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**FROM HASTINGS STREET TO MEDELLIN:
CANADA AND ISSUES IN INTER-AMERICAN NARCOTRAFFICKING**

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Abstract

Together with speculation, a central component of post-modern economics is the significance of the informal or underground economy. Exemplary of this is the immense illicit drug trade. Its presence is obvious in countries such as Mexico and especially Colombia, but it also thrives in a more hidden and unspoken manner in Canada. This industry should be examined within the context of the stream of associated power, which flows through local, national and global spaces. In hemispheric affairs, a 'crisis' of narcotrafficking has been constructed to mask the political and military aspirations of Washington. Ironically, the origin of the most serious ill effects linked to the 'crisis' is actually the prohibition of drugs, rather than the drug usage itself.

Introduction

The ascendancy of narco-trafficking deserves serious attention due to the huge threat it wages against human security and legitimate political structures. While its presence is perhaps more obvious in countries such as Mexico and especially Colombia, the industry thrives in a more hidden manner in Canada. In some major communities in British Columbia for example, narco-trafficking represents a leading sector of the economy, yet many remain unaware of the depth of its presence. While its specific effects are diverse to the extreme, what is clear is that the prohibition of certain drugs has created profound and often unspoken implications in the realm of social power.

Premise number one is that the informal economy of narco-trafficking is immense, both locally and globally. The United Nations estimates that the trade, in its narrowest sense, comprises about 10% of global commerce. A number of points flow from this. One result of the gigantic wealth associated with narco-trafficking has been the construction of potent and sophisticated parallel security structures to protect and regulate the trade. The informal economy relies on private security, or the illegitimate leasing of state security. Another crucial implication of the illicit drug market is the range of effects it has on social power, from the destitution of the East Hastings Street drug addict, to the corruption of the State, to the empowerment of Canadian 'Biker Gangs' and Colombian guerrilla groups such as the FARC. Canada's role in narco-trafficking should be viewed against this stream of power which flows through local, national and international spaces.

The analysis begins at the street level in Canada, and then spans out to explore the politics of drugs along the country's frontiers. Since Canada's role in the drug trade is clearly related to Inter-American narco-trafficking, this endeavor will also examine the roles performed by the two most important Latin American countries engulfed in the global narcotics market - Mexico and Colombia. Hence, we shall address the politics of drugs within the context of NAFTA, but will go beyond this to explore the Colombian

conflagration. A raging civil war in Colombia has made it the hemisphere's most prominent strategic problem at the dawn of a new millennium, and much of the crisis is fueled by narco-trafficking. The political stakes have been rising steadily, given that Colombia is now the third largest recipient in the world of US military assistance.

Narco-trafficking and the Body Politic in Canada: NGOs, Health and Social Issues

British Columbia and especially the Vancouver area, is treated here as a microcosm for issues in Canada concerning the relationship between narco-trafficking, the politics of the body, and the agenda of relevant NGOs. While there is no doubt that significant variations exist within and between provinces, the themes examined here are general ones and are therefore pertinent to the country as a whole. The conceptualization employed here is that of human security, which entails a redefinition of antiquated and often abstract notions of national security. It entails a vision of security which traces the link between domestic and global spheres, and which has concrete meaning to the lives of individuals and communities in Canada and throughout the world. It is closely tied to the notion of the human body as the ultimate site of politics.¹

While the state and political parties remain highly important, civil society and especially NGOs have an amplified role in conceptions of human security, since they provide a direct and pluralistic link between the government and the 'grass roots'. As we shall see, NGOs are crucial actors which have defined a wide variety of important social issues related to narco-trafficking. Some of these issues include those associated with race, gender, sexuality, poverty, and health.

In many ways, the AIDS epidemic represents a crucial intersection between narco-trafficking and the social issues noted above. It primarily involves the trafficking and consumption of illicit narcotics which are used intravenously, especially cocaine and heroin. Specialists note that despite the 'War on Drugs' which began in the 1980s, drug consumption is at a crescendo as we approach the new millennium.²

The relatively low price of cocaine suggests that there is more of this illicit drug on the streets than ever, and a 1999 report by the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board indicates the increased presence and use of heroin in Canada.³ Beyond the direct link between injection use of cocaine and heroin to newly diagnosed cases of HIV, there exists related issues such as the medical use of marijuana for those suffering from AIDS. As we shall see, each illicit drug is characterized by its own constellation of politics, although there are some significant concentric areas between them. The analysis shall begin by examining a variety of issues related to AIDS and the use of illicit narcotics, and will then turn to a menu of feasible options aimed at addressing what may be shortcomings in existing policy.

An epidemic of cocaine use first appeared in Vancouver during 1991-1992,⁴ with problems concentrated in the downtown East Side along the corridor of East Hastings Street. More recently, such problems have spread throughout the metropolitan region, particularly in communities directly located along the Sky Train which links downtown Vancouver to other highly populated areas of the Lower Mainland.⁵ As the following table demonstrates, newly reported cases of AIDS in the 1990s are linked to issues associated with injection drug use and with matters of sexuality.

Newly Diagnosed Persons Testing Positive for HIV by Risk Category, 1992-1997

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
<i>Men having sex with men</i>	338	217	223	183	159	147
<i>Men having sex with men/injection users</i>	16	11	12	26	26	14
<i>Injection drug users</i>	83	143	191	265	312	223
<i>Heterosexual</i>	50	35	47	65	84	77
<i>Other</i>	30	33	44	70	62	25
<i>Unknown</i>	271	264	323	81	71	74
TOTAL	788	706	840	690	714	560

Source: BC Ministry of Health and Ministry Responsible for Seniors, *BC's Framework for Action on HIV/AIDS* (Victoria, BC: 1998), p.4

The crisis linking illicit use of injection drugs to HIV appears to have peaked in 1996, although the

number of cases since then clearly remains significant. During the first six months of 1998, the last period for which statistics are currently available, there were 81 newly diagnosed cases of HIV among injection drug users (IDUs).⁶ It is also worth noting that in 1997 almost half (44.5%) of newly diagnosed HIV cases were among IDUs. Thus, there continues to exist a strong correlation between AIDS and the illicit use of injection drugs.

Beyond the statistics noted above, illicit IDUs and those working with them, point to link between injection drug use and the sex trade. An undefined number of heroin and or cocaine addicts work in the sex trade to support their habit. This, combined with unprotected sex on the part of HIV infected IDUs, means the transmission of HIV to the sexual partners of IDUs or to their 'johns' who may not be illicit drug users.⁷

These cases of HIV among IDUs stem from the sharing of contaminated needles. Needle sharing not only results in the proliferation of HIV, but of other infectious diseases as well, perhaps the most dangerous of which is Hepatitis C. During the last few years, a needle exchange program has been implemented in Vancouver, and there is no doubt that this has assisted in reducing the number of HIV cases among IDUs since 1996. The program has involved fixed sites open during certain hours, in combination with mobile van units, which have sometimes operated on a 24-hour basis. Data from health specialists in the field indicate that the mobile van units which have been particularly important, since clients of the van-based needle exchange program have a higher risk profile for HIV and other infectious diseases than those attending a fixed site.⁸ As one specialist noted, "funding for needle exchanges was variable, and at one time vans had to be removed due to a budgetary shortfall."⁹

So far the discussion has painted in broad strokes the HIV-injection drug use problem. Yet crucial variations exist across social class, race, gender, as well as other variables. The poor and/or homeless cocaine or heroin addict on East Hastings Street may be relatively prone to share contaminated needles with fellow addicts. But the 'jacuzzi junkie' in Kitsolano has the economic means to avoid dirty needles, and because of social taboos, is more likely to 'snort' or smoke cocaine or opiates than to inject them. Hence, among

addicts, those with greater economic means are presumably less likely to be infected by HIV.

Race is another important variable. In Vancouver, aboriginals "are over-represented among IDUs."¹⁰ Further, Native IDUs are more likely to be female (51% as opposed to 28% of the general population of IDUs), more likely to be HIV positive (30% versus 21%), and less likely to be enrolled in a methadone treatment program (5% versus 14%).¹¹ This suggests that beyond the racial variations among Vancouver's aboriginal IDUs, important cultural distinctions exist among other racial groups throughout the country. Further, many of those interviewed for this project reported racism on the part of authorities, directed not only against aboriginals, but against blacks, orientals, hispanics and so on¹² - a topic to which we shall return in an ensuing discussion that addresses related security themes.

Others point to a relation between mental illness and HIV/injection drug use,¹³ and more broadly, to provincial and federal cutbacks in social services. One expert for example, noted that "more than 85% of the places dedicated for individuals with mental health illness were closed, yet 30% (of IDUs)...reported a diagnosis of mental illness." Further, "federal government support for social housing disappeared ...detoxes were eliminated as budget restrictions were imposed...social assistance was denied to individuals with outstanding police warrants...We postulate this lack of critical services and the negative effects of deadly public policies facilitated an epidemic of HIV in IDUs."¹⁴

The government, at provincial and especially federal levels, has had to cope with the pressures associated with a galloping debt and deficit by enacting often painful cutbacks in a variety of areas, including programs of relevance to the crisis of illicit injection drug use. A variety of polls over the last few years demonstrate general public support for frugal public spending in order to control perils associated with the debt and deficit. This is an era where the bottom line is increasingly important. With this in mind, it is worth noting the observations of Janet Dunbrack of Health Canada - Canadian Policy Research Network, Inc. She points out that the cumulative cost of the HIV/AIDS epidemic by the end of 1998 was \$26.8 billion, with the direct cost per

individual case of \$153,000. Importantly for our purposes, she calculates that "in order to break even on public investment in prevention, we need only prevent 106 cases per year."¹⁵ As we have already observed, nearly half of the newly diagnosed cases of HIV/AIDS in BC during the year from which statistics are most recently available (1997) are among IDUs. Therefore, it is clear that a rethinking of Government spending on the relation between IUDs and HIV/AIDS is order. That is, a reorientation of Government spending and programs on the crisis of injection drug use may likely save money at a time when the bottom line is increasingly important. In that vein, the following section presents a number of feasible options.

Narcotrafficking and the Body Politic: NGOs and Options from the Grass Roots

The analysis above summarized some of the chief social and health issues surrounding illicit narcotic consumption, ones which were identified by NGOs and by experts who work at the grass roots level. The following discussion offers a menu of feasible¹⁶ options for consideration by both the federal and provincial governments. What is striking is that the numerous suggestions offered by interviewees, and through the published works of a wide variety of experts, remain highly similar. They tend to focus upon the concept of 'harm reduction'. This perspective clearly falls within the wider rubric of 'human security' which entails both domestic and global dimensions.

As defined by the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU), an NGO which represents the interests of IDUs in the Vancouver's East Hastings Street district, harm reduction means "practical strategies aimed at meeting drug users 'where they are' to reduce harms associated with drug use."¹⁷ This includes harms inflicted upon both the user and society in general as a result of injection drug use. Rather than lofty notions of security, harm reduction is consistent with the domestic dimension of human security, since it 'zooms in' on concrete security issues that clearly affect the lives of individuals and the communities in which they live. The options presented in this section, as noted earlier,

shall focus on health and social issues, while more traditional dimensions of human security will be addressed in subsequent sections such as those on policing and border control.

The harm reduction concept often entails a two-pronged medical approach to the problem. As a Senior Scientist at Toronto's Addiction and Mental Health Services Corporation observes, "a decision to quit would be supported by appropriate encouragement, therapies or alternative medications, as discussed with and agreed upon by the addict-patient. A decision to keep using would be accompanied by a plan, with the patient's consent, for a more controlled and less harmful pattern of drug use...."¹⁸ Hence, although the harm reduction approach entails programs aimed at ending drug abuse, it postulates that there will always be a population which engages in the injection use of drugs such as cocaine and heroin, a view supported by addicts interviewed for this study.¹⁹

What are other, more specific components of harm reduction? First, they include needle exchange and injection sites, especially mobile units and particularly ones that are open 24 hours.²⁰ The purpose is to provide IDUs with sterile needles in a clean and safe setting, to reduce as much as possible the proliferation of HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C, and other highly infectious diseases which are transmitted through the sharing of contaminated needles. Beyond promoting better health among users and addicts, such a program would save the government money in the long-run by preventing hugely expensive cases of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, as was demonstrated in the cost-benefit analysis referred to in the previous section.

A potential danger associated with such a program however, would be the tossing away of used needles by addicts into the community. These could be contaminated needles, which would pose a danger to the community at large. Needle exchange programs, whereby users exchange previously used needles for new ones, could address this potential problem. However, the danger of tossed needles, although reduced, would nevertheless remain under this scenario. The option posing the least harm would be 24-hour regulated injection sites where users are provided with a needle under direct supervision to ensure

that no needles are taken away from the site.

A second component of the harm reduction model is the provision of mental health services to addicts,²¹ about a third of whom, as noted above, have been previously diagnosed with a significant mental illness. Such programs have been slashed drastically during budget cutbacks in the 1990s, yet mental illness may be at the root of drug abuse among a significant proportion of IDUs. Here a cost-benefit analysis, such as the one referred to above regarding HIV/AIDS and IUDs, would be useful - yet no such study exists. What remains clear, to reiterate, is that there is a proven link between mental illness and injection drug use in about one-third of examined cases.

Thirdly, significant areas of British Columbia lack sufficient detoxification facilities. Kelowna, the second largest population centre outside the Lower Mainland (larger, for example, than Victoria, Kamloops, and Prince George) has been struggling for years for the provision of a detox centre to serve its burgeoning population. As a matter of sheer common sense, the provision of detox services offers hope to IDUs who wish to quit drug abuse. Related to this is the provision under medical supervision of alternative drug programs, such as methadone treatment for heroin addicts. Such programs reduce harm not only to users but also to the community as well through the reduction of crime and violence which is sometimes associated with injection drug use²².

Since there exists a significant link between IDUs, HIV/AIDS, and the sexual transmission of those and other diseases as noted in the previous section, a fourth component of harm reduction is the promotion of safe sex among users. Free distribution of condoms is a vital element of such a strategy,²³ as is proper access to sexual education.

A fifth and crucial dimension of harm reduction is the appreciation of the cultural context of the user, since without such an appreciation, well-meaning government and NGO policies may be doomed to failure. A study of injection drug uses among the Canadian Native population offers the following conclusion: "Culture is important and diverse with First Nations, it should be part of the (harm reduction) program and needs to be determined at a local level...The program must be non-judgmental, pragmatic, flexible, and

recognize the IDU's ability to make their own informed decisions."²⁴ Thus, given Canada's multi-cultural mosaic, cultural distinctions represent an important ingredient in the construction of harm reduction programs.

While some of the suggestions offered by NGOs and others in the field represent requests for more or different government programs, what can the currently unemployed injection drug user give back to society? Since it is well known that work provides individuals with a sense of self-esteem and most IDUs are capable of working, it is worth emphasizing that a Dutch program has found success in providing addicts with public services jobs. Even the provision of such jobs as trash collection or public garden maintenance have been eagerly accepted by 'junkies' who may not be in a position to find other work. Hence, society gains something from such a program, and as the Dutch program found, a significant proportion of the addicts gained the self-esteem and job experience necessary to find work in the private sector.²⁵

Along similar lines, members of the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users suggest stipends for addicts who could help other addicts in areas of health or social services. They note, for example, that many social service and health care 'professionals' are simply too afraid to enter East Hastings Street's dangerous rooming houses in order to help addicts. This void could be addressed they argue, by putting IDUs to work.

A sixth element of harm reduction, and one in which IDUs can serve their community, is work provision. Perhaps the most profound component of harm reduction, and the one that presumably is the most controversial, is the medicalization/regulation of injection drugs such as heroin. It must be underscored that this option does not involve a free market legalization of drug sales on the street, but instead entails the dispersement of such drugs by qualified health professionals. It is at the core of many of the harm reduction programs suggested by NGOs and experts in the fields of medicine, addiction, social services, and so on.²⁶ Advocates suggest that the benefits of medicalization/regulation include the following: 1) it provides users with a clean, safe and steady supply of drugs, thereby reducing health risks to the user, and the associated medical costs to society; 2) under such programs, users do

not have to turn to violent crime, property crime, or to the sex trade, etc, to finance their habit, and therefore the community benefits from such a program both fiscally and through enhanced public security; 3) the program ultimately costs the government and society less money, since it vastly reduces the apparently wasteful funding currently directed towards policing and incarcerating addicts, and also vastly reduces expensive and lengthy proceedings in an already clogged judicial system; 4) it takes political and economic power out of the hands of dealers and related crime syndicates, and also hugely reduces the associated crimes of money laundering, tax evasion, the arms trade, the sex trade, and so on - points to which we shall return in the subsequent section which focuses on more traditional elements of security.

This type of program has been implemented in Switzerland with highly positive results. As the Coordinator of the Swiss Office of Public Health observed in 1998, the medicalization/regulation of heroin in Switzerland has resulted in general health improvement among users, less homelessness, more job activity, a greater tendency to quit heroin altogether, less associated crime, and reduced contact with the 'drug scene'.²⁷ This particular study focused on heroin and additional studies would need to be developed regarding other injection drugs such as cocaine.

An eighth and related component of the harm reduction approach is the medical use of marijuana for those suffering from HIV/AIDS.²⁸ Marijuana has been found to stimulate appetite, which can be helpful for AIDS sufferers whose malaise and medication can result in drastic weight loss. It can also suppress pain among sufferers. Arguments calling for the complete legalization of marijuana will be dealt with in the subsequent section.

Finally, the spatial location of the drug epidemic must also be addressed. We are not only talking about the use of injection drugs on the street. Increasing evidence points to significant drug trafficking and use occurring, ironically, in prisons. Quebec Ombudsman, Daniel Jacoby, estimates that at least \$60 million in drug trafficking is conducted in Quebec prisons.²⁹

Narcotrafficking: The Political Economy of Prohibition, Crime and Security in Canada

The prohibition of what are now illicit drugs began in Canada in 1908 with MacKenzie King's Opium Act. Recently, the most significant legislation affecting drug prohibition is Bill C-7, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which was introduced by the Liberal Government and which became law on May 10th 1997. Despite prohibition however, there exists mounting evidence to suggest that both production and consumption of illicit drugs in Canada and throughout much of the world, has reached higher levels than ever.³⁰ The analysis will begin with a look at the relation between prohibition and crime, and will proceed to a discussion of the economic dimensions of the issue. This will be followed by an analysis of the politics of prohibition and of various options concerning government regulation of drugs that are currently illicit.

With regard to the domestic dimension, what is the link between drugs, prohibition and crime in Canada? According to a senior scientist with Toronto's Addiction and Mental Health Corporation, there appears to be a link between violence and cocaine psychosis - the prolonged use of high levels of cocaine and its derivatives. But there is no empirical evidence linking violence or violent crime, to the *actual consumption* of other illicit drugs.³¹ There is evidence to suggest that IDUs, particularly cocaine and heroin users, commit property crime, especially theft and fraud, and may also be involved in the sex trade in order to finance their consumption of these drugs. Such crimes are generally limited to users with relatively low incomes, since more affluent addicts are able to pay for illicit narcotics without resorting to crime.³² Overall, violent crime has been associated with cocaine psychosis but not with other drugs, and property crime committed by addicts is not a result of the drug itself, but of attempts to pay for such narcotics on the part of low-income users.

During the late 1990s, well-placed critics of existing policy suggested that it is the *prohibition of drugs* which is the most important source of crime, rather than actual usage of illicit

narcotics. Although there are many who make similar arguments, among the most thorough and eloquent cases offered by a Canadian is that of Gil Puder, a Constable with the Vancouver Police Department. Puder suggests that "...people persistently and wrongly identify drugs, rather than prohibition, as the cause of related criminal activity." Further, he argues that the arrests which are typically made in drug cases "...usually involve poor, hungry people on street corners or in rooming houses and filth-strewn alleyways," rather than high-end dealers who have the means to insulate themselves from the law.³³ In a similar vein, other experts suggest that prohibition actually increases crime by driving the costs of drugs up, so that low-income addicts are driven to property crime and the sex trade in order to finance their habit. At the same time, 'sweeps' of busting street dealers in a particular locale not only drive up the cost of drugs, but push dealing and other criminally-related activities into other parts of town, thereby expanding the problem geographically.³⁴

While it has been shown that illicit drug users, especially low-income IDUs, are sometimes perpetrators of property and sex crime, what is often overlooked is that this population itself is frequently the victim of serious and violent crime. The most common of these is theft and beatings from others involved in illicit narcotics activity, as well as harassment and racism on the part of police. This is according to the testimonials of IDUs interviewed for this study, as well as data from experts who work at the grass roots level.³⁵ One such expert who has done work in the United States, a country which admittedly has generally higher crime rates than Canada, observes that street dealers in Washington DC have a 1 in 14 chance of serious injury and a 1 in 50 chance of death on an annual basis.³⁶

Especially worrisome for Canada is the creation of a parallel security state that accompanies the widespread and lucrative illicit drug trade. As we shall see, in Latin America the parallel security state is usually performed by guerrilla groups or by paramilitary groups. They provide security services to a billion dollar business, which due to its illegitimacy, cannot seek such services from the police or military (or at least not from honest members of those forces).

This same function, namely the provision of security services to a hugely profitable but illicit business, is typically performed in Canada by motorcycle gangs. These include the Hell's Angels, which preside over BC's burgeoning marijuana industry, and a variety of other 'biker gangs' throughout the country.³⁷ As Gil Puder observes, "Hell's Angels and other biker organizations are deeply involved in trafficking," yet "reality finds bikers and other high level gangsters using their profits for lawyers and accountants, effectively layering themselves from the transaction process" and therefore making it difficult to prosecute them.³⁸ Overall, the strength of the parallel security state is immense and presumably is increasing, thereby subverting Canada's legitimate security apparatus.

Yet another subversion of legitimate security structures in Canada concerns the corruption of such institutions by some of its members who are enticed by the vast wealth this industry can offer. One prominent example of this phenomenon that has come to light, although there are presumably many more cases which have not, is the conviction in early 1999 of Quebec Judge, Robert Flahiff, for laundering \$1.7 million of drug money between 1989 and 1991.³⁹ Vulnerable institutions would include the police, RCMP, judicial services, correctional services, customs, and so on. Overall, the creation of parallel security structures, and the corruption of legitimate security structures, are among the most serious problems entailed in the prohibition of drugs.

What are the economic implications of the illicit trade? This can only be based on guesswork, since drug dealers do not fill out T-4 forms. This guesswork itself can be manipulated for political purposes - it can be exaggerated by bureaucracies wishing to get more funding for their agency to fight the trade, or for example, it can be minimized to suggest that the existing War on Drugs is working. It is worth noting that the political economy for each drug is very distinct. While Canada does not produce heroin or cocaine, it imports these drugs, and also distributes them to the United States through the highly porous border separating these two countries - a point to which we shall return. Marijuana, on the other hand, is produced in Canada, and is also exported to the United States.

Much of the marijuana production is reportedly centred in British Columbia. In the Okanagan for example, the leading legitimate economic sector is manufacturing. It is dominated by the Western Star truck factory in Kelowna, the annual revenue of which is estimated to be about \$1 billion in 1999. Yet the narcotrafficking industry could easily rival this. The marijuana business alone could quite reasonably be worth \$360,000 million annually.⁴⁰ This does not include the market value for other drugs - cocaine, opiates, barbituates, etc. It also does not include the 'overhead' market associated with the trade - such as administrative, legal and security services. Connections between narcotraffickers and the sex trade should also be factored in. Moreover, the overall value of this immense underground industry should include profits flowing from any investments made by traffickers. The point is that the Okanagan's narcotrafficking sector probably rivals that of the leading producer in the legitimate economy. Also noteworthy, is that this illicit financial empire appears to be protected by a parallel security structure in the form of the Hell's Angels. One can extrapolate from this example to others throughout Canada.

Within the illicit industry as a whole, there are many spin-off sectors employing lawyers, accountants, surveillance experts and money launderers, not to mention lower-level dealers. The industry has flourished at a time when the Canadian economy is undergoing a process of restructuring and when the legitimate BC economy has been floundering. In some ways then, it has masked weaknesses in the formal economy. Hence, the informal economy of illicit drugs is an important dimension of the economy as a whole, but it is hidden. While the illicit drug economy makes some contributions to the overall economy, it also has important costs in the forms of government funding devoted to policing, incarcerating, and so on. Professor Eric Single, an economist at the University of Toronto, estimated that in 1992 the government spent about \$400 million for policing, courts, incarcerations, etc.⁴¹ It is important to note that this figure does not factor in the health costs associated with AIDS/HIV discussed earlier.

What are the options? One option is to stay the course, and the other set of options entails

some sort of legalization, regulation or medicalization that are specific to distinct drugs. This latter process has already begun. It must be emphasized that according to interviews with key members of the BC Headquarters of the RCMP, "we have moved to the Netherlands model by default." This means that while illicit drugs are officially illegal, there is 'discretionary enforcement', whereby the trade is permitted in certain areas, and whereby the RCMP generally have turned a 'blind eye' to marijuana production and trade.⁴² Similarly, RCMP have made public proclamations that they do not have the resources to fight what is obviously a losing battle.⁴³

With regard to opiates and perhaps cocaine, medicalization is an option worth considering. The studies discussed previously have shown medicalization reduces the problems and costs associated with health and criminal activity linked to the usage of injection drugs. As well, it avoids the criminal, health and political problems that would stem from legalized street dealing by putting the issue into the realm of health and social welfare.

With regard to marijuana, limited legalized medical use of this drug has already commenced following a protracted outcry from activists.⁴⁴ But that option may not go far enough to address the obvious reality of widespread usage and production. An Angus Reid poll conducted in October 1997 found that 51 percent of Canadians favored the decriminalization of that drug.⁴⁵ Further, in April 1999 the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police called for the decriminalization of marijuana, echoing arguments made earlier by Vancouver Constable Gil Puder that Canada is spending good money after bad with regard to its current and apparently failed policy on marijuana.⁴⁶ Constable Puder observes that "a government regulated marijuana distribution system would create employment, generate revenue to promote health and education, cut off funding from organized crime, and finally provide police with a credible mandate for enforcement against the few black marketeers who remained..."⁴⁷

Such arguments are congruent with those made by Nobel Prize winner, Milton Friedman, and others who stress both the economic benefits of legalization as well as arguments which emphasize what should be the political liberties of

individuals.⁴⁸

Overall, existing domestic policy with regard to drug prohibition appears to be a failure. Production and distribution of illicit drugs seems to be reaching record levels and law enforcement officials admit they cannot cope with the problem. Further, prohibition clearly generates health problems and a wide assortment of criminal activity. The RCMP in BC have moved to a *de facto* Netherlands model, while the Canadian Association of Police Chiefs echo Angus Reid polls which call for the decriminalization of marijuana.

What obstacles are in the way of government regulation of illicit drugs? One popular fear is that regulation would increase drug use. Yet studies have shown that with regard to the US decriminalization of marijuana in the 1970s, no such increase resulted.⁴⁹ With regard to heroin and cocaine, the dispersment by health professionals of injection drugs could be limited to those who are already proven addicts. Any government profits from the regulation and distribution of drugs such as marijuana could be used for drug education, detox centers, and other efforts to reduce drug consumption. Such efforts presumably would have to accompany more strenuous efforts than currently exist with regard to the culture of legal drug consumption: industries which push aspirins for minor headaches, alcohol for pleasure, prozac for depression and the increasing prescription of drugs for children. Reducing drug consumption, and increasing the promotion of good clean living, is a project which needs to be implemented to confront the culture of both legitimate and illegitimate drug use.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle in the path of Canada's option regarding the government regulation of currently illicit drugs is pressure from the United States, which has shown no sign of changing its existing prohibitionist policy. As we shall see in subsequent discussions, Washington has manipulated the War Against Drugs for a global political agenda which often has little to do with combatting drug use. While the US might not have much at stake with the medicalization of injection drugs in Canada, it might have problems with government regulated sales of marijuana which could mean even more

exports to the US. Beyond this, if Canada moved to legalization or regulation of marijuana, it could also mean drug tourism from the US to Canada, the implications of which deserve further study.

Global Dimensions of Narcotrafficking: Canada's Coasts and Borders

The following discussion will provide a political and economic analysis of Canada's role in the importation and exportation of three principal illicit drugs namely cocaine, opiates and marijuana. Each is characterized by a distinct political economy, although there exist common themes between them. While subsequent sections will focus on Canada's relations with Mexico and Colombia vis-a-vis narcotrafficking, the task here is to concentrate upon Canada's coastlines as well as the frontier with the United States. The analysis will begin with a discussion of the origin and destination of such drugs, including the provision of data regarding drug seizures. The second part of the discussion will point to some prominent weaknesses in existing policy and will then turn to a presentation of feasible options for consideration by Ottawa.

The following charts provide data regarding drugs seized in Canada and, more particularly, in Canada's Pacific region. Authorities estimate that in general, opiates come to Canada principally from Asia and tend to enter from British Colombia.⁵⁰ The huge amounts of cocaine and its derivatives appear to enter the country in a wide variety of locales - on the coast, through Canada's porous border with the US, and through illicit airstrips. In particular, the national RCMP points to a connection between Quebec-based transportation companies and Colombian 'cartels'.⁵¹ Beyond the exportation of cocaine, we shall see that Colombian producers and distributors are increasingly focusing on opiate exports, and therefore the same routes utilized by Colombian narcos for cocaine may also include opiates - heroin as well as smokeable opium.

Three related points must be emphasized. First, much of this involves guesswork, since authorities readily admit that well over 90 percent of illicit drugs entering Canada are not seized - this is also the case in the United States. Boats

entering Canada's rugged and generally unpatrolled coasts, the porous border with the US and traffic at Canada's busy airports, suggest a plethora of possibilities for both import and export. In short, many routes may not be known by authorities. Secondly, import and export routes are as much determined by 'turf wars' between narcos as they are by easy entry points. For example, while almost all of BC's heroin is known to be 'China White', which as the name suggests comes from Asia, just across the border in Seattle, heroin almost solely originates from Mexico and perhaps Colombia. Thirdly, it is presumed that a significant amount of the illicit narcotics which enter Canada are not only meant for Canadian consumption, but are also destined for the more lucrative market of the United States through Canada's porous frontier with that country.

Drug Seizures by Canada Customs in Canada's Pacific Region (in kilograms) – 1998

Marijuana	15.2
Opium	1.4
Cocaine	462
Heroin	12
Hashish	.4

Source: Canada Customs Intelligence Services, Pacific Region, 19 February 1999

Drugs Seized in Canada (in kilograms), 1992-1998

Seizures by: RCMP, Canada Customs, S.Q, MUCPD, O.P.P, and Metro Toronto

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Heroin	116	153	85	128	83	95	103
Cocaine	5202	2731	7915	1544	3110	2090	2325
LSD	26086	38046	32829	49019	15618	25519	8142
PCP	4	2	25	35	25	5	4
Marijuan	13725	7314	6472	5500	17234	50624	10547
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Hashish	15822	56721	36614	21504	25155	6118	15520

Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, *Drug Situation in Canada*, January 1999.

Let us turn first to some prominent challenges which must be faced by Canada with regard to the importation and exportation of illicit drugs. The

national RCMP estimates that about 75 percent of illicit drugs arrive in Canada by land - either by flowing through border crossings or unpatrolled regions of the frontier with the US.⁵² This problem is augmented when one considers the recent implementation by Canada of automated border crossings (that is, with no human presence), such as the one north of Scobey, Montana. The United States also contributes to this situation since it assigns only approximately 300 border control agents to the border to Canada, compared to thousands with Mexico.⁵³ Overall, the highly porous border with the US renders Canada to be not only an 'easy mark' for the importation of drugs, but means that Canada is a key point for the ultimate exportation of illicit drugs into the much larger US market.

If Canada is a key site for the importation of illicit drugs, for both local consumption and perhaps for subsequent exportation to the US, a key component of the problem has to be the truly alarming and extraordinary situation with 'containers' entering Canada's harbors. Such containers, which are offloaded by transport ships, have over a 98% chance of not being inspected by customs authorities.⁵⁴ In fact, according to customs officials, the true figure may be closer to 100 percent.⁵⁵ Just one gaze by the casual observer at the thousands of such containers in Vancouver's harbour will immediately acquaint the viewer with the immense magnitude of the problem.

Given that these containers are so obviously an easy means of transporting drugs into Canada, why do the overwhelming majority of them go uninspected? The answer provided by authorities is that Canada currently does not possess the technology to inspect such containers in a highly rapid fashion. Why is speed of inspection such a crucial factor? The response given by Customs officials is that at a time of ultra-competitiveness which is associated with economic globalization, speed of transport is key. Officials estimate that it would cost importers approximately \$850 to inspect each container, when factoring in lost transport time combined with the relatively high wages received by those who would unload and reload the containers. Ultracompetitiveness, combined with deflationary trends in certain markets, essentially make such

inspections untenable according to Customs officials. Beyond this, such officials emphasize that recent cutbacks in Canada Custom's annual budget only serves to exacerbate the already difficult situation.⁵⁶

Overall, the situation with containers at Canada's harbors is an obvious part of the problem concerning the importation of illicit drugs into the country. The ease of transporting drugs into Canada through these containers raises doubts regarding the figures presented above by the RCMP that 75% of such drugs arrive in Canada by land. Turning to the issue of illicit drugs which are exported from Canada over land, these include not only cocaine and opiates which arrive from other countries and which, in part, may be destined to the US. It importantly includes high potency marijuana which is produced in Canada. It was already noted above that British Columbia in particular is a major producer of 'hi-test' marijuana predominantly cultivated through in-door hydroponic operations. Overall, given the increasingly porous border with the US, and the ease of shipping illicit drugs through containers at harbors, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that existing methods of deterring drug shipments are ineffective to the extreme. One obvious but politically difficult option is government regulation of currently illicit drugs, a point which will be discussed more fully following the presentation of situations in Mexico and Colombia. Such an option entails a global solution, rather than a unilateral one on Canada's part, or even bilateral one with the US.

Beyond these profound challenges, members of both the RCMP and Customs interviewed for this study raised an additional problem, one which may be more easily addressed.⁵⁷ At a time of fiscal cutbacks in Canada, relevant bureaucracies are encouraged to compete with one another for scarce government funding, rather than to cooperate and share pertinent information. Clearly, high level efforts must be made at the federal level to avoid these bureaucratic turf wars, and instead to promote coordination and cooperation in order to cope with a hugely difficult situation.

Narcotrafficking in Mexico and Colombia

What is the nature of the stream of power which flows through the 'crackhead' on Canadian streets to guerrilla movements and paramilitary forces in Colombia? If 'biker gangs' such as the Hells Angels are part of Canada's parallel security structure for the drug trade, how do they compare and contrast with their counterparts in Latin America? Does a free trade agreement with Mexico also mean a liberalized illicit drug pact among NAFTA countries? Who directs the trade, and who benefits from it? What are the politics behind Inter-American narcotrafficking, and how does this affect hemispheric affairs? In what ways does hemispheric narcotrafficking threaten human security? What feasible policies can Canada construct to cope with Inter-American narcotrafficking, and how can Canada promote human security in key target countries? These are some of the questions addressed in the next two sections, which deal with narcotrafficking in Mexico and Colombia.

Mexico⁵⁸

As with the Canadian case, the global dimensions of Mexico's current position in the illicit drug market must be viewed in the context of domestic and historical circumstances. Mexico's role in hemispheric narcotrafficking began in the 1930s and revolved around opium production. At that time, Chinese immigrant farmers in Mexico produced opium for the illicit heroin market in the United States.⁵⁹ During World War II, Washington unwittingly helped keep the ball rolling when it encouraged legal production of opiates in Mexico, in efforts to obtain enough morphine to treat those wounded in combat. By the end of this period, however, the United States expressed alarm regarding the linkage between expanded legal production of opium and increased supplies on the illicit market. In late 1942, the situation prompted the involvement of the Mexican army in the realm of illicit narcotics control, a relationship that would yield serious and unpleasant complications in future decades. From this time until the early

1960s, Mexico served as a producer or transit point for approximately 95 percent of the illicit opiate market in the States.

By the early 1960s, Mexico's position in global narcotrafficking was based on its own production of marijuana and opiates, but also involved the country's role as a distribution center for drugs such as heroin and cocaine from South America, Europe, and Asia. This led the US Department of Drug Enforcement (DEA) to open its door in Mexico in 1961. Until the 1970s, the country's opiate cultivation was situated primarily in the northwestern states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango. During this decade Mexico's marijuana crops, which were located in the northern Sierra Madre Mountains, expanded enormously. This prosperous trade was rooted in the burgeoning drug culture that emerged in the United States during the late 1960s. Along with Mexico, the countries of Jamaica and Colombia became important suppliers for American drug habits spawned during the 'hippie' era.

Given the escalation of illicit drug use during that period, the Nixon Administration introduced Operation Interception in 1969. It entailed an inspection of vehicles at the U.S.-Mexican border, which resulted in a steep drop in US tourism to Mexico, as travelers avidly avoided time-consuming border hassles. This was problematic from Mexico's perspective, since it resented being blamed for a problem that it felt essentially originated in the States. In addition, Mexico sorely missed the tourist dollars, which diminished in the wake of the Nixon operation. Not surprisingly, political relations between Mexico and the United States became strained under such circumstances. The situation improved when Mexican President, Díaz Ordaz, initiated Operation Cooperation in efforts to convince the United States that the government of Mexico was working in harmony with Washington's interests. The Mexican Government learned early that at least it had to appear to be serious in the war against drugs.

Against this backdrop, important shifts occurred in the 1970s. The termination of the French connection in 1972 catapulted Mexico to the position of leading supplier of heroin to the US market. By 1975, Mexico shipped an estimated 6.5 tons of heroin to the States annually, and by

the late 1970s, it was speculated that Mexico produced or distributed about 80 percent of the marijuana and opiates entering the United States.⁶⁰

The situation prompted the Mexican government to incorporate narco-trafficking into its official discourse on national security. As we observed earlier, the Mexican army during the Cold war became the first in Latin America to be engaged in the extensive antinarcotics campaign. This paralleled similar efforts by other security apparati such as the police force and the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS). It represented a dark premonition of things to come in Latin America, especially in the Andean countries. That is, it marked the beginning of a trajectory whereby Mexican security structures became penetrated by narco-traffickers, severely weakening their credibility and legitimacy.

Some groups of narco-traffickers appeared to have established a close relationship with the armed forces in areas outside of the illicit drug trade. It has been speculated, for example, that the DFS during the early and mid-1970s relied upon drug barons for cooperation in the Dirty War against suspected leftist subversives in Mexico, especially in the states of Guerrero, Jalisco, and Sinaloa. At least 1,500 campesinos were murdered as a result of that campaign. Here we observe linkages between narco-trafficking and corrupt conceptions of national security, as well as the ideological spirit of free enterprise and anticommunism shared by the traffickers and state authorities.⁶¹

Also within the domestic realm, there were other important dynamics at work during this era. Peasant farmers, for example, increasingly appreciated the profits that drug crops could yield, especially in the context of an emerging economic crisis. The number of campesinos engaged in drug cultivation during this period reached the tens of thousands. Their relationship with traffickers began as one of economic necessity, but a closer partnership would prevail in certain regions where drug lords financed schools, hospitals, and other social welfare projects. State-society relations shifted during the neoliberal era to the extent that social forces such as NGOs and traffickers performed duties normally expected of the state. This was one of many contributing factors to the erosion of the PRI's legitimacy and perhaps its

hegemony.

A sharp increase in the arms trade rode on the back of the ever more lucrative commerce of drug trafficking. Hence, in addition to penetrating legitimate security structures, traffickers also began to construct a substantial arsenal of their own. This would add to their political power, and potentially challenge, to some extent, the state's monopoly on the use of force. It is worth emphasizing that it is the illegality of the drugs under consideration here that has cemented the relationship between arms and traffickers, since their place outside the legitimate economy means that drug barons must invent their own security structures. Further, in contrast to the cycles of boom, recession, and restructuring that have punctuated the legitimate economy in the post-1945 era, the illicit drug industry has witnessed a steady and spectacular growth since the late 1960s. The huge profits potentially available from narco-trafficking were obvious by the 1970s, a prospect that naturally fuelled increasing investment in this illegal sector.⁶²

Mexican Narco-trafficking During the NeoLiberal Era

Between 1982 and 1988 a number of events added fuel to the fire of illicit Mexican drug production and distribution. One factor was sheer luck, such as the long periods of cloudy weather that made it difficult for the state to administer herbicides on drug crops. Much more significant were the intricacies associated with the political economy of this multi-billion dollar business. First, it was clear that narco-trafficking was a high-growth industry with billions of dollars yet to make. Crucially, the post-1982 debt crisis coincided with the promotion of illicit drugs as a key subsidizer of a near bankrupt Mexican economy. Another factor that underpinned this flourishing illicit commerce had to do with shifts in hemispheric production and trafficking routes. Mexico emerged as a major transit point for Andean cocaine entering the United States, especially after the United States began to crack down on Colombian traffic through Florida. This exemplifies the so-called balloon effect, whereby applying pressure in one region simply pushes the

trade elsewhere.

Also contributing to the boom was the termination in the 1970s of marijuana eradication programs that utilized paraquat. Further, the export price of Colombian marijuana in the mid-1980s was only about one-twentieth of the Mexican price, but huge transportation costs for Colombian marijuana made Mexico more competitive for this popular product. Mexican production of marijuana is estimated to have been around 6,000 tons annually in 1977, falling to about 750 tons in 1982, but rising back to about 5,000 tons during 1982-1988.⁶³ It should be emphasized that while marijuana was an important component of Mexican narcotrafficking during the mid-1980s and earlier, its bulkiness contributed to its partial displacement by the more profitable trafficking of compact substances, particularly cocaine and opiates.

During the 1980s the tempo quickened for drug production and trafficking in Mexico as much of the legitimate economy continued to plummet. The production of opium poppies, for example, spread throughout the country in the 1980s and made strong inroads in the states of Chiapas, Michoacán, Nayarit, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. US estimates placed Mexican opiate exports to the United States at about two tons in 1984, rising to about three times that amount by 1988.

Along with opiates, the cocaine trade in Mexico swelled during this period. This was a result of both the burgeoning cocaine market, especially in the States, and by bolder America interdiction attempts off the coast of Florida in the mid-1980s, which rendered Mexico a favorite substitute transit point for shipments of Andean cocaine into the United States. Mexican traffickers reportedly received about 10 percent of the profits, either through money or the provision of drugs, from their Colombian cohorts who utilized Mexico as a distribution center. A highly conservative estimate placed Mexican drug sales at about \$2 billion (US) annually in the late 1980s.⁶⁴

As the illicit drug industry flourished during the 1980s, and to some extent financially masked the effects of the debt crisis, issues surrounding narcotrafficking received higher significance in mainstream conceptions of

security. In the context of global and hemispheric strategic issues, the Central American crisis began to wind down after about 1985, as "world socialism" slid to its quick demise. Initially, drugs would replace communism as the favorite enemy of the US government. While a number of US administrations recognized narcotrafficking as a difficult issue, Ronald Reagan became the first US president to declare it a national security problem. The obvious effect was pressure upon the Mexican government to appear to be addressing what the United States had decided was a serious problem.

Given the backdrop of the debt crisis and the economic contribution made by narcotrafficking in Mexico, there is room for considerable doubt regarding the credibility of the Mexican government's professed intention of combatting the illicit drug trade. Yet paradoxically, during the 1982-1988 period, about 60 percent of the attorney general's budget was devoted to the War Against Drugs, and by the end of the decade the army would allocate about 25 percent of its resources to this project. Despite this, US suspicion of the Mexicans' actual resolve to curtail narcotrafficking was manifested in a number of cases. One such incident occurred when Washington questioned statistics provided by Mexican army General Juan Arevalo Gordoqui, which appeared to widely inflate the quantity of illicit narcotics Mexico eradicated during the 1982-1987 period. As we shall see, there is also evidence that US intentions were dubious during the 1980s, especially in relation to Washington's policies in Central America.

A watershed in the US-Mexican drama over narcotrafficking occurred on March 6th 1985, with the discovery of the tortured cadavers of US DEA agent Enrique Camerena Salazar, and his Mexican pilot. Mexican traffickers suspected of involvement in the murders were arrested. Particularly straining for US-Mexican politics was the admission by Armando Pavon, who led Mexican state and federal police investigations into this case, that he had accepted a \$275,000 bribe to provide safe passage at the Guadalajara airport for one of the key suspects in the Camerena Salazar case.

Tensions continued to plague US-Mexican relations in 1986, when a US Customs

Service Patrol agent was murdered on the States' side of the border, apparently in a dispute involving Mexican traffickers. In March of 1986, the US government closed 75 percent of its frontier with Mexico in an intense operation aimed at detecting the shipment of drugs and/or arms into the United States. Also during that year, the US State Department identified Mexico as the leader exporter of marijuana and heroin to the United States. By 1986 a total of 45,000 Mexicans from the army, navy, and attorney general's office had been assigned to combat illicit narcotics.

The Salinas Years

Carlos Salinas de Gortari became president in 1988, marking the beginning of an unprecedented era of economic and military integration between Mexico and the United States. Although Mexico, during the Salinas regime, would spend more on fighting drugs than any previous Mexican government, the flow of Mexican narcotics into the States remained on an upswing. Further, given the context of negotiations leading to NAFTA, it was very conspicuous that Washington was much harder on the Andean region than on Mexico in the crusade against narcotrafficking. This was especially the case during the 1989-1994 period - a topic to which we shall return.

At a global institutional level, in 1989 Mexico signed the United Nations Drug Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. It also became signatory to a bilateral accord with the United States in the name of fighting narcotics. On the domestic front, the 1989-1994 National Development Plan expanded the scope of the armed forces, whose tasks now clearly included the battle against narcotrafficking. The Mexican government perfected the necessary art of making all the right noises to please First World officials.

Friction between the United States and Mexico resurfaced in the 1990s, when NBC television ran a miniseries entitled "Drug Wars." The program suggested that the attorney general under President de la Madrid, Sergio Garcia Ramirez, was involved both in drug trafficking and in the 1985 murder of DEA agent Camerena.

The documentary emphasized the burgeoning drug industry in Mexico, where there were estimated to be two hundred narcotrafficking organizations flourishing at the time.⁶⁵

Corruption of official Mexican institutions by narcotraffickers became more apparent in the 1990s, especially under the Salinas government. In addition to an assortment of implications regarding the military's involvement in trafficking, prominent political figures were also linked to illicit drugs in 1992. One of these was Manuel Bartlett, secretary of the Interior Department under the de la Madrid government. Another was Juan Alvarez de Castillo, governor of Jalisco during the assassination of DEA agent Camerena, and attorney general during the first part of the Salinas Government. In 1992, the new attorney general, Jorge Carpizo, asserted that Mexican political institutions had become infiltrated by the interests of narcotraffickers.⁶⁶

The US State Department, in the context of obvious corruption in Mexico, argued that nationalistic perceptions of Mexican sovereignty stood in the way of meaningful cooperation between the two governments on the issue of illicit drugs. In the spring of 1993, ex-president de la Madrid acknowledged the existing complicity between narcotraffickers and important components of the Mexican state. Despite mounting evidence of the penetration of security structures by narcotraffickers, as well as the impunity enjoyed by the military with respect to narcotrafficking and human rights abuses, the armed forces continued to devote about 25 percent of their budget to the War Against Drugs.

The NAFTA Era

The year 1994 was a crucial turning point with regard to Mexico's involvement with narcotrafficking. This was especially due to the establishment of NAFTA and the alleged links between narcotrafficking and the assassination of high-ranking Mexican politicians in that year. The trade agreement lent publicity to the murder of leading presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, who was killed on March 23rd 1994 in a poverty-stricken district of Tijuana. Since then, there have continued to be competing theories as

to who was behind the murder, with narco-trafficking playing a large role in many such scenarios.

The issue of narco-trafficking became more complicated in 1994, during Nafta's inaugural year. The number of major drug cartels proliferated and formed part of four larger narco-trafficking groups. One result of this proliferation has been an increase of violent turf wars. Some have estimated Mexico's profits from narco-trafficking to range, in the mid-1990s, from about \$7 billion to \$25 billion (US) annually, with the trade worth about \$100 billion per year. The last figure represents about twice the total revenue from the petroleum sector.⁶⁷

With the capture of the two kingpins of Colombia's Cali Cartel in the summer of 1995, US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gelbard, suggested on August 9th that Mexico could soon surpass Colombia as Latin America's most important producer and trafficker of illicit substances. But Mexico had been as important as Colombia in the realm of narco-trafficking for quite some time, though significant attention was not devoted to the Mexican case until the Nafta era. Further, Gelbard's view was based on what is probably an incorrect premise that other Colombians would not absorb the Cali Cartel's business. It is worth recalling that the Cali Cartel itself grew very powerful only after it captured commerce lost by Escobar's clan in the wake of his death. Overall, narco-trafficking is not driven by leading personalities in cartels, but by the logic of capital.

Mexican authorities were able to display to the United States the capture of their own version of Pablo Escobar in January of 1996. Juan García Abrego, head of the infamous Gulf Cartel, had presided over a drug empire with an estimated value of between \$10 billion and \$20 billion (US). Because he held both US and Mexican citizenship, and since he was responsible for linking Colombian cartels with immense markets in Texas and New York, he was on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list. Those under García Abrego's employment reportedly infiltrated top echelons of the Mexican Government.⁶⁸ Mexican authorities caught him in Monterrey, and subsequently deported him to the United States. Ultimately his arrest served to placate, at least

partially, US authorities who doubted Mexico's resolve to combat narco-trafficking. But as was the case with Colombian drug kingpins, it is clear that García Abrego's absence will not diminish the drug trade to any significant extent.

Since Nafta has boosted border traffic in general, with this has come an apparent rise in the flow of drugs from Mexico to the United States.⁶⁹ There is mounting evidence that huge amounts of drugs flow over the US-Mexican border at major frontier crossings. Considerable concern arose in 1995 when it was reported that absolutely no cocaine was confiscated from more than 2 million trucks that passed through three of the busiest entry points along the southwestern border in 1994.⁷⁰ The episode suggests the possibility of corruption of US officials, and more generally, it brings to light the magnitude of the problem. About two-thirds of all cocaine entering the United States crosses the US/Mexican border at official entry points.⁷¹

A turning point appeared in 1996 with a major US-Mexican military pact, the first of its kind. This was a major step for the formerly nationalist Mexican military, which not long ago considered the US its major enemy. The pact meant more US-Mexican cooperation, and significantly more militarization of Mexican society. Much of this increased militarization was done under the guise of fighting narco-trafficking, with 25% of Mexico's armed forces participating in antinarcotics operations in 1997. But the military features of the War Against Drugs may be designed, as well, to repress social discontent in Mexico and to combat subversive movements. In fact, a 1996 report by the US General Accounting Office acknowledged that several helicopters provided by the United States to Mexico were actually used to transport Mexican military personnel in 1994 during the beginning of the Chiapas conflict.⁷² This came to light only through the persistence of critical NGOs. It raises the possibility of other military hardware used for counterinsurgency projects rather than the stated use of anti-narcotics operations.

As we shall see later, there exists a significant overlap between some guerrilla groups in Colombia and the business of narco-trafficking. What is the relation between illicit drugs and Mexico's guerrilla movements? As of 1999, there

has been no evidence uncovered which links the Zapatista rebels to illicit drug commerce. Narcotics seizures have been made in Chiapas, however, and the region has been utilized for poppy cultivations. The Mexican government acknowledged that the country was the second largest grower of opium poppies in 1995. Chiapas has also been a significant route for trafficking a variety of contraband through Guatemala. But the Zapatistas, in contrast to some of their Andean counterparts, have declared themselves to be drug and alcohol free. Subcomandante Marcos observed in 1995 that

When we governed (through autonomous zones in Chiapas), we lowered to zero the rate of alcoholics, and the women here became very fierce and they said that drinking only served to make the men beat their women and children, and to act barbarically, and therefore they favor the order that no drink was allowed, and that we could not allow drinking to go on, and the people who received the most benefit were the children and women, and the ones most damaged were the businessmen and the government.⁷³

The credibility of the Zapatistas would diminish precipitously if any ties were discovered between them and narcotrafficking.

By contrast, there are various reports linking Mexico's other major guerrilla group, the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR), to opium and marijuana cultivation, especially in the state of Guerrero. Those familiar with the situation in Guerrero suggest that campesinos cultivate such crops for subsistence against the backdrop of an agricultural crisis in Mexico, and that segments from many sectors of society - military, government officials, guerrillas, campesinos - seem to be involved in the trade.⁷⁴ Overall, the ties between the EPR and narcotrafficking appear noteworthy but not overwhelming, as they are in the Colombian case.

There has not been significant change in the situation in Mexico since the inauguration of Nafta in 1994. Funding for militarization continues, despite mounting evidence of policy

failure. Between 1996 and 1999, the Pentagon has devoted 'dozens' of military helicopters to Mexico in the name of fighting drugs - yet it is known that traffickers almost never use air routes in Mexico and instead prefer to ship by marine containers. Not one jetload of cocaine has been detected by this operation since it began three years ago.⁷⁵ Given the utter failure demonstrated in that record, the possibility arises that these helicopters might actually be used for other purposes, perhaps combatting subversives. Moreover, in July 1999 the US General Accounting Office heavily criticized the policies of the DEA in Mexico, citing highly ineffective work and poor fiscal accountability.⁷⁶ Yet, aid from Washington continued to flow into Mexico in 1999. Despite what most observers view as the ascendance of the drug trade in Mexico, the country continues to be 'certified' by the United States for its willingness to 'cooperate' with Washington.⁷⁷

Overall, the Mexican role in narcotrafficking appears to be deepening since Nafta. Increased militarization officially aimed at fighting drugs has not appeared to be successful, and there is evidence that at least some of this assistance is instead being devoted to fighting subversive movements. Increased trade and integration under Nafta has accelerated the illicit narcotics market.

Options

The context regarding Canada's interest vis-a-vis Mexican narcotrafficking is that much of the front-line issues are dominated by the US. Indeed, we have seen that the already strong US influence over Mexico has grown significantly during Nafta years. Still, Canada has significant economic interests of its own in Mexico, which have escalated considerably since the beginning of Nafta - imports rose from \$4.5 billion in 1994 to \$7.6 billion in 1998, and exports rose from \$1.05 billion in 1994 to \$1.3 billion in 1998.⁷⁸ The rise in imports suggests a greater possibility for smuggling. As Canada's economic relations with Mexico have grown closer, so too, have political relations. The following options are general ones which promote human security and would be politically popular in Mexico.

The presumption is that illicit drugs will not be legalized anytime soon, and certainly not within the next five years. The primary long-term option is to consider the ramifications of legalizing these substances, and the best forum for this is either in trilateral Nafta negotiations or through relevant international organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States. One question which deserves considerable research is whether legalization of illicit drugs is economically feasible in Mexico, that is, could sudden legalization actually trigger a major economic downturn due to decreased narcodollars in the economy?

The following options are feasible in the immediate term, and would appear to have a strong sense of success. The first option is to provide support to NGOs that deal with consumption issues, especially addiction-reduction and health related issues similar to those among injection drug users in Canada. This is particularly important since the number of illicit drug users in Mexico is estimated to have risen 58 percent between 1988 and 1998. This sort of support is welcomed and has no complicated political connotations. It could be 'piggybacked' on already successful ventures launched by Mexican NGOs.

A second option concerns assistance provided to judicial institutions and legal agencies. The potential for such aid ranges from the bolstering of the government's legal and judicial agencies which deal with issues emanating from narcotrafficking, to supporting both national and international agencies which investigate money laundering. It could also entail the provision of aid to NGOs that offer alternative legal assistance to those affected by violence associated with trafficking. Highly effective NGOs which promote human rights in the context of narcotrafficking in Mexico include the Comision Mexicana de Defensa y Promocion de los Derechos Humanos in Mexico City and the Instituto Guerrerense de Derechos Humanos in Chilpancingo, Guerrero.

Third, much of southern Mexico is undergoing an agricultural crisis, while Northern Mexico is witnessing a manufacturing boom triggered by strong US demand combined with a relatively low Mexican peso. Opium growth is located precisely in the southern agricultural belt,

and so this region could be the target of alternative development programs - either through international agencies or through the provision of aid to Mexican NGOs. Environmental training and sustainable development techniques could effectively be tied to programs in subsistence agriculture. An environmental NGO in Mexico with a strong record of success is PRONATURA, and support should be considered for some of its endeavors.

Fourth, communication technology could be provided by Canada to Mexican NGOs, connecting the wealth of information available in Mexico's urban centers to the country's periphery in ways that promote human security and use the least resources. The possibilities here are endless, but the central notion is to allow the peripheral population to educate itself in areas that promote human security in the face of threats posed by narcotrafficking. Two broad examples include the promotion of alternative development through Internet information or courses, as well as the ability for peripheral populations to have instant contact with urban centres in order to report human rights violations (many of which are committed in the name of fighting narcotrafficking).

Colombia

Colombia is remarkably beautiful and dynamic. Boasting what some consider to be the greatest living writers and artists in the hemisphere, Bogota is considered by many as the 'Athens' of Latin America. This country of approximately 38 million people, has a GDP of about \$90 billion (US). This figure places Colombia within the mid-range of major Latin American economies, yet it is probably artificially low since it does not account for the immense illegitimate economy of drugs. Colombia is the epicenter of hemispheric narcotrafficking. It is also the site of the most prominent strategic crisis in the hemisphere, and is the third largest recipient in the world of US military assistance. From the Canadian perspective, two key questions come to mind. What Canadian interests are affected by Colombian narcotrafficking? What feasible policies can Canada employ to better ensure the

promotion of human security in Colombia within the context of narco-trafficking and civil war? For Canada to formulate workable policies aimed at promoting human security, Ottawa will have to appreciate major transformations regarding warfare and economy, which are apparent in the Colombian case.

Historical Aspects

Although cocaine and opiates are currently the mainstay of Colombia's illicit drug market, the country's serious role in hemispheric narco-trafficking can be traced to the marijuana trade of the early 1970s. Many of those who participated in this emerging informal economy had a solid history of dealing in contraband, particularly with regard to the illegal emerald industry.⁷⁹ It is worth emphasizing that narco-trafficking represents only the latest wrinkle, although far and away the most profitable one, in Colombia's protracted experience with contraband. By the late 1970s, and into the 1980s and 1990s, the marijuana market would become dominated by Mexico and Caribbean sources, and increasingly, by indoor-hydroponic operations in Canada and the United States. Perhaps the notoriously shrewd Colombian entrepreneurs would not have let go of this industry so easily were it not for certain 'headaches' associated with the marijuana trade. Chief among these is the product's bulkiness, and therefore the relatively high expense of shipping. About 70% or more of Colombia's profit in narco-trafficking was derived from marijuana in 1979.⁸⁰ But within a decade the tables turned. By 1988, Colombia is estimated to have shipped 270 tons of the relatively precious cocaine to the US, compared to only 15 tons of bulky marijuana.⁸¹

Within the global cocaine industry, Colombia is the unrivalled kingpin. Two other Andean countries, Peru and Bolivia, contribute significantly to coca growth, and to a lesser extent, processing. But Colombia almost exclusively dominates the lucrative businesses of management and distribution, and continues to play a leading role in both chemical processing and coca cultivation (about 79,500 hectares in 1997, compared to 68,800 for Peru and 45,700 for Bolivia). In the 1990s Colombia's plans for

expansion within the narco-industry have focused on the production of opiates, especially smokable varieties, which presumably have a wider social appeal and therefore marketability, compared to the taboos associated with injectable heroin. In 1998 there were an estimated 8,000 to 16,000 hectares of opium grown in Colombia, principally in the Departments of Cauca, Huila, Tolima, and Narino.⁸² In 1999, Colombia was estimated to supply 80 percent of the cocaine and 60 percent of the heroin seized on US streets.⁸³

Narco-trafficking, Security, and the State

The vast wealth entailed in narco-trafficking has spawned a series of security issues. Within this illicit empire, traffickers have felt compelled to create parallel security structures to protect and regulate the trade. This expansion of non-state security apparatus has exacerbated existing strategic problems in Colombia - especially the guerrilla war which commenced in the 1960s, as well as the historic lack of centralized authority in the government or military. Beyond the creation of non-state security structures, certain sectors of the state security system itself - military, police and judicial - have been 'leased' by traffickers. This has meant the debilitation of the state through intense corruption, at the same time that non-state security forces have expanded.

Before addressing these security issues more carefully and especially their relation to the weakening of centralized authority, it must be emphasized that the Colombian State has always been anemic.⁸⁴ Intense political divisiveness, imposing geographical barriers, a misdirected and uninspired military, as well as the context of a general dispersion of political power, have all contributed to the state's historic role as a chronic underachiever. Moreover, horrific and worsening maldistributions of income have done little to boost the popularity of the central Government. At least 70 percent of the population lives in poverty or absolute poverty, and IMF prescribed austerity cutbacks will only exacerbate the situation as we enter a new millennium. The trend spiralled further downward in the 1990s, with the gini coefficient rising from .46 to .51 between

1991 and 1998.⁸⁵ About 10 percent of the population owns 90 percent of agrigable land, and the Farc rebel movement claims that 70 percent of that land is devoted to narcotrafficking.⁸⁶

Colombia appears to be more like a collection of city-states than a unified country.⁸⁷ Power is dispersed into various quarters, none of which are strong enough to exert hegemony over the rest. Hence, politics are complex to the extreme.⁸⁸ What is especially significant is that narcotrafficking has debilitated the Government even further, serving to push the country to the abyss of chaos. Beyond the drastic intensification of a security crisis for Colombia itself, the situation has sparked profound strategic implications for its hemispheric neighbors - so much so, that in July 1999 the US indicated that it was prepared to intervene in Colombia more extensively than it already has.⁸⁹ Let us trace this trajectory, beginning in the 1980s, with an examination of the complex effects of narcotrafficking upon guerrilla movements, paramilitary forces, as well as upon the policies of Colombian and US governments.

Narcotrafficking, Guerrillas, and the Paramilitary Forces

Leftist guerrilla groups emerged in Colombia in 1964. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, factions of them sometimes served as the security arm of narcotraffickers during those heady days when vast new fortunes were being amassed. But this alliance was an uneasy one. The traffickers remain vehemently right wing ideologically - viewing themselves as Colombia's new and legitimate 'bourgeoisie' - and this has clashed with the dogma of left-wing guerrillas. Narcotraffickers have had more in common ideologically with large landowners. Many proprietors became increasingly irate over guerrilla activities, such as forcibly 'taxing' estate owners as well as the tendency among some subversives for kidnapping.

An important turning point came in 1981, with the formation of "Muerte a Secuestadores" (Death to Kidnappers), a right-wing paramilitary death squad. They served as the force of 'social cleansing' (murdering homosexuals, street people,

etc), and as armed rivals to leftist guerrilla 'kidnappers'. Especially important for the purposes at hand, the paramilitaries displaced leftist guerrillas as the principal security apparatus for the narcos. Some guerrillas still benefitted from the trade through the control of shipping routes or cultivation areas, providing the guerrillas with a source of funding that would render them independent from the control of the Soviet Union, Cuba or China. But, by and large, security for the narcos was provided by right-wing paramilitary groups beginning in the early 1980s.

Strategically, it was a complicated nexus with narcotrafficking at the heart of much of it: the narcos and right-wing paramilitaries in alignment; a significant penetration of the already weak and corrupted state by the narcos; and an assortment of competing leftist guerrilla groups some of which fed off narcotrafficking. Further, the political prominence of the narcos grew considerably since the late 1970s. For example, they dominated Colombia's judicial and security systems, commencing with the symbolic assassination of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 1984. At times, they also enjoyed significant social prestige through contributions to public programs, and it is reported that drug kingpins Jorge Luis Ochoa and Pablo Escobar, even offered to pay off Colombia's national debt.

But unlike the rest of Latin America, which endured the depressionary features of the debt crisis and concomitant restructuring in the 1980s, Colombia never needed to reschedule its debt with the IMF. In fact, the country grew at an annual growth rate averaging about 5%, and the state always seemed to have plenty in its coffers. Together with a fundamentally sound economy and a truly dynamic workforce, the spin-off effects from the narcotrade added to the economic boom which, until 1999, had kept the IMF at bay.

Narcotrafficking and the Privatization of War

The corruptive influence of narcotrafficking has also been apparent for the US. In July of 1999, for example, it was revealed that the wife of the United State's highest ranking military officer in Colombia was suspected of utilizing US diplomatic mail services to traffick

cocaine from Colombia to New York City.⁹⁰ This general theme of corruption and shady deals is not a new one. There is evidence linking the United States to the illicit narcotics trade in the 1980s, especially in relation to the proliferation of crack cocaine and funding for the US-supported Contra counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua. The US "Kerry Commission", officially known as the US Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, indicated that it had established proof that the US had at least \$27 million directed to the Contras from funds generated by trafficking cocaine, especially crack.⁹¹ Despite its magnitude, this remarkable story received relatively little attention. But for those familiar with the issue, it severely weakened the credibility of the War Against Drugs.

This was also the beginning of what one observer called the entrenchment of the 'privatization of war' in Latin America during the neoliberal period.⁹² Belligerents, even governments, increasingly sought private means of raising funds for warfare. In the Americas, this has ranged from the United States' policy in Central America to the private sources of funding which finance the world's strongest guerrilla group - Colombia's FARC. Ironies abound: the US apparently has employed narcotrafficking to achieve its strategic objectives, despite the 'War on Drugs'; and the Marxist Colombian guerrillas use the capitalist crime-businesses of drug dealing and kidnapping in their stated quest to establish a non-capitalist and crime-free 'nirvana'.

Colombia, Narcotrafficking, and the Global Context

The 1990s witnessed an acceleration of narcotrafficking alongside the development of what may be the most profound changes to occur within global politics in hundreds of years. While strong lines of continuity still tie us to the past, we also observe the vast neoliberal restructuring of the global economy, the ascendancy of speculation, the transformation of warfare, new forms of political space and a revolution in language and communication. Narcotrafficking is related to each of those shifts. The Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary groups, which have grown to be the

most powerful subversive movements in Latin America, have done so because they have their finger on the pulse of global change.

Colombia, the Global Economy and Narcotrafficking

Global economic transformations are reflected in narcotrafficking and guerrilla/paramilitary activity. Narcotrafficking represents neoliberalism to the hilt - a globalized free market that responds to a seemingly insatiable international demand. It has occurred alongside the Third World debt crisis, as well as the economic 'restructuring' which has often meant the shedding of jobs in the formal economy. The industry flourishes in part because of 'coopted' state officials who not only benefit personally from the trade, but exploit it to handle government finances and debts. It also generates cherished jobs - cultivators, processors, deliverers, exporters, foreign distributors, accountants, lawyers, money launderers, heavy security forces, and so on. Significant 'spin-off' jobs materialize when traffickers invest in various legitimate businesses, and when those who are employed in any sector of the trade spend their personal income on goods and services.

It is impossible to put a precise figure on the value of narcotrafficking to the Colombian economy, although in the early 1990s Forbes Magazine suggested that some of the richest people on the planet were Colombian narcotraffickers, such as the late Pablo Escobar. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the trade in Colombia was concentrated in the hands of a few 'cartels'. The death of Escobar in 1992 and the subsequent weakness of his Medellin cartel meant the strengthening of rival groups, especially the Cali cartel, from about 1992 to 1994-5. During that period, Cali boomed. But with the capture of leading Cartel figures in 1994-95, the city's huge but artificial economy collapsed, against the backdrop of a legitimate economy consisting almost solely of the depressed sugar cane market. The destitution and depression in Cali is obvious to any visitor in 1999 - and perhaps this 'before-

and-after' story is the truest measure of how much the industry can be worth.

The incarceration and eventual murder of Pablo Escobar, as well as the incarceration of leading figures of the Cali Cartel, demonstrate another relevant phenomenon - the balloon effect, which we also observed in Mexico. When one kingpin or cartel goes down, others pop up to take their place. This is the context for a wave of high level arrests in the Fall of 1999 of alleged drug barons in Colombia, Mexico and elsewhere. The industry continues to boom - Colombia is growing more coca and opium poppies than ever. The trade is driven by the sheer logic of capital - a point that is often overlooked despite its centrality to neoliberal ideology. Rather than its concentration in a few 'cartels', the industry is now more dispersed.

It is noteworthy that in 1999 Colombia entered its worst depression since the 1930s, having avoided the economic perils felt by most of its neighbors in the mid-1980s. Low oil prices, record low prices in the mining and agricultural sectors, rising current account deficits, and greater spending on the part of the state since the 1991 Constitution, are all part of the puzzle. So, too, are the deflationary pressures emanating from the Brazilian crisis, as well as the escalating levels of violence and terror in Colombia, which may deter existing or potential investors.

It is significant that the Chair of the New York Stock Exchange visited leaders of the FARC in a remote Colombian jungle on June 26th 1999. This was billed as an opportunity for the FARC to better understand the global stock exchange and how Colombia could prosper from it, on the eve of dubious 'peace negotiations' between the rebel group and the Government. It was also an opportunity for the Chair of the NYSE to meet the leaders of the world's strongest guerrilla group, who have a significant interest in what is Latin America's most important transnational corporation - the illicit drug trade. Recently the IMF observed that the prevalence of political violence in Colombia has added to an economic depression not seen since the 1930s, partially because national and international investors have been growing increasingly fearful of Colombia.⁹³ This includes not only direct investment, but may also include speculative investment, which helps

to explain the huge devaluation of the Colombian peso on international markets during the spring/summer of 1999. The complex links between narco-trafficking, the guerrilla movement, and the global speculative economy are worthy of sustained investigation.

Overall, the narco-trafficking industry naturally reflects transformations in the global economy. The debt crisis, neoliberal restructuring, global free trade, and the speculative economy provide the environment in which narco-trafficking flourishes. Colombia's remarkable entrepreneurial spirit, combined with natural endowments, has rendered the country as the principal site of cocaine trafficking in the hemisphere. Guerrilla groups and paramilitaries have been able to seize upon this informal and illegitimate economy, thereby financing handsomely their military and political ambitions. If it were not for the industry of narco-trafficking, Colombia's guerrillas and paramilitaries surely would not enjoy the power they currently do.

The Transformation of Warfare

The Colombian predicament exemplifies many of the features inherent in the global transformation of warfare, which is apparent at the threshold to a new millennium. Some of these include shifts in the geographical space where warfare occurs, the fresh roster of participants, the blurring of warfare/terror/crime, and the establishment of new forms of communication. The primary focus here will be upon human security in relation to narco-trafficking and the privatization of war.

While traditional forms of combat entail confrontation between opposing militaries, the Colombian case, since the 1980s, has involved combat between the military, the paramilitary, an assortment of competing guerrilla groups, and narco-traffickers. Civilians are involved, either as targets for terror - as was the case with regard to Pablo Escobar's reign of narco-terror in the late 1980s and early 1990s - or as innocent bystanders caught between the crossfire emanating from a multitude of belligerents. There have been 726,000 Colombians displaced by warfare

between August 1994 and June 1998, with about 40 percent of these under the age of 18.⁹⁴ Between the wars waged by leftist revolutionaries, right-wing paramilitaries, the narcos, and the State, "the rate of killing in Colombia far exceeds the amount of ethnic cleansing that went on after the breakup of Yugoslavia."⁹⁵ About 35,000 Colombians have lost their lives in warfare over the last ten years.

While narcotrafficking contributes to the blurring of borders between belligerents and civilians, it is by no means the only factor. Perhaps the biggest growth industry in Colombia during the late 1990s is the kidnapping business. The dominant player is the country's second strongest rebel group, the ELN, which, despite their Christian-Marxist dogma, employs kidnapping for political purposes and monetary aggrandizement. They achieved international notoriety after kidnapping an entire plane load of people, and later a church congregation, in mid-1999. The Farc, paramilitaries, and assorted crime organizations also participate in the trade to the point that Colombia is home to more than 25% of the planet's kidnappings, and the trend points upwards. Between January 1996 and April 25th 1999, there were a total of 4,925 reported kidnappings, with 66% perpetrated by guerrillas, 19.6% by criminals, 1.3% by paramilitaries, and 22.6% by unknown authors.⁹⁶ The trade is worth at least \$80 million US annually,⁹⁷ and perhaps more, since many kidnappings simply go unreported. Not only are the boundaries between soldier and civilian erased, but the phenomenon is also indicative of the privatization of war whereby the bounds of military financing are being pushed.

The business of kidnapping, while clearly important, is secondary overall as a source of income for subversive groups. Estimates suggest that the guerrillas in Colombia could reasonably receive as much as \$500-600 annually from the illicit drug trade - and this does not count the paramilitary's 'cut'.⁹⁸ Yet the FARC denies any connection whatsoever to narcotrafficking.⁹⁹ Experts suggest that, like much of politics in Colombia, even the power of the FARC is dispersed - some factions derive support from narcotrafficking, while others remain vehemently opposed to it on moral and ideological grounds.¹⁰⁰ The paramilitaries also deny any connection to the

industry,¹⁰¹ yet extensive drug laboratories operated by the paramilitaries have been discovered,¹⁰² and it is well known that their origin was as the official security arm of the narcos. While warfare and violence in Colombia existed long before the advent of narcotrafficking, what is clear is that narcotrafficking has amplified these phenomena.

Turning to a more geographical focus upon the notion of shifting boundaries, Colombia's 'zona de distensión' is truly noteworthy. In what may be viewed as a rather bizarre olive branch for tarnished 'peace negotiations' originally scheduled for July 1999, the Federal Government provided the Farc with a chunk of territory about the size of Switzerland in November of 1998 (16,000 square miles and about 100,000 residents). The Government retracted all its forces from the 'zona', leaving the guerrillas free to utilize the strategic region chiefly for coca growth, and perhaps military training as well. Politicians in the US, especially members of the Republican Party, have not been shy about concealing their outrage over the issue. They are not alone - Colombia's respected Minister of Defense resigned in mid-1999, citing the 'zona de distensión' as a prime example of his irreconcilable differences with the floundering government of Andres Pastrana.¹⁰³ Naturally, the Farc appears unwilling to give back any portion of this strategic real estate. The area is now being contested militarily by the government. It launched a major military offensive in the region in mid-July 1999, following an ever-louder litany of complaints by the Colombian population and Washington regarding the Farc's claim to the zone.¹⁰⁴

Narcotrafficking also raises issues related to the space of the biosphere. Soil erosion, and chemical pollution of waterways, are well known hazards associated with coca cultivation and its processing into cocaine. Of even greater concern is the pollution surrounding increasing opium growth near Colombia's border with Ecuador, a location that also marks the source of many of the country's rivers.¹⁰⁵ Beyond those worries, aerial fumigation on the part of the State with herbicides designed to kill coca not only causes pollution from the herbicide itself, but ironically this process has also been shown to result in increased cultivation and associated pollution. This is

because growers take into consideration the probability of fumigation, and therefore cultivate additional crops.¹⁰⁶

Spatial boundaries also have been altered through the Internet. Guerrilla and paramilitary groups have established Web pages and electronic mailing lists aimed at attracting support from the English speaking world.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, such groups have attempted to establish themselves on a level of global credibility at least as substantial as that of the Colombian government. As the aforementioned visit by the Chair of the NYSE to the jungle locale of the Farc demonstrates, the strategy seems to be working. The use of the Internet by subversive forces demonstrates that the target audience is an international one that surpasses Colombia's own population.

Canada, the United States and Colombia

Canada has significant economic interests in Colombia. A related security interest is the protection of Canadian employees throughout Colombia, especially in the extractive sector. This is in the context of high level kidnappings of Canadians during the late 1990s. Canada is the tenth largest investor in the country. Canadian exports to Colombia rose from about \$137 million (US) in 1991 to about \$291 million in 1998, with imports rising from about \$68 million in 1991 to \$141 million in 1998. Recent investment projects under consideration by Canadian corporations include those in the petroleum and gas sectors, a hydroelectric project, telecommunication projects, the development of urban transportation metros, and the creation of water systems.¹⁰⁸

Canadian interests are clearly affected by the policies of the United States toward Colombia.

The latest trajectory of American policy can be traced to the 1989 Andean Initiative, launched by George Bush in 1990 as part of his War Against Drugs.¹⁰⁹ At that point, with the Soviets gone, 'Drugs' became Washington's new official enemy.

The Andean Initiative, however, may also have been aimed in part at eradicating Latin America's last remaining leftist strongholds in Colombia and Peru, now that the Sandinistas had been tackled in Nicaragua. The Initiative turned out to be a failure - the narco industry appears stronger than ever at

the end of the decade. Certainly the US has failed at taming Colombia in the 1990s.

The neighbors are growing restless over Colombia's predicament with guerrillas, narcotrafficking, and related crime and warfare. Particularly worried are Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela. With almost \$300 million in aid from the US in the form of counternarcotics assistance, Colombia is the third largest recipient of US aid in the world. In July of 1999 the Colombian Government formally requested \$500 million (US) of additional military aid for the next two years, beyond a request to 'borrow' some US military equipment stationed next door in Panama.¹¹⁰ Importantly, the Colombian military began a major restructuring in 1999 aimed at making it more flexible geographically, better trained and motivated, less top heavy, and more aggressive in its approach to the guerrillas, who have shown themselves to be strategic masters.¹¹¹ Given this situation, it is not hard to imagine an even stronger US military presence in the region - especially in the context of Panama's newfound control over the Canal combined with its limited resources, and against the backdrop of the defiant policies of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Once again, it is likely that a much stronger US military intervention in Colombia and perhaps surrounding areas is in the offing, and Washington may ask for assistance from its hemispheric allies.

Options

The single most significant medium-to-long-term option is the consideration of legalized cocaine and opiates, as was noted in the Mexican case. There is no doubt that such a bold policy would take power away from feuding Colombian groups, and reduce significantly the violence and corruption which blights the Colombian state. Since the US, among others, vehemently opposes this idea, it is simply not feasible in the short-term. What is feasible, however, is to attempt to bring the topic to legitimate and thorough debate within the forum of international organizations such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

The following are immediate-term options, which presume that the cocaine and

opium trade will remain illegal. The first option addresses consumption, since without this there would be no production of illicit drugs. While consumption of drugs has been a problem in Northern countries for decades, it has only been during the 1990s that it has become problematic within Colombia and many other developing countries. Augusto Perez Gomez, Colombia's current anti-consumption czar, has energetically initiated innovative programs, such as educating parents, journalists, and teachers to educate others regarding drug consumption, and has also promoted detox clinics as well as programs to reduce drug use in prisons.¹¹² He is seeking additional international support, which is something Ottawa should consider. The United Nation Drug Control Program is also active in Colombia with anti-consumption programs, an idea which seems popular in all sectors of society, even among guerrillas,¹¹³ with whom the UNDCP has a joint program in alternative development.¹¹⁴ The positive public perception of such programs add to their feasibility. The concrete effects of such policies, combined with their role in reducing to some extent the drug trade, place them solidly within the rubric of human security.

A second option is the promotion of NGOs in Colombia, especially in relation to the broad relation between narcotrafficking and human security. Because the state is weak and corrupted, the provision of aid to non-state avenues such as NGOs represents a feasible means to strengthen grass-roots public participation and social development.¹¹⁵ In the specific sense, support with a strong chance of success could be provided to NGOs that specialize in anti-consumption and youth rehabilitation. Other types of feasible aid could be provided for economic development. Alternative development could work well in Colombia, since it could mean supporting industries that are already highly successful, such as the export of coffee and flowers. This stands in contrast to the more problematic settings for alternative development in Peru and Bolivia, where competitive industries worthy of support are sometimes difficult to find in areas where narcotrafficking is economically prevalent. Once again, Colombia is a good candidate for the right kind of alternative development strategies that are aimed at bolstering

already successful enterprises.

Other NGOs are deserving of support, especially those dealing with the secondary results of narcotrafficking in the forms of violence and conflict. The Peace Brigades, for example, is already receiving some support from Canada, and perhaps even more is justified. The group provides a high profile official escort to peace makers, human rights organizations and other NGOs, thereby reducing their risk of being attacked by guerrillas, kidnappers, and paramilitaries.¹¹⁶ Beyond them, extensive consideration should be afforded to the high-profile role of Canadian NGOs, which launched a vigorous protest in 1999 regarding the massacre of 32 people in Barrancabermeja on May 16th and 17th 1998. Through an international legal tribunal, Canadian groups rightly demanded that the Colombian State be held responsible for the murders launched by paramilitaries and others. Such groups deserve Ottawa's support. Canada also provides assistance to alternative legal services aimed at promoting human rights, such as the Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos (ILSA).¹¹⁷ Such NGO efforts are worthy of continued support. They are on the front lines of human security, and provide quick and tangible results for the assistance provided to them.

The fortification of international organizations specializing in such things as judicial cooperation, the prevention of money laundering, and related forms of surveillance,¹¹⁸ may represent a third option for Ottawa to consider. The pursuit of such an option would aim at keeping the power of drug cartels from escalating - a containment policy, as it were - since the eradication of such groups seems unlikely. Narcotrafficking is established as an important item on the agenda of what could be lengthy peace negotiations which were scheduled to begin in Colombia in late July 1999, but which were postponed due to the Farc's difficulty accepting the role of an International Peace Commission in the 'zona'. However, the notion of an International Commission has received considerable support from Colombians, since an outside presence can bring a sense of justice and legitimacy which is required for peace to be constructed. A fourth option is the expressed position of the Canadian

Government to be of whatever support Colombians request to mediate the crisis.

A fifth option concerns the restructuring currently taking place within the Colombian military. While Canada may not be well advised to provide combat training, there are other avenues where Canada could make a clear contribution to human security in Colombia. These include: human rights training for troops; training to promote better political relations with civilians; and the promotion of intelligence, rather than violence, as a tool to obtain strategic objectives (as President Fujimori has done with regard to the capture during 1992 and 1999 of key members of the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso).

Conclusion

Canada plays multiple roles in the current crisis of hemispheric narcotrafficking. Within its own borders, Canada is a significant consumer, producer, and distributor of illicit drugs. Abroad, Canada finds its investments threatened by the violent and corruptive effects of narcotrafficking, especially in Colombia. At home and abroad, the important conception of human security is closely related to narcotrafficking. Feasible options in dealing with the crisis must define effective policies commensurate with human security and apply them in an efficient manner.

Ironically, a strong case can be made that the origin of the most serious ill effects associated with the crisis is actually the prohibition of drugs, rather than drug usage itself. A culture of demand for illicit drugs, which began in the North in the late 1960s and early 1970s and has spread to the Third World in the 1990s, has meant an insatiable underground market which continues to fuel the industry. But, consumer tastes are manipulated by the narcotrafficking industry, as demonstrated by the marketing of 'crack cocaine' to the urban poor in the US. Hence, although the industry is driven by predominantly northern consumer demand, the narcoindustry perpetuates and manipulates the market.

The immense magnitude of the industry has meant the creation of a parallel security structure to protect and regulate it. These manifest uniquely in distinct societies, from 'Biker' gangs in Canada to guerrilla groups in Colombia. The State in general has encountered challenges in the post-Cold War Era, which have the capacity to weaken it - especially in relation to economic globalization and the revolution in information and communication. By creating parallel security structures, narcotrafficking weakens the State even further. While the idealic traditional State maintains a monopoly on the use of force, narcotrafficking disperses military and political power away from legitimate institutions. Social power accrues to those criminal elements who can best manipulate the trade.

The problem is manifested in terms of an assortment of threats to human security. The

violence spawned by the Hobbesian 'dog-eat-dog' world of narcotrafficking is the most obvious of such threats - ranging from the victims of Vancouver's gang wars to the victims of paramilitary and guerrilla forces in Colombia. A vast array of human rights abuses are also apparent as a result of the industry. Crucially, the corruptive influence of narcotrafficking erodes the structures that can provide human security, such as a truly democratic government, an honest judicial system, and a trustworthy army and police force. The wide range of health problems faced by users of illicit drugs may be viewed as another blight to human security emanating from the industry of narcotrafficking.

Feasible solutions to the problems generated from narcotrafficking require a realistic assessment of both local and global situations. They must take into account significant transformations in the realms of economy, warfare, communication, and political space. Because the industry and market of narcotrafficking are global, fundamental solutions must be sought on that level. In this hemisphere, the role of the US, Canada, Mexico, and the Andean countries are key. Multilateral efforts can be made at the United Nations Drug Control Program and at the Organization of American States' CICAD. Despite the necessity of global resolutions to confront the problem, Canada can still act locally in ways that promote human security.

End Notes

1. Here, the works of Michel Foucault are essential. See especially: *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage, 1977); *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage, 1978); as well as a variety of pieces in James Faubion, ed., *Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology - Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 2* (New York: New York Press, 1994).
2. See, for example, Jeffrey Singer, MD, "Medicalization: A 'Third Way' to Approach Drug Policy," paper presented at the Fraser Institute Conference "Sensible Solutions to the Urban Drug Problem," Vancouver, BC, 21 April 1998, p.2.
3. As reported in *The National Post*, 23 February 1999.
4. Interview, Bud Osborne, Board Member, Vancouver-Richmond Health Board, 23 February 1999, Vancouver, BC.
5. Interview, Pierre Beauline, Developer, Communications and Marketing, BC Persons with AIDS Society, 23 February 1999, Vancouver, BC.
6. Statistics from *BC Persons With Aids News*, # 106, December/January 1999, p. 13.
7. Interview with Anne Livingston, of the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU), and with ten anonymous cocaine or heroin users who are members with VANDU, 24 February 1999, Vancouver BC. Also, interview with Pierre Beauline, of the BC Persons with Aids Society, op. cit.
8. See S.L. Currie, et.al., BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, "Risk Profile of Injection Drug Users Accessing Mobile Needle Exchange Vans vs. a Fixed Site," in BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, *Surviving and Thriving - Developing Skills and Ideas for Today and Tomorrow*, 11th Annual BC HIV/AIDS Conference, Final Program and Conference Syllabus, 21-24 November 1998, p. 24.
9. M.V. Shaughnessy, et.al., BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, "Deadly Public Policy," from BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, *Surviving and Thriving...Syllabus*, op. cit., p. 38.
10. Martin Schechter, et.al., "Determinants of HIV Infection in a Cohort of Native Canadian Drug Users," BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, *Surviving and Thriving...Syllabus*, p. 40.
11. Ibid.
12. Interview with Bud Osborne, op. cit.; Interview Anne Livingston of VANDU, and with ten anonymous addicts, op. cit.
13. Interview, Ann Livingston, VANDU, and ten anonymous addicts, op. cit.
14. M.V. Shaughnessy, et.al., op. cit.
15. See Janet Dubrack, et. al., "Costing HIV/AIDS: The Canadian HIV/AIDS Economic Research Initiative," BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, *Surviving and Thriving...Conference Syllabus*, p. 26.

16. 'Feasible' is the operative word here. During interviews for this study, it was stressed that rather than devising 'wish lists,' interviewees would have more clout in their communication with government if the options they presented were, in their opinion, highly credible ones. Similarly, in the published research from which this study draws, an effort was made to identify works which provided, from the various authors' perspectives, feasible alternatives to existing policy aimed at improving the current situation.
17. Interview with Anne Livingston, and with ten anonymous addicts who are members of VANDU, 24 February 1999, op. cit.
18. Patricia Erickson, "Drugs, Violence and Public Health: What Does the Harm Reduction Approach Have to Offer?," Paper Presented at the Fraser Institute's Conference, Sensible Solutions to the Urban Drug Problem, Vancouver, 21 April 1998, p. 21.
19. Interview with members of VANDU, op. cit.
20. Interview, Anne Livingston and members of VANDU, op. cit.; S.L.Currie, et.al, BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, *Surviving and Thriving...Conference Syllabus*, op. cit., p. 24; Sandra Greene, Canadian Aboriginal Aids Network, Ottawa, "Joining the Circle: An Aboriginal Harm Reduction Model," *Surviving and Thriving...Conference Syllabus*, p.38; M.V. O'Shaughnessy, et.al., "Deadly Public Policy," *Surviving and Thriving...Conference Syllabus*, p. 38.
21. Interview, members of VANDU, op. cit; M.V. O'Shaughnessy et.al., "Deadly Public Policy," op. cit; See also, Patricia Erickson, "Drugs, Violence and Public Health," op. cit.
22. See, for example, Assignees, op. cit.
23. See Sandra Greene, "Joining the Circle," op. cit.
24. See Sandra Greene, op. cit., p. 27.
25. *Globe and Mail*, 27 February 1999.
26. Interview with Bud Osborne, Board Member, Vancouver-Richmond Health Board, Vancouver, 23 February 1999; Interview with Anne Livingston and VANDU members, Vancouver, 24 February 1999; Gil Puder, Constable Vancouver Police Department, "Recovering Our Honor: Why Policing Must Reject the 'War on Drugs'", paper presented at the Fraser Institute Conference, Sensible Solutions to the Urban Drug Problem, 21 April 1998, p. 17; Patricia Erickson, "Drugs, Violence and Public Health: What Does the Harm Reduction Approach Have to Offer," op. cit., p. 24;
27. See Ueli Minder, Drug Policy Coordinator, Swiss Federal Office of Public Health, Bern, Switzerland, "Swiss Drug Policy Including the Aspect of Harm Reduction and Heroin Supported Therapy Program," paper presented at the Fraser Institute Conference, Sensible Solutions to the Urban Drug Problem, 21 April 1998, p. 5.
28. The medical use of marijuana is one of the official platforms of the BC Persons With Aids Society, Interview with Pierre Beauline, Developer, Communications and Marketing, 23 February 1999, Vancouver.
29. *Globe and Mail*, 27 January 1999.
30. The US reports that marijuana consumption in that country is higher than it has been for decades, *El Tiempo*, 25 Mayo 1999. The most complete survey by the United Nations suggests that drug consumption has reached new heights worldwide, see United Nations Drug Control Program, *World Drug Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.29. With regard to Canada in particular, the United Nations reported in 1999 that

consumption of heroin and opium derivatives has reached record levels, as has production of marijuana in Canada, largely from indoor hydroponic operations, as reported in the *National Post*, 23 February 1999.

31. See Patricia Erickson, "Drugs, Violence and Public Health: What Does the Harm Reduction Approach Have to Offer?", op. cit., pp. 7-9.
32. Interviews at RCMP Headquarters, Vancouver, 23 February 1999. Interviews with: Pierre Beauline, BC Persons with Aids Society, op. cit.; Anne Livingston and 10 addicts from VANDU, op. cit.; and Bud Osborne, Board Member, Vancouver-Richmond Health Board, op. cit. See also Patricia Erickson, "Drugs, Violence and Public Health," op. cit., especially pp. 7-16.
33. See Gil Puder, "Recovering Our Honour: Why Policing Must Reject the 'War on Drugs'", op. cit., p. 5.
34. See Patricia Erickson, "Drugs, Violence and Public Health," op. cit., pp. 12-13.
35. Interviews with: Anne Livingston and 10 IDUs who are members of Vandu, op. cit.; Bud Osborne, former addict and Member of Vancouver-Richmond Health Board, op. cit. See also: Gil Puder, "Recovering Our Honour," op. cit., p.5; and Eugene Oscapeella, Lawyer, Canadian Foundation for Drug Policy, Ottawa, "Witch Hunts and Chemical McCarthyism: The Criminal Law and Twentieth Century Canadian Drug Policy," paper presented at the Fraser Institute Conference, Sensible Solutions to the Urban Drug Problem, 21 April 1998.
36. See Patricia Erickson, "Drugs, Violence and Public Health: What Does the Harm Reduction Approach Have to Offer?", op. cit., p. 14.
37. Interview at BC RCMP Headquarters with narcotrafficking experts, 23 February 1999.
38. Gil Puder, op. cit, pages 16 and 5, respectively.
39. See the *National Post*, 27 February 1999.
40. The calculation is as follows: Throughout the Okanagan Valley region there are 300 'basement operations' each with 50 plants, with two harvests annually. In addition, there are estimated to be about 30 'warehouse operations' with 1000 plants each, and with three harvests annually. Each plant is valued conservatively at \$3,000 - this means one to two pounds on average per plant (probably a low figure), and the pounds sell at a wholesale rate (not the much higher street value, or the value of selling in US dollars). Within this calculation as a whole, even if the number of basement and warehouse operations is too high, this is balanced by 'lowball' figures regarding yield and value per plant. This means that about \$360,000 million annually are generated from the marijuana trade in the Okanagan Valley.
41. See Eric Single, "The Economic Costs of Illicit Drugs and Drug Enforcement," presented at the Fraser Institute Conference, Sensible Solutions to the Urban Drug Problem, Vancouver, 21 April 1998, p. 1.
42. Interviews with member of the BC RCMP Headquarters who specialize in drug enforcement, op. cit.
43. As reported in the *Daily Courier*, Kelowna, 21 April 1999.
44. One of many such groups is the BC Persons With Aids Society, Interview with Pierre Beauline, Developer, Communications and Marketing, op. cit.
45. Angus Reid poll figures released and discussed by Daniel Savias, Senior Vice President, Public Affairs, "Canadian Attitudes Towards Decriminalizing Marijuana Use," paper presented at Fraser Institute Conference, Sensible Solutions to the Urban Drug Problem, 21 April 1998, p. 2.

46. As reported in the *Daily Courier*, Kelowna, 28 April 1999.
47. See Gil Puder, "Recovering Our Honour," op. cit., p. 17.
48. See, for example: "Milton Friedman Calls for Legalization - More Police, Jails, Repression Worsens Things," *Wall Street Journal*, 5 September 1989; and Milton Friedman, "The Drug War as a Socialist Enterprise," *Keynote Address*, Fifth International Conference on Drug Policy Reform, Washington DC, 16 November 1991.
49. See Robin Room, Chief Scientist, Addiction Research Foundation, Toronto, "Psychoactive Substances in Canada: Levels of Harm and Means of Reduction," paper presented at the Fraser Institute Conference, Sensible Solutions to the Urban Drug Problem, 21 April 1998, p. 2.
50. Interviews at BC's RCMP headquarters, Drug Enforcement, Vancouver, 23 February 1999.
51. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Drug Situation in Canada 1998*, January 1999.
52. See RCMP, *Drug Situation in Canada*, op. cit.
53. See *Globe and Mail*, 15 April 1999
54. RCMP, *Drug Situation in Canada*, op. cit.
55. Interview with senior members of Intelligence Services, Canada Customs, Vancouver, 23 February 1999.
56. Interview with members of Intelligence Services, Canada Customs, op.cit.
57. Interviews with members of the RCMP, BC headquarters, op. cit, and with member of Canada Customs, op. cit.
58. Much of this section on Mexico is taken from my book *Redefining Mexican Security: Society, State and Region Under Nafta* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997). See also James Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994).
59. Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt, "Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-US Drug Issue," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, #34, Fall 1992, p. 92.
60. Bruce Zagaris and Scott B. MacDonald, "Mexico," in Scott MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, eds., *International Handbook on Drug Control* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1992), p. 172.
61. See Reuter and Ronfeldt, op. cit., pp. 100-104.
62. See Jorge Chabat, "El narcotráfico en la relación México-Estados Unidos: Lo que se ve lo que hay," *Estados Unidos*, vol. 3, #3, ontoño 1993, pp. 5-15.
63. See Reuter and Ronfeldt, pp. 94-96.
64. See Magaris and MacDonald, p. 173
65. See "El narcotráfico: Problema numero uno," *Epoca*, # 153, 9 Mayo 1994, pp. 10-18.
66. Ibid.

67. See Christopher Whalen, "Mexico: What's Next?" Council on Foreign Relations, speech, 6 March 1995. <http:mexico2000@mep.d-org>.
68. *New York Times*, 15 January 1995.
69. Interview by author with José María Ramos, Investigador, Departamento de Estudios de Norteamericana, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana, 6 February 1995.
70. *Los Angeles Times*, 13 February 1995.
71. US Border Control, San Diego Sector, "Fiscal Year Drug Seizures," June 1996.
72. See *La Jornada*, 13 Junio 1996.
73. Quoted in *La Jornada*, 22 Marzo 1995.
74. Interview by author with: Aurora Muñoz, Instituto Guerrerense de Derechos Humanos, Chipancingo, Guerrero, 25 June 1997; and Javier Mojica, Comisión de Derechos Humanos, Acapulco, Guerrero, 23 June 1997.
75. See *New York Times*, 23 December 1998.
76. *La Jornada*, 23 July 1999.
77. Associated Press, "US Fears Narcotrafficker May be too much for Mexico to Handle," 11 February 1999.
78. Statistics Canada, *Imports by Country and Exports by Country*, various years.
79. See Javier Guerrero Barón, "La Sobre-Politización del Narcotráfico en Colombia en los Años Ochenta y sus Interferencias en los Procesos de Paz," in Ricardo Peñaranda and Javier Guerrero Barón, eds., *De Las Armas a La Política* (Bogotá: TM Editores, 1999), especially pages 243-244.
80. See, for example, Harvey Kline, *Colombia - Democracy Under Assault* (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p. 60.
81. See Jenny Pearce, *Colombia - Inside the Labyrinth* (New York: Monthly Review, 1990), p. 111.
82. Interview by author with Klaus Nyholm, Representante, UNDCP, Bogotá, Colombia, 6 May 1999. United Nations Drug Control Program, *Colombia: Apoyo y compromiso integrales* (Bogotá: UNDCP, Octubre 1998), p. 15. Earlier estimates placed Colombia's opium growth at 16,000 hectares, with at least two-thirds of the world's opium trade dominated by Asia, and to a much lesser extent, Mexico and Guatemala. See Jorge Mario Eastman, *Amapola, Coca y ...* (Bogotá: Editorial Gente Nueva, 1993), pp. 9-22.
83. Anthony Boadle, "White House sees Setbacks in Drug War in Latin America," Reuters News Service, 16 July 1999.
84. For an excellent historical overview of Colombian politics in relation to the situation in the 1990s, see, for example: Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, *Insurgencia sin Revolución* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1996) ; Alfredo Rangel Suarez, *Colombia: Guerra en el Fin de Siglo* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1998); and Malcolm Deas and Fernando Gaitán Daza, *Dos Ensayos Especulativos sobre la Violencia en Colombia* (Bogotá: Fondo Financiero de Proyectos de Desarrollo, Fonade, 1995).
85. A coefficient of 0 = perfect distribution of income, 1 = worst maldistribution. See *El Tiempo*, 9 Mayo 1999.

86. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo, *Ponencia Presentada por la Comisión Internacional de las Farc-EP, Narcotráfico en América Latina y el Caribe*, San José, Costa Rica, 18-19 Julio 1997, www.burn.ucsd.edu/~farc-ep/communicados
87. Interview by author with: Profesor Umberto Vélez, Departamento de Historia, Universidad del Valle, Cali, 29 May 1999; Profesor Gabriel Murillo-Castaño, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, 4 May 1999; Padre Gabriel Izquierdo, Instituto Pensar, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana; Alfredo Rangel Suarez, Director de Política y Estrategia, Fundación Social, Bogotá, 6 May 1999.
88. Interview by author with Profesor Gonzalo Sánchez, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, 10 May 1999.
89. See *Globe and Mail*, 5 July 1999.
90. Laurie Anne Hiatt, wife of US Army Col. James Hiatt, allegedly used US diplomatic mail services to traffick cocaine from Bogotá to New York City. *St. Petersburg Times*, 7 August 1999.
91. *Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, of the Committee of Foreign Relations, US Senate, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1989). See also: "La Narco-CIA," *Revista Semana*, # 753, Bogotá, Octubre 8-15, 1996, p. 64; and for an extensive and excellent coverage of this issue, see Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America* (University of California, Berkeley Press, 1991).
92. See Javier Guerrero Barón, "La Sobre-Politización de Narcotráfico en Colombia en los Años Ochenta y sus Inteferencias en los Procesos de Paz," op. cit., especially pages 245-252.
93. *El Espectador*, 7 Julio 1999.
94. *El Espectador*, 8 Julio 1999. The source is the Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y Desplazamiento.
95. Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz, *Colombia's Three Wars: US Strategy at the Crossroads*, (Carlisle, Penn.: US Army War College, 5 March 1999), p. 3.
96. *El Espectador*, 5 Mayo 1999.
97. *El Espectador*, 6 Mayo 1999.
98. See Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz, op.cit., p.16.
99. One of almost innumerable examples of the Farc's denial regarding links to the drug trade appears in a press release: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo, *Comunicada de Prensa*, 8 Junio 1997, www.burn.ucsd.edu/~farc-ep/communicados.
100. Interview by author with Professor Jorge Hernández, Departamento de Sociología, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia, 19 May 1999; collective interview with Juan Guillermo Hoyas, Director de Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad de Antioque, Profesora Adriana González Gil, Historia, Juan Carlos Vélez Redón, Historia, Universidad de Antioque, Medellín, 27 May 1999; and interview with Klaus Nyholm, Representante, UNDCP, Bogotá, op. cit.
101. See, for example, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, *Letter for Curtis Kamman, Ambassador of the United States to Colombia*, 8 Mayo 1998, www.colombialibre.org

102. See *El Tiempo*, 6 Mayo 1999.
103. *El Tiempo*, 28 Mayo 1999.
104. See, for example, *El Spectador*, 12 Julio 1999.
105. Interview by author with Klaus Nyholm, UNDCP Bogota, op. cit.
106. See *El Tiempo*, 18 Mayo 1999.
107. For example, the Web address of the Farc is: www.burn.uscd.edu/~farc-ep/
The address for the right-wing paramilitary group is: www.colombialibre.org/
108. *El Spectador*, 31 Mayo 1999.
109. For an extended discussion of this, see James Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas: the Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), especially pages 209-225.
110. See *El Spectador*, 16 Julio 1999.
111. Interview by author with profesor Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Director, Instituto de Estudios y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, 13 May 1999.
112. Interview by author with Augusto Perez Gomez, Director, Programa para el Afrontamiento del Consumo de Droga, Bogotá, (part of Colombia's federal government), 6 May 1999.
113. The Farc's support for anti-consumption and alternative development policies are found in many of its documents including: Comision Internacional de las FARC-Ep, *Carta publica al pueblo y a los sectores progresistas de Norteamerica*, Abril 1998 (no day of month provided), www.burn.uscd.edu/~farc-ep/communicados
114. Interview by author with Klaus Nyholm, UNDCP, Bogotá, op. cit.
115. Respected experts, such as Profesor Gabriel Murillo Castano, Ciencia Politica, Universidad de los Andes, op. cit.
116. Interview by author with Pilar Laso, Peace Brigades International, Bogota, 12 May 1999.
117. Interview by author with Camilo Castellenos, Presidente, Instituto Latinamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos (ISLA), Bogota, 4 May 1999.
118. Such forms of surveillance would include, for example, information regarding shipments of chemicals from a variety of global locations to Colombia for use as precursors for cocaine.