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On August 28, 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) granted leave to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal’s (“FCA”) judgment in St. John’s International Airport Authority v Thibodeau, 2024 FCA 197 [Thibodeau]. This case presents an opportunity for the SCC to define the boundaries of a purposive analysis under the modern approach to statutory interpretation.
Facts
Factual and Statutory Background
Airport authorities, including the St John’s International Airport Authority (“SJIAA”), were established in the late 1990s under the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matter) Act, SC 1992, c. 5 [ATA]. These authorities are local, private not-for-profit entities that administer airports. Among other things, airport authorities have specific obligations regarding Canada’s official languages (Thibodeau, para 7).
Notably, s (4)(1) of the ATA provides that various provisions in the Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c. 31 [OLA] apply to the airport authorities and airports as if they are federal institutions (Thibodeau, para 36). These provisions apply to the airport as if it were an office or facility of a federal institution, other than its head or central office (Thibodeau, para 36).
In 2018, Mr. Michel Thibodeau (“Mr. Thibodeau”)—a language rights advocate—filed six complaints with the Commissioner of Official Languages (“COL”) pursuant to s 58 of the OLA. He alleged that the SJIAA did not include sufficient French-language material on its social media accounts, website, press releases, documents published on its website, and automated teller machines located at St. John’s International Airport (the “Airport”) (Thibodeau, para 8). His complaint alleged that these failures violated ss 22-23 of the OLA (Thibodeau, para 8).
Section 22 of the OLA provides that federal institutions must “…ensure that any member of the public can communicate with and obtain available services from its head or central office in either official language…” [emphasis added] (Thibodeau, para 10). For clarity, s 23(1) notes that every federal institution which “…provides services or makes them available to the travelling public has the duty to ensure that any member of the travelling public can communicate with and obtain those services in either official language from any office or facility of the institution in Canada…” [emphasis added] (Thibodeau, para 10).
Additionally, s 23(2) provides that federal institutions must ensure that services provided to the travelling public are provided or made available in both official languages (Thibodeau, para 10). Put simply, a federal institution cannot contract out of its obligations.
Together, ss 22 and 23 establish a detailed regime to regulate the delivery of federal services to the travelling public in Canada’s official languages.
The COL’s Reports
In response to Mr. Thibodeau’s complaints, the COL issued three reports.
The April 2019 report concluded the SJIAA had violated s 23(3) of the OLA. In that report, the COL identified a federal regulation that establishes automated banking machines as a service for the travelling public. This service was not properly labelled in both official languages at the time of Mr. Thibodeau’s complaint (Thibodeau, para 11).
The May 2019 report found that the SJIAA was a “head office” for the purposes of s 22 of the OLA (Thibodeau, para 12). It also noted that s 23 of the OLA applied to the Airport (Thibodeau, para 12). The COL determined that the SJIAA did not comply with the OLA and recommended that it take “necessary actions” to address the violations within six months (Thibodeau, para 12).
In June 2021, the COL issued another report. It concluded that the SJIAA failed to take sufficient action to comply with the May 2019 recommendations, particularly regarding its website and social media accounts (Thibodeau, para 14).
The Dispute
Between May 2019 and June 2021, Mr. Thibodeau brought an application to the Federal Court (“FC”) against the SJIAA under s 77 of the OLA. In part, s 77 allows any person who makes a complaint to the COL in respect of a duty under ss 22-23 to apply to the FC for a remedy. This application initiated the FC dispute, ultimately leading to the current appeal at the SCC.
Judicial History
The Federal Court’s Decision
The FC found that the SJIAA breached the OLA and awarded Mr. Thibodeau damages under s 77 and costs. There are two important takeaways from the FC decision for the purposes of this article.
First, the FC held that s 77 is designed to give “teeth” to the OLA (Thibodeau, para 17). The text, context, and purpose of this provision must be assessed alongside a “liberal and purposive” interpretation, given the OLA’s quasi-constitutional status (Thibodeau, para 17). Similarly, in assessing s 4(1) of the ATA alongside s 22 of the OLA, the FC concluded that the SJIAA has a head office for the purposes of the OLA and must offer its services in both official languages (Thibodeau, para 18).
Second, the FC interpreted “travelling public” under s 23 of the OLA broadly, rejecting the SJIAA’s submission that it applies only to members of the public carrying a travel document (Thibodeau, para 19). The FC held that determining whether a service or communication is directed to the “travelling public” requires examining whether the recipients or beneficiaries of the service or the communication “are all or mainly members of the travelling public” (Thibodeau, para 19).
Issues
Among other issues, the following questions were put to the FCA:
1. Did the FC err in finding that airport authorities are head offices pursuant to s 4(1) of the ATA?
2. Did the FC err in its interpretation of s 23 of the OLA?
The FCA’s Decision
Preliminary Remarks
Boivin JA, writing for the majority, begins the judgment with preliminary remarks on language rights in Canada. He traces the roots of the OLA to the 1967 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which established Canada’s two official languages (Thibodeau, para 27). Following the patriation of the Constitution, the OLA was overhauled to reflect the constitutional status of language rights and eventually acquired quasi-constitutional status (Thibodeau, para 31). Despite this new status, the OLA was afforded a narrow interpretation until 1999, when the SCC developed a purposive, broad, and generous interpretation of the legislation (Thibodeau, paras 33-34).
Issue #1: Section 4(1) of the ATA
The FCA upheld the FC’s interpretation on this issue. The majority concluded that the object of s 4(1) of the ATA is to ensure the continuity of language obligations rather than the ATA’s broader economic motivations to transfer power from the federal government to airport authorities (Thibodeau, para 45).
The grammatical and ordinary sense of s 4(1) also indicates that Parliament intended to deem airport authorities federal institutions, as these entities are otherwise corporations that are not bound by the OLA (Thibodeau, para 50). Boivin JA closely examined the text of s 4(1) to demonstrate that head offices must exist for airport authorities to comply with the principles of corporate law, and that airports are offices for the purposes of the OLA (Thibodeau, paras 55-60).
Even though other statutes delegate official language obligations to otherwise private actors using different statutory language, the context of s 4(1)’s enactment overwhelms any minor linguistic differences in favour of finding that airport authorities are head offices (Thibodeau, para 63).
Issue #2: Section 23 of the OLA
The FCA upheld the FC’s interpretation on this issue as well. Boivin JA concluded that a narrow interpretation of s 23 to limit the “travelling public” to individuals who use airports to fly from one point to another runs contrary to the purpose of the OLA, which promotes the preservation and development of English and French (Thibodeau, paras 69-70).
According to the majority, narrow interpretations of the OLA similarly run contrary to the presumption of consistency. Federal regulations indicate Parliament would have used the term “passenger” to refer to the “travelling public” had it intended to include only people with travelling documents (Thibodeau, para 74). Crucially, requiring members to possess a travel document to obtain communication or services in the official language of their choice further limits a linguistic minority’s ability to plan travel (Thibodeau, para 75).
Analysis
In my view, while both the majority and the dissent disagree on several points of law, both opinions bear the hallmarks of a sound purposive interpretation rooted in textual analysis. Specifically, the majority and dissent emphasize that the text serves not as a secondary consideration in a purposive analysis but instead as an anchor to ensure interpreters do not risk undermining Parliament’s intent. I support this observation below in two parts.
Part #1: Defining the Purposive Analysis
Perhaps the most compelling part of Boivin JA’s reasons is his overview of how Canadian courts have arrived at a purposive and liberal interpretation of the OLA. Rather than simply stating that the OLA regulates a quasi-constitutional matter and therefore requires a purposive interpretation, Boivin JA traces the history of language rights in Canada alongside the OLA’s development. In doing so, the majority clearly sketches the boundaries of what the purposive interpretation can and cannot support under the modern approach.
For example, the FCA explicitly rejected any argument that the OLA ought to be afforded a narrow interpretation because language rights were simply a “political compromise” (Thibodeau, para 75). The majority makes clear the OLA is to be interpreted broadly and liberally, as “…language rights are not frozen in a historical context…” (Thibodeau, para 34). In this way, Boivin JA explains that a dynamic interpretation is appropriate in these circumstances, allowing legislation tied to important constitutional values to develop over time.
Similarly, Goyette JA, writing for the dissent, acknowledges that a purposive analysis is needed in these circumstances to promote the preservation and development of official languages in Canada (Thibodeau, para 110). The interpretive disagreement in this case concerns the text itself, rather than the balance between the text and the legislative purpose. Goyette JA acknowledges that the broader economic goals of the ATA do not displace the specific official language objective outlined in s 4(1) (Thibodeau, para 125).
Part #2: Applying the Purposive Analysis
Both the majority and the dissent apply purposive analysis in a careful, balanced manner, solidly rooted in the text. Almost half the paragraphs addressing the statutory ambiguities in issues 1 and 2 of the majority’s decision reflect textual reasoning (Thibodeau, paras 39-78). In dissent, Goyette JA’s breakdown of s 4(1) in a colour-coded screenshot of the provision’s sentence structure reinforces my point: the text is the starting point for applying purposive analysis (Thibodeau, para 111).
The advantage of this framework is that it helps ensure predictability in the otherwise loose framework typically used for purposive analyses. The purpose of a provision, like the text, is a tool of interpretation rather than a catch-all net for statutory ambiguity, particularly in quasi-constitutional matters. This case presents a unique opportunity for the SCC to affirm the careful balance interpreters ought to respect between purpose and the text under the modern approach to statutory interpretation.