On February 2, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal the Court of Appeal for British Columbia’s judgment in Named Persons v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 BCCA 197. This appeal provides the SCC with an opportunity to clarify the scope and application of s 7 principles of fundamental justice and s 24(1) damages under the Charter.
In early 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal the decision in R v Cope, a split decision from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. The primary question of law on appeal concerns how sentencing judges should balance the reconciliatory imperatives of R v Gladue, and R v Ipeelee, with Parliament’s emphasis on denunciation and deterrence as primary considerations in cases involving violence against Indigenous women.
In R v Bouvette [“Bouvette”], the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) confronted a remedial question at the intersection of prosecutorial discretion and appellate authority. When a conviction is quashed for miscarriage of justice, in what circumstances should a court of appeal enter an acquittal rather than order a new trial or impose a judicial stay, […]
In Dorsey v Canada (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada marks not only an important victory for inmates in federal correctional facilities but also a step forward in the application of access to justice arguments in administrative law. As the decision underscores, Dorsey will play an important role in shaping both habeas corpus case law and assessing the degree of access to justice in complex administrative regimes.
When the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in R v Bharwani, it represented the first instance in over three decades that the highest court had the opportunity to interpret section 2 of the Criminal Code, since Parliament established the statutory definition for “unfit to stand trial” in 1991. Canadian mental disorder jurisprudence has come a long way in the previous three decades, but fitness—an issue central to the accused’s autonomy, trial fairness, and the “Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder” regime—remains largely governed by Taylor, an integral, but pre-Charter-evolution decision.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s (“SCC”) decision in R. v. Varennes 2025 SCC 22 ("Varennes") highlights the tension between prosecutorial discretion, judicial oversight, and the protection of Charter rights under extraordinary circumstances. Varennes addresses whether a trial judge can order a judge-alone trial over the Crown’s objection during the COVID-19 pandemic. The SCC’s reasoning navigates […]
The Supreme Court of Canada’s (“SCC”) decision in R. v. S.B., 2025 SCC 24 [S.B.] engages critical questions regarding the Youth Criminal Justice Act’s (“YCJA”) framework for imposing adult sentences on young offenders. The role of social context evidence is central when evaluating whether the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under section 72(1) of the YCJA. This appeal tests the boundaries of how youth courts weigh personal and systemic circumstances against the judgement and maturity displayed through the planning of criminal conduct.
In the decision of R v Di Paola, 2025 SCC 31 the Supreme Court of Canada examined how s. 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code should be interpreted during sentencing. The issue was whether a sentencing judge may consider, as aggravating factors, facts that could constitute a separate offence when that charge has already been laid but is no longer pending and has no rendered verdict. The Court’s decision clarifies both the scope of this provision and the Crown’s duty of fairness in presenting aggravating facts during sentencing.
The Supreme Court of Canada recently released its decision in R v Kinamore, clarifying that a complainant's sexual inactivity amounts to sexual history under s. 276 of the Criminal Code. Evidence of one’s sexual inactivity is therefore presumptively inadmissible unless first vetted through a voir dire, a pre-trial hearing to determine admissibility. The Court further clarified that this requirement applies regardless of which party introduces the evidence.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v JW addresses two intertwined controversies in Canadian sentencing law. First, it clarifies whether—and how—a sentencing judge may take account of the time an offender is likely to need to complete institutional programming when setting a custodial term. Second, it refines the meaning of “wrongful conduct” for the purpose of denying enhanced pre-sentence credit under s 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.