

The Politics of Enclosure in Thomas More's *Utopia*

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Thomas More and International Theory

International Relations (IR) is a disciplined field of study. Like all disciplines it attempts to control which forms of analysis are acceptable and which are not; it works to enable some questions while disabling others (Foucault, 1984). As its name suggests, conventional analysis within IR utilizes the familiar distinction between the international and domestic realms and so makes an implicit geometric division based on the dialectics of inside and outside. This division, as Rob Walker (1993) has argued, relies on the idea that there exists a proper and entirely appropriate division of academic labour between political theory and international relations. The basis of this idea is the assumption that the location of "authentic" political life resides within the spatial confines of the modern sovereign state. Thus, political theory is able to discuss the finer points of liberty and freedom, rights and responsibilities, and debate the type of desirable political life which should thrive within the safety and order provided by the territorial confines of the state. Conversely, IR is relegated to study the uncertain and changing power relations of states in the insecure and anarchical space of the international realm. Whereas the

state is capable of providing a spatial resolution to the problem of political order by insisting that all disputes within its bounded territory will be resolved by a legitimate sovereign power, the *lack* of such a common power to order and judge actions between states is interpreted as evidence of the anarchical nature of the international realm. Hence, as IR scholars have historically interpreted this logic, within states *politics* can occur; outside states only *relations* exist (Walker, 1993).

This article problematizes this disciplinary division by reading Thomas More's *Utopia* from the perspective of international theory. It does so fully conscious that to utter "Thomas More" and "international theory" in the same sentence will, at first blush, seem highly unusual. After all, More's name is hardly one which is typically invoked in the debates surrounding the "tradition" of international theory. Indeed, when his name *does* appear, it is usually to contrast his utopian writings with the realist perspective offered by his Italian contemporary, Machiavelli. The latter theorist has been an irresistible figure for a discipline dominated by realists and neo-realists. At least according to the popular caricatures, Machiavelli's significance lies in his willingness to confront the conflict, violence, and deception associated with the practices of statecraft. As such, he is seen as an early modern proponent of *realpolitik* and *raison d'etat*.¹ From this perspective, More's *Utopia* seems to stand in stark contrast in both theme and orientation: its focus is to map out the best and most ideal way of ordering human activities *within* a political community, and so has seemingly little relevance to the external orientation of international relations.

Utopia, however, is a highly enigmatic text, and one which resists present-day stereotyping. In the first place, as the discussion below will illustrate, More's text certainly has many things to say about international affairs. However, the central concern of this article is not to merely point out textual passages which are somehow relevant to the external affairs of states. Instead, this paper argues that if read with an appreciation of More's use of irony, *Utopia* has as much to say about the *limits* to modern conceptions of political community as it does about ideal social structures and relationships. These limits become particularly apparent when More's use of the theme of enclosure is analyzed. This theme is obviously an important one given the historical context in which More was writing. At the time, the enclosure movement was spreading across the English countryside like a wildfire, destroying all previously held relationships between the people and the land and replacing them with the new social relationships of early modern capitalism (i.e. universalized wage-labour). However, it is also important to recall that More was writing at a time (the early sixteenth century) when "modern" conceptions of the state were coalescing and superseding earlier medieval understandings of the location and character of political space. Medieval allegiances based on temporal hierarchies were being replaced (albeit slowly and unevenly) by a conception of politics which emphasized the importance of the enclosed territorial space of the state. Thus the theme of enclosure in *Utopia* is not limited to socio-economic relations only; it also can be read to apply to the type of practices that are constitutive of

political space itself. After all, to enclose something is a highly political act as it involves the use of exclusionary practices to create an inside/outside as well as concomitant identities of us/them. What this reading of *Utopia* will emphasize then is More's ironic awareness of the dangers and limitations associated with this theme of enclosure in even the most seemingly perfect and best ordered political communities.

Approaching Utopia: From History to Myth and Back Again

Thomas More included in his vast critical armoury of rhetorical and political skills a highly crafted sense of irony. Irony (the slippage between that which is said and that which is meant) utilizes the rhetorical strategies of overstatement and understatement: the former makes the seemingly ordinary, outrageous; the latter says very little while implying that there is much more to be said (Ferguson, 1991). In the case of *Utopia*, it is, on the one hand, a disarmingly straightforward account of Raphael Hythloday's views on the relationship between the intellectual and politics and, most importantly, his account of the "extremely prudent and sacred institutions" (50)¹ of the island of Utopia. On the other hand, it is unclear as to whether Hythloday's views can be taken seriously, what with his invented name meaning "skilled in nonsense." Then again, is this "nonsense" to be understood in a pejorative sense, or in a more positive Socratic sense?² That the voluminous secondary literature on *Utopia* has as

yet to come to any semblance of agreement on this basic issue is indicative of how the use of irony infuses ambiguity into a text which on the surface appears to be entirely straightforward.

More employs two initial textual strategies of enclosure - one temporal, the other spatial - to carefully orient the reader's introduction to the island of Utopia. The first strategy involves setting up a radical dichotomy between myth and history. More accomplishes this by dividing *Utopia* into two distinct sections: Books I and II. On the one hand, Book I is situated in More's contemporary Europe, in Antwerp. It is structured as a retrospective account by the character "Thomas More" of the conversations held between himself, Peter Giles, and Raphael Hythloday. Under discussion are some of the most controversial issues of the day; for example, the problem of crime and the treatment of criminals, the effects of the enclosure movement in England, and the question of what should be the proper relationship between intellectuals and the state. What is of interest here is that Book I is firmly rooted in an actual place and an actual time, one recognizable to More's readership. That the names of prominent politicians (Henry VIII), church leaders (John Morton), humanists (Peter Giles), and explorers (Americus Vesputius) are placed in the dialogue further emphasizes this point. And, indeed, it is a *dialogue* which is taking place: Book I consists of a discussion over serious, historically-identifiable issues which does not necessarily procure agreement among the parties involved. More and Giles, for instance, take exception to Hythloday's argument that "There is no place

for philosophers among kings" (48) as well as his belief that no "republic can be prosperous or justly governed where there is private property and money is the measure of everything" (50).

Book II, on the other hand, is More's recollection of a monologue given by Hythloday on the nature of the island of Utopia. This section posits an ideal society far away and quite isolated from the historical immediacy of Book I. In contrast to the dialogue and differences in opinion of the first Book, Hythloday is, until the very last concluding sentences, the only speaker in this Book. Here, Utopian society is seemingly presented as an absolute ideal far removed from any historical contingencies which may undermine this ideal.

Upon closer reading, however, this segmentary relationship between history (Book I) and mythical idealism (Book II) is transformed into one which is considerably more fluid and interactive. Indeed, as John Freeman argues, the relationship between Books II and I is such that "the circumstantial historical contingency of the latter is in a *constant transaction* with the mythic content of the former" (Freeman, 1992: 303; emphasis added). In his influential reading of *Utopia*, J.H. Hexter argues that Utopian society is effectively "hedged around with a system of political and moral sanctions" in order to prevent the maladies of More's historically-situated England from infecting it.³ Freeman seizes upon this insight to argue that the mythic quality of Utopia in Book II is effectively "hedged around" or enclosed by a discussion of Utopia's international context that occurs in Book I (*Ibid.*: 302-5). Hythloday, after all, is among other things a

traveller and his initial references to Utopia in Book I are mediated by a discussion of the three exemplary foreign lands he encounters in his travels. In his discussion with Thomas More and Peter Giles, Hythloday refers to each of these societies in order to bolster the arguments he make about improving the state of English social and economic life. What is clearly most significant about these polities is that they each represent the attainment of a particular socio-economic ideal, and thus foreshadow important characteristics of Utopian society. For instance, in comparison to the practices of More's England, the Polyerites possessed a vastly more humane system of punishing criminals. The Achorians, a people who "inhabit an island to the southwest of Utopia" (45), avoid the entrapments of the French king of More's day by refusing to participate in foreign wars which end up in expensive and inefficient rule over multiple territories. Finally, the Macarians, "a race who live near Utopia" (47), believe that vast quantities of accumulated wealth lead to evil deeds, and so require their king to take an oath that "he will never have more than a thousand pounds of gold in his treasury, or its equivalent in silver"(47). It can therefore be seen that as the reader moves through the text toward Book II, so too does s/he move farther and farther away from More's (historical) Europe. Moreover, as the examples of foreign lands come physically closer to Utopia so do their similarities. Consequently, the further Hythloday travels away from (historical) Europe, the more the lands he encounters are free from the royal absolutism, militarism, and burgeoning capitalist greed of the Europe of his day.

One of the effects of this move to abstract Book II from historical situations is to displace any detailed discussion of the consequences involved with the Utopian social and economic organizations exalted by Hythloday. This can be seen, for instance, in the discussion surrounding the physical enclosure of land. In the historically situated Book I, Hythloday is extremely critical of the "enclosure movement" taking place in More's contemporary England. The enclosure of land for large-scale sheep farming reduced costs and increased profits for landholders; one shepherd could be employed in the stead of many labourers and the high quality wool which was produced gathered an equally high price at the export market. In the process of enclosing the land, however, farm land is depopulated, causing a simultaneous rise in unemployment and food prices. In addition, the oligopolistic nature of the wool trade leads to an actual increase in the price of wool, making it unaffordable for many small-scale cloth-makers, thereby causing a further increase in unemployment. Hythloday argues that these practices lead people to desperation, to vagrancy, and to crime. In the historically-bound world of Book I, Hythloday is profoundly, even vehemently, hostile to enclosure movements.

This attitude stands in ironic contrast to Hythloday's views of the historically abstracted world of Utopia presented in Book II. Here, Hythloday speaks in glowing terms of King Utopus, the creator of the island that bears his name. However, as Hythloday's own testimony affirms, the well-ordered polity of Utopia was also born out of violence, a violence not too dissimilar from the

enclosure movement Hythloday so steadfastly opposes in Book I. In one sense, Utopus was a cunning opportunist, not unlike the wool farmers of sixteenth century England. He recognized that the infighting among the native Abrazan religious sects "presented him with the opportunity of conquering all of them" (87). Having achieved conquest, Utopus dug a fifteen-mile trench to separate the newly created island of Utopia from the mainland of the continent. It was only through this act of violence to a native people, and the subsequent enclosure of their land, that the ideal society of Utopia was made possible. Moreover, the peace-loving society of Utopia is only possible through its violent beginnings: Utopus' warriors become earthly agriculturists; the Abrazian savages become cultured. The point here is that while enclosure movements in both England and Abraza/Utopia are notable for their violent effacement of previously held social and territorial relations, the full consequences of its enactment are discussible only in the historically contingent world of Book I. By leaving history to Book I, Book II is effectively enclosed and protected from any such discussion. The relationship between the two Books, moreover, becomes one of turning history inside out, of converting the negative aspects of enclosure found in Book I into its "other," that is, into positive attributes.

A here/there distinction therefore exists between Books I and II. This distinction has the effect of enclosing all debate over historical contingencies within the "here" of Book I. The problems of England are recognizable to all and so may be discussed and debated. The organization of Utopian society, by contrast, is known only to Hythloday

and so is presented as a monologue, distinct and separate from history.

The Ordering of Utopia

Having released Book II of any historical moorings, More is free to begin his account of Hythloday's recollection of Utopian society. This account actually begins near the very end of Book I when Hythloday remarks to a sceptical More and Giles that if they had observed the customs and institutions of Utopia for five years as he had, "you would have to admit that you had never seen a people so well ordered" (51). The choice of the word "ordered" is not insignificant. Hythloday does not call Utopia the "best" society, or even the "most just," but rather remarks as to how well ordered it is.⁴ To be sure, a tacit connection is implied, perhaps even a causal one, between a "good" or "just" society and one in which everything is in its "proper" place. What is important, however, is that this proper place falls within a tightly constrained, controlled, and ultimately, enclosed societal space.

The question of enclosure within Utopian society is, at first glance, a curious one. After all, Hythloday is persistent in his emphasis on the great freedoms enjoyed by Utopians. Indeed, given that his audience is More and Giles, many of these freedoms were quite radical for the day. For instance, the six hour work day of Utopia stands in stark contrast to the practices in More's contemporary England. At the time, working hours in Tudor England were stipulated by the "Acte Concernyng Artificers and

Labourers" which held that from mid-September to mid-March, labourers were to work from daybreak to night; from mid-March to mid-September the hours of work were to be from before five a.m. to between seven and eight p.m. (Greenblatt, 1980: 264). Despite the relatively greater freedoms enjoyed by Utopians, particular attention to how they are introduced and then developed by Hythloday is needed. Here, More employs the ironic technique of understatement in his description of Utopia: while Hythloday continually stresses the great freedoms enjoyed by Utopians, the supplementary details he provides invariably outline vast and extensive prohibitions and restrictions. In this sense, various enactments of enclosure are placed on the actions and desires so that they may be properly "ordered" into a cohesive unified community.

Liberal commentators on *Utopia* such as Stephen Greenblatt point out that "Utopian institutions are cunningly designed to reduce the scope of the ego: avenues of self-aggrandizement are blocked, individuation is sharply limited" (Greenblatt, 1980: 39). For Greenblatt, the inability of Utopian citizens to constitute a private self, away from the view of others, is a crucial means by which these people are enclosed within a "properly ordered" space. One of the primary means by which this is achieved is through a complex moral strategy of honour and shame at work in all Utopian institutions. While it is true that Utopia does not have many formal laws restricting or directing the behaviour of the citizenry, Utopian society manages to nonetheless achieve this by placing a high value on honour which leads citizens to

altruistic behaviour. At the same time, transgressions of societal norms are severely punished, causing intense feelings of shame. The evidence of these practices can be found throughout Hythloday's description of Utopian society. For instance, honour is conferred on people who volunteer their free time labouring in addition to the regulated six hours a day; these altruistic actions of these people are "praised as being of service to the common good" (58). Indeed, while the Syphogrants are legally exempt from work, their feelings of honour do not let them take advantage of this (59). Similar feelings of honour come to women who volunteer as wet-nurses while others dine: "women who can nurse offer themselves willingly because they are praised highly" (63).

Conversely, feelings of shame deter Utopians from engaging in behaviour which would alter the "proper" ordering of society. As Greenblatt notes, "disorder is checked not by fines or seizure of property, but chiefly by *shaming*" (Greenblatt, 1980: 47). For instance, permission to travel is "easily obtained" by Utopians as they are "at home everywhere." However, unless the conditions of leave are strictly adhered to, harsh public punishment will follow: individuals who travel without permission are "treated with scorn" (64). Similarly, while couples who engage in premarital intercourse are "gravely punished," one of the greatest deterrents to this sort of behaviour is the shame it brings to parents: "Both the father and mother of the individuals involved suffer great infamy since they have failed to instil in their children a proper set of values" (77). Soldiers do not retreat for fear of the shame of losing their wives or fathers who accompanied them into battle:

"it is a disgrace for a man to return from battle without his wife - or for a son to return without his father" (84). Even something as seemingly banal as eating a meal at home, while not forbidden, does not take place largely because "it would not be honorable" (63).

The ultimate form of shaming, however, is to be forced into slavery. Utopian citizens may be enslaved for a variety of reasons: for committing "vicious crimes" at home or abroad (76), for travelling without permission (second offence) (64), for adultery (78), and for becoming over-vehement and dogmatic in one's religious views (87). As slavery has no essential economic function in Utopian society, its existence can only be understood as an extreme form of punishment for the purposes of social control. To be sure, Utopian criminals are usually not executed or locked away (there is no mention of jails in Book II of *Utopia*). The important part of slavery-as-punishment, then, is its visibility. Unlike the solitude of imprisonment, or even death, the slave cannot hide his or her sins and failings from the community. Slaves are part of the community and so are subject to the universal gaze of all as they perform unsanitary and demeaning work. Indeed, one of the principal functions of the slave is to slaughter animals; Utopians will not otherwise engage in this activity for "fear that the habit of compassion, the human affection of our nature, would perish little by little" (62).

The controlling effect of the surveillance is not limited to slaves alone. Indeed, the processes by which honour and shame are secured require that all people living in Utopia be seen. "Being seen," Greenblatt points out, "is

central to the experience of shame (and, for that matter, of praise), and thus *Utopia* is constructed so that one is always under observation" (Greenblatt, 1980: 49). The evidence of this surveillance effect can be seen throughout Hythloday's account of Utopia. Meals, for instance, are a communal affair and are held in public; private dining is discouraged. Indeed, the dining halls themselves are constructed so that the Syphogrant and his or her spouse's table is raised above everyone else's: "Everyone thus falls under their gaze" (63). At religious services the heads of all families are seated so that they can see the rest of the family and also that they may be "observed by their inferiors as representatives of authority and discipline in the home" (92). As well, there are no locks on the doors of Utopian houses (56), no unauthorized travel (64), and no secret meetings (57). Finally, even if a Utopian manages to swallow her shame and find some illicit privacy, she would still be unable to escape the ever-present gaze of surveillance set up by Utopian society as the dead would still be able to watch her. Utopians believe that the dead "busy themselves among the living and are witness to their words and deeds...[detering] them from secret dishonesty" (89). Consequently, as Greenblatt says: "The extension of surveillance to the dead in effect renders the jury supremely monolithic and always in session" (Greenblatt, 1980: 50). Utopia is thus a society in which all space is public space. For all their freedoms, Utopians have their actions and beliefs enclosed and restricted by various moral strategies of honour and shame. Paradoxically,

these strategies require an open society in order for it to be effectively enclosed.

Outside Utopia

The internal ordering of Utopian society is further enhanced by the way it defines its relations with those societies and people outside its borders. The Utopian attitude toward other communities and societies is one of assumed superiority. All their relations are hierarchical, with Utopia always occupying a dominant and superior role. For instance, the care the Utopians take in not damaging an enemy's territory during war is not so much for altruistic reasons, but rather so that the Utopians may benefit from the fruits of the land after victory is secured (85). Just as focusing on slavery served as an extreme exemplar of strategies of surveillance, so too will focusing on the limit-activity of war help to illustrate the nature of Utopia's relations with other societies and the way in which this relates to issues of enclosure.

Book II begins by situating Utopia geographically, a spatial placement which, it should be stressed, is marked by enclosure. The island itself takes on the appearance of a crescent moon; it has a maximum breadth of 200 miles, with tapering ends which amount to a circumference of 500 miles.⁵ The physical shape of Utopia ensures that the island is protected from the wind and so keeps the internal bay of the island "quiet and tranquil" for Utopian and visiting ships. Recalling that the shape of the island was intentionally constructed by Utopus, it should be stressed that Utopia's geography allows for the strict control over

who may enter and exit the island. This is a crucial element to the theme of enclosure that runs throughout *Utopia* and the processes for determining inclusion and exclusion are worth quoting at length:

The entrance to this harbor, with shallows on one side and rock on the other, is terrifying. Almost in the centre of this inlet, on the one rock that rises above the water, the Utopians have built a tower manned by a garrison. The other rocks are hidden and treacherous. Since the Utopians alone know the channels, it seldom happens that any foreigner penetrates to the inner coast without a Utopian pilot. Even these pilots would not be able to enter the harbor, without the aid of certain navigational marks on the shore. If these marks were shifted, the Utopians could easily lure an enemy fleet, no matter how well prepared, to destruction (53).

This passage illustrates the geographical means by which the "outside" can either be warmly received into the "inside" as worthy visitors, or rejected wholesale as undesirables. The physical construction of the island allows for a relationship between Utopia and the world which places a great deal of emphasis on ensuring a secure and stable, beautiful and ordered, inside, one which is protected from the dangers and threats, the undesirable and historical contingencies of the outside.

The Utopians make distinctions between two kinds of friendly states, those which are "allies" and those which are "friends." The former rely on Utopians to provide them with officials to govern; the latter are not too closely allied, but they do receive benefits (80). While Utopians hold war to be a subhuman activity - "Nothing is considered as inglorious as is the glory gained from war" (81) - they will engage in this activity to "guard their own boundaries,

drive out enemies who may have invaded the lands of their friends, or to liberate peoples who have been made miserable by tyranny and servitude" (81). In all cases, however, it is Utopians who have control over the matter; client states must simply submit to Utopian designs. In waging a war, Utopians first try to buy off the enemy (or elements of it) in order to create dissension among their ranks. Indeed, it is for this destabilizing purpose that the Utopians keep reserves of gold and precious metals. If this strategy fails, then Zapoletan mercenaries are hired to fight for the Utopians. These people are generally held in disdain and are considered "barbarous" by the Utopians. If they win a battle, then the Utopians benefit; if they lose and great numbers of their people are exterminated, Utopians are not too disheartened as they feel that the eventual extermination of the Zapoletans "would be a great benefit to mankind" (84). If this option fails, then Utopians resort to auxiliary troops drawn from client states. It is only when all these options are expended that Utopian citizens actually become involved in battle.

What can be seen as occurring here is the construction of a hierarchy of human lives with Utopians firmly secured at the top. Indeed, even Utopian colonists, located outside the island of Utopia, are ultimately expendable: "Utopians would prefer that their colonies perish rather than that any of the cities of the island decay" (61). Violence is something which must be kept outside Utopian boundaries at all costs, even if this is at the expense of the annihilation of other peoples. Further evidence of this sort of understanding of the world can be

found in the very opening paragraph of Book II which sets a distinct inside and outside to be negotiated. Very simply, the inside (that is, the community of Utopia) is where goodness and beauty may be realized; the outside (that is, the rest of the world) is regarded as inferior and must only be included with great caution. What is of concern is not so much the specific *a priori* human being, but the type of human being that is *produced* by the enclosed space of Utopia. Consequently, there exist different standards in the relations between human beings inside and outside the boundaries of Utopia. The basic pattern forming here is a belief that notions of truth, beauty, justice, and politics may only be developed within the enclosed space of a community, being in this case Utopia. Outside this enclosed space there are only relations, which may be cordial and congenial, or may be violent and bloody.

Conclusion

All distinctions - whether between inside and outside, political theory and international relations, or history and myth - depend on enclosing one element from another. Despite the apparent clarity they bring to distinctions, however, enclosure strategies usually have the effect of raising more questions than answers. This is largely because of the arbitrariness of the enclosure is readily apparent. As the problematic and ultimately unstable division between history and mythic idealism in Books I and II of *Utopia* indicates, not only is there is no obvious way from "here" to "there," it is not even clear that we

would want to go there anyway. And yet, imaginative journey helps to clarify certain things. What does More's *Utopia* clarify?

By exaggerating the differences between (historical) Book I and (mythic) Book II, More draws our attention to the political difficulties that come with resolving the challenge of societal order by insisting on a unified and enclosed space. As a society, Utopia attains perfection by ordering itself according to a logic of identity which is continually striving for a sense of unity. This desire for unity is illustrated by the great efforts the Utopians make to achieve an element of sameness in their society. For instance, Hythloday notes that Utopia's fifty-four cities are "identical in language, customs, institutions, and law" and, to the extent that the surrounding landscape will allow, "all have similar plans and sites" (54). Similar moves towards a universal sameness can be seen in the dress and clothing of the Utopians which is undifferentiated and shows no visible signs of social rank.⁶ Furthermore, as all Utopians possess a common training in agriculture, the traditional distinction between city and country life is undermined.

The desire for unity, however, has the effect of generating a logic of separateness, or hierarchical oppositions. Like all moves toward sameness, what is created is not a unity, but a duality: an inside and an outside. As Iris Marion Young notes, "Any move to define an identity, a closed totality, always depends on excluding some elements, separating the pure from the impure" (Young, 1990: 303). Therefore, far from being a utopian tract with no relevance to IR, *Utopia* in fact highlights how

the enclosure that provides the condition of possibility for the anarchic international realm is precisely that enclosure which allows for the ideally ordered public space. What then does *Utopia* clarify? That even in the case of the seemingly ideal public space, to the extent that it relies upon the exclusionary logic of spatial enclosures, it also involves a sustained violence to the Other.

Endnotes

¹ All numbers in parentheses refer to page numbers in More, 1967.

² Dominic Baker-Smith notes that in the ancient Greek language, "nonsense" and "drivel" are the same word. Smith argues that Hythloday's name can be interpreted in a positive sense on the basis of his reading of the passage (336d) of Plato's *Republic* where Thrasymachus charges that Socrates' talk of "that which ought to be" is mere "drivel." See Baker-Smith, 1991: 88-89.

³ Quoted in Freeman, 1992: 303.

⁴ Indeed, as James Greene has noted, this separation is made in the very name of More's work, the full title of which reads *The Best State Of A Commonwealth And the New Island of Utopia*. The key word here is "and" which separates and subtly provokes the reader to make a distinction between "The Best Commonwealth" and "The New Island of Utopia." See James J. Greene, "Introduction," in More 1967: 21.

⁵ This is mathematical impossibility again calls attention to the fact that Utopia is not historically situated. Just as Utopus (whose name translates into "no place") legislated himself out of existence, Utopia, as described, constitutes a mathematical contradiction and so cannot exist. See Baker-Smith, 1991: 153, 196 note 6.

⁶ This is in stark contrast to the practice of differentiating social class by clothing that was so common in More's day.

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