Law students typically learn about solicitor-client privilege as centred around the client. This privilege, so I was taught, ensures that clients can be frank with their lawyer; with the benefit of full disclosure from their client, lawyers can make the best case for their client. The facts in R v Fox turn this paradigm on its head: what if privilege is claimed not to protect the client, but the lawyer?
In R v Hussein, the SCC clarified the Corbett application. While the Corbett application has been upheld, albeit with clarifications, this Comment compares Hussein with the original R v Corbett case and argues that Hussein appears to favour La Forest J.’s Corbett dissent.
R v Rioux was crowned the “Raspberry Award” for being the worst Supreme Court of Canada decision of 2025. While the award might be in jest, the implications of Rioux certainly are not, especially for the increased possibility of the reversal of an acquittal. In my analysis, I suggest that the majority’s decision in Rioux is contrary to the SCC’s deference considerations when determining an error of law. I also suggest that the SCC has expanded the concept of error of law.
In R v I.M., the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) ruled that the standard of proof to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, which governs the imposition of adult sentences for youth, is the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Quebec v Senneville, 2025 SCC 33 is a publicly polarizing yet legally unsurprising decision of the SCC. Senneville affirms that the 1-year mandatory minimum sentences associated with the offences of accessing and possessing child pornography when prosecuted by indictment are contrary to section 12 of the Charter. However, only a narrow five-judge majority arrived at this conclusion, while four dissenting judges stopped short of a complete analysis.
In early 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal the decision in R v Cope, a split decision from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. The primary question of law on appeal concerns how sentencing judges should balance the reconciliatory imperatives of R v Gladue, and R v Ipeelee, with Parliament’s emphasis on denunciation and deterrence as primary considerations in cases involving violence against Indigenous women.
In R v Bouvette [“Bouvette”], the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) confronted a remedial question at the intersection of prosecutorial discretion and appellate authority. When a conviction is quashed for miscarriage of justice, in what circumstances should a court of appeal enter an acquittal rather than order a new trial or impose a judicial stay, […]
In R v Pan, the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed the scope of the “air of reality” test as it applies to included offences in jury trials. The majority has upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal’s verdict that Jennifer Pan should undergo a new trial regarding her initial first-degree murder charge, but maintained her conviction related to the attempted murder charge. Furthermore, the Court determined that the trial judge erred by failing to leave lesser included offences, such as second-degree murder or manslaughter, to the jury where there was a realistic possibility of conviction on those offences.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s (“SCC”) decision in R v Larocque, 2025 SCC 36 [Larocque] addresses the scope of the evidentiary shortcuts available to the Crown in impaired driving prosecutions. Specifically, the SCC clarified what must be proven before the statutory presumption that breath test results are accurate can apply and whether the “target value” […]
Fifty-four years after Parliament passed the Bail Reform Act, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified the law with respect to challenging the lawfulness of an arrest without a warrant. The unanimous judgment in R v Carignan, 2025 SCC 43 authored by Justice Côté interprets subsections 495(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code which had originally been enacted as part of the Bail Reform Act. This judgment is significant as it allows accused persons to establish a breach of their Charter right to be free from arbitrary arrest where their arrest was made contrary to subsection 495(2).