Rarely does a tax law dispute reach the SCC, but when it does, it often provides a welcome opportunity for comprehensive statutory interpretation. Last month, the SCC heard an appeal from the unanimous FCA decision of Bank of Nova Scotia v Canada, 2024 FCA 192, leave to appeal granted (41643).
In R v Pan, the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed the scope of the “air of reality” test as it applies to included offences in jury trials. The majority has upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal’s verdict that Jennifer Pan should undergo a new trial regarding her initial first-degree murder charge, but maintained her conviction related to the attempted murder charge. Furthermore, the Court determined that the trial judge erred by failing to leave lesser included offences, such as second-degree murder or manslaughter, to the jury where there was a realistic possibility of conviction on those offences.
On August 28, 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal’s judgment in St. John’s International Airport Authority v Thibodeau, 2024 FCA 197. This case presents an opportunity for the SCC to define the boundaries of a purposive analysis under the modern approach to statutory interpretation.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s (“SCC”) decision in R v Larocque, 2025 SCC 36 [Larocque] addresses the scope of the evidentiary shortcuts available to the Crown in impaired driving prosecutions. Specifically, the SCC clarified what must be proven before the statutory presumption that breath test results are accurate can apply and whether the “target value” […]
Fifty-four years after Parliament passed the Bail Reform Act, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified the law with respect to challenging the lawfulness of an arrest without a warrant. The unanimous judgment in R v Carignan, 2025 SCC 43 authored by Justice Côté interprets subsections 495(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code which had originally been enacted as part of the Bail Reform Act. This judgment is significant as it allows accused persons to establish a breach of their Charter right to be free from arbitrary arrest where their arrest was made contrary to subsection 495(2).
On December 5, 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in R v BF, restoring a conviction for attempted murder and rejecting the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s holding that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury sufficiently on a potential defence. In doing so, the SCC engaged with a fundamental question arising in the case: whether there was any air of reality to the theory that, rather than attempted murder, the accused was aiding a suicide attempt.
In Dorsey v Canada (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada marks not only an important victory for inmates in federal correctional facilities but also a step forward in the application of access to justice arguments in administrative law. As the decision underscores, Dorsey will play an important role in shaping both habeas corpus case law and assessing the degree of access to justice in complex administrative regimes.
The Quebec Court of Appeal’s (“QCCA”) decision in Organisation mondiale sikhe du Canada c. Procureur général du Québec brings forward a constitutional question the Supreme Court of Canada will soon have to address directly: does section 28 of the Charter possess any independent legal force, or can its equality guarantee be displaced entirely through a section 33 declaration? The result of that decision is stark: the QCCA treats section 28 as having no independent force, no interpretive weight, and no residual function once the rights it echoes are suspended.
When is a public company required to disclose new information to the public? The answer to this question is far from clear, and the ambiguity that lies at its core plagues securities lawyers who are tasked with advising clients on corporate disclosures. In light of this ambiguity, the Supreme Court of Canada’s (“SCC”) highly anticipated decision in Lundin Mining Corp v Markowich was expected to provide some clarity to the question of when to disclose information relating to a company’s affairs. This clarity, however, remains elusive.
When the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in R v Bharwani, it represented the first instance in over three decades that the highest court had the opportunity to interpret section 2 of the Criminal Code, since Parliament established the statutory definition for “unfit to stand trial” in 1991. Canadian mental disorder jurisprudence has come a long way in the previous three decades, but fitness—an issue central to the accused’s autonomy, trial fairness, and the “Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder” regime—remains largely governed by Taylor, an integral, but pre-Charter-evolution decision.