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FROM THE KINGDOM OF ENDS TO THE KINGDOM WITHOUT ENDS: KANT AND NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF REASON

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The writings of Kant marked a turning point in the history of Western philosophy. His predecessors had stumbled upon insuperable obstacles; the quest for certainty had remained largely unfulfilled and a seemingly unbridgeable schism divided mind from matter. Kant attempted to extricate metaphysics from this quagmire by postulating that certainty was to be found within the rational subject; any attempts to locate it in an "objective reality" would flounder. Knowledge was no longer an effort by the mind to reflect on matter; instead it constituted the imposition of form onto matter. Kant's task was to uncover the preconditions or structures of the mind that made all knowledge possible, thereby putting it onto a more secure footing.

It was in the domain of the ethical where the subject's rational capacities could truly be exercised, and where it could claim its independence from empirical reality, being guided by purely formal law. The absolute universalizability and permanence that had eluded theoretical reason were to be found in the realm of the "ought", not in the realm of the "is". The tension between the ought and the "is" provided the impetus for action, since it was the subject's duty to act in accordance with these truths and transform the empirical reality that it confronted. In addition, the grand metaphysical questions surrounding God, freedom and immortality which had escaped theoretical proofs were to be considered postulates or necessities of practical reason. Only a rational faith in them made ethical action possible.

Nietzsche accepted the tacit link that Kant had made between knowledge and interpretation but he insisted that reason was merely one form of interpretation among many. For Nietzsche, Kant's critique had only

scratched the surface because it stopped short of asking why reason was to be venerated. Moreover, Nietzsche insisted that reason could become an obstacle to activity, rather than its catalyst.

According to Nietzsche, free activity was also stymied by Kant's moral philosophy, which reflected social conformity rather than the independence of a transcendental subject. In his famous (or infamous) reevaluation of values, Nietzsche proceeded to undo Kantian morality from within, by stripping it of its claim to purity and universalizability. Rather than reflecting an independence from natural stimuli, Nietzsche insisted that morality was a sophisticated manifestation of the urge to dominate adopted by the weak, who could not avail themselves of brute physical force.

There is some overlap between the Nietzschean and Kantian positions, for both recognize that reason is a struggle against nature. However, Nietzsche objected to the ascetic element in Kant's philosophy which advocated a denial of the natural and sensual self. Such a self would remain perpetually alienated. In lieu of what he considered stagnant activity, Nietzsche prescribed a different kind of striving, which would appropriate and transform rather than shun humanity's natural or empirical self. He solicited rather than spurned change, for constant change attested to the creative capacities of the subject.

Ia. The Quasi-Independence of the Theoretical Mind

Kant's Copernican revolution catapults the subject into the centre of philosophical enquiry. Structures of thought allow the subject to organize a disparate reality, thereby making knowledge possible. Knowledge is no longer considered merely objective but also subjective for it demanded a combination of form and content, the form being supplied by the subject, the content by the external "reality." In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant examines this process as well as the limitations of theoretical knowledge that had stymied metaphysical enquiry. These barriers are to be overcome by practical reason.

According to Kant, the human appetite for certainty and order is insatiable: "What then, is the reason why, in this field, the sure road to science has not hitherto been found? Is it perhaps, impossible of discovery? Why, in that case, should nature have visited our reason with the restless endeavour whereby it is ever searching for such a path, as if this were one of its most important concerns" (Pu R: xv). However, Kant differs from the empiricists, because the wellspring of this certainty is not to be located in the objective or empirical world but rather in patterns of thought. In this way, he hopes to put rationality and knowledge on firmer ground than the empiricists had allowed while at the same time hinting at the independence and uniqueness of the subject.

Kant's central goal in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to determine "how synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible." Synthetic judgements are the linking together as necessary and universal of otherwise inchoate experiences and perceptions. Unlike *a posteriori* judgments which are generalizations made by abstracting from various experiences, *a priori* judgments are "independent of all experience" as well as "universal and necessary" (Pu R 2). *A priori* judgements constitute the conditions that make knowledge possible and structure our perceptions. Knowledge is formative rather than reactive. Thus, Kant implies that the only certain knowledge we can have is a knowledge of how knowledge is possible. We cannot separate knowledge of the self from knowledge of the objective world.

Mathematics and geometry are held up as prototypes of theoretical reason and are to be imitated "so far as the analogy which, as a species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may permit" (Pu R xvi). They satisfy the penchant for certainty, more so than any other field of knowledge, since they are models of "a priority." A mathematical proof is the closest approximation to pure structure that one can point to, and its veracity can be ascertained even without compiling mounds of empirical evidence. The concept of a number, such as two, is something that the subject brings to physical objects, with the

intention of ordering its experiences.

In the "Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant discusses space and time, which are preconditions of all sense perception (Pu R:B42). If space were a *posteriori*, or abstracted from experience, we could imagine an object that was not situated in space. But while we can imagine an empty space, we cannot conceive of objects that are not in space. The form of space also enables us to project beyond our own immediate experience. We can conceive of an infinite space or an infinite time, even though we do not have a direct experience of it. Our mind has manifested its independence by being able to escape the precincts and limitations of its own sensory experience.

In the "Transcendental Analytic," Kant examines the *a priori* categories that allow us to piece the various fragments of perception together. They go beyond immediate sense experience, and permit us to make judgements about objects. While the particular type of connection made depends on experience, the art of connection itself is antecedent to experience and is a function of the mind. One example of such a judgment would be that heat causes ice to melt. Kant maintains that while we cannot prove definitively that a specific event A (heat) causes event B (the melting of ice), we do know that the concept of causation is necessary for our experience. Thus, while we know inductively that heat melts ice, there is nothing in the activity itself that makes it a necessary connection. This necessity is contributed by the concept of causality, a function of the mind.

By attributing the possibility of knowledge to structures of the mind receptive to sense experience, knowledge of the external world and knowledge of the self become inseparable. Kant expresses this through his "transcendental unity of apperception" in which he postulates that the activity of connecting perceptions presupposes a unified subject that could synthesize experiences: "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and this is equivalent to saying that the representation would be

impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. ...All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found" (Pu R B131). The manifold can only be conceived in relation to the constant and vice versa. External and internal consciousness are synonymous: "perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me...In other words, consciousness of my existence is, at the same time, an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (Pu R. B276). Although we acknowledge the existence of a self in-itself, we have no knowledge of it as it is not a spatio-temporal object, being aware only of our own activity as knowers. Similarly, we recognize that a "thing in itself" triggers our perceptions but its essence also escapes us.

Making Room for Practical Reason—the Antinomies of Pure Reason

The "Transcendental Dialectic" serves as a bridge between Kant's practical and theoretical philosophy. In it, he examines metaphysical principles, such as God, immortality and freedom, in part copying the pattern he had laid out in the "Transcendental Analytic." However, in lieu of the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories," Kant proves that there can be no such proof affirming the existence of these Ideas, since they refer to the totality of existence and therefore cannot be objects of experience. Yet, Kant's repudiation of metaphysics is a means by which to rescue its Ideas, taking them out of the realm of theoretical reason, and situating them in the domain of practical reason.

I will examine the Third Antinomy which deals with freedom and natural law because this impinges most directly on Kant's moral philosophy. An antinomy occurs when contradictory sets of conclusions can be arrived at, neither of which can be refuted. The thesis of the Third Antinomy affirms that: "Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is

also another causality, that of freedom." (Pu R:B472) Its antithesis proclaims that "there is no freedom, everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature" (Pu R: 473).

If freedom were a complete independence from the laws of causality, it would undercut the rules of the understanding which enable us to make connections and bring order into the world. However, reason is not satisfied with the concept of causality furnished by the understanding, which can only provide an incomplete sequence: "If therefore, everything takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature, there will always be only a relative and never a first beginning, and consequently no completeness of the series on the side of the causes that arise to one from the other" (Pu R 474).

In order to make one's vision more complete one must admit of "an absolute spontaneity of the cause, whereby a series of appearances, which proceeds in accordance with the laws of nature, begins of itself" (Pu R: B475). A spontaneity of causes is necessary in order to allow us to conceive of an "entire series of conditions."¹ This seems to imply that the only way to envision a complete series is to set limits to the causal chain, and therefore find an unconditioned beginning. We can only accept a totality for which the parameters are set. Paradoxically, freedom and limitation are in some sense analogous.

However, this solution is insufficient, because it would allow reason to impose conditions on the rules of the understanding. Kant was unwilling to allow a subversion of the understanding by reason: "this law is a law of the understanding which can on no account be surrendered" (Pu R,B 570). On the other hand, Kant was not prepared to relinquish reason's aspirations for the totality. To resolve this conundrum, he consigned causality to the realm of appearance and freedom to noumena, or things in themselves. Recognizing that appearances do not constitute reality in its entirety, and that the understanding is only operable in the realm of appearances, he could preserve freedom without delegitimizing the efforts

of the understanding. Each appearance must have a thing in itself behind it, of which we can have no knowledge: "Thus, the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature" (Pu R: 565).

The contradiction between freedom and causality thus arose when a misguided attempt was made to make freedom an object of the understanding. We cannot have knowledge of freedom or of the noumena that enjoy freedom. Nevertheless, Kant is not prepared to leave the noumena be, and uses his moral philosophy as a forum in which to access the mysterious noumenal sphere. In a sense Kant's moral philosophy addresses the frustrations of theoretical reason by demonstrating that the object, in this case the noumenal self, is to be attained through action rather than contemplation. It is to be made rather than understood. Action is made necessary perhaps precisely because we cannot comprehend or know the totality.

Ib. Overcoming the Limitations of Theoretical Reason-The Primacy of Practical Reason

As mentioned previously, practical or moral reason is necessary in part to satisfy reason's penchant for the absolute. Because the world cannot be fully grasped, the rational subject creates the unconditioned realm of the "ought" in which rationality can operate unhindered. Thus, the subject is able to unhinge itself from its empirical limitations. Knowledge becomes a function of creation. Practical reason attains its object² by furnishing it, thus achieving the goal that had eluded theoretical reason. Kant shrewdly avoided the traps of Western metaphysics without relinquishing entirely the nature of its goals, namely the absolute certainty of a totalizing or rational system.

According to Kant, practical reason is the "purest" form of reason, because it marks the rational agent's independence in a way that her theoretical reason cannot. While theoretical reason represents activity because it

gives form to a maze of perceptions, its form cannot stand on its own in the absence of the content which it can shape. An incontrovertible knowledge can only be attained by constructing a system in which the testimony of empirical facts is irrelevant: "Its moral value, therefore, does not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely on the principle of the volition by which the action is done irrespective of the objects of the faculty of desire" (FMM: 253).

Yet, morality has no meaning apart from experience, because it lays down guidelines for our behaviour in the empirical realm. By exalting the ethical imperative in this way, Kant broke with metaphysical convention and spearheaded a shift in the understanding of reason. Reason was to play a transformative and constitutive role rather than a reflective one. Thought and action would become inextricable.

From Thought to Action-the Subject as Legislator

Moral reasoning yields maxims that are true in and of themselves and are to reflect complete independence from the empirical realm. Kant beseeches us to act for the sake of law itself, rather than with a view to the consequences of one's action. He then posits a number of conditions that must be met if an action is to be considered moral. First of all, the action undertaken must be universalizable. This means that one can rationally envision a realm in which every individual acted as one plans on acting. If the action one contemplates eventuates in a contradiction, it is not moral. Kant uses the example of false promises and demonstrates that this is not a universalizable action. The promise itself would lose all meaning in a world in which everyone made lying promises, and a moral realm cannot sustain such a contradiction: "no one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at such an assertion as vain pretence" (FMM: 422).

However Kant's categorical imperative goes beyond this and insists that we are to act as though we were to bring about the realm of the ought through our action:

"Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature" (FMM : 254). Thus, moral action is supposed to manifest a transformative attempt by the rational agent to make content synonymous with form. This is signified by the fact that Kant uses the word "universal law of nature" rather than "universal law of reason." The subject is to project his rationality onto the natural world, including that part of himself that is wedded to this world.

Kant reformulates this imperative later in the text in order to underline the importance of agency and autonomy. He entreats the subject to "act only so that the will through its maxims could regard itself at the same time as giving universal law" (FMM: 277). By stressing the giving of the law, he suggests that it is imperative that we obey our own commands. An action that is universalizable, but merely mimics the actions of others is not a moral action, because it stems from an external rather than an internal source.

The second aspect of the categorical imperative is correlative to the first. If a law is considered truly universalizable, it must be applicable to all agents. The subordination of one individual to others would not only denote an inconsistency but would constitute an affront to the rational agency of the individual who was made subservient. Thus, Kant exhorts us to "treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only" (FMM:273).

Each individual must act in such a way as to preserve the rational dignity of not only himself but of all other rational beings. As an end in himself each individual should only be subject to those laws that he ordains. To treat another subject as an end is also to treat her as a beginning, namely as a rational agent with the capacity to formulate her own laws. While these laws limit one's behaviour, they do so in order to protect one's freedom as well as the freedom of others. Thus, each individual legislates simultaneously for one and for all.

We are instructed to always act as though members of a community. The Kingdom of Ends would be a com-

pletely harmonious and free community. We are free insofar as limits apply to every subject equally and there is no subordination of one individual by another. Conversely, if each individual unscrupulously cultivated her own self interest, then dissonance would result. However, we are members of this community only insofar as we completely abstract from concrete external experiences; therefore it cannot exist apart from being the yardstick against which the moral rectitude of real communities is measured.

Kant has been criticized for failing to more clearly adumbrate the actual content of morality. However, this was not his objective, since he wanted to preserve the autonomy of the individual as a moral legislator. An individual could not be considered moral or free if she merely adhered to moral prescriptions that were the product of another's reasoning: "For as an end in himself, he is destined to be a lawgiver in the realm of ends, free from all laws of nature and obedient only to those laws which he himself gives" (FMM: 278).

A cursory examination might suggest that this conception of freedom differs from the definition Kant offered in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which stipulated that freedom is the ability to initiate a new causal chain: "We must therefore admit another causality, through which something takes place without its cause being further determined according to necessary laws by a preceding state. That is we must admit an absolute spontaneity of causes..." (Pu R: 129). However, moral freedom is according to Kant the only freedom that is entirely unconditioned by empirical inclinations. Freedom for Kant becomes the determination of one's own necessity.

The Freedom in Contradiction and the Role of the Will

While freedom for Kant represents an independence from nature, it also depends on the resistance nature poses. Without this resistance, we would have no need to act. Our ability to act in accordance with self-made laws is the essence of freedom. If nature were no

obstacle, it could not be said that we freely choose the moral law. Thus the option of "choosing against the law"³ must be preserved. Paradoxically, the freedom of the "ought" demands that the option of succumbing to the empirical self remains open. Moral behaviour must be chosen, and choice requires alternatives to choose from.

A completely rational and consistent moral universe would be devoid of contradictions, but the same contradictions that always threaten to subvert morality make it possible. There can be no realm of the "ought" without the realm of the "is" against which it can be defined. Because of the abyss that separates the practical and the empirical, we must perpetually strive in order to approximate the moral Kingdom of Ends.

Freedom in Kant can only be experienced as freedom from something, and it is the empirical self that constitutes the hurdle to be vaulted. This internal division of the self ensures that humanity's struggle is not only against the physical world but also against the self. Kant thus finds himself in the paradoxical position of having to place a high premium on unity, while recognizing that the achievement of such unity would mark absolute freedom and the end of freedom at the same time. The legislator requires someone or something to legislate. Those shackles which constrain us are at the same time the mainsprings of our freedom.

The will manifests this freedom by subordinating empirical urges to the strictures and axioms of practical reason. It acts as a disciplinarian that ensures that the subject does not allow himself to be overwhelmed by desires: "A rational creature acts from principles and in accordance with rules, while an irrational creature is moved directly by the feeling of desire."⁴ This attests to the fact that moral action is often the outcome of a struggle against the empirical self. A purely rational creature would have no need for a will: "The will is thought of as a faculty of determining itself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws" (FMM:272). The will ensures that cognition becomes causal rather than remaining contemplative.

While Kant recognizes that contradiction acts as a catalyst to activity, he also recognizes that the possibility of an end to this striving is an equally important impetus to action. Reason is not content until it has reached a state of complete unity. The subject can only rationally strive to reach an end, if she believes this end to be attainable. Thus, we must be able to envision the unity between necessity and freedom as well as nature and morality. We need to have faith that "neither our natural impressions and desires, nor the outer world of sense present insurmountable obstacles to our obedience to its moral command."⁵

According to Kant, it is only through God that the chasm separating nature and morality can be breached because he is the architect of nature (Pr R: 125). Humanity "not being nature's cause, cannot by his own strength bring nature, as it touches on his happiness, into complete harmony with [our] practical principles" (Pr R: 125). God, as the source of complete unity and harmony becomes a postulate of practical reason.

As rational beings, we long for completeness, and the inner discord arising from the friction created by the sensual and empirical self is an impediment to such completeness. Kant notes that although the performance of a good deed can lead to "contentment with one's own person" it "cannot be called happiness..because it does not include complete independence from inclinations and desires" (Pr R: 118). The perfection that we strive for as rational beings cannot be achieved in our life time, and therefore the immortality of the soul is considered by Kant to be another postulate of Practical Reason: " Thus, the highest good is practically possible only under the supposition of the immortality of the soul, and the latter, as inseparably bound to the mora law, is a postulate of pure practical reason" (Pr R: 124).

Kant does not intend to undermine the primacy of moral reasoning by introducing God as a condition of morality. This may appear to be the case because he argues that morality is an absolute end in itself, and yet also insists that God is an absolute end, for an absolute

being cannot be dependent on anything, not even the moral will: "Kant intends to exalt the moral law as the summit of man's total existence, and yet he also wants to put God above the summit."⁶ However, the existence of God does not usurp each individual's responsibility to act in accordance with his own moral legislation. Unlike much of Christian philosophy, Kant does not present God as the supreme legislator in whose midst individuals are mere puppets. Rather, God for Kant represents the hope that our actions will eventually bring about the Kingdom of Ends that we had envisioned. Therefore, morality leads to religion, religion does not lead to morality. Kant does not show that God exists but rather stresses that the belief in God would strengthen moral reasoning. In fact, it is because we cannot have knowledge of God, but only faith, that Kant's moral philosophy remains intact: "it can be called faith and even pure rational faith because pure reason alone is the source from which it springs" (Pr R: 126).

II. Nietzsche-The "Subject" Embedded in Nature

Nietzsche uses those elements that comprise the substratum of Kant's philosophy in order to eviscerate it, thereby turning Kant against himself. Although Nietzsche is indebted to Kant for the acknowledgement that an "objective reality" cannot be known, his critique of reason goes further than that of his predecessor. In his assault on Kant, he debunks some of the key pillars of Kantian thought leaving little intact. In so doing, Nietzsche uses Kant's philosophy as a touchstone against which to delineate his own. The Nietzschean world is the inverse of Kant's world.

According to Nietzsche, Kant had reformulated the questions that had preoccupied Western philosophers, but he also left a reservoir of questions untapped. Although Kant recognized that the quest for an objective totality would come to naught and could only be based on illusions, he did not consider the possibility that reason itself was an illusion: "That which constrains these men, however, this unconditional will to truth, is faith in the

ascetic ideal itself, even if as an unconscious imperative—don't be deceived about that—it is the faith in a metaphysical value of truth, sanctioned and guaranteed by this ideal alone" (GM III 24). Nietzsche went one step further than Kant by subjecting the activity of reason itself to intense scrutiny. Ansell-Pearson notes that Nietzsche's thought "is born out of an attempt to overcome the *a priori* of Kant's critique of metaphysics."⁷

While Kant launched his enquiry into reason with the question "how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible.", Nietzsche supplanted this with the question: "Why is belief in such judgements necessary" (BGE 11). In fact, Kant unquestioningly accepts the unifying and classifying functions of reason in an act of irrational faith. Kant's knowledge is, according to Nietzsche an 'article of belief' " (WP 530).

The Kantian system relies on an opposition between nature and reason to sustain its theoretical edifice. Kant opposes the heterogeneity and flux of the empirical, natural world to the permanence and universality of reason in order to point to the latter's superiority. Using the Kantian opposition, Nietzsche inverts the hierarchy that had placed reason at the pinnacle, suggesting that the use of reason to try to stem the tide of heterogeneity attests to our fallibility and our inability to cope with the salvo of experiences and stimuli that bombard us.

However, Nietzsche does not ignore the creative potential of reason which can contribute to the vibrancy of life. Therefore, he collapses the boundary that Kant had interposed between reason and nature, insisting that reason is a sophisticated means of survival and adaptation to the natural world. It does not transcend empirical reality, as Kant would claim but transfigures it, thereby confirming that we are agents deeply embedded in the reality that we transform. In fact, there is no "reality" that is distinct from our activity within it and knowledge is such an activity. Reason does not elevate us above nature but is a means of participating in the dynamic interplay between forces within the "natural world". Therefore, Nietzsche denies Kant's "apriority" insisting that it does

not extricate us from the world of flux but rather is a reaction to it.

According to Nietzsche, because we are limited beings, we try to limit the world around us and reduce it to more manageable proportions. Thus, there is no such thing as universal knowledge; it is all particular and relative. We limit our experience by inventing concepts that abstract from differences in order to more easily manage our environment and create a world that is within our grasp. Thus, unlike Kant, Nietzsche does not try to ascertain what the limitations of knowledge are but rather insists that limitation constitutes knowledge. For example, the concept of identity does not inhere in nature but represents an attempt to control the infinite by making it finite. Even our conception of causality is designed to infuse change with a permanent form because of our profound resistance and "fear of the unfamiliar" (WP 551). All Kantian categories "provide a basis for recognition and re-identification."⁸

However, Nietzsche does try to account for the sacred status that has been bestowed upon reason in traditional metaphysics. In an ironic twist, he suggests that we have to accord reason a transcendent status because it can never completely curb the flux of the natural world. Its shortcomings are cloaked by insisting on its supremacy. Because of our inability to avert the dynamic of change, we are impelled to seek refuge in reason in order to flee from the unpleasantness of 'reality'.

For Nietzsche, however, "nothing is gained by what he sees as the invention of an imaginary world which has the categories necessary to do away with the problems of this one."⁹ As soon as we use reason to flee from reality, it loses its effect as a catalyst to action and becomes a deterrent, threatening to dilute our experience of life. : "All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has escaped from their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these conceptual idolaters— they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship" (TI II 1).

Our surrender to the world of concepts excludes us from the realm of action and the world of life.

Even the subject - which for Kant is the unconquered figure behind all activity - is unravelled by Nietzsche. We do not know the subject, as that which exists prior to action but as something that is deeply embedded in experience. Kant had looked to the will as the wellspring and essence of the subject's autonomy that enabled it to separate itself from its empirical moorings. Conversely, Nietzsche uses his concept of the will to power to insist upon the subject's interconnectedness and dependence on "external" forces. The will, for Nietzsche, is not a source or starting point of action but is itself contingent, arising as we react to "external" stimuli. We have an innate desire to release energy and continuously expand, a trait we share with all natural beings. Thus, Nietzsche strips the will of the metaphysical primacy that had been conferred upon it by Kant. Our autonomy cannot be dissociated from our heterogeneity according to Nietzsche.

However, while claiming that the world is a field of forces which act and react to each other, Nietzsche also acknowledges that our reaction is not merely impulsive but interpretive. As agents that have an awareness of our own active power, as well as having a sense of being acted upon, we strive to make our mark in the empirical world. In so doing, we assume a place within it.

Ascetic Morality-The Failure to Legislate

The capacity for reflection develops as part of a historical process. While Kant's practical moral philosophy developed out of his theoretical philosophy, for Nietzsche all theoretical philosophy arises out of practical needs. The rational self could not disentangle itself from the influences of the empirical self, as Kant beseeched individuals to do, since rationality itself reflected a natural need. Although Nietzsche saw danger in the spurning of the empirical or sensual aspects of life, he tries to whittle away at the pillars of Kantian moral philosophy from within, thereby demystifying practical reason.

Practical reason represents man's greatest triumph, according to Kant, because only it wrests man from nature, and therefore represents his legislative powers at their zenith. The Categorical Imperative abstracts from all interest, all desire, all sentiment so that one is left with pure law. In so doing, it abstracts from many characteristics that we would commonly consider human, such as aspirations for happiness, love, and sympathy. Here Nietzsche's philosophy overlaps with that of Kant, although the confluence is predicated on opposition rather than agreement. Nietzsche also denies that sentiments such as love are moral because they preserve the interests of weaker life forms, and represent an ascetic and life denying impulse. Kant excludes these from the kingdom of morality because they are not ascetic enough, and manifest an attachment to empirical things that can only cloud one's understanding of the law.

Through moral reasoning, Kant believed that humanity had ascended to the level of the unconditioned and had reached a truth that was absolutely true in and of itself. This becomes the primary target of Nietzsche's indictment. There can be no such thing as "disinterested" morality according to Nietzsche; all morality is a function of utility. The detached legislator that Kant venerates is only someone who listens to the ordinances of his own ego: "What? You admire the categorical imperative within you? This 'Firmness' of your so-called moral judgment? This 'unconditional' feeling that 'here everyone must judge as I do'? Rather admire your selfishness at this point. ...For it is selfish to experience one's own judgment as a universal law" (GS 335). There is no such thing as one single universal morality, since morality in the Nietzschean understanding always serves the interests of a specific life form.

The *Genealogy of Morals* differentiates between masters and slaves in order to historicize morality. Master morality did not manifest any traces of a fear of life and was an explosion of unmediated energy: "The knightly-aristocratic value judgments presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing

health.. and in general all that involves vigorous, free joyful activity" (GM I 7). Slave morality, which is tantamount to Kantian morality in many ways, is seen as emblematic of human weakness, rather than human strength, as Kant had proclaimed. The act of reflection represented by the slave is a means of compensating for physical weakness. By underlining the utility function of morality, Nietzsche attempts to destroy the Kantian claim to its universal and permanent legitimacy.

Nietzsche does not deny that in its nascent stages, slave morality was a creative act which was used by the weak to curtail the power of the strong. The weak vilified all the attributes of strength, transforming weakness into a virtue: "slave morality from the outset says No to what is 'outside' what is 'different,' what is 'not itself' and this No is its creative deed" (GM I 10). Therefore, unlike Kant, Nietzsche insists that morality could not possibly be good in and of itself, but that its goodness is relational and is used to address a power imbalance between the strong and the weak.

Nietzsche appropriates the duality between the "ought" and the "is" that characterizes Kant's moral philosophy, but turns it on its head, so that "ought" becomes a negation of the "is." The universalization of a moral code is necessary in order to construct a social system in which the weak can thrive. Yet, such universalization snuffs out the creative flame that underlies slave morality because it demands a conformity to rules that stifles creativity and further thought. Thus, in direct opposition to Kant, Nietzsche disdains morality when it becomes universal, for this is when it begins to grow stale and ossified. For Nietzsche, self legislation is tantamount to an internalization of a conformist slave mentality. Moral introspection cannot take place without social construction.

The development of the moral conscience requires the disciplining of humanity which can no longer discharge its energy and redirect it towards itself, marking the birth of the bad conscience: "The man who, from lack of external enemies and resistances and forcibly confined

to the oppressive narrowness and punctiliousness of custom...this deprived creature, racked with homesickness for the wild... this fool, this yearning and desperate prisoner became the inventor of the bad conscience" (GM II 16).

Nietzsche thereby collapses the internal-external distinction that was necessary to Kant's philosophy. In fact he argued that "consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings...My idea is, as you see, that consciousness does not really belong to man's individual existence, but rather to his social or herd nature." When man looked inward to find the source of moral truth, as Kant encouraged each individual to do, he was in reality appealing to the social conventions that had been seared into his memory.

Nietzsche's Alternative: Freedom in Overcoming

After discrediting the values that underpinned Western civilization, Nietzsche proffers new values which would not consign individuals to a static life-denying existence. Like Kant he prizes the will but not in its Kantian guise. However, Nietzsche does not strip morality of its worth entirely. In fact to a certain extent, he concedes that morality did allow humanity to disengage itself from its purely animal nature. It was morality as we know it that laid the groundwork for the will to power and true self affirmation. Paradoxically, although Nietzsche hurls invective against Judeo-Christian morality for being ahistorical and making the impermanent permanent, it was this type of morality that also made human beings capable of being truly historical beings, for it taught them to make promises and take responsibility for their future: "If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again from morality and custom, autonomous and supramoral, in short the man who has his own independent protracted will and the right to

make promises" (GM II 2).

However, this does not mean that the morality that marked the genesis of the new individual should be preserved, for it too must be overcome. The value of morality lies in its contribution to the process of becoming and therefore Nietzsche reveres it for very different reasons than Kant. Yet, one result of Judeo-Christian morality, was that man had forgotten how to forget. For Nietzsche, this was a skill that had to be relearned so that one did not remain riveted to habits of the past (GM II 1).

Thus, a degree of predictability enabled man to will the future and avoid merely succumbing to immediate desire. Like Kant, Nietzsche saw in humanity a creature that was not constrained by pure impulse and could determine its own end, but unlike Kant he wanted the nature of the end to change continuously. Nietzsche does not advocate a return to our animal impulses, but rather he exhorts his reader not to forget these impulses because they are part of life, and part of the process of overcoming.

Kant also pleads with us to continue striving, but this is because the empirical realm will always interfere with the moral Kingdom of Ends. Nietzsche, on the other hand, insists that we must not let morality interfere with this process of striving. Instead of a Kingdom of Ends, humanity must aim for a kingdom without ends: "If the motion of the world aimed at a final state, that state would have been reached. The sole fundamental fact, however, is that it does not aim at a final state and every philosophy and scientific hypothesis which necessitates such a final state is refuted by this fundamental fact. ...Becoming must be explained without recourse to final intentions" (WP 708). Therefore, Kant wants humanity to overcome the heteronomy of the will, which plays a vital role in Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche, on the other hand wants man to cease being a slave to the permanent and have the courage to instigate a process of constant change.

Conclusions-Nietzsche and Kant: Allies or Antagonists?

Both Kant and Nietzsche moved beyond traditional metaphysics by making the subject the foundation of their respective philosophical edifices. Knowledge for Kant was not something to be taken from reality but rather something that could be imposed on it. By revealing the subject's form giving activity, he showed how the subject maneuvered its way through an empirical labyrinth. However, Kant was cognizant of the fact that structures of knowledge left a residue behind, namely the noumenal self, which was resistant to the probes of theoretical reason.

The empirical world proved to be a poignant reminder of the subject's limitations; its heteronomy and multiplicity confounded the requirements of totality, stability and unity which Kant sought. This in part accounts for his turn to practical philosophy, in which the subject could act according to pure laws that did not depend on empirical evidence for their validation. Such an approach demanded that the rational subject was considered of supreme importance, and the aim was to make the external correspond to the internal. Therefore, Kant did not dispense entirely with the correspondence theory of truth, but inverted it. The effort to have the mind reflect an external reality was supplanted by the endeavour to make the external reality to mirror the mind.

However, this marked an important shift in Western philosophy, for by inverting the correspondence theory of truth, Kant left open a channel for action rather than contemplation. Theory and practice were married in Kantian philosophy and were no longer relegated to separate spheres.

The purpose of moral action was to extirpate the messiness of the empirical world that did not meet the demands of rationality. The heteronomy of the empirical world was an obstacle to be overcome in favour of the realm of the "ought" which was devoid of the contradic-

tions that beset nature. Thus practical reason was not entirely distinct from theoretical reason but was an outgrowth of it. It aimed to provide the certainty that theoretical reason sought but could not achieve. Moral behaviour was a type of theoretical action that rebelled against the empirical world. This battle raged internally as well, since the moral agent tried, albeit unsuccessfully to divest herself of her empirical cloak.

Hopes for reconciliation between nature and reason or the empirical and rational rested on God, who as architect of the empirical world was capable of bridging the gap that human beings strove. For critics like Nietzsche, Kant's introduction of religion unmasked the weaknesses in his framework, for it demonstrated that the grandeur of reason was not unconditional but depended on an irrational faith. Thus, Nietzsche managed to ally rationality and irrationality, which Kant had situated in separate spheres.

Nietzsche's mission was in part to tear asunder the premises of Kantian morality by taking Kant's critique one step further and questioning those elements that Kant had immortalized. He refused to take the value of reason for granted, insisting that although it was a form giving activity, it also shut out many experiences. Thus, to Nietzsche reason symbolized a reluctance to live, a profound fear of life and the unfamiliar. He recognized that it was an attempt to reign in nature but held that it had failed.

Nietzsche also objected to the rigidity of Kant's moral strictures. He claimed to have peeled off the veneer of purity that shielded Kantian morality by historicizing it. In his writings, Kantian morality was portrayed as a manifestation of the will to power of the weak who needed to universalize precepts that would discourage the strong from squashing them. Moreover, the activity that Kant implored the subject to engage in order to realize moral goals signified an attempt to halt activity according to Nietzsche.

Despite his diatribes, Nietzsche did impute some worth to morality for producing the sovereign individual

who could control his or her actions, rather than acting from pure impulse. While Nietzsche adopted life and the process of continuous flux as his primary value, he did not propose a return to instinct governed behaviour but instead claimed that reason should render its services to life rather than vociferously deny it. Goals needed to be set, but they should be constantly reevaluated. Heteronomy had to be taken advantage of rather than scorned, for multiplicity ensured that the process of becoming would not cease.

One could argue, that Nietzsche, far from jettisoning the metaphysical aspiration to reach the totality that had preoccupied Kant, had merely given it a new form of expression by encouraging individuals to constantly recreate both themselves and their environment. Since the totality was a constant process of change, and was infinite, the only way to approximate it was to participate in this process. Thus, both Nietzsche and Kant maintain that the human subject must reign supreme and at the core of all philosophical efforts, even though they have very different understandings of what this entails.

Notes

1. Bernard Carnois, *The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 6.
2. Howard Williams, *Kant's Political Philosophy*. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 37.
3. Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, (London: Athlone Press, 1983), p. 33.
4. W.T. Jones, *Morality and Freedom in Kant*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 33.
5. Richard Kroner, *Kant's Weltanschauung*, p. 32.
6. Richard Kroner, *Kant's Weltanschauung*, p. 46.

7. Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche's Overcoming of Kant and Metaphysics from Tragedy to Nihilism," in *Nietzsche Studien Band 16* 1987, p. 310.
8. M.C.Dillon, "Apriority in Kant and Merleau-Ponty", p. 406.
9. Tracy Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press: 1975), p. 226.

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"LEGISLATING-OUT" SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION: NATIVE WOMEN AND BILL C-31

Christine Saulnier

Mary Two-Axe Early fought for Native women's rights. She fought a federal government that revoked her right to vote on Native reserves, to send her children to school there, to inherit property and to be buried there. The government enfranchised Mary Two-Axe Early and many other Native women because they chose to marry non-Native men. The government did not, however, enfranchise Native men who chose to "marry-out." The government designed Bill C-31 to redress the discriminatory parts of the Indian Act of 1869 that allowed for enfranchisement. When Mary Two-Axe Early died on August 21, 1996, a CBC host posed this question to the executive director of the Ontario Native Women's Association: "Did Mary's fight change things?" The reply was: "No, not significantly." The executive director explained that those Native women and their families who were disenfranchised continue to be labelled as "Bill C-31 Natives," and to be marginalized.¹

A large body of literature exists that proposes various methods of policy analysis. The methods that predominate in this literature rely on "rational," quantitative, objective ways to answer questions regarding the design, implementation and impact of a specific policy. Many critics have argued that these methods are narrow and gender-biased, and contain basic empiricist flaws.² In this paper I examine Bill-C-31, an "Act to Amend the Indian Act," to demonstrate how inaccuracies and problems that can arise when "rational" methods of policy analysis are employed to determine a policy's impact on its target population. In an attempt to illustrate some critical debates surrounding policy analysis, I focus on the government's own evaluation of this policy that was designed in part to remove sexual discrimination from the Indian Act of 1869.