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Arab language education in the Hebrew state

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Introduction

The Arabs in Israel constitute 18 percent of the total population, numbering 1,130,000[1] including East Jerusalem.[2] Language education is considered an important part of the curriculum at all stages of education. The languages studied are Arabic, Hebrew, English; French is studied as well in several private schools.

The *Bagrut* examinations[3] and the National Assessment for Educational Progress[4] (known as MASHOV) clearly show that the Arab pupils in Israel do not have a satisfactory command of the three main languages (Arabic, Hebrew and English) that are taught.[5] The unsatisfactory command of these languages is attributed to two main groups of factors, which can be labeled external and internal. The chief external factors are: the policy of control and supervision that the Ministry of Education exercises on Arab education in general (Al-Haj 1995) and on language education in particular; the dominance of Hebrew; the status of Arabic as "official" in name only; and the definition and perception of Israel as a Jewish State. The internal factors are related to social processes within Arab society, that is, the socio-economic situation, the diglossic situation of Arabic, and the increasing use of Hebrew features into Spoken Arabic.

As Al-Haj (1995:216) explains "the ruling groups [in Israel], without exception, have attempted to delegitimize Arab and Palestinian nationalism and to use the education system as an instrument for legitimizing the official ideology alongside the transmission of vague universal values".

Formulation of the language education policy in the Arab sector is under the exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The implementation of this policy is evident, for instance, in the curricula, in the number of hours allocated to language instruction, in the hiring of teachers, and in the approval of textbooks. The teaching materials in the textbooks do not meet the needs of the Arab pupil, and they are designed, among other things, to educate the

learner about the values of the Jewish society and its customs. For instance, in Hebrew language classes, Arab pupils learn more about Judaism than Jewish pupils do in State-sponsored public schools. In Arabic more literary texts from the classical period are learnt than from the modern period. These texts are distant from the life and the identity of the Arab learner. In English there are many texts imbued with Jewish themes and Western culture, also distant and even alien to the Arab pupil's world. Language education emphasizes the technical side of language instruction. That is to say, language is emphasized as a means of communication, and the importance of language in fostering the character of the Arab pupil as an independent individual; in conveying national symbols is almost ignored.

Arabic in Israel is recognized as an official language along with Hebrew. However, in reality it is official in name only (Spolsky and Shohamy 1999). Jews, as many studies show,[6] avoid studying Arabic, while Arabs study Hebrew formally (from the third grade on) and informally for both instrumental and communicative needs. Highly educated Arabs in most cases have a better command of Modern Standard Hebrew than of Standard Arabic (see Amara and Abu-Akel 1998).

A linguistic repertoire is considered an important asset for every minority. Good command of a variety of languages is needed by minorities to increase their chances to cope successfully with the socio-economics of their lives. Appropriate language education policy may contribute to success in schooling and raise the level of their achievement. It is important to emphasize that success in education contributes significantly to the integration of the Arab graduate in the life of the country, giving him/her better opportunities for progress in his/her career.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the major forces shaping Arab language education in Israel. The forces influencing Arabic, Hebrew and English and the effects of these forces on pupil achievement will be considered. First, a general background of Arab society in Israel is given. This is followed by a brief description of the group's language repertoire. Finally, the major factors influencing and shaping Arab education are described and discussed.

Arabs in the Hebrew state: General background

The point of departure here is the impact of the extra-linguistic forces on the Arab language education. Arab society in Israel has been considerably influenced by the changed socio-political circumstances in the last five decades. Three interrelated factors need to be considered in order to understand the main characteristics of the society and the collective identity of the Arabs in Israel: (1) Israel's policy towards the Arab minority; (2) internal developments within the Arab society; and (3) external regional developments and their influence on the Arabs in Israel. Relevant to the first of these is the Israeli-Arab conflict and the perception and definition of Israel as a Jewish State. Together these help determine the nature of relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority in the Jewish State. These relations are characterized by continuous tension and friction.

The basic assumption after the founding of Israel was that because the Arabs in Israel are a national minority, they are an integral part of the Arab world and because they identify with that world emotionally and physically, they constitute a risk to Israel's security. As long as no appropriate solution is found to the conflict, the Arabs will continue to be a security risk (Riter 1996). Consequently, the Arabs are perceived as citizens whose loyalty to the country is "questionable and … a potential for risk to its Zionist character (in the best case) or even to its very existence (in the worst case)" (Benziman and Mansur 1992: 211). The security perception has brought about the exemption of the Arabs in Israel from the duty of military service and has created the perception of "loyalty conflict" (Riter 1996) or "dual loyalties" (Landau 1971). According to these perceptions, the Arabs are more loyal to the Arab world than to Israel. The results of these perceptions, especially military exemption, has helped to institutionalize discrimination against Arabs in Israel. For example, many financial benefits are granted only to those who serve in the army.

Israel performs many activities in the name of security. Land appropriation is one of the most salient; in this and other domains, laws have been enacted, and emergency regulations have been implemented. A well-known example concerns the villages of Iqrit and Biram.[7] Discrimination against the Arabs is also evident in allocating government resources and payments, such as national child allowances (up until 1998) and university fees, as determined by the Katsav Commission.

The security issue is not the only factor influencing the situation and status of Arabs. The main influence on their situation and status lies in the very definition and perception of Israel as a Jewish State. The Independence Charter states this clearly in its formulation that Israel is a Jewish national state, and many laws have been enacted to enhance the Jewish character of the country (Kretzmer 1990).

Extensive and continuous concern for security issues has prevented genuine discussion of the essence and identity of the country, and has made the question of relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority a marginal issue. Policymakers in Israel have not clearly determined the type of policy to be carried out regarding the Arabs in Israel, either in the short or long run. Decisions have been made under the pressure of events (Benziman and Mansur 1992). However, because these events were few and scattered, there was no active pressure on decision makers to take decisive steps. Generally speaking, problem solving in the Arab sector is ad hoc, such as after strikes or violent demonstrations. A good example is the first Land Day[8] marked in 1976 when the Israel government for the first time considered seriously the demands of the Arab minority.

It is worthwhile mentioning that in the last decade considerable changes have occurred among Israeli leaders from both left and right wings about the need to narrow the gap between the minority and majority in various domains of life. This is clear in some areas, but in spite of the changes, the status of the Arabs in Israel has not been essentially altered. In other words, there is clear preference of Jews over the Arabs.

So far we have dealt with Israel's policy towards the Arab minority. We turn now to internal and external developments which shape Arab society in Israel. The main internal factors are: discrimination against Palestinians in Israel in the civil and national domains, modernization and urbanization processes in the Arab sector, and contact with Israeli Jews. One of the consequences of modernization and contact with Jews was the internalization of some aspects of Western culture, some of which had previously been alien to Arab society in Palestine. Modernization and urbanization have led to socioeconomic changes, and the Arab sector, mainly rural, has begun to acquire urban characteristics. In the 1960s and 1970s, in spite of the acquisition of urban characteristics and an increase in the standard of living, local councils were not able to introduce sufficient services and infrastructure to accommodate these emerging changes (Bar-Gal and Soffer 1981). The traditional *hamula* (a clan of extended families related through a common ancestor and carrying the same family name), which was initially strengthened after 1948, became gradually weaker. Nakhleh (1975) argued that urbanization, changes in the Arab economy, and the resultant decline in its political power weakened the ability of the traditional *hamula* to control its members. By the early 1970s, this led to increased factionalism in inter-village politics. In the civil domain, Arabs experienced increased discrimination, at the same time becoming more aware of their status and the effects of their unfavorable position. In the national domain, the definition of Israel as a Jewish State made it extremely difficult for Arab citizens to identify with symbols which are representative of the Jewish majority, e.g., the flag and the state's national anthem.

Finally, several regional developments over the last fifty years have contributed to the shaping of Arab society in Israel: Pan-Arabism in the 1950s and 1960s, the defeat of the Arab countries in the Six Day War, the increasing power and recognition of the PLO in the international arena, the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the growth of religious fundamentalism in the neighboring countries, the Lebanon War in 1982, the Palestinian Intifada 1987–1993, and more recently, the Oslo accords.[9] In sum, Israel's policy towards the Arab minority together with internal and external developments all contribute to the current texture of Arab society in Israel.

Language education

The remainder of the paper seeks to highlight the major factors affecting Arab language education in Israel. First, a brief description of the Israeli Palestinian language repertoire is in order.

Linguistic repertoire

The Palestinian Arab linguistic repertoire during the British Mandate was simple, and to some degree, uniform. Since the majority of people were villagers and since Palestinian society was predominantly agrarian, schooling was not available to all, and contact with the outside world was infrequent. The majority of the Palestinians knew and spoke mainly the local Palestinian dialect, and only limited sectors of the population knew standard Arabic, English; even fewer knew and used Hebrew. After the establishment of the State of Israel, the Israeli Palestinian linguistic repertoire gradually became more complex and diverse.

The linguistic repertoire of Palestinians in Israel is at the present time changing rapidly, with many of the changes coming from increasing contacts with standard Arabic, from contact with other varieties of Arabic, and from contact with Hebrew and English (e.g., Amara 1986, 1995, 1999a).

Arabic is the mother tongue and the main national language of the Arab citizens of Israel. It serves as the sole official language of Israel's neighboring countries and enjoys a unique status in most Muslim countries.[10] Arabic in

Israel is unique in a different way: It is both a minority language and a recognized second official language. Arabic was a major language until the founding of Israel, and due to changes in socio-political circumstances, it became marginalized. Arabic is learnt as the first language in all the Arab schools from the first to the twelfth grades, and is the language of instruction at several teacher training institutes.

Hebrew is the dominant national language. It is learned formally and informally. Since Hebrew is one of the official languages of Israel, Israeli Palestinians learn Hebrew as the language of the country and not as a foreign language (see Winter 1981). Hebrew is taught in Israeli Palestinian schools from the third grade on, but the influence of informal learning from outside contact is even more important (see Reves 1983). All age groups, regardless of gender, have informal contact with Hebrew speakers, though in varying degrees (see Spolsky and Cooper 1991).

Arabs learn Hebrew for pragmatic reasons: for work, for communication in everyday matters, to obtain services from governmental and private institutions, and for continuing studies at institutions of higher education (Amara 1986; Amara and Spolsky 1986). Consequently, Hebrew is an important tool for every Arab citizen in Israel, since it enables him to function effectively in all domains of life.

English is taught in Israeli Arab schools from the fourth grade. In other words, it is studied formally. Outside contact is very slight because there is no direct contact between the Arabs in Israel and an English-speaking community. However, English is important because of its role as the international language of science, technology and commerce, the popularity of American culture, and the close relationship between the USA and Israel.

Major factors affecting Arab language education

The results of the National Language Tests (Mashov) of 1996 and 1997 show consistent and wide gaps between Arab and Jewish pupils in performance on tests in their mother tongues, Arabic for Arabs and Hebrew for Jews. (See Table 1, and the same results are displayed in Figure1), and also in English (Table 2 and Figure 2).

The gap in English between the Arab and Jewish pupils is striking, amounting to two standard deviations. Only 40% of the pupils in the Arab sector reached a satisfactory level of achievement, among whom fewer than 10%

Table 1. Averages for achievement in reading comprehension and writing in the mother tongues in both Arab and Jewish schools in grades 4 and 8.

	ReadComp-4	ReadComp-8	Writing-4	Writing-8
Arab (Arabic)	60.3	56.1	39.5	54.1
Jewish (Hebrew)	72	73.6	72.1	70.9

Source: The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport and The National Institute for Testing and Evaluation 1998a, 1998b, 1998c and 1998d. The National Mashov for the Education System, grades 4 and 8 in Arabic and Hebrew as mother tongue in both Arab and Jewish sectors.


Figure 1.   Achievements in reading comprehension and writing in both Arab and Jewish schools in grades 4 and 8 (%)

reached an advanced level. Close to 60% fell below the level desired. Simply put, 60% of the Arab pupils failed the test, in contrast to approximately 15% of the Jewish pupils.

The data presented above indicate that approximately half of the Arab pupils fail to reach a satisfactory level of achievement in their mother tongue, Arabic, and the majority fail to do so in English (60%). What are the explanations for this low level of achievement? As explained above, many forces are involved in shaping Arab language education. To understand the complex nature of the issues in Arab language education and the low level of achievement in the various languages taught, including the mother tongue, linguistic, sociological, political and pedagogical explanations are all relevant.

We begin first with diglossia,[11] offering linguistic as well as ideological explanations. Diglossia, as many studies have shown (e.g., Amara and Abu Akel

Table 2. Averages of achievements in English in five skills in both Arab and Jewish schools in grade 8.

	Reading	Listening	Speaking	Writing	Grammar
Arab sector	42.6	40.4	40.7	37.2	27
Jewish sector	73	83.9	61	68.8	50.7

Source: The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport and The National Institute for Testing and Evaluation 1998e. The National Mashov for the Education System, English, grade 8, in both Jewish and Arab sectors.


Figure 2.   Achievements in English in grade eight, according to skill by sector (%)

1998; Maamouri 1998) is a major burden on the Arab learner. Standard Arabic is a different language, with syntax, morphology, and lexicon all substantially different from the spoken variety. The problematic nature of a diglossic situation is not only linguistic, but also social and ideological. The standard is limited in its use to only a few domains and settings, making it limited as a spoken variety. Competence in the standard variety requires competence in the four major language skills, which are acquired only through education. In school standard Arabic is mainly used in language classes. Thus, the learner speaks the standard with difficulty only when the situation demands it. This limitation in use explains why the standard is not an everyday language, and probably explains the low proficiency of most Arab learners in either writing or speaking the standard. The distinction between the spoken and written varieties is to a large degree ideological, with the major purpose being to maintain the purity of the Arabic language.[12] The standard is limited to formal domains, such as school, media, courts, and mosques or churches etc. So it is probably not surprising that the various Arabic reform attempts have met with almost total failure (Abu-Absi 1986).

Arabic diglossia in Israel is even more complicated and constitutes a bigger

burden on its speakers than it does in Arab countries. As mentioned already, the official status of Arabic in Israel is only titular (Spolsky and Shohamy 1999). Its use is limited to the local public sphere. Beyond that sphere, mostly Hebrew that is used, e.g., in the Knesset (parliament), in the media, in higher education, on road signs, etc. This means that Arabic in Israel is different from Arabic in the Arab world, since the public sphere for the use of the standard is extremely limited, mainly used in education (and even in education, as we will see below, it competes with other languages) and in religious places. In other domains, Hebrew is dominant. Furthermore, there is a major influence of Modern Standard Hebrew on educated Arabs. The majority acquire their higher education in Hebrew[13] and feel much more comfortable expressing themselves in writing and formal speaking in Hebrew (Amara and Abu-Akel 1998). The burden of diglossia is evident not only in the case of the mother tongue, but also in the case of Hebrew, as a second language, and English, a foreign and third language for Arabs. It is also important to mention that Arab pupils must learn three writing systems.

A second factor in Arab language education is the socio-political milieu. The changed socio-political circumstances after the founding of Israel turned the Arabs in Israel into a numerical and marginal minority. Life necessities and priorities heavily influence language proficiency and use among the Arabs in Israel. From the various studies conducted by Amara (e.g., 1986, 1995, 1999a) on the language repertoire of Israeli Palestinians, it was found that Arabs use Hebrew not just for filling gaps left by the absence of equivalent elements in Arabic. That is to say, Hebrew features are not only used for communicative needs, but also to "show off".[14] Hebrew fulfills a major symbolic function among Palestinians in Israel and symbolizes the desire and aspiration to associate oneself with the outside modern world.

The prestige of Hebrew is related to Israeli progress in many fields. That Israel is seen as a modern country with advanced technology has encouraged Palestinian youth in Israel to learn Israeli patterns of behavior in order to join this progress. The fact that Israeli Palestinian youth read Hebrew papers and watch Hebrew programs on television is an indication of their desire for some of this modernity. Nevertheless, they attach different values to the two languages. Because Israeli Palestinians are aware of the fact that Arabic is a rich, beautiful and prestigious language, for them the mastery of Hebrew is a method of achieving social, educational and economic levels similar to those of Israeli Jews (see Amara 1986). This implies that Palestinians in Israel learn Hebrew for practical or instrumental motivations rather than integrative purposes. This

situation reflects the nature of Palestinian-Jewish relations in Israel. First, Israel is considered a Jewish state, rather than a country for all its citizens. Consequently, Palestinians seek to enhance their unique identity in the Jewish state with Arabic being an important vehicle (see Amara 1995). Second, the Israeli-Arab conflict enhanced the differences between the majority and minority. Third, residential patterns which can be described as defacto segregation do not contribute to extensive contact between the two nations. All of the above factors together do not lead to a high level of social convergence towards the majority culture and its language among Palestinians in Israel. This means that each side preserves its identity and the associated language (Amara 1999b).

Though Hebrew is the other significant language among Palestinians in Israel, due to contact with Israeli Jews in various domains of life, and though it serves as a modernization agent, there are nevertheless sociolinguistic constraints on language convergence. In the words of Ben-Rafael (1994: 176):

> ... a barrier impedes this convergence, as expressed in a retention of Arabic. The limits each case imposes on convergence towards the dominant culture respond to the nature of the commitment to the dominant culture. For the Muslim and Christian Arabs, the legitimate language remains Arabic, as an expression of their fundamental identity. The penetration of Hebrew as the dominant language does not subtract anything from Arabic, though its deeper influence comes out in borrowing and substitutions.

Though the Arabs in Israel express positive attitudes towards English, there is a lower level of priority for learning English. Arabs see learning Hebrew as the first priority (Shohamy and Donitsa-Schmidt 1998).

Another related issue is place of residence. A large proportion of Arabic speaking children comes from villages (more than 65%) and not towns, where they have less exposure to the English speaking Western culture that has come to dominate Israeli cities.

A third factor is teachers' qualifications and status. In the three languages taught, there is a problem of teacher qualification. Most of the university graduates of Arabic language and literature receive their education at Israeli universities, where Arabic is taught as a second (or even foreign) language, and teacher education programmes are not designed for Arabic as a mother tongue. Consequently, teaching Arabic is based on intuition rather than knowledge and expertise. This is also true to a large degree of Hebrew language pedagogy, since most of the Arab teachers receive their higher education at Israeli universities. This means that their qualification in Hebrew is as a mother tongue, rather than as a second language. In the case of English, the gap is even wider when

compared with the Jewish sector. A large proportion of the teachers in the Jewish sector have university degrees in English, which means that they spent several years in classes taught in English. Another sizable group of English teachers includes either native speakers of English or those who have spent extended periods in English-speaking countries. It is also to be noted here that decisions about the appointment of language teachers in the Arab sector are made by general Ministry of Education inspectors and not, as is increasingly true in the Jewish sector, by language inspectors.

Still another relevant issue is the way Arab teachers are hired. As Rouhana (1997: 86) explains "the security principle was used to restrict teacher appointments relentlessly in the early years of the state". Though the security principle has attenuated over the years, hiring Arab teachers is still influenced by security and political considerations. Arab teachers must fill out a "security form", which does not exist in the Jewish sector. This affects the level of teaching since some qualified teachers are not hired.

A fourth factor concerns educational goals, curricula, and textbooks. One of the major goals of the Israeli education in the Arab sector is to make Arab education devoid of any national content. Al-Haj (1995: 121) explains that "policymakers sought from the very beginning to reinforce the religious-cultural component and Israel-citizenship component instead of the Arab-national component". This policy is in line with the definition of Israel and its perception as a Jewish State. This policy has been implemented through curricula and materials. Former curricula and textbooks that were used in the British Mandate were completely removed. The new curricula and textbooks was aimed to tighten the control of the state over the content of Arab education (Al-Haj 1995). Analyses of the educational goals, curricula and content of textbooks in the Arab sector shows clearly that the State aims at weakening the Palestinian Arab identity (Peres et al. 1968; Mari 1978; Lustick 1980).

The textbooks in the Arab sector in the three languages do not meet the needs of the Arab pupil. Through Arabic education, the country aspires to achieve a policy of denationalization of the Arab minority, that is to say, to weaken and devalue Palestinian identity and to expose Arab pupils primarily to texts from the classic Arab period. In the early period of Israeli statehood, Arabic was emphasized in the curriculum as a tool for self-expression, totally excluding its role in conveying national symbols. In the recent curriculum the national pride of the Arabs in their language is mentioned as one of the goals of teaching Arabic. For example, one of the goals is "the pride of the Arab in his

national language".[16] However, there is still little congruence between the declared goals of the curriculum and the teaching materials.

In Hebrew, emphasis is placed on "exposure of Arab students to the culture and heritage of the Jewish people and on the development of Israeli citizenship" (Al-Haj 1995:133). This becomes clear when we compare Hebrew in Arab schools with Arabic in Jewish schools. In the Arab schools the aim of teaching Hebrew is to expose the Arab student to Hebrew culture and values in the past and present (Mari 1978), while the aim of teaching Arabic in the Jewish schools is instrumental, i.e., learning about Arabic language and literature. Though educational goals and the curriculum for teaching English are the same for both Arabs and Jews, the content of the textbooks put the Arab pupils at a disadvantage. There is a lack of cultural adaptation of the textbooks to Arab minority pupils. The textbooks represent the majority culture, which no doubt further weakens motivation.

The factors influencing and shaping Arab language education examined above are not the only ones, but they are the most influential. Other factors related to those mentioned above are, for instance, allocation of resources and pedagogical issues, e.g., the much lower level of support that the schools in the Arab sector receive (Amara and Kabaha 1996). There is a tremendous shortage of teaching hours allotted to Arabic language classes. The curriculum for teaching Arabic is outmoded. Currently, the Arab student learns about Arabic, rather than how to use the Arabic language. Because of the diglossic situation, the skill of speaking is largely neglected.

Conclusion

The unique case of Arab language education in Israel has been influenced and shaped by internal and external factors. As Spolsky (e.g., 1972; Spolsky and Shohamy 1999) wisely suggests, language education is a complex matter, its understanding depends on a great number of sociological, economic, historical, political educational, religious, cultural, and other factors. Unfortunately, in language education both in the Arab world (Amara and Abu-Akel 1998; Maamouri 1998), and in Arab society in Israel, linguistic and pedagogical factors are those advanced to describe and account for language education in general and for the curriculum and textbooks in particular. External factors, such as the political and socio-cultural, are not seriously considered by policy-makers. This paper has attempted to bring some of these factors to light.

Notes

1. Muslims 15% (901,000), Christians 1.7% (129,000) and Druze 1.3% (99,000) (Yediot Ahronot, 1.1.1999).

2. Shortly after the 1967 War, Israel unilaterally unified East and West Jerusalem, declaring the whole city of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which includes the Old City and the inhabited areas outside it, numbers about 180,000 people. East Jerusalem is not included in describing Arab language education, not only for political reasons, but because linguistically and in terms of language education it has more to do with the West Bank than the Arabs in Israel.

3. The Bagrut is the Hebrew term for matriculation examinations given at the end of high school in all schools in Israel. Great importance is accorded to Bagrut achievement in Israel, especially for college and university admission.

4. These tests were carried out by the Ministry of Education with the assistance of the National Institute for Testing and Evaluation. They are considered the most comprehensive and reliable language achievement tests in the Israeli schools.

5. School achievement of Arab pupils in comparison with Jewish pupils is reported below.

6. Most of the studies on teaching Arabic in Jewish schools (e.g., Ben-Rafael and Brosh 1991; Kraemer 1990) show negative attitudes of both pupils and parents towards Arabic. Arabic suffers from a low status among Jews.

7. These villages, located near the Lebanese border, were evacuated during the 1948 War by the Israeli army. The Israeli authorities promised them that they would come back once the war was over. However, so far the villagers have not been allowed to go back to their villages, and for about 50 years they have run a legal and public struggle to return to their villages.

8. Land Day was first marked in 1976, when Israeli Palestinians participated in massive protests against the confiscation of Arab lands and continued discrimination with respect to civil rights. On March 30, 1976 violent clashes took place between Palestinians in Israel and the Israeli police. Six Palestinians were killed, and several were wounded. This day came to be known as Land Day, which is remembered and celebrated annually by Palestinians in Israel.

9. For greater details on the influence of regional developments on the Arabs in Israel, see Amara and Kabaha (1996) and Rouhana (1997).

10. Arabic is the sole official language in the Middle East, excluding Turkey and Iran, and the Arab countries of North Africa. In Israel, Somalia and Chad, Arabic shares official status with other languages. Because it is the language of the Qur'aan, it has a special status in many Muslim countries.

11. Arabic is considered a diglossic language (Ferguson 1959; Brosh 1996). One of the main characteristics of a diglossic situation is that the functional division between the standard (according to Ferguson, the High variety) and a local dialect (low variety) is absolute. That is to say, the standard is used for specific functions and the spoken for others. The use of functions of one variety in the other is artificial if not ridiculous.

12. The spread of Islam, the learning of Arabic by non-Arabs, and the threat of a wide diversification of Arabic contributed to this distinction.

13. There are no Arab universities in Israel. Arabs tried to establish an Arab university, but failed to do so, mainly because the Hebrew State is not interested in such a university, lest it becomes the center for Arab intellectuals and for nationalism.

14. Observation of signs in an Israeli Palestinian city, Tira, located in the area known as the Little Triangle, showed that more than 90% of shop signs were written in Hebrew — though in many of the stores, clients are only Arabs. One explanation for this may be that Hebrew enjoys a high status among Israeli Palestinians; writing in Hebrew adds prestige and credibility to the goods being offered for sale.

15. This goal was formulated in the recent curriculum. In former curricula, Arabic teaching was not associated with nationality or identity.

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Adult use and language choice in foreign language policy

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In the last several decades, the field of language policy analysis has grown immensely. A rich set of case studies of language policy in a large number of countries is now available, and several attempts have been made to develop a comparative, analytic framework. (e.g., Spolsky 1999; Schiffman 1996; Lambert 1999). Most studies of language policy, however, concentrate on what I would call "domestic" languages, those in use by major portions of the population within a country. Its two principal divisions, "corpus policy" that deals with the prescription of the proper form of a country's language(s); and "status policy" that is concerned with the relative standing of the languages of ethnic minorities are both focused within the country.

It is striking, how little attention is paid in discussions of general language policy to the use and teaching of foreign languages, languages whose home domain is in another country. The distinction between domestic and foreign languages is, of course, a slippery one, as any prairie province Canadian student learning French, or American student studying Spanish can attest. There is also a debate about whether ex-colonial languages in, for instance, Africa (Tengan 1994) and India are domestic or foreign languages. Even allowing for this definitional imprecision, however, it is surprising how little discussion of foreign languages there is in analyses of domestic language policy.

While discussions of foreign languages do not often find their way into domestic language policy, there is a vast literature dealing solely with what is, in effect, foreign language policy, although it is usually not referred to as policy. A number of comprehensive foreign language policy analyses within single countries have appeared recently. They include the Dutch National Action Plan (Van Els, et al. 1990), the Australian National Plan (Lo Bianco 1987), and most recently in England a national review of foreign language policy sponsored by the Nuffield Foundation entitled *Where Are We Going with Languages* (Moys 1998).