the extent that most indigenous nations are subject to some form of ethnic or racial discrimination and that the convention does attempt to control these discriminatory practices.

The UN World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination held in 1978 developed the theme of racial discrimination even further and for the first time made specific reference to indigenous peoples. The Conference declared :

[This conference]... endorses the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional structure of economy and culture, including language, and also recognizes the special relationship of indigenous peoples to their land and stresses that their land, land rights and natural resources should not be taken away from them (cited in G. Alfredsson 82: 119).

Moreover, in its Program of Action (Art. 8), the Conference proposes that states respect a

number of rights for indigenous peoples, including the right to have an official status and to form their own representative organization to carry on their traditional structure of economy and way of life, **and to receive education and** information in their own language. The only drawback in this document appears in Art. 10, which states that indigenous peoples should be allowed to develop cultural and social links among themselves so long as they respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of those countries in which they live. This additional proviso clearly implies that "external self-determination" i.e., independent statehood, is not considered to be a viable alternative for any indigenous peoples (G. Alfredsson 82: 120).

3. Genocide, International Law and Indigenous Peoples

One final international treaty, ratified by a large number of governments including that of the United States, able to provide a recourse for some indigenous nations in danger of extinction is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was passed by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and put into force in 1951. This convention stipulates that genocide, whether in time of war or peace, is a crime under international law. Genocide itself is defined as "acts committed with the *intent of* destroying, in whole or in part, a national, racial, or religious group by killing or causing serious harm to members of the group." The convention goes on to argue that, apart from outright murder, this destruction can be brought about also by inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical elimination, by imposing measures to prevent births or by forcibly transferring children outside of their group.

If one turns to the case of indigenous peoples, one sees that this Convention only applies to countries such as Guatemala, East Timor or West Papua where the state engages in outright extermination policies. Most indigenous peoples are experiencing a different form of violence, however, which can be called *cultural genocide or ethnocide*. There is no explicit provision in the Convention for

this form of genocide and, in fact, most international lawyers are unwilling to recognize the concept of ethnocide.

Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, argue that ethnocide is simply a more subtle way of committing genocide, that is, the destruction of a people or ethnic group. According to R. Stavenhagen, ethnocide may be defined as the process whereby a culturally distinct people loses its identity due to policies designed to erode its cultural base, including its land, language, customs social and political institutions, religious practices, values, art forms and so on (R. Stavenhagen 87: 75). By prohibiting a people from practicing their culture or by taking away the base from which their culture is derived (in the case of indigenous peoples, land would be of particular importance), a state effectively destroys their separate identity.

From the indigenous perspective, ethnocide is a crime committed not only against particular peoples, but also against humankind as a whole. In the "Declaration of Principles" adopted at the Fourth General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the cultures of the latter are proclaimed to be part of the cultural heritage of mankind (Declaration of Principles, 1984). They argue that it is only by legislating against ethnocide that it is possible to safeguard the cultural diversity of the world and, thereby, preserve a fundamental dimension of human existence.

In response to increasing pressure on the part of Latin American indigenous peoples, an international meeting was organized by UNESCO in which Indian delegates and other experts were invited to discuss the issue of ethnocide and ethno-development in the region. The conference, held in Costa Rica in 1981, produced the "Declaration of San Jose" which, although not legally binding, is one of most comprehensive declarations on indigenous rights yet to emerge within the UN context. The declaration states that ethnocide is a violation of international law equivalent to that of genocide. It also affirms that ethno-development, which includes the exercise of self-determination, is an inalienable right for all indigenous peoples. In article 5 they are identified

as the **creators, bearers and propagators of a civilizing dimension of their own, ' which in turn represents 'unique and specific facets of the heritage of mankind. " Indigenous peoples are, thus, portrayed in the declaration not as remnants of an un-retrievable past, but as important contributors to the present and future progress of humankind.*

In conclusion, as can be seen clearly from their counter-hegemonic project, indigenous peoples are not attempting to return to a "golden age of nativism," they are very willing to negotiate with states for an arrangement which protects the state's sovereignty while granting indigenous peoples a certain degree of freedom to determine their own way of life. As we have seen, in terms of development strategies, they are willing to combine elements of both the capitalist and socialist economic models so long as they can realize sustainable development practices. With regards to their political status, the majority of indigenous peoples accept the notion of regional autonomy provided that they are recognized as separate "peoples" or "nations." Finally, when it comes to international law, they clearly state that although existing international instruments do not protect the right of indigenous peoples adequately, they are more than willing to respect contemporary human rights standards and to peacefully seek to expand the jurisdiction of international law to include the rights of indigenous peoples.

V) THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER

In this last chapter we shall discuss the role of ideas in the International Indigenous Movement and, more generally, in international relations. In order to do this, we shall briefly review how, on the one hand, ideas have become powerful weapons in the hands of seemingly "powerless" social forces and, on the other, how there has been a recent proliferation of counter-hegemonic struggles at the global level which are not only challenging the normative foundations of today's "world order" structure, but also proposing alternative visions of a new non-hegemonic world order.

A. Ideas: The Power of the Powerless

Indigenous peoples can be seen as a "powerless" social force to the extent that they have no significant economic or political resources of their own. As we have seen, most indigenous peoples are living in peripheral regions in sub-standard living conditions. Moreover, they have been systematically marginalized from sources of political power and, despite their increasing penetration of the legal and political system, they remain a politically alienated social movement. Nevertheless, indigenous peoples from across the globe have been able to launch an international movement which has mounted a formidable defense of indigenous rights and a significant challenge to the legitimacy of the current economic and political strategies of nation-states and transnational corporations. Devoid of material power, indigenous peoples have had to rely on the force of ideas to give their movement momentum and credibility.

The role of ideas within this context can be seen from two vantage points. On the one hand, ideas have played a crucial role within the movement itself. It was the process of "ideology-building" which joined disparate groups into a social movement and it has been the creation of a counter-hegemonic project which has given the International Movement force and direction.

On the other hand, the role of ideas also played a vital role in the communication process between indigenous peoples and the, dominant social forces of today's world order. Indigenous peoples, realizing the need for common conceptual parameters in their negotiations with the dominant "other," have sought ways of expressing their ideas in terms of today's conventional wisdom and norms. To this end, they have appropriated the language and concepts of the western liberal discourse and turned them into political tools by infusing them with new meanings. Thus, the indigenous counter-hegemonic project not only provides a critique of the prevailing patterns of thought and behaviour today, but it also attempts to offer an alternative ideological discourse by reformulating "old" ideas into a new project which is

fundamentally pluralistic, non-eurocentric and non-hegemonic. As Falk states:

In a fundamental sense, indigenous peoples preserve and embody alternative lifestyles that may provide models, inspiration, and guidance in the essential work of world-order redesign, an undertaking now primarily associated with overcoming self-destructive tendencies in the behaviour of modern societies (R. Falk 89: 205).

Alone, the International Indigenous Movement may not be able to do more than secure rights for indigenous peoples in the form of concessions, but in conjunction with the other oppositional social forces, it may contribute to a slow transformation of our world order. It is to some of these other movements to which we turn next.

B. Beyond Pax America: The Preeminence of the Historical Structure of "World Order"

As is well known, the international order has been challenged during the last few decades by a proliferation of counter-hegemonic projects which are proposing alternative forms of social relations and organization at the national and, most particularly, at the international level. In this section we shall briefly examine the nature of the ideological challenges presented by three forms of social opposition to our contemporary world order: new social movements, marginalized Third World states and the mobilization of non-governmental organizations and private citizens.

Since the 1970's a number of social movements heralding causes such as human rights, the environment, women's rights, consumer rights and world peace have not only emerged, but established firm roots in the civil societies of western industrialized nations. These new social movements, unlike the labour and agrarian movements, are not primarily class-based and in fact revolve around broad, collective issues which

transcend interest-group politics. As R. Dalton, M. Kuechler and W. Burklin state:

A distinguishing feature of new social movements is that they lack the narrow special interest appeal to any one social grouping. ... New social movements thus signify a shift from group-based political cleavages to value and issue-based cleavages that identify only communities of like-minded people (R. Dalton, M. Kuechler and W. Burklin 90: 12).

In terms of ideology, these new social movements have begun to lay the groundwork for a new paradigm of oppositional discourse which not only challenges the contemporary status quo of industrialized societies, but also differentiates them from more traditional leftist movements. Again, according to R., Dalton, M. Kuechler and W. Burklin, these new social movements

... generally question the emphasis on wealth and material well-being that is prevalent in industrial democracies: instead they advocate greater attention to the cultural and quality of life issues that received less attention in the post-war affluence (R. Dalton, M. Kuechler and W. Burklin 90: 11).

In this way these movements are filling in an ideological gap created by the dominance of the liberal-Marxist debate. After all, both these ideological models unquestioningly accept the premise that human progress depends on continued economic growth, large-scale production and increasing material well-being. The new social movements question this premise and as such they represent a radical departure from mainstream debates. C. Boggs describes the subversive potential of these movements in the following way:

In their most mature expression, these movements constitute counter-hegemonic struggles in the Gramscian sense to the degree they

can lead to an alternative ideological framework that subverts the dominant patterns of thought and action, that challenges myths surrounding the vulnerability of the status quo (C. Boggs 86: 5).

The internationalization of many of these movements in the last 15 years has given them the capacity to influence national governments and place their concerns on the global agenda.

One example of a new social movement is the Green Party Movement of West Germany. The Green Party project represents a vision of a qualitatively new society in which a range of disparate traditions -- including pacifism, ecological radicalism, new leftism, feminism, populism and even spiritualism -- all play a role. The unifying element in this potpourri of ideas is a militant search for new kind of politics (C. Boggs 86: 177).

As part of this quest for a new politics, the Green movement offers a strong critique of today's economic model of development. The Greens argue that our contemporary model of economic growth is doomed to failure and that there is a desperate need for a better understanding of the limits of industrial expansion. Furthermore, not only is the industrial system unable to sustain itself economically, but it is also based on questionable values. Inherently destructive, it impoverishes and alienates workers, destroys the environment and unleashes conflict between rich and poor nations. As the Green Party Program states:

What industrial society calls 'growth' is based in reality on a global competitive battle by the strong against the weak, which can only end with a general collapse. The *domination* of the world market by giant corporations leads to an increasing impoverishment of the Third World countries and must end in a breakdown of the present world economic order (cited in C. Boggs 86: 191).

In opposition to the destruction and wastefulness of today's economic system, the Greens propose a shift away from the 'mass consumption' of industrialism towards a more self-sustaining, non-exploitative system. This transformation from quantitative to qualitative development would imply the establishment of a mixed economy which would make room for cooperative enterprises, worker's self-management and local, human-scale organizations. In addition, there would be a need for a change in the nature of production and consumption. Instead of concentrating on the amount of industrial output, more attention would be paid to what is produced with the aim of discriminating against wasteful or harmful commodities like nuclear weapons and emphasizing goods that directly satisfy human needs. As C. Boggs points out:

For such a model to work, however, there would have to be a vast transformation of consciousness, with the old productivism and privatized consumerism giving way to an ecological thinking that placed human values and needs at the core of historical progress (C. Boggs 86: 189).

Marginalized Third World states have also presented a formidable ideological challenge to the international status quo since the early 1970's. Since this is not the place to develop this point we shall analyze only one example.

One of the more innovative and potentially radical attempts to restructure the distribution of power and resources in the world took place as early as 1958 with the formulation of the concept of "the common heritage of mankind" by the Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo. Reacting to the UN Convention on the Continental Shelf passed in 1958 which allows coastal states to extend their sovereign rights over the sea-bed as far as they are able to exploit it, Pardo argued that it would be dangerous and immoral to allow the most powerful nations of the world to be the sole benefactors of this potentially rich resource, especially when it is used for the installation of fixed military equipment on

the ocean floor. According to Pardo, the only responsible and just alternative was the establishment of an international agreement declaring the sea-bed and the ocean floor part of the "common heritage of mankind." As such these resources could be exploited solely for peaceful purposes. As A. Cassese states:

The concept radically departed from traditional sovereignty-oriented laissez-faire approach, geared to national self-interest and totally oblivious of the common good and in particular the 'have-nots' (A. Cassese 86: 381).

The proposed agreement further stipulated that the sea-bed and the ocean floor were to be excluded from the possible appropriation or use of individual states and that their control and administration was to be entrusted to an international agency which would ensure that sea-bed resources would be distributed fairly. Given the poverty of the Third World, it was argued that a large part of these resources were to be given to underdeveloped countries. Moreover, the proposal insisted that the sea-bed and ocean floor were not to be used for military purposes and that measures should be taken to protect the environment. Last but not least, the plan envisaged the promotion of marine research.

The Pardo plan, which languished for a decade without resolution, was finally adopted by the General Assembly in 1970. The resolution was entitled the "Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed" and it enshrined the notion that the ocean floors are the "common heritage of mankind." This meant that states were not allowed to make competitive use of its resources and those states which did explore and exploit the ocean floor had to ear-mark a certain percentage for developing countries. Moreover, it was agreed that the exploitation of resources was to be carried out in accordance with an international agreement to be established in the near future (A. Cassese 86: 383-4).

Clearly, the promulgation of the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" was an effort by Third World states to secure a share in a newly discovered source of wealth and to this extent it can be seen as a political ploy to undermine the advantage that rich industrialized countries had over them in the exploitation of this resource. Nonetheless, the concept also represents a new conceptualization of wealth distribution which pioneers a consensual, cooperative, collective approach to resource management at the international level. As A. Cassese states:

The introduction of the concept of "common heritage of mankind" no doubt represents a great advance in the world community. In particular... it marks the passage from the traditional postulate of sovereignty to that of co-operation. In other words, the expression "common heritage of mankind" succinctly expresses with all its merits and limitations- the 'new model' of world community *which has* gradually emerged since 1945 (A. Cassese 86: 391).

Since the early 1970's this concept has been expanded to other areas such as space, the Antarctic and to even more abstract concepts such as monuments, sites, cultural traditions and the whole scientific and technological enterprise (S. Marks 85: 509). Its application to cultural traditions is significant because of its potential for revolutionizing our ways of understanding and addressing cultural differences. If cultural traditions are the "common heritage of mankind," then both dominant and subordinate classes and nations must cooperate in an effort to protect the world's ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism.

NGOs and academic and professional sectors of civil society the world over have for the last 20 years become agents of change at the national and international level. International associations of professionals, academics and social activists have been able to combine their expertise and construct alternative interpretations of contemporary international law. One example of

this type of mobilization can be found in the promulgation of the Algiers Declaration in 1976.

This Declaration was the outgrowth of efforts by the Lelio Basso Foundation for the Rights of People, a private Italian institute, to organize an international conference of jurists, politicians, sociologists and economists in Algiers in July 1976. The preamble of the declaration states:

Aware of expressing the aspirations of our era, we met in Algiers to proclaim that all peoples of the world have an equal right to liberty, the right to free themselves from any foreign interference and to choose their own government, the right, if they are under subjection, to fight for their liberation and the right to benefit from other peoples' assistance in their struggle. Convinced that the effective respect for human rights necessarily implies the rights of peoples, we have adopted the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples (cited in R. Falk 82: 432).

The originality of this declaration is that it extends coverage of human rights from individuals to "peoples" and posits a claim that rights can be authoritatively formulated by populist forces and do not depend on governmental actions. Moreover, the declaration claims that new forms of imperialism, which emerged in the postcolonial period, have contributed to the problem of human rights abuses (R. Falk 82: 420). In this connection the declaration adopts a global perspective in its analysis of the causes of domination and identifies multinational corporations as playing an important role in this neo-colonial process. As R. Falk states:

In the background of the Algiers Declaration is a preoccupation with those transnational structures of domination (and their domestic collaborators) that preclude genuine political, economic, and cultural

autonomy on a national level... (R. Falk 82: 420)

Despite its relative obscurity, the Algiers Conference did prompt further efforts on the part of private citizens to organize conferences concerned with issues not adequately treated by traditional institutions. The Permanent Peoples Tribunal held in Italy in the late 1970's is one such example. The tribunal was carried out within the constitutional framework established by the 1976 Algiers Declaration and looked at cases of serious human rights abuses. Among the issues discussed at the tribunal were the Turkish genocide of Armenian people, the Soviet role in Afghanistan, the role of the United States in Central America, the case of the Indonesian annexation of East Timor and the plight of indigenous peoples in the Philippines (R. Falk 89:210).

Both the right to the "common heritage of mankind" introduced by Third World states and the "rights of peoples" put forward by a group of private citizens present a normative challenge to existing conceptions of human rights and international order. Instead of individual rights, a proliferation of new counter-hegemonic projects are emphasizing collective rights. Moreover, the imperative of state sovereignty is also diminishing as more and more social issues are placed under international jurisdiction. Indeed the concept of world community has come of age as international lawyers and scholars develop legislation with regards to the right of all peoples to food, to development, to a safe environment, to peace, to communication and to humanitarian assistance (S. Marks 85: 506).

At this point it is possible to ask oneself whether the rise of these counter-hegemonic forces, including the International Indigenous Movement, reflects the irrevocable decline of *Pax Americana* and the beginnings of a new world order. It may be too early to tell, but it is possible to hazard a guess that, should a different world order emerge in the next few decades, the role of ideas will be of much greater importance than hitherto.

The era of *Pax Americana* represented a hegemonic world order configuration in which all three historical structures, "modes of social relations of production," "forms of state" and "world order" fitted together and formed a coherent whole. The glue that cemented their union was a consensus around certain fundamental liberal ideas the most prominent of which revolved around economic considerations as opposed to social or political ones. This was in part due to the tendency of Liberalism as an ideology to focus on economic issues (S. Sofer 87: 511). As S. Sofer states:

The two principal elements of the liberal tradition's influence were the close analogy between domestic affairs and foreign policy and the tendency to subordinate political to economic considerations. Free trade and the power of reason, liberals believed, would bring about international harmony. Commerce would secure peace in the world... (S. Sofer 87: 511).

This focus on economic issues, however, was also due to the desire on the part of the United States to expand its economic regime to the Third World and to the globe as a whole. Lastly, the outbreak of the Cold War which pitted two economic systems against each other served to further highlight economic concerns and economic belief systems over other issues and ideas. Thus, it is possible to argue that from 1945 until the mid-70's the role of ideas in international relations was very much linked, though not exclusively of course, to defending the dominant mode of production relations within the world economy against the criticisms of both the socialist camp and Third World countries. Even the normative challenges from the Communist bloc and the Third World states, however, did not present fundamentally opposing views of world order as both were concerned with material progress and industrialization. As S. Sofer explains:

Both liberalism and Marxism led to awareness of the necessity and desirability of material progress,

emphasizing scientific and technological components and the importance of the economic dimension for politics and international relations (S. Sofer 87: 505).

In this way during the era of *Pax Americana* ideas served primarily a preservationist, legitimizing function in which economic structures took precedence over all others.

From the mid-1970's onwards, however, with the decline of *Pax Americana*, the role of ideas in international relations has expanded greatly. On the one hand, international elites continue to use neoliberalism to legitimize the international status quo. On the other hand, as we have seen, disaffected social groups have challenged in a variety of ways the dominant ideological system. More important still, the ideological agendas put forward by these oppositional forces go beyond economic issues and respond to a new set of concerns, such as the environment, peace, human rights, gender, ethnicity, nationalism, cultural pluralism and the control of technological and scientific progress. In this way, while the dominant ideas during *Pax Americana* were generated by one historical structure, "modes of social relations of production," the decline of *Pax Americana* seems to have activated the role of ideas at the level of all three historical structures: "modes of social relations of production," "forms of state" and "world order," particularly the latter.

At this stage it is impossible to tell to what extent this trend reflects a structural change in international relations. Recent events in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia could give a new lease on life to the neo-liberal belief systems. This may, however, have the effect of energizing further the counter-hegemonic projects we have referred to in this chapter. Whatever happens, the role of ideas in international life will most certainly be greater than in the past. More important still, if the counter-hegemonic projects were to contribute to bring about a new "world order configuration" in the next few decades, it is quite possible that ideas, particularly those that pertain to the historical

structure of "world order," will become central to this world order.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen in the last chapter of this paper, the International Indigenous Movement is clearly not an isolated phenomenon, but rather part of a growing trend in which various oppositional movements are unfolding at the international level. Given this growing proliferation of counter-hegemonic struggles it has become imperative for scholars of international relations to study these diversifying forces as well as their impact on global elites and on the processes of global institutional and ideological change.

In this paper we have focused on one of these social forces, that is, the International Indigenous Movement. In Chapter I, the theoretical framework for this paper was described. In Chapter 11 we examined how this movement emerged onto the international scene in the mid-seventies as a consequence of global changes at the level of production relations, forms of state and world order. The globalization of capitalism, the expansion of the state, the rise of the Cold War, the decolonization process, the mobilization of "core sectors" of civil societies in industrialized nations and the development of international law are all factors that contributed to the mobilization of indigenous peoples at the national level and to the eventual internationalization of their movement.

In Chapter III we saw how this Movement has developed since 1975 into a truly global phenomenon in which indigenous peoples from North and South America, the Arctic, Northern Europe, Asia, the Pacific and even Africa are now involved. In Chapter IV we focused on the indigenous counter-hegemonic project and examined how the worldview of indigenous peoples contrasts with that of the dominant social forces of today's world order. Moreover, we saw in what ways indigenous peoples are trying to appropriate some of the ideas of the dominant "other" in an attempt to create an alternative world order project. Perhaps one of the most important dimensions of

the indigenous project is that, unlike some other ethnic movements which are exclusionary and xenophobic, the International Indigenous Movement stresses the need for coexistence and mutual respect. Although critical of capitalist and socialist development strategies, liberal state policies and the ethnocentrism of international law, indigenous peoples do not reject outright or ignore these fundamental aspects of contemporary world order. Instead they argue for a decentralized, pluralistic world in which there is a mutual acceptance of cultural and ideological differences and in which they too can continue to live according to their own traditions and beliefs. Thus, the indigenous peoples are not demanding the right to return to a "golden age of nativism." Instead they wish to pursue modern but sustainable development strategies, to secure regional autonomy within the state and to expand international law to include the rights of non-western minority peoples.

Throughout this paper we have used Cox's theoretical approach to international relations. Cox's framework does allow room for the role of ideas in international relations and as such it has been very useful in my analysis of the indigenous counter-hegemonic project. Despite its general applicability, however, Cox's framework remains production-oriented and must be enlarged if it is to capture the nature of the new social movements. The concept of "social force," for instance, must be interpreted in a pluralistic way, i.e. not as a class-based phenomenon generated exclusively by changes at the level of production, but as a force that can arise at the level of all three historical structures, including "forms of state" and "world order." It is important to underline, however, that this multi-level interpretation can be achieved while remaining within the parameters of the Coxian framework, as we have shown in this paper.

Let us conclude with a remark concerning the field of international relations itself. With the rise of *Pax Americana*, this field attracted scholars from the "core" nations of this hegemonic world order and as a consequence it has been, until recently, mainly preoccupied with the study of issues relevant to the dominant global forces. Today, as *Pax Americana* slowly recedes into the

background and as the world slides into an era of transition, there remains a pressing need for international relations scholars to redirect their attention to non-dominant, non-hegemonic social forces which may well contribute in an unprecedented way to the reconstitution of a new, more pluralistic world order.

ENDNOTES

1. Some dependency scholars such as Celso Furtado have dealt with the role of cultural variables, especially as it relates to imperialism. See Walker, R. B. J., ed. Culture. Ideology and World Order Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

2. Given Cox's interest in explaining the rise and decline of *Pax Ameficana*, it is perfectly understandable that he has concentrated on social forces generated by the production process. Indeed it would be difficult to argue that the social forces that have shaped international relations for the last four decades, such as the transnationalist capitalist class and the "established workers class." have not been engendered by the capitalist process of production. In recent years, however, a number of social movements have arisen onto the international stage which are impossible to explain solely in terms of the production process. The International Indigenous Movement itself can be seen as a movement which owes as much to changes in "forms of state" and "world order" structures as it does to changes in the "modes of relations of production." Take the peace movement as another example; it can plausibly be argued that this is a social force generated at the "world order" level by the rise of the Cold War and the nuclear-arms build-up. If this is the case then a more pluralistic interpretation of the term "social force" may be needed.

3. There are 2.5 million native Indians in North America, between 25 and 30 million in Central America and South America, 60,000 Saami in Scandinavia, 240,000 Maoris in New Zealand and 250,000 Aborigines in Australia. The majority of indigenous peoples live in Asia, however, with 6.5 million in the Philippines, 11 million in Burma, 500,000 in Thailand, 51 million in India and 67 million in China (J. Burger 87: 11).

4. As stated in the introduction, the main source of information for my analysis of the indigenous counter-hegemonic project has come from indigenous declarations and statements made at international conferences. Most of the official declarations have been reproduced in books and

journals, and have titles. When referring to these declarations I shall footnote them with a title and a date. Most of the oral statements made by indigenous organizations at the United Nations, however, were printed as UN documents and have no titles. When referring to these statements I shall footnote the name of the indigenous organization making the statement and the date it was made.

5. In connection with this critique on the part of indigenous peoples, we would like to make a brief comment. While it is true that the process of decolonization disregarded the "multi-national" composition of the colonial empires, one has to recognize that it was this process that effectively universalized the idea of self-determination and legitimized it as a goal for non-white, non-European peoples (D. Ronen 79: 11). Prior to World War Two the concept of self-determination had been understood in at least three ways, none of which applied to non-white, non-European peoples. During the context of 19th century Europe, self-determination was understood in terms of nationalism and was, therefore, seen as a centripetal force which brought people together. With the rise of Marxism as an ideology from the mid-19th century on, the concept of self-determination evolved and, for some at least, began to include the notion of class struggle and the liberation of the poor. Finally, during the early years after World War One the notion of self-determination was once again expanded, this time by President Woodrow Wilson, who applied the concept to the democratic rights of national minorities in Europe. It was only in the 1950's and 1960's, however, when the process of decolonization started, that the concept of self-determination came to mean that all peoples, including non-white and non-Europeans, have the right to be free from foreign domination (D. Ronen 79: 29-35).

6. It is important to note that I am not arguing that the role of the subjective (ideas) has become more important than that of objective or institutional factors. The relationship among these three forces remains dialectical. Rather, I am saying that during-*Pax Americana* ideas played fundamentally a hegemonic role and that the dominant ideas of this era were connected to legitimizing particular

"modes of social relations of production" (capitalist or socialist). Today, on the other hand, ideas are playing a counter-hegemonic role to the extent that they have become powerful weapons in the hands of social forces which are challenging the normative foundations of not only the prevailing "modes of social relations of production," but all three historical structures.

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