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Abstract:

This paper challenges views of the Cold War as a kind of strategic game waged exclusively within high-level circles of power in Washington and Moscow. Using the case of a 1979 uprising staged by Mayan women against a Guatemalan army incursion in the marketplace of Chupol, a small, rural community by the side of the Panamerican highway, I argue that Cold War developmentalism, instead of producing an “anti-political” effect on Chupolenses, granted efficacy to their powers of calculation by targeting rural people like them for incorporation into “the market” of economic theory with interventions like the construction of the Panamerican highway and rural marketplaces. Applying these powers to their own particular situation, including their long-standing engagement in marketing activities as the traditional travelling merchants of the Guatemalan highlands and their historical claim on spirituality as charges of the colonial Catholic Church, Chupolenses made calculations quite contrary to those Cold War developmentalists expected: they became some of the most militant rural supporters of Guatemala’s revolutionary movement. This paper explains this process to show how people like Chupolense women became Cold War actors despite—or indeed, because of—their distance from the centres of Cold War strategizing.

Introduction

On a Sunday morning in early July 1979, Guatemalan army troops drove a truck into the weekly market of a small rural Mayan village called Chupol, intending to forcibly press any young men they could find there into military service. Having successfully accomplished such missions in the past, the soldiers were surprised by the resistance they encountered on this occasion. As they began their round up, women wielding large sticks and torches surrounded the truck, throwing rocks and threatening to kill the intruders if they did not leave Chupol at once. Local leaders of the Committee for Peasant Unity—the political wing of Guatemala’s largest guerrilla group, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor—had organized the women’s action as a forceful repudiation of the Guatemalan state’s incursions into indigenous communities, and it achieved its purpose. Fearing for their lives, the soldiers retreated without any new conscripts, leaving Chupolenses to celebrate their victory.

Is this event part of the Cold War? Some events that took place in Guatemala do appear in Cold War histories: the 1954 CIA-planned and –backed overthrow of Guatemala’s democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz, for example, has been called “one of the best known and important episodes in Washington’s Cold War policies.”¹ This description of the coup, however, implies that it counts as a Cold War event only because high-level American government policy-makers participated in its planning and execution, painting the Cold War as a kind of strategy game for the world’s best and brightest men. Given the geographic and social distance that separates Chupol’s angry women from such people, the relevance of their uprising to Cold War geopolitics is not immediately evident.

As R.G. Saull argues in this volume, however, the Cold War was waged not only

between the superpowers, but also through a “global struggle concerning the organisation of social and economic life.”² Ideologically committed to the separation of the state from the sphere of production, U.S. Cold Warriors saw their struggle against communism as one to expand the reach of the invisible hand of the market around the globe. In classical economic theory, the market is a “coordination device” for resolving transactions among buyers and sellers possessed of different interests in the form of a price both judge as fair.³ In a perfect market system, American Cold Warriors imagined, the pricing mechanism would advance U.S. interests without the need for direct U.S. political authority by ensuring that everyone’s interests were best served by capitalism. Victory over communism, therefore, depended on opening markets around the world.

To function, markets require buyers and sellers possessed of what Michel Callon calls “calculative agencies,” the capacity and the will to understand their interests in economic terms and engage one another and the objects of their engagements exclusively to serve those interests.⁴ Modernization theory was the tool Cold Warriors used to form such agencies in countries like Guatemala. Identifying the so-called Third World’s rural area as the market’s essential outside, modernization theory located the vanguard of the battle against communism in the calculations of the Third World’s rural residents.

To incorporate Third World rural people into the theoretical space of the perfect market system, however, would-be modernizers had to build physical marketplaces to secure the conditions for performing market-based calculations. In so doing, they radically transformed the rural areas in which they intervened, in some places, such as Chupol, allowing their residents to discover and act on interests different from those modernization theory had identified for them. In this chapter, I seek to explain this phenomenon by tracing

the relationship between Chupol's market and "the market" of Cold War modernization theory. Chupol's marketplace, I show, was the product of a series of engagements between the local, the national, and the global to which Cold Warriors came late. Cold Warriors' attempts to make this place operate according to the laws of "the market," however, did not so much misconstrue this history as create the conditions under which new engagements between these different levels became possible, making Chupol's angry women players in geopolitics precisely by marking their distance from Washington and its policy-makers. Stories like that of the uprising are critical to understanding the history of the Cold War, I argue, because they show that it is also necessarily Guatemala's—and Chupol's—history.

Third World Cold War: Development as Anticommunism

The notion of the "rural area," as a discrete space governed by a distinct social and economic logic, is an artifact of the mid-20th-century reconfiguration of global relations of power that set the Cold War in motion. After World War II, Arturo Escobar shows, a new field, "development economics," emerged to explain the inequalities in wealth between national economies that persisted in defiance of the predictions of classical economic theory. By introducing the evolutionary notion of "development" into economic theory, this new science framed agrarian regions as historically backward spaces, grouping poor nations into a single Third World that had to overcome its own rural nature, and locating the knowledge necessary for it to do so in wealthy First World nations.⁵ The development paradigm, Escobar and others argue, thus recuperated colonial relations of power from the collapse of the colonial system by making continued interventions in the Third World's "rural area" a scientific necessity.⁶ Such interventions, James Ferguson argues, in turn worked like an

"anti-politics machine" on Third World rural areas, producing "alongside the institutional effect of expanding bureaucratic state power [into such areas]... the conceptual or ideological effect of depoliticizing both poverty and the state."⁷

The invention of the anti-politics machine coincided with the emergence of the United States as a superpower and helped the United States to consolidate its superpower status, but critical studies of development have largely failed to address the embedding of the development paradigm in the Cold War. Escobar, for example, argues that Cold War geopolitics was one of the factors that "lent legitimacy" to the development paradigm, rather than a constitutive feature of that paradigm.⁸ In their concern to demonstrate that the actual anti-political effects of development interventions virtually never correspond to those intended by development planners, these studies tend to dismiss the explanatory value of development planning for understanding the anti-politics machine. For Ferguson, who does not mention the Cold War, the "logic" of development thus "transcends the question of planners' intentions," geostrategic or otherwise.⁹

Planners' intentions, however, should be considered one of the anti-politics machine's effects. Development economics, Timothy Mitchell shows, depended on the prior formation of "the economy" as the domain comprising the material substrate of all other varieties of human endeavor—politics, society, religion, and so forth.¹⁰ In its inert materiality, the economy "became arguably the most important set of practices for organizing what appears as the separation of the real world from its representations, of things from their values, of actions from intentions, of an object world from the realm of ideas," separations necessary for making economic calculations.¹¹ The economic sciences, including development economics, perform these separations by structuring interventions in the economy. Enacted in the

anti-politics machine, planners' intentions thus enable calculative agencies, not particular actions, in the Third World's rural areas.¹²

Third World rural calculations, in turn, enact a Cold War agenda, because any place where calculative agencies operate is a space under U.S. control, as Walt Rostow explains in his canonical 1960 treatise on modernization theory, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. For Rostow—who served as a high-level Cold Warrior in the Kennedy (1961-63) and Johnson (1963-1968) administrations in addition to theorizing about the Cold War—moral transformation is the key to bringing poor nations to “take-off,” the shift from dependence on agriculture to dependence on industry. Thus, although Rostow notes that for take-off to happen, governments must construct the “social overhead capital, most notably in transport” that will lay the foundations for industrial society,¹³ he is considerably more concerned with “the view taken of human motivation” in such societies.¹⁴ To reach take-off, “men must come to be valued in the society not for their connexion with clan or class... but for their individual ability to perform certain specific, increasingly specialized functions.”¹⁵ Likewise, man must cease to “regard his physical environment as virtually a factor given by nature and providence, but [rather] as an ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive change.”¹⁶ Finally, “the population at large must be prepared to accept training for—and then to operate—an economic system whose methods are subject to regular change.”¹⁷ Eventually, these transformations will bring former agricultural societies into the “age of high consumerism.”¹⁸ By enabling calculative agencies, development links the Third World's rural markets to “the market” of high capitalist theory.

In producing this link, development becomes anticommunism and vice versa:

“The test of our own economies—and of the non-Communist world as a whole—lies not in the Soviet economic performance, but in our ability to fulfill the ambitions of our own peoples,” Rostow notes.¹⁹ The final purpose of modernization, therefore, is to “demonstrate that the underdeveloped nations—now the main focus of Communist hopes—can move successfully through the preconditions into a well-established take-off within the orbit of the democratic world, resisting the blandishments and temptations of Communism.”²⁰ This demonstration, Rostow believes, will persuade the Soviet Union to at last abandon its imperialist designs on the world and enter the age of high consumerism itself. As an instrument of and for calculation, the anti-politics machine was a weapon forged for the frontlines of American Cold War battles, and it transformed the Third World rural areas on which it worked into privileged Cold War battlegrounds.

Guatemala as Cold War Showcase

Nineteen-fifties Guatemala was ripe for modernizing: it was an agrarian society in the sense that its economy depended on the export of a very limited range of agricultural commodities—coffee; bananas; and to a lesser extent cattle, sugar, and cotton. This plantation economy dated from the late 19th century, when German entrepreneurs showed Central America that coffee could be an immensely profitable crop and Liberal governments seeking to take advantage of the windfall introduced a series of legal reforms that “forever altered rural life” in Guatemala in three ways.²¹ First, changes in property law allowed much of Guatemala's best land—its fertile coastal piedmont and lower highlands—to be transferred from the hands of indigenous communities into those of foreign and Ladino (non-indigenous Guatemalan) entrepreneurs, who consolidated their holdings into a small number of vast estates. Second, coercive measures including labor laws to prevent “vagrancy” among the

propertyless ensured that the newly dispossessed indigenous communities would provide a steady stream of workers for the new plantations. Third, the abolition of colonial protections for indigenous communities permitted Ladinos to take up residence in these communities, where they quickly seized control of municipal government and used it to tighten the state's control over indigenous labor. In just a few decades, these policies concentrated 72 percent of Guatemala's arable land in the hands of two percent of landowners—the least equitable distribution of land in Latin America—and channeled the rhythms of rural indigenous life into a cycle of forced seasonal migration from the highlands to the tropical coast.²² Thus, nineteen-fifties Guatemala was also an agrarian society in the Rostovian sense that much of its capital was reproduced by unfree rural labor (itself reproduced in noncapitalist peasant households) and that much of its surplus was wasted on reproducing ascriptive social identities.

The doomed Arbenz government sought to build the Guatemalan nation by introducing programs to liberate the rural area from precisely these phenomena. Building on the reforms of his predecessor, who had abolished forced labor and introduced new educational programs aimed at the indigenous population, Arbenz introduced an agrarian reform law in 1952. This law, Decree 900, aimed to reverse Guatemala's rural "backwardness" by expropriating land left fallow by large landholders and giving it in usufruct to tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and agricultural laborers, thereby transforming them into petty agrarian capitalists and potential consumers of the products of Guatemala's fledgling industries. Other initiatives included extensive investment in transportation infrastructure, including a new highway to the Atlantic (a route previously served only by railroad) and a new Caribbean port.²³

On the surface, these programs were eminently compatible with plans like Rostow's for development. Indeed, according to Jim Handy, Arbenz's economic initiatives were largely "based on the recommendations made in an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [the World Bank's predecessor] survey," an inspiration of which Rostow might well have approved.²⁴ Nonetheless, Arbenz's reforms raised multiple red flags in the U.S. and among Guatemalan elites. In a country politically dominated by large landowners, and where the largest landowner was the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company, both Decree 900 and the new infrastructure, which competed with the United Fruit Company's prior monopoly on transportation along these routes, directly attacked entrenched national and transnational interests.²⁵ The prominent position of José Manuel Fortuny, leader of the Communist-affiliated Guatemalan Workers' Party, in Arbenz's government, and particularly his role in writing Decree 900, raised fears among the Guatemalan elite as well as U.S. officials about the government's plans for the future.²⁶ Decree 900's establishment of new peasant and community organizations to oversee expropriations and its granting of usufruct rather than title to the land it redistributed—measures Fortuny intended as a means of "introduc[ing] a progressive element into a capitalist reform"—gave weight to their fears.²⁷ Finally, the geopolitical moment also worked against Arbenz, for China's peasant revolution had very recently "stirred deep misgivings in Washington policymaking circles" by suggesting that communists could find a foothold in susceptible rural hearts and minds as well as on the European front lines.²⁸ The very fact that Arbenz took such an interest in agrarian matters was thus perceived as a sign that his government's nationalist initiatives were but a front for the worst sort of internationalist intentions: in a 1953 report to the National Security Council, the Bureau of Interamerican Affairs characterized Decree 900 as a law "designed to produce social upheaval."²⁹

Fears about Arbenz's intentions helped frame the 1954 coup against his government as a world-historical anticommunist triumph rather than as the overthrow of a particular regime, making the need to modernize Guatemala appear all the more acute. In 1955, members of the U.S. House of Representatives sought development aid for the post-coup government by arguing that Guatemala was "a political, social, and economic laboratory," whose fate "will be a major factor in determining the future course of Latin American affairs."³⁰ Rostow himself recognized that keeping rural areas free of communism required not only a mere shift in attitudes toward marketing but also "a change translated into working institutions and procedures" for marketing.³¹ In the wake of the coup, Guatemala became a "pilot project" for the introduction of such institutions and procedures to the Third World: between 1954 and 1960, Guatemala received fifteen percent of all U.S. foreign aid to Latin America.³²

The aid served two purposes: first, strengthening Guatemala's internal security forces to increase their vigilance against Communism and second, implementing developmental policies designed to create "a climate in which Communism will not thrive."³³ The post-coup government's tactics for creating this climate were in some respects similar to Arbenz's tactics for creating a nation: the showcase project of the late 1950s, for example, was the Inter-American highway (as the Panamerican highway is called in Central America), a road Arbenz had planned to build until the U.S. cut off aid to his government in 1951.³⁴ Likewise, although the new regime restored most of the land expropriated under Decree 900 to its previous owners, it also implemented its own, more limited, agrarian reform. Under U.S. guidance, however, the strategy these tactics served had changed: post-coup development sought to build markets, not national industry. The new government channeled its infrastructural investments through the private rather than

the public sector, and the majority of those who received land under its agrarian reform were "[r]elatively well-off ladinos" already making capitalist use of their land.³⁵

Yet, the peculiarly anticommunist thrust of post-coup modernization efforts was most evident in the creation of a novel set of institutions and programs targeted specifically at the rural area. Poorly funded in comparison with the large infrastructural projects, these entities had a much more ambitious purpose than those projects: disciplining Guatemala's rural agencies for the new economy through interventions in education, housing, literacy, community development, and public health.³⁶ The Socio-Educativo Rural, an instance that trained rural teachers to educate their charges in hygiene, nutrition, crochet, and the like, exemplified such interventions; government dailies described its work as an effort to "change the negative attitudes of our people for favorable attitudes."³⁷ As Stephen Streeter has shown, most of these efforts were profoundly unsuited to Guatemalan rural life and soon petered out.³⁸ Nevertheless, these programs helped mark rural Guatemala as a discrete space with distinct interests, and thus as a place demanding particular kinds of intervention.

The Cold War Church and Indigenous Guatemala

The Catholic Church responded to this demand more successfully than the state, for its historical claim on Guatemala's rural area was far stronger than that of the central government. During the conquest of Mesoamerica, the Church had secured its place in the Crown's new territories by affirming that Indians had souls that required spiritual guidance. As the Indians' "defenders," clergy were the only non-indigenous people regularly permitted to live in indigenous communities under colonial law, such that the Church "effectively was the state in rural areas" for

hundreds of years.³⁹ At the time of the coup, the Church's ability to assert this claim on the rural area was weak, for nineteenth-century Liberal regimes had stripped the Church of its Guatemalan privileges and properties, imposing "perhaps the longest and most severe restriction that the Catholic Church has suffered in Latin America."⁴⁰ By the 1950s, few clergy remained to administer the sacraments outside of Guatemala City, and few Guatemalans missed receiving them. With fanatically anticommunist Archbishop Mariano Rossell y Arellano at its helm, however, the Church's situation was gradually improving.

In the 1940s, Rossell had begun to seek new social relevance for the Church by creating new entities for the cultivation of anticommunist—and, with Arbenz in power, antigovernment—sentiment.⁴¹ One such entity was Catholic Action, a movement originally founded by Pope Pius XI to encourage laypeople to help the Church spread the Good Word as a means of counteracting the corrosive forces of modernity, Protestantism, and secularism. Subsequent popes had held up Catholic Action as a bulwark against communism as well. Following their lead, Rossell issued a pastoral letter in 1946 urging all Guatemalans "who feel the waves of evil striking Nations in order to drag them into the abyss, and who long to consecrate their lives to the good cause" of their nation's salvation to join the movement.⁴² Without a strong institution behind it, however, Catholic Action initially found few joiners.

Rossell's luck with anticommunist interventions improved during the campaign leading up to the coup against Arbenz. In 1953, Rossell sent the revered image of the Black Christ of Esquipulas, Guatemala's most visited pilgrimage site, on an anti-Arbenz excursion around the countryside, and in April 1954, he issued a pastoral letter calling explicitly for a "sincere crusade against Communism."⁴³ After the coup, such activities allowed the Church to claim it had played an important role in Arbenz's

undoing, teaching Rossell that he could best serve God and himself by using the Church's pastoral techniques to serve Cold War plans for Guatemala.

Conveniently for Rossell, the lone reminder of the Church's glorious past in 1950s Guatemala was indigenous spirituality, which happened to a rural phenomenon. Catholicism had retained some of its sway over Indian souls even after the Church itself abandoned indigenous communities: in the absence of clergy, indigenous people simply transformed the lay fraternities, or *cofradías*, that had traditionally cared for saints' images into "Indian institutions that served chiefly Indian purposes."⁴⁴ The *cofradías* presided over *costumbre* (custom), a nominally Catholic religious practice that replaced the authority of the priests with the authority of an indigenous gerontocracy and emphasized agricultural rites over the orthodox liturgy.⁴⁵ Much like the colonial Church, moreover, the *cofradías* also exercised their authority in political matters, collecting the indigenous labor that municipal governments demanded, but resisting these demands when they became excessive. Under their power, indigenous people gained a measure of protection from Liberal impositions, but also a means of affirming their dignity as spiritual beings in the face of soulless ladino rule.

Inspired by Cold War modernization theory, Rossell decided he could enlist indigenous souls as well as rural hearts and minds for take-off, thereby making the Church into an essential partner for the post-coup state. In a lecture at the Third Catholic Congress on Rural Life, held in Panama in 1955, Rossell acclaimed rural life as "one of the principal aspects of the titanic struggle now waged by the militant City of God...against the diabolical city now incarnate in the seduction of Communism."⁴⁶ During the colonial period, he argued, the peasant and the Church had forged an alliance for the defense of Indian lands; Liberal attacks on Church lands were

in fact designed to facilitate their attacks on Indian lands. The Communists had used agrarian reform to try to win Indian loyalties away from the Church, and almost succeeded, because “[a] peasant without land is already halfway and unconsciously within the orbit of Communist seduction.”⁴⁷ But when “the divine spell of a crucifix [the Black Christ of Esquipulas] reconquered an entire nation” in spite of such ruses, it revealed the continuing allegiance of peasants to the Church.⁴⁸ Warning that land distribution in post-coup Guatemala was still not exactly “Christian,”⁴⁹ Rossell concluded that the Church would have to resume its role as defender of the Indians to help keep rural Guatemalans on the right track.

The post-coup government responded to such arguments by restoring the Church’s right to own property and provide religious education in the 1955 constitution.⁵⁰ The Vatican was likewise disposed to help Rossell minister to Guatemala’s Cold War spiritual needs by sending new religious personnel to expand the Church’s institutional reach. Foreign clergy had begun to arrive in Guatemala in the late 1940s in response to the Vatican’s call for Catholics in wealthy nations to “save Guatemala from Communism,”⁵¹ but after the coup, this trickle became a flood. In the early 1940s, religious personnel in the country numbered 120 in total, virtually all of them Guatemalans; by 1966 there were 531 priests, 96 monks, and 805 nuns in Guatemala, of whom 434, 96, and 705, respectively, were foreigners.⁵²

To accommodate the influx, new dioceses and parishes opened throughout the country, mostly in the rural, indigenous communities Rossell had determined were the frontline of the battle against Communism. The predominantly European and North American priests sent to minister to indigenous communities, however, had little notion of what they would encounter there: “They did not understand the cultural or religious reality of the places they were sent to work ... Their idea of the pastoral

was entirely spiritual,” charges one account of their arrival.⁵³ Most reacted violently: they were appalled by the indigenous misery and ladino racism that prevailed in Guatemala’s highlands and by what they saw as *costumbrista* paganism. Worse still, they felt that the Church’s longstanding practice of accommodating indigenous *costumbre* was complicit in this lamentable state of affairs.

Their solution to these problems was to bring Rossell’s Catholic Action movement to indigenous Guatemala. Kay Warren argues that Catholic Action is premised on a set of oppositions between body and soul, external and internal worlds, and material and spiritual phenomena.⁵⁴ For the foreign priests, *costumbre* exhibited an imbalance along all three of these axes, privileging the bodily pleasures of drink and sex; the external world of processions and display; and the materiality of fireworks, candles, and flowers in worship. By inverting these emphases, they trusted, Catholic Action would turn indigenous souls inward and upward, modernizing the procedures through which they made their spiritual choices and curing the spiritual confusion that kept them poor.⁵⁵

To get to indigenous souls, however, the priests first had to break the earthly power of the *cofradías* by leveling the material distinctions *costumbre* had institutionalized among indigenous people and between indigenous people and Ladinos. Clergy used their international connections, therefore, to channel a flow of funds and training into modernizing their communities’ economies. North Americans, for example, often had links with USAID, which gave funds to cooperatives, peasant leagues, and credit providers; and to the Peace Corps, which provided training and labor for specific local projects such as the construction of schools. Europeans brought substantial funding from the Christian Democrats as well as Misérior, the German bishops’ grant-making foundation, to their own community projects.⁵⁶ By the late

1960s, priests in many communities were deeply involved in parishioners' efforts to set up agricultural cooperatives, savings and loans institutions, community Betterment Committees, peasant leagues, and rural schools and markets. In just two decades, such interventions substantially improved material conditions in many highland communities.

The Church's harnessing of modernization to evangelization served the Church's purposes: in the decades after the coup, the growth of Catholic Action was "almost prodigious,"⁵⁷ and the power of the *cofradías* waned apace. In reconstructing the domain of religious belief, however, the priests also wrought a revolution in aspects of indigenous life now considered external to religion. To replace the gerontocracy, the priests had singled out particularly worthy members of Catholic Action as "leaders" of their communities in a political as well as spiritual sense. By 1967, USAID had trained 74 rural Catholic Action members to organize agriculture-related "interest groups," while the Christian Democrats had trained some 160 more.⁵⁸ Formed by initiatives that required literacy skills as well as competence in Spanish, these leaders tended to be younger and have more formal education than *costumbrista* authorities, and were thus better equipped than they to deal with Ladinos on Ladino terms. As Ricardo Falla has shown, moreover, the earliest, most enthusiastic, and most prominent indigenous Catholic Action converts tended to be those who worked as traveling merchants rather than those more committed to working the land.⁵⁹ In overthrowing the spiritual authority of the *cofradías*, therefore, Catholic Action also lent authority to political and economic behaviors quite foreign to those sanctioned by *costumbre*, radically transforming the grounds on which indigenous identity was constructed.

In opening up the rural area to Cold War evangelization, moreover, Rossell very quickly lost control over the Guatemalan Church. Schisms began to open within the

Church, on the one hand between members of religious orders and the regular clergy, and on the other between international theologies and the traditions of Guatemalan Catholicism. At the Vatican II Council, the Guatemalan bishops voted against most proposed reforms,⁶⁰ and their response to John XXIII's new charter for the Church was to issue familiar warnings about Communism and calls for a land reform based on the God-given right to private property.⁶¹ Nevertheless, the bishops' power over their increasingly decentralized institution was insufficient to prevent foreign arrivals from following their ever more progressive theological inclinations.

Religious, whose funding came from their orders rather than a parish, were particularly disinclined to respect the political limits the regular hierarchy sought to impose. In the early 1970s, the Jesuit Landívar University began to offer courses in Bible study inspired by liberation theology to rural indigenous leaders identified through church networks. In the mid-1970s, members of Guatemala City's Jesuit Center for Research and Social Action began to travel to the highlands departments of Chimaltenango and the Quiché, forming similar study groups with local Catholic Action leaders outside of regular parish and diocesan activities, and sometimes against the wishes of local priests and bishops.⁶²

In 1978, the members of one of these study groups, based in Santa Cruz del Quiché, came together to form the Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC), the group that later organized Chupol's market uprising. Robert Carmack describes the CUC as "more ideological than any previous Indian organization had been."⁶³ The CUC's first newsletter supports this assertion, calling the group "an organization of all workers in the countryside, of individuals, associations, leagues, committees who want to fight valiantly to get rid of oppression, using our strength united with the forces of all the other exploited people of Guatemala."⁶⁴ Indeed, although the CUC

represented itself as an autonomous grouping, the national leadership of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor participated in the decision to create the organization. However, neither socialist ideology nor clandestine guerrilla ties made the CUC less indigenous: on the contrary, the organization essentially gave political form to the ambit for indigenous political action Catholic Action had created. In the CUC, therefore, the Church's appropriation of Cold War modernization to serve the Indian soul came around full circle: CUC leaders' soul-searching led them to take action on their own rural economic reality.

State, Church, and Market in Cold War Chupol

Chupol, one of 64 "cantons" or hamlets that make up the rural hinterland of the township of Chichicastenango in the highlands department of the Quiché, is an eminently rural place. The canton's population is entirely indigenous and, as Chupolenses put it, "poor," characteristics strongly correlated with rural residence in Guatemala. Chichicastenango is also a classic example of what Mesoamericanists call the "ceremonial center" pattern of settlement, by which they mean that the great majority of Chichicastecos, including Chupolenses, have lived for many generations on the plots of land where they grow corn and other subsistence crops, traveling to the township's small urban center only on market days or ritual occasions. Maxeños, as indigenous Chichicastecos are called, are thus even more "rural" than indigenous people in other communities. Historically, moreover, Chupol's distinction among its rural neighbors was its remoteness from urban life: at four or five hours' walk from town, Chupol is one of the cantons furthest geographically and culturally from the center.

For modernization theory, places like Chupol represent the market's final frontier. The impact of development

interventions on Chupol, however, reveals Chupol's relationship with the market to be older and more complex than a modernization theorist might imagine. Arbenz's reforms had virtually no effect on the canton—the township of Chichicastenango witnessed no petitions for land under Decree 900—and few Chupolenses remember Arbenz's name or his presidency.⁶⁵ Two factors account for this failure to take advantage of agrarian reform. First, although Chupolenses are by no means rich in land—indeed, archival records reveal they have long complained about land shortages—they live in a place where small landholdings are the norm. Chichicastenango is one of Guatemala's largest townships, but also one of its highest and coldest. Much of its territory lies above 2000 meters, and daytime temperatures range from 12 to 18 degrees Celsius (53.6 to 64.4 degrees Fahrenheit) year-round.⁶⁶ The crops that thrive in such a climate are corn, beans, and apple trees, not tropical exports. For 19th-century agrarian entrepreneurs, such land was simply not worth the trouble of stealing: no properties large enough to be affected by Decree 900 were ever formed within the township and Maxeños were spared the massive dispossession experienced by other indigenous communities.

Second, although many Maxeños were at some point forced to join the massive seasonal migrations to the coast to harvest export crops, they always had another—vastly preferred—money-making option available to them: petty trade. Located in the center of Guatemala's Western highlands, Chichicastenango has hosted one of the most important markets in the region since before the Conquest, and Maxeños themselves have long served as the region's designated traveling salesmen. Even in 1937, dark days when agents of the plantations were, in ethnographer Ruth Bunzel's words, waiting "like a multiple Circe" with loans and liquor to entrap Maxeños into debt labor,⁶⁷ at least half the township's men described their profession

as “trader” (*comerciante*) on official registers.⁶⁸ Being a trader in those years meant traipsing for hundreds of kilometers around the mountains with up to 150 pounds of goods on one’s back, so the preference Maxeños felt for trading over plantation work was not due to the ease of the former. Rather, as Chupolenses who have engaged in both kinds of labor note, the virtue of trading is that it gives one the freedom to determine one’s own pace and schedule. Paradoxically, therefore, Chupolenses’ prior experiences with marketing may have left them indifferent to Arbenz’s attempts to make them agrarian capitalists.

Cold War modernization, in contrast, wrought profound changes in Chupol precisely because of this experience. Initially, its effects were entirely accidental: the Cold War came to the canton in the form of the Inter-American highway, which was built through the community in 1956 for reasons to do with Chupol’s terrain, not Chupolenses’ needs. But simply by virtue of lying in the highway’s path, Chupolenses suddenly gained access to a means of transport for their goods other than their own backs, one which further improved when third-class bus lines began to run on the highway in the mid-1960s. The village’s merchants found their formerly Herculean trading trips significantly eased, and discovered both new places to sell and new goods—mostly cheap, industrial manufactures like shoelaces, disposable pens, plastic toys, etc.—in the capital city, now at only two hours’ distance. By expanding their commercial possibilities, the Inter-American highway thus definitively freed Chupolenses from hated plantation work. Rushing in droves to take advantage of this opportunity, many men had accumulated what they call “capitals” (*capitales*) in goods they claim were worth up to 15,000 quetzals (15,000 USD) by the mid-1970s. Instead of hiking around the highlands, moreover, these men spent most of their time in the capital, where they were forced to learn Spanish in order to engage with the ladinos and indigenous people from

other linguistic communities they encountered while peddling their wares.

Chupolense salesmen who experienced these changes felt themselves liberated not only from the threat of the plantations, but also from the chains of prejudice and ignorance that they believed had prevented them from developing their historic genius for trading. They describe the import of these changes in terms that would make a modernization theorist proud. “Here [in the capital] it depends on one’s own spark,” one salesman told me. “You have to be brave enough to say, ‘Will you buy from me? I have a cheap watch...’ And you have to know what price to put on things.” “Now there’s respect between indigenous people and Ladinos,” another explained, “because everyone comes here for the same thing: to buy.”⁶⁹ To the extent that Chupolenses were “penny capitalists,” therefore, Cold War development interventions made them exemplary Rostovians, allowing them to calculate their own and others’ interests in market terms.⁷⁰

More deliberate than the highway’s construction were the Church’s interventions in Chupol. Chichicastenango, owing to its central location and relative proximity to Guatemala City, was one of three parishes in the Quiché that maintained a priest throughout the Liberal era. After the 1954 coup, it became something of a regional showcase for the revitalized Church. In 1955, the parish’s status was raised to “*ad nutum Sanctae Sedis*,” meaning that its priest could only be dismissed or moved by the Pope, and by the late 1950s it had three priests in residence. An executive committee for Catholic Action formed in 1954, and as might be predicted for a community of traveling merchants, parish membership in Catholic Action grew quickly.⁷¹

Chupolenses say that true religion arrived in the canton in the 1960s, when a Spaniard named Father Felipe González became parish priest. According to Sebastián, a prominent Catholic Action

leader from the canton next to Chupol and the son of an important *cofradía* member, Father Felipe finally explained the purpose of the Christian life. Unlike previous priests who only preached sterile doctrine, Father Felipe spoke about racism and poverty, telling his flock that all people were children of God, made in his image, and that out of respect for God's dignity and justice, "it is not possible that we let them discriminate against us." Other Chupolenses echo Sebastián, saying the priest taught them that, "We are all children of God; we all have rights," and that to please their Father they would have to claim those rights.

Just as important as his pastoral message in bringing this religion to Chupol, however, was Father Felipe's decision to construct four "missionary centers" (*centros misioneros*) in the parish's rural area, to hold regular masses for the rural area's Catholic Action converts. He chose Chupol as the site of one of these centers: its new church would welcome parishioners from seventeen neighboring cantons. Chupolense Catholics believe that they earned this honor for their canton by converting to Catholic Action more quickly and enthusiastically than the rest of the township.⁷² Cristóbal, another Chupolense Catholic Action leader who was appointed to the committee that organized the construction of the center, recalls that, "In Chupol the Catholics were always asking for masses... but they had to hold them in private houses."

Nevertheless, Chupolenses realized that the center also served as a remedy for the marginality imposed on Chupolenses by their distance from town. Its construction was thus an act of justice as well as a reward for just behavior, as Cristóbal's wife, Ana, whom Father Felipe placed in charge of building materials, explained to me.

Since the Father worked here [in Chichicastenango], and a representative from each canton had to come on Saturdays, the Father thought, the people who are old ...

can't stand [the trip], they can't come here anymore, so the Father thought it would be better for us to make a center so that for the people who can't come to Chichi anymore, they can go there, to the center.

The priest chose the site for the church, on top of a hill by the side of the highway, because there was already a *costumbrista* prayer chapel there, and because he "saw that this place was a center." The Diocese put up the money to buy the land, and Father Felipe called on all the cantons that would use the center to contribute their money and labor to the project. Catholic Action members from all seventeen cantons heeded the priest's call: old and young, men and women built the center together. (*Costumbristas* insist even they participated, although both Ana and Cristóbal deny this claim.)

To give Chupolenses their due, however, a church was not enough. Indeed, according to Cristóbal, the construction of the church was only a pretext for building a market: "Father Felipe would say, don't think you're just going to stay like this, life will get harder in the future and so you have to build yourselves a market here, so you can do your marketing here in Chupol." Building the market was undeniably a stroke of genius on the priest's part, for it provided an ecumenical space in which *costumbre* and Catholic Action could engage. At first only Catholics were willing to open stalls in this market, but the more people heard about it and saw others doing their shopping there, the more they came. "Now, it's for everybody, not just Catholic Action, but everybody. It's a center" Ana points out. Provided with a physical market in which to engage one another, Chupolenses could at last begin to engage in proper market relations at home as well as on the road.

Insurgent Modernizers: Chupol's Market as Revolutionary Center

In constructing a space for “the market” in Chupol, however, Father Felipe transformed Chupolenses’ relationships with the other spaces in which they participated. In a township with a ceremonial center, life is supposed to revolve around urban space, where power is concentrated. In the 1930s, as described by ethnographers Ruth Bunzel and Sol Tax, Maxeño authority was embodied in the fourteen *cofradías* that cared for Chichicastenango’s church and performed services for the ladino municipality through the institution of the indigenous mayoralty. In the *cofradías*, Bunzel claims, Church and state were united, a union physically represented in the architecture of Chichicastenango’s central plaza, where the indigenous municipality is separated from the church only by a narrow street.⁷³

On Thursdays and Sundays, this plaza also hosts Chichicastenango’s market. When Tax and Bunzel were doing fieldwork, no rural Maxeño, and few rural Maxeñas, would have voluntarily missed a market day, however far they had to walk to get to town. Even if they did not keep a stand in the plaza, Maxeños used it as a place to shop, socialize, hear community news, and drink. For both ethnographers, the township’s convergence on this space of power represents the *ur*-Maxeño moment. Tax claims that, “just as the town is more than a town, so Sunday is more than a Day; it is a multitude of climaxes, a sort of temporal nerve-center of the scattered organs of Chichicastenango life.”⁷⁴ Similarly, for Bunzel the central dynamic of Maxeño life is this market-driven alternation “between the monotony of the canton and the excitement, joyfulness, and color of the town, for [the town] is more than a center; it is the heart through which all life in the region flows.”⁷⁵

But for whom did this heart beat? Archival evidence suggests that

Chichicastenango’s primordial rhythm—and thus the town’s symbolic importance—is in many respects an artifact of the 19th-century Liberal reforms that allowed Ladinos into indigenous communities. Correspondence between the Quiché military governor’s office and the ladino municipality in Chichicastenango from the late 1800s reveals that Maxeños, like their indigenous counterparts across the highlands, employed a wide variety of foot-dragging techniques to resist the new demands the Liberal reforms placed on their labor, including sabotage, petitioning for release, and running away. In Chichicastenango, however, the easiest way to escape was to hide in the township’s inhospitable rural area behind the back of the indigenous mayoralty.

Correspondence between Juan Rodríguez, the ladino mayor of Chichicastenango for several terms between 1880 and 1900, and the military governor of the Quiché testifies to the success of this tactic. In 1883, for example, Rodríguez complained that he was unable to finish a cattle census because “the town is extremely large, and worse so because of the coldness and indifference presented by the Naturals’ Authority, from whom I should have some hope of support, but find none.” In 1885, his lieutenant wrote that despite the military governor’s order that the indigenous mayoralty gather 200 men to work on the railroads, “now that it is around four in the afternoon I have gone back to ask this same Mayoralty if said people were already gathered; they have answered me that only those they have already collected, who number forty, will go.” The indigenous mayoralty’s ability to protect its constituents ultimately rested on its ability to keep the rural area safe from prying ladino eyes, as Rodríguez recognized in 1897, when he explained his many defeats at its hands by complaining about the size and climate of Chichicastenango’s rural extensions.⁷⁶

Such uses of rural space for thwarting the rapacious demands of

Chichicastenango's ladino authorities suggest that the urban center was the arena of state and Ladino, not Maxeño, power. For Maxeños, indeed, the plaza represented a threat as well as a meeting place, for plantation agents and Ladino officials haunted such spaces. *Pace* Bunzel and Tax, therefore, it seems that Maxeños' 1930s journeys through the "heart" of Chichicastenango could be as frightening as they were life-giving, and likewise, that Maxeño canton life was less "monotonous" than carefully protected against outsiders.

Chupolenses were thus rural inhabitants of a place where rural residence had long constituted a significant act of resistance to state control. In opening a new space for Chupolenses to exercise their calculative agencies, Father Felipe's market allowed them to incorporate this act of resistance into their calculations. Laboring on the center, Chupolenses and their rural neighbors found themselves voluntarily working to fulfill their own most pressing needs, instead of being forced to toil on ladino and state projects that stood them no benefit. With their labor, moreover, they managed to transform what had been one rural place among many into an alternative temporal and spatial "nerve center" to Chichicastenango, in this case an entirely indigenous center that allowed indigenous people to prosper while permitting only a minimum of other distinctions to prevail among them. For Sebastián, the head of the center's construction committee, the center made the racist legacy of the 19th-century Liberal reforms visible:

Here in the center we are all equal, no one is greater and no one is lesser, but all people are the same. So why—because then I understood—when you go to the civil registry in Chichi [and say], "Sir, I've come to register a birth certificate," [they answer], "All right, wait for me outside for a bit, outside please." So then you're out there, standing, in the sun. And then

sometimes other people come, who are ladinos: "Come in sir, how can we help you? Please, sit down." And all the while, you stand there. Maybe you have to wait there for an hour, an hour and a half, and then you go in again: "I already told you, sir, that you should wait for me for a bit. I told you, wait for me, please!" . . . As though we weren't people! So that's when I understood that it's true, they haven't taken us into account . . . As though one were worth more and the other less!

By bringing Chupolenses into "the market," modernization helped them to become better capitalists, but by building a market in Chupol, modernization mediated by evangelization helped them to challenge the racist foundation of Guatemalan agrarian capitalism. Thus, Cristóbal notes, "a very combative religion began" in Chupol.

The devastating earthquake (7.5 on the Richter scale) that struck Guatemala's highlands on February 4, 1976 helped Chupolenses transform this new understanding of their interests into a project that would further them. In Chichicastenango, forty per cent of the township suffered material damage in the earthquake;⁷⁷ in Chupol, which lies close to the earthquake's epicenter, most residents' houses—one-room adobe constructions with tile roofs—fell down, and many families suffered human losses. Two weeks after the disaster, Chichicastenango's municipal council formed an emergency commission to deal with the "grievous situation" the earthquake had caused.⁷⁸ Father Felipe, a member of the commission, immediately proposed that Chupol's church serve as a center for aid distribution and named Sebastián as "warehouse-keeper," thereby cutting both the municipal government and the army out of Chupol's reconstruction.

The center's conversion into an aid warehouse confirmed Sebastián's claim that the center represented and promoted the

welfare of the community as a whole, irrespective of religious or other differences. Asked to draw a mural depicting the community's history, Chupolense participants in a 1999 Church-run mental health workshop—only some of whom were Catholics—represented 1976 as a stream of objects, including clothing, metal roofing sheets, corn, cooked beans, nails, and boards, emerging from the doors of a church. Sebastián also used his new position of authority to strengthen this claim, following the example set by the center's construction and organizing people into collective work groups. The somewhat plaintive comments of one *costumbrista* participant in the mental health workshop suggest the process of rebuilding the community inexorably incorporated Catholics and *costumbristas* alike into new community networks controlled by Sebastián: "They asked for our help. They built houses collectively [*en común*] ... what could we do but join?"

Meanwhile, Sebastián's growing influence over the center made him a target for other parties interested in gaining access to communities like Chupol. Shortly after the earthquake, the Jesuits invited Sebastián to participate in one of their liberation theology seminars—which he found very inspiring—and he later joined one of the study groups organized by indigenous Catholic Action leaders in Santa Cruz del Quiché. In 1978, he was invited to the CUC's inaugural meeting, which he failed to attend because, ironically, he was on a sales trip. In turn, Sebastián transmitted his evolving political commitments down the new hierarchy the center had created: the list of early CUC members in Chupol is essentially a list of prominent Catholic Action members, topped by those who worked on the church construction committee.

At first, according to Cristóbal, the CUC was little more than a "joining bonus" (*promoción de entrada*) for Catholics. It is not clear that even Sebastián himself

initially knew of the CUC's ties to guerrillas, but in any case its political agenda was kept clandestine: "When we spoke about the CUC, the organization of the CUC, we didn't, shall we say, *identify* it as the CUC," Cristóbal notes. Indeed, early CUC proselytizing hardly differed from Father Felipe's preaching: "People came and spoke, always about the Bible, but also about injustices and why they were this way." Early CUC meetings also took place in Church buildings, either the center or a prayer chapel in a neighboring canton. Following Father Felipe in linking spiritual questions to earthly problems allowed the new organization to assume the mantle of ecclesiastical authority.

On the advice of the CUC's national leadership, Sebastián also turned to ecumenical developmentalism as a way of reaching out to non-Catholics.

We looked for the way to get in with people. The first idea they gave us was [to ask] how do we make friends with people? So what are the community's problems? For example, at that time, like right now, in April, May, and June, is when the chickens have accidents. Ay! Tons of chickens die! So [the CUC] gave us shots to vaccinate the chickens. We charged people money for the shots, but only three cents a person. But the money we collected wasn't for the organization, but for the community. If we gathered 20, 30, 40 quetzals, we gave it to the Betterment Committee for the community's benefit. So then we can explain to people that we're not taking this money, but rather leaving it here.

Drawn by such economic appeals, Chupolenses flocked to the CUC: within a year, almost every household in the village had joined. Asked now why they chose to participate, most Chupolenses simply state that "the organization helps the poor" or

“the organization defends our rights,” phrases that speak to the organization’s success in linking its own interventions to Father Felipe’s sermons.

The CUC’s decisive grab of Chupolense hearts and minds away from the Church, however, came when it chose the market Father Felipe had built to stage its defense of indigenous, rather than divine, interests. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Guatemalan army began to recruit the soldiers it needed for its increasingly bloody counterinsurgent campaigns by kidnapping indigenous men. Chupol’s center, built precisely at this moment, had inadvertently provided the state with a convenient place to find conscripts: in the early 1970s a number of Chupolenses men who are now in their 50s were kidnapped in the market and forced to do military service. Chupolense CUC leaders began to argue that defending the rights Father Felipe had helped the community discover meant keeping the army out of Chupolenses’ hard-won gathering place, an argument that once again convinced both *costumbristas* and Catholics.

Women, however, felt the imperative to defend Chupol’s market most powerfully because they experienced attacks on the market as attacks against their households. In Chupol, labor is strictly divided by gender: women work in the home, while men cultivate the corn their family eats as well as providing their household with the cash it needs for other foodstuffs, clothes, and so forth. Men’s part in this exchange is more difficult to replace than that of women, for its value is higher: men are considered the “heads” (*ujolom racho’ch*) of a household whose other members are imagined as a body needing guidance. As heads, men also own their family’s property, even when that property is part of their wives’ inheritance rather than their own. Thus, woman-headed households tend to suffer economically. As their families’ heads, moreover, men are also their households’ political representatives to the outside world. Speaking to strangers and

particularly emitting definitive opinions in their presence make Chupolense women uncomfortable, and until the late 1980s, women did not attend community meetings. Even now that they do, community authorities (all men) tend to silence or dismiss their opinions. Without someone to represent them, women are targets for men’s aggression.

Men who go on sales trips even for weeks at a time may be physically absent, but they are morally present in the sense that they are doing their part for the household economy. Men who leave for a year or two to labor for the Guatemalan state, in contrast, have essentially abandoned their families. From the moment of their kidnapping, moreover, the training conscripts received at the hands of the Guatemalan army was deliberately brutalizing. Kept in their barracks by real and threatened violence, new recruits learned both that they had the right to kill anyone they chose and that they had no choice but to kill upon order.⁷⁹ Indigenous recruits in particular received additional training designed to shame them about and distance them emotionally from their indigenous roots, and thus to make them capable of “murdering people like their own families,” as one informant quoted by Michael McClintock reports.⁸⁰ Chupolense women felt that the army’s violent and racist indoctrination techniques not only made it difficult for men to return to their communities, but also disposed them to be abusive toward their families when they did.

In helping women use the market to take action against the state as women, therefore, the CUC both advanced the decay of the gerontocracy that Catholic Action had set in motion and demonstrated that any sufficiently organized group, no matter how weak and politically unprepossessing its individual members, could defend its own interests. Perhaps for this reason, no other CUC action is remembered with such pleasure as the uprising; men and women alike snicker gleefully as they recall how the

intruders “left with their tail between their legs that day.” Among Chupolense women, the uprising is also constitutive of their sense that they are subjects possessed of the rights Father Felipe had revealed. When asked why *they* joined the organization, women cite its struggle against forcible recruitment as well as its work on behalf of the poor. This struggle, in the words of one woman who participated in the uprising, was itself “a fight against discrimination against women,” precisely because it allowed women, for the first time, to behave as political actors. Maneuvers like the market uprising allowed the organization to claim that within its embrace “no one was greater, and no one was lesser,” fulfilling, as neither modernizers nor the Church had been able to, the market’s promise. To the extent that Chupolenses were something other than penny capitalists—namely Catholics, indigenous people, and gendered members of households—modernization thus made them the enemies of capitalism. The matrix of Chupol’s market transformed Cold War anticommunism into Cold War revolutionary action.

Despite the triumph of the uprising, Chupolenses, like hundreds of thousands of other rural Guatemalans, suffered enormously for their involvement in the Cold War. Shortly after the uprising, the CUC and the Guerrilla Army of the Poor officially merged, incorporating almost every Chupolense, willing or not, into an organization whose goal was immediate military action. For many, guerrilla warfare—or logistical support for guerrilla warfare, which is what the rural indigenous “social base” generally provided—represented a further extension of the rural politics they had developed over successive Cold War interventions. Nevertheless, U.S. Cold Warriors and their Guatemalan friends had another means of ensuring their calculations would prosper when the market failed to do so: genocidal violence. The soldiers returned to Chupol’s market in late October 1981, and stayed for good: Chupol’s church was used as an army base

and “killing center” until 1985, and almost two decades later, a platoon of soldiers stationed in a new base just off the highway still occupies Chupol. The army’s counterinsurgent tactics against Chupolenses included wholesale massacres of men, women, children, and old people as well as systematic rape of women, indiscriminate violence that inverted and made a mockery of the egalitarian forms of popular mobilization represented in the uprising. “Liberated” by the Cold War, Chupolense intentions were not free to determine its course any more than their oppressors’ intentions had been able to; Chupol’s oppressors, however, had more than intentions on their side.

Conclusion

Rostow had an explanation for “failed” cases of modernization like Chupol. In a 1961 address, offended by rural hearts and minds in Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo that refused to feel and think as he had intended them to, he blamed “the efforts of the international Communist movement to exploit the inherent instabilities of the underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world.”⁸¹ As I have shown, however, Rostow’s charge does little to explain why Chupol’s angry mothers behaved as they did. Any influence the “international Communist movement”—if the CUC or the Guerrilla Army of the Poor can even be described in these terms—had on these women was both very recent and highly mediated by local histories and local leaders at the time of the uprising. It was not the instability of Chupol’s situation, moreover, that allowed these organizations to disrupt Rostow’s plans, but on the contrary certain very durable features of that situation.

Instead, the key to understanding Chupol’s flouting of Rostow’s expectations can be better located in the very nature of those expectations. In Rostow’s calculations, the “rural market” figured as an abstract

economic entity, devoid of empirical content and thus subject to laws Rostow had already mastered. The uprising happened in Chupol's rural market, however, because it was a concrete historical formation: by building a market in Chupol, the Cold War church helped Chupolenses further their 19th-century projects for escaping the racialized Guatemalan state, despite or even through Cold War efforts to shore up that state. As Rostow might have wished, this market helped Chupolenses "understand," in Sebastián's words, their own reality, but what they understood was that indigenous people were worth the same as ladinos and deserved the same treatment. Equipped with this understanding, they could also bring it to bear on oppressive relations among indigenous people, like those between men and women. For Cold War calculations to take effect in Guatemala, the uprising shows, those making the calculations had to account for the interests of the soul and the family as well as the pocketbook, allowing those interests to become not only Guatemalan but also indigenous, and thus something for which they failed to account. Cold Warriors like Rostow set this process of understanding in motion at the price of mastery over its outcome.

Notes

¹ Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984), 111.

² R.G. Saull, "The Global South and the Theorisation of the Cold War," in *In From the Cold*. TEMPORARY REF.

³ Michel Callon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics." In *The Laws of the Markets* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 3.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 74-75.

⁶ See also James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: Why Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), and Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

⁷ Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine*, 256.

⁸ Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 34.

⁹ Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine*, 255.

¹⁰ Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, 82.

¹¹ Ibid., 6.

¹² There were, of course, Third Worldist, Marxist and Marxian critiques of development that had other developmentalist goals—import substitution industrialization or dependency theory, for example. Opinions are divided about whether to consider these essentially variations of modernization theory or alternatives to it. I do not engage these theories here, however, because I am not addressing nationalist efforts to develop, which, especially in Latin America, tended to be grounded in such theories, but in First World to Third World interventions, which almost never were.

¹³ W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 26.

¹⁴ Ibid., 149.

¹⁵ Ibid., 19.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 20.

¹⁸ Ibid., 134.

¹⁹ Ibid., 103.

²⁰ Ibid., 134.

²¹ David McCreery, *Rural Guatemala, 1760-1940* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 161. See McCreery for a detail account of this history.

²² Jim Handy, *Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 82.

²³ Ibid. and Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 155-6.

²⁴ Handy, *Revolution in the Countryside*, 39.

²⁵ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1982).

²⁶ See Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

²⁷ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 151.

²⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 87.

²⁹ Cited in Cullather, *Secret History*, 35.

³⁰ Cited in Stephen M. Streeter, *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000), 137.

³¹ Ibid., 149.

³² Ibid., 109.

³³ Operations Coordinating Board, Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Guatemala (Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d), June 1, 1955. RG 59, Box 19, State Department Participation in OCB, National Archive, College Park, MD, 5.

³⁴ Streeter, *Managing the Counterrevolution*, 121. For the cut-off of U.S. funding see Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 227.

³⁵ Streeter, *Managing the Counterrevolution*, 144 and 152.

³⁶ Ibid., 143.

³⁷ Diario de Centroamérica, *Desarrollo integral de las comunidades rurales en Guatemala*

(Guatemala City: Editorial del Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1956), 15.

³⁸ Streeter, *Managing the Counterrevolution*, 156.

³⁹ McCreery, *Rural Guatemala*, 130.

⁴⁰ Richard Adams, *Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944-1966* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), 269.

⁴¹ Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 213.

⁴² Mariano Rossell y Arellano, *Carta pastoral del excelentísimo y reverendísimo Señor Don Mariano Rossell Arellano, Arzobispo de Guatemala, sobre la Acción Católica* (Guatemala: Tipografía Sánchez & de Guise, 1946), 1.

⁴³ Mariano Rossell y Arellano, "Carta pastoral del 4 de abril de 1954," in *El calvario de Guatemala: paginas de horror y crimen* (Guatemala City: Tipografía Nacional, 1955), 321.

⁴⁴ McCreery, *Rural Guatemala*, 137.

⁴⁵ Kay Warren, *The Symbolism of Subordination: Indian Identity in a Guatemalan Town*, 2nd ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 87.

⁴⁶ Mariano Rossell Arellano, *Conferencia del excelentísimo y reverendísimo Monseñor Mariano Rossell Arellano, Arzobispo de Guatemala, en el Tercer Congreso Católico de la Vida Rural el 21 de abril de 1955 en la Ciudad de Panamá* (Guatemala City: Tipografía Sánchez & de Guise, 1955), 2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵⁰ José Luis Crea, "The Process and the Implications of Change in the Guatemalan Church" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1988), 127.

⁵¹ Cited in Diócesis del Quiché, *El Quiché: el pueblo y su iglesia, 1960-1980* (Santa Cruz del Quiché: Diócesis del Quiché, 1994), 37.

⁵² Adams, *Crucifixion*, 283.

⁵³ Diócesis, *El Quiché*, 49.

⁵⁴ Warren, *Symbolism of Subordination*, 105.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁵⁶ Diócesis, *El Quiché*, 62.

⁵⁷ Diócesis, *El Quiché*, 39.

⁵⁸ Brian Murphy, "The Stunted Growth of Campesino Organizations," in *Crucifixion by Power*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), 473.

⁵⁹ Ricardo Falla, *Quiché Rebelde* (Guatemala City: Editorial Universitaria de Guatemala, 1978).

⁶⁰ Adams, *Crucifixion*, 290.

⁶¹ Episcopado de Guatemala, *Carta pastoral del Episcopado guatemalteco sobre los problemas sociales y el peligro comunista en Guatemala* (Guatemala: Unión Tipográfica. 1962).

⁶² See Yvon LeBot, *La guerra en tierras mayas: comunidad, violencia, y modernidad en Guatemala (1970-1992)* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992) and María del Pilar Hoyos de Asig, *Fernando Hoyos ¿Dónde estás?* (Guatemala City: Fondo de Cultura Editorial, 1997).

⁶³ Robert Carmack, "The Story of Santa Cruz Quiché," in *Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis*, ed. R. Carmack (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 51.

⁶⁴ Comité de Unidad Campesina, "Presentación," *Voz del Comité de Unidad Campesina: Periódico informativo del CUC*, 15 April 1978, 1.

⁶⁵ A group of Chupolenses did participate in a claim on a *finca* in neighboring Tecpán, but they did not lead the drive to file the claim, and were marginalized by the group of Tecpanecos that did. At one point the Tecpanecos even tried to exclude the Chupolenses from participating. See Carlota McAllister, "Good People: Revolution, Community, and *Conciencia* in a Maya-K'iche' Village in Guatemala" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2003), 220-21.

⁶⁶ Municipalidad de Santo Tomás Chichicastenango, *Diagnóstico y Plan del Desarrollo del municipio de Santo Tomás Chichicastenango* (Guatemala City: FUNCEDE, 1995), 16.

⁶⁷ Ruth Bunzel, *Chichicastenango* (Guatemala City: Editorial José de Pineda Ibarra, 1981), 42.

⁶⁸ Censo de Vialidad, Primer semestre 1937, Legajo 2087, Archivo General de Centroamérica, Guatemala City, Guatemala.

⁶⁹ This paper is based on a total of 17 months' fieldwork in Chupol and with Chupolenses in Guatemala City, conducted in several periods over the years between February 1997 and January 2001, as well as archival research. The primary method I used during fieldwork was participant observation; I lived with a Chupolense family and took part in all manner of community activities, including those organized

by different churches and popular organizations as well as more familial affairs. I also conducted a survey of twenty-five households, as well as numerous informal interviews and fewer formal interviews. Only some of the latter are taped, in accordance with the expressed desires of my respondents. All comments attributed to Chupolenses within this paper come from interviews or conversations that took place during the time of my fieldwork. All the names of my interlocutors, except for one who gave me permission to use his name, have been changed.

⁷⁰ Sol Tax, *Penny Capitalism: A Guatemalan Indian Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute of Social Anthropology, 1953).

⁷¹ Diócesis, *El Quiché*, 42n.

⁷² I have no quantitative data that could support or challenge this assertion because I was denied access to parish archives.

⁷³ Bunzel, *Chichicastenango*, 210.

⁷⁴ Sol Tax, Notes on Santo Tomás Chichicastenango, 1947 (microfilm, University of Chicago Library Microfilm Collection), 815

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ All correspondence in Jefatura Política 2 (El Quiché) Box 11b (Chichicastenango), Archivo General de Centroamérica, Guatemala City, Guatemala.

⁷⁷ Benedicto Revilla, *Guatemala: El terremoto de los pobres* (Madrid: Ediciones SEDMAY, 1976), 73.

⁷⁸ Actas municipales de Chichicastenango, 129-76, p.120.

⁷⁹ Michael McClintock, *The American Connection. Volume 2: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala* (London: Zed Books, 1985), 166.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ W.W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas," in *The Viet-Nam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis*, eds. M.G. Raskin and B.B. Fall (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 110.

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