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Ten years ago, in R. v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 [Jordan], the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC” or the “Court”) outlined a framework and presumptive ceiling for determining at what point the length of a criminal trial infringes s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [Charter]: the right to be tried within a reasonable time. In R. v. R.B.-C., 2026 SCC 30 [R.B.-C.], the Court was asked to extend the same framework and ceiling to post-conviction sentencing delay.
Writing for the Court, Martin J. rejected this approach, holding that the test should be a ‘markedly longer’ standard. She also held that the appropriate remedy for an infringement of s. 11(b) in the sentencing context will ordinarily be a reduction in sentence, not a stay in proceedings. As will be shown, the Court’s decision in this case reflects its trust in judges and its reluctance to implement bright-line rules that might interfere with judicial discretion.
Background
In Jordan, the majority articulated a presumptive ceiling for determining unreasonable delay in trying a criminal case. From the laying of the charge to the end of trial, the ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in provincial court and 30 months for cases tried in superior court (Jordan, para 5), after which, absent exceptional circumstances, a breach of s. 11(b) is found. The default remedy is a stay of proceedings. In R. v. Charley, 2019 ONCA 726 [Charley], the Court of Appeal for Ontario (“ONCA” or the “Court of Appeal”) adopted a presumptive 5-month ceiling for sentencing delay (Charley, para 87).
Facts
The appellant in R.B.-C. was convicted of sexual assault in October 2021 (R.B.-C., para 7). The sentencing process faced numerous complications, including collateral immigration consequences, technical difficulties, and multiple instances of trial judge and Crown unavailability. By October 20, 2022, R.B.-C. had still not been sentenced, so defence counsel brought an application for a stay of proceedings on the basis that the delay in sentencing infringed the appellant’s s. 11(b) right (R.B.-C., paras 9-14).
Judicial History
Ontario Court of Justice (Redgate J.)
On December 16, 2022, more than 14 months after the initial conviction, the trial judge dismissed the s. 11(b) application and sentenced the appellant to a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation (R.B.-C., para 15). Justice Redgate followed the 5-month presumptive ceiling from Charley, finding that the sentencing phase totalled 378 days. After attributing 74 days to defence conduct, Redgate J. deducted 80 days for her unavailabilities, 69 days for the complexity of the matter, and 39 days for the delay due to technical difficulties. She thus held that the net delay was 116 days, falling below the presumptive ceiling (R.B.-C., paras 16-18).
Court of Appeal for Ontario, 2024 ONCA 930, (Trotter, Favreau and Gomery JJ.A.)
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge made two errors in her s. 11(b) analysis. First, she erred by deducting 69 days for complexity. The ONCA found no complexity in the appellant’s immigration consequences to justify delay beyond the presumptive ceiling (R.B.-C., para 19). Second, she erred by deducting time for technical difficulties. The Court of Appeal held that these were not exceptional circumstances and should have been managed better. The revised net delay was 225 days, which exceeded the presumptive ceiling and infringed the appellant’s s. 11(b) right (R.B.-C., paras 19-20).
The ONCA held that the appropriate remedy for post-verdict sentencing delay was a sentence reduction. It treated the unreasonable sentencing delay as an enhanced mitigating factor and reduced the appellant’s conditional sentence to 20 months (R.B.-C., para 21).
Issues
The SCC was asked to determine the correct approach to assessing the reasonableness of post-verdict sentencing delay, as well as the appropriate remedy for an unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).
Decision
No Presumptive Ceiling
The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Justice Martin declined to extend the presumptive ceilings from Jordan to sentencing delay, thereby rejecting Charley as well. First, she held that the variability of sentencing proceedings makes them ill-suited for a rigid ceiling. Sentencing is an individualized process that requires the sentence to be fit to a specific offender and offence. Gladue reports, psychiatric evaluations, and victim impact statements, among other factors, may each be appropriate in any given case, and the time required for sentencing varies accordingly. (R.B.-C., paras 33-35). Sentencing time may also vary drastically between jury trials and those with a judge alone.
Second, the rationale for presumptive ceilings does not apply to post-verdict sentencing delay. Jordan ceilings were designed as a specific remedy to a specific issue: the “culture of complacency” in bringing accused persons to trial (R.B.-C., para 40). Justice Martin held that there is no comparable culture in sentencing. She pointed to other cases, including R. v K.G.K., 2020 SCC 7 [K.G.K.], where the Court similarly declined to extend the Jordan presumptive ceilings to verdict deliberation time. Charley did not sufficiently consider the rationale for adopting the Jordan ceilings and thus erred in applying them to post-verdict sentencing delay (R.B.-C., para 43).
The Correct Test is the “Markedly Longer” Test
The Court held that the “markedly longer” standard applies to sentencing delay. When trial delay falls below the presumptive Jordan ceiling, a breach of s. 11(b) is still established if the sentencing proceedings took markedly longer than they reasonably should have (R.B.-C., para 48). In K.G.K., Moldaver J. held that the “markedly longer” test applied to verdict deliberation because of the presumption of judicial integrity: the presupposition that trial judges will only take as much deliberation time as is reasonably necessary in the circumstances (K.G.K., paras 65-66). The Court held that this presumption, and thus the same test, applies with equal force to post-verdict delay (R.B.-C., para 49).
This is an objective and normative test, assessed contextually, not mechanically. The inquiry is whether sentencing proceedings have taken markedly longer than they should reasonably take in a criminal justice system functioning as it ought to in a free and democratic society (R.B.-C., para 52). The Court adopted the determining factors set out in K.G.K.
First, and exceptionally, sometimes the sheer duration of the delay may be so plainly excessive that it breaches s. 11(b) regardless of context. Second, the case’s complexity will be an important consideration. Third, any information from the parties, the judge, or the court that might explain specific delays is relevant. Fourth, the parties’ positions or conduct may be relevant. Fifth, one can compare the elapsed time against the length of comparable local cases (R.B.-C., paras 54-59). Nonetheless, this objective and normative inquiry does not displace the usual deference owed on appeal to the sentencing judge’s findings of fact (R.B.-C., para 60).
Remedies for Unreasonable Delay
Justice Martin held that remedies for unreasonable delay in sentencing proceedings are discretionary, but the ordinarily appropriate remedy is a reduction in sentence (R.B.-C., para 76). The default should not be a stay in proceedings, as the interests in play are qualitatively different. Once guilt has been established, the offender still retains their fair trial, liberty and security of the person interests, but they are either altered or diminished, while society’s interest in the timely imposition of a fit and proportionate sentence is heightened (R.B.-C., paras 66-73). A stay of proceedings may be appropriate and just in some circumstances, but those circumstances are rare and confined to “clear cases” (R.B.-C., para 78).
A reduction in sentence responds directly to the harms of this delay, including uncertainty, extended restrictions on liberty, and deferred sanction. The goal of this remedy is to place the offender in the position they would have occupied had the sentencing process taken a reasonable amount of time (R.B.-C., para 75). The Court of Appeal erred by treating the unreasonable delay as an enhanced mitigating factor; the remedy for delay is not part of the ordinary sentencing process, but is a constitutional remedy and must be treated as such (R.B.-C., para 77).
Application
Justice Martin concluded that the time taken to sentence R.B.-C. was markedly longer than it should have been. The collateral immigration consequences were neither novel nor unusually complex, and the trial judge allowed the issue to spiral out of control over multiple appearances. While none of the other delay-causing factors were remarkable in isolation, together they did not explain why the process took so long (R.B.-C., paras 82-83). Nonetheless, the ONCA correctly reduced R.B.-C.’s conditional sentence to 20 months, even if the appellate court erred procedurally in reaching that conclusion (R.B.-C., para 84).
Analysis
Since Jordan, the SCC has had multiple opportunities to extend presumptive ceilings to other areas of the criminal justice system; in K.G.K., the Court declined to apply a ceiling to verdict deliberation time; in R. v K.J.M., 2019 SCC 55, it declined to lower the ceiling for youth justice proceedings; and in R. v J.F., 2022 SCC 17, it found there was no proof of a “real problem” that required a modification of the ceiling for retrials. The Court has repeatedly endorsed a narrow reading of Jordan rather than a broad one, and there may be good reason for this approach. While a “culture of complacency” may have justified the Court in establishing the presumptive ceilings, the evidence is unclear as to their efficacy ten years on.
In the present scenario of post-conviction sentencing delay, most provinces already recognized that a presumptive ceiling approach was the incorrect course of action. Alberta and Nova Scotia had already adopted the “markedly longer” test, Manitoba and British Columbia applied a standard from R. v MacDougall, 1998 CanLII 763 (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 45, and Quebec opted for a “flexible, modulated approach” (R.B.-C., para 45). Charley was the outlier. This decision, partially reflected by the Court’s unanimity, was the expected outcome.
Nonetheless, although Martin J.’s justifications for her conclusions were largely practical, they reveal how the Court uniquely trusts judges to make normative decisions. To clarify, some of the Court’s rationales hold more weight than others. The trial process is just as complex and individualized as sentencing, and yet the Court was still willing and able to quantify a standard for unreasonable delay there. Furthermore, Jordan was distinguished from R.B.-C. because of the “cogent evidence of a real systemic problem” present in that case and not here (R.B.-C., paras 42-43). But this is a normative question disguised as a practical one, because it necessarily requires a baseline of delay against which the “cogent evidence” can be measured. This presupposes a normative assessment of what amount of delay is reasonable, and we return to the question of quantifiable standards: how much delay is acceptable before a problem becomes “real?” One could argue that this case turns on neither argument.
Ultimately, the Court's presumption of judicial integrity carried the day. As Moldaver J. wrote in K.G.K., “the presumption of integrity… significantly limits the circumstances in which a reviewing court may second-guess the trial judge’s determination of how much… time was reasonably necessary” (K.G.K., para 66). Holding judges to a quantifiable standard at this stage risks overwhelming their discretion, interfering with principles of deference, and creating secondary practical difficulties. In determining the correct test in R.B.-C., the SCC affirmed its confidence in judges to determine what is reasonable in the circumstances, even if the trial judge got it wrong this time. That kind of trust is incompatible with presumptive ceilings.

