By 1787, the reputed date of the establishment of the first sugar mill in Trinidad, the system of exploiting African labour had already been fully developed throughout the South Atlantic region. From Brazil to Barbados, from Cuba to the Guianas, since the middle of the seventeenth century a Western European-based commercial elite and its African allies nurtured and developed a system that lived up to its expectations and produced a healthy return on investments. The Caribbean version of slavery and slave control had emerged over time, often by trial and error, and with local variations, but all characterized by a common raison d'etre, viz. how to maximize profits from the labour of a coerced workforce that was largely imported. Moreover, it had produced societies in which the cultural landscape exhibited the results of the interaction of Europe and Africa.

The combination of sugar and slaves with all its attendant conflicts and its mechanisms for control as well as its processes for cultural interaction and change came to Trinidad fully developed and matured. But it came late. The timing of Trinidad’s entry into the slave-holding and sugar-producing world of the South Atlantic had important implications for its social and cultural development. Although Trinidad had all the contours of the typical slave-based plantation society of the Americas, it differed in significant ways from most of its neighbours, especially those in the English-speaking and French Caribbean. Its demographic profile and its ethnic composition were much closer to those found in Cuba and New Orleans than to those of Jamaica or
Barbados. This chapter discusses the impact of this late entry on the age, gender and ethnic composition of the subordinate population and the implications of the frontier nature of the colony for cultural development. In particular, the chapter is concerned with discussing issues relevant to the debate over African cultural continuities, creolization and cultural change.

The subaltern population of Trinidad — that is, the non-white free, semi-bonded and enslaved — derived from a variety of sources and came to the island in various streams. These streams were:

1. **Direct arrivals** from Africa. Up to 1807 these came as slave labour, but Africans liberated from slave ships continued to arrive until about 1869.
2. **Transferred slaves** from French colonies or, after 1800, transfers from English colonies. These came with their owners, who were relocating in response to economic and political conditions.
3. **Refugees**; that is, those who came with their owners or on their own, fleeing the consequences of revolution and civil war in the French colonies and nearby Venezuela.
4. **Demobilized soldiers** who came either from the United States of America in the aftermath of the war of 1812 or those who had been settled in Trinidad after their service in the British West India regiments.

It is my contention that the source/origin (and timing of arrival) influenced the subalterns’ expectations of their situation and therefore their responses to the opportunities available in the new society. I am well aware that historians tread on thin ice when they attempt to claim too much about intention, motivation and expectations without strong evidence. The perils of anything that hints at psycho-history are as well known as are the dangers of being seduced by evidence-shy postmodernism. But in an area of study where the documentary evidence to support assertions about the actions of the subaltern ranges between the slim and the non-existent, the historian feels reluctant to leave the subaltern for ever silenced. In the midst of a famine of evidence, the historian is forced to ask his readers to feast on informed speculation.

These migrations forming the building blocks of the Trinidad community are the result of the colony’s late entry into sugar production. Although the island had been claimed by Columbus for Spain in 1494, there was never any systematic effort to develop the colony, unlike in the case of the other Hispanic possessions in the Greater Antilles. It remained a virtual backwater until the late eighteenth century. And because Spain had not been a major player in the sugar relay that had swept the Caribbean since at least 1639, Trinidad did not experience those radical socio-economic changes that have been labelled the Sugar Revolution. Since the landing of the Spanish, the major impact of their arrival was the decimation of the indigenous population. It meant that until 1787, Trinidad still was a colony of a few Spanish settlers, a small but significant indigenous Arawak and Carib population and an insignificant number of Africans.
The population figures for the period are not completely reliable; nonetheless, they do reflect this state of underdevelopment, especially in comparison with non-Hispanic colonies of the time. In 1777, the population of Trinidad was a mere 3432. The population listed as Indian numbered 2082, descendants of an indigenous population of possibly 20,000–30,000 at the time of conquest in 1492. They formed the majority. Among the non-Indian free population, 295 were listed as 'coloured' and 126 white. It is estimated that in 1777, of a total population of 3432 only 222 (6.5 per cent) were enslaved blacks.\textsuperscript{2} In 1782, the slave population was registered at only 310. This was in stark contrast to Jamaica with its slave population of 217,584 in 1787 and smaller Barbados with 62,000 in 1786. Trinidad was yet to experience the demographic revolution, changes in social structure, and peculiar racial ratios associated with slave-based sugar-producing colonies that would bring it closer in line with the other colonies of the region.

Agricultural production, the barometer by which to judge the social development of these colonies, was in a primitive state of development. The productive capacity of the colony was far less than that of most of the other colonial possessions of the region. Trinidad in 1787 more closely resembled Antigua, Barbados or St Kitts of the previous century, except for the existence of a relatively large indigenous population in Trinidad, than developed colonies like Jamaica. Spain had eschewed the possibilities of sugar production in the Caribbean despite the fact that Columbus had brought the plant with him on his second voyage in 1493 and the first sugar mill built in Santo Domingo was erected in 1509.\textsuperscript{3} The attraction of mineral wealth and labour supply on the mainland were some of the more compelling reasons behind this reluctance to be part of the sugar bonanza that swept the Caribbean after 1630. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, sugar was produced in Trinidad, as elsewhere in the Spanish Caribbean, in small and unimportant quantities. The plant was growing in Trinidad in 1570, and a report of 1593 described the island as abundant in sugar cane. But no sugar was produced in commercial quantities. Between 1751 and 1777, probably no more than 275 pounds (125 kg) of sugar was exported, and most of the sugar produced may have been consumed locally, since the registered imports for the period do not list sugar.\textsuperscript{4}

The island's original flora and fauna were still relatively intact. The landscape was still heavily wooded, with huge tracts barely touched by human habitation. And the sugar plantations for whose existence land had to be cleared had not yet dominated the landscape. Trinidad in 1783 was virgin territory relatively untouched by the ravages that had wreaked havoc on humans and the environment elsewhere in the region where the 'sugar revolution' had long applied its baleful Midas touch. But only relatively untouched. Two hundred and eighty five years of Spanish rule, since 1492, had resulted in what one historian has sneeringly described as 'unrelieved dismalness'.\textsuperscript{5} Its main 'achievement' was the reduction of the indigenous population by war, disease and exportation as slave labour. Spanish colonial administration had relegated its Caribbean possessions to a supporting role in its imperial plans, with preference given to the more lucrative mainland.
colonies. Trinidad was merely a transit stop, or at best a military base to prevent non-Hispanic access to the South American mainland.

Trinidad experienced dramatic changes between 1776 and 1797 that altered this picture. Many of these were due to or made possible by the general liberal policies which were introduced and which changed the restrictive administrative regulations that had bottlenecked the Spanish Empire. As a result of these changes in attitude and policy, it was possible to put in place strategies for the development of Trinidad. These strategies made Trinidad more like its non-Hispanic neighbours, and it began to exhibit all the typical contours and characteristics of the slave-based plantation society. Development in the eighteenth-century Caribbean meant the introduction of sugar plantations producing for a world market, and this inevitably meant the introduction of Africans as enslaved labour. But Spain's lack of direct access to the markets in Africa posed a problem for those who needed slave labour to develop plantations.

The Spanish administration of Trinidad, in seeking to take advantage of the wind of change and to circumvent this disadvantage, chose a short-cut to development. In 1776, the authorities allowed, since this was now permissible, non-Spanish planters and their slaves to settle on the island provided they were Roman Catholic in religion. These newcomers were given land grants determined by the number of slaves that they brought with them. The administration also took advantage of another international development, the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which had put the French colonies of Dominica, St Vincent, Grenada and Tobago under British control. French Catholic planters in those territories, chafing under British rule as well as suffering from an attack of sugar ants that threatened to destroy their estates, were eager to take advantage of these concessions and emigrate to Trinidad. Within two years, some 500 immigrants with 1500 slaves arrived in Trinidad. This was just the beginning of the transformation of Trinidad from a backwater of the Spanish Empire to a bustling slave society on the sugar frontier.

Within the next two decades, the population, including slaves, increased from 3432 in 1777 to approximately 17,718 in 1797. The Treaty of Versailles in 1783, which gave to Britain some of the French territories it had seized during the war of 1778–83 (including full control of St Kitts, which it had shared with the French since 1624), increased the opportunity to recruit French Catholic immigrants. The proclamation of a Cedula of Population in 1783 spelt out in more precise language the terms of settlement and the incentives offered to prospective immigrants. This deliberate policy of recruitment not only increased the population but also changed the productive face of the island. Instead of the lone sugar mill established by M. de la Perouse in 1787, there were 159 sugar mills and 60 rum distilleries in 1797 which produced some 7800 hogsheads of sugar valued at slightly over 50 per cent of total commercial crop production. King Sugar had been enthroned, and with him came the usual retinue of enslaved workers.

Another phase of development began in 1797, when the British captured the island, its final cession being legalized by the Treaty of Amiens in 1802.
British capture intensified the entrenchment of sugar production and its accompanying peculiar organization of life, labour and society. There was a further expansion of population and production. The governance of the society may have changed, but the *raison d'être* of colonization and the logic of exploitation remained intact, and indeed intensified. British control now encouraged the immigration of English-speaking planters and their slaves to take advantage of the opportunities and to provide the critical demographic mass needed to bolster political rule in this French-populated Spanish ex-colony. Those whose fortunes had run out in the older colonies, who needed a new start in life or who needed a new area to invest, some of them just one step ahead of the law in their last places of residence, sought the virgin frontier of Trinidad.

But Trinidad was a frontier and a new space of opportunity not only for the Europeans who sought to exploit its potential. It was also a frontier and a new space of diverse opportunities and possibilities for those of African origin and descent. This African population included not only the significant number of free ‘coloureds’ and free blacks whose presence gave Trinidad a socio-demographic profile that distinguished it from many of its neighbours, but also the increasing number of Africans who were in various positions of subordination. The new frontier of Trinidad also provided opportunities for this non-white subaltern population, which when exploited impacted on the dynamics of cultural continuity and change.

Yet for all its attractiveness, the potential of the frontier was not to be realized as fully as had been hoped by the European newcomers. A number of innovations in the political organization of British colonies, revolutionary legislation affecting the supply of slaves, and changes in the command structure for slave control would combine to change the dynamics of slave society in Trinidad. The introduction of Crown Colony rule rather than a legislative assembly and the establishment of a Protector of Slaves reduced the ability of the slave-owning class to exploit fully the potential of the frontier in the ways in which their predecessors and counterparts elsewhere had been able to do. These developments frustrated the immediate realization of the expectations of slave-owners and created tensions on the frontier.

Even more significant than those changes affecting the ability of slave-owners to exercise total control and protect their economic and social interests was the reduction in their traditional supply of labour. In 1807, within ten years of assuming control of this new frontier, the British unilaterally abolished the slave trade. Even though the Anti-Slavery Society had been active since 1787, most West Indian planters did not believe that the British would commit ‘econocide’ and abolish a trade that seemed so crucial to British prosperity and their own. But economic interest, political strategy and humanitarian concern merged to deal a death blow to the trade. When in 1802 George Canning, the future prime minister of England, argued in the House of Commons that the development of Trinidad to the level of the older territories required ‘the destruction of about a million of the human species’, the writing was on the wall. The end came with the prohibition in 1806 of slave-trading
with the newly ceded territories, which meant Trinidad, and then in 1807 the Act for the abolition and suppression of the slave trade.

The abolition of the slave trade meant that Trinidad’s development had to take place without the use of the massive importation of African labour. All this is important because it underscores my contention that on the frontier there was a tension-riddled climate of uncertainty as largely external circumstances impacted on slave-owners and their slaves. Slave-owners understood the enormity of the changes and the new restraints under which they were working. Perhaps symptomatic of the times was the action of William Stewart, a planter who came from Grenada in 1792. When he established a new plantation in 1819, he chose to name it ‘Who’s Afraid?’11 He seems to have been articulating or signifying through his choice of name the uncertainty of the times from the point of view of the plantocracy. But slaves did not live in a vacuum. They too sensed and also understood that times were changing and that they could take advantage of the volatility. They were not afraid to exploit the fissures in what had hitherto appeared as the impregnable structure of white power. They indicated by their actions as reflected in the volume and nature of offences recorded by the Protector of Slaves that they too were not afraid.12

It was not only expectant slave-owners who were affected by abolition. The end of a regular stream of arrivals from the homeland, and the realization that they were no longer easily replaceable, certainly changed the expectations and behaviour of the enslaved. For them, abolition ushered in an opportunity to ‘renegotiate’ the terms and conditions of their situation. The removal of this guarantee of a steady flow of enslaved labour created additional tensions in the society and had an impact on the problem of slave control and slave discipline. It is in this climate and context that the possibilities for cultural continuities, change and creolization have to be considered.

The efforts to circumvent the restrictions of the Act for the abolition of the slave trade were not enough to satisfy the increasing labour demands of the new frontier. Slave arrivals continued after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807.13 There was an active illegal inter-island trade in slaves, and the labour-hungry frontier was a prime destination. In order to prevent this trade, the British government established a compulsory registry of slaves in 1812. Slave-owners were required to list births, deaths, purchases, transfers, runaways, manumissions, family units, place of birth, ethnicity, country marks, heights and other kinds of identifiers.14 It was hoped that periodic updating would provide a check on illegally acquired slaves and provide information on slave conditions, including infant mortality. The first returns published in 1813 showed that there had been an increase of 14 per cent in slave numbers since the last slave census of 1811, which confirmed the suspicions of an illegal slave trade.

The slave registration of 1813 provides us with the first comprehensive portrait of the slave population of this frontier society six years after the abolition of the British slave trade. The returns divide the slave population into African born and Creole, many of whom were born to an African parent
or parents but in the Caribbean. The total number of African born was listed at 13,984 (or 54 per cent of the total slave population); the number of Creoles, including 31 born at sea, was given as 11,633 (or 45 per cent of the total slave population); and there were 79 of unknown birthplace for a total slave population of 25,696.

The African-born population comprised those who had been brought directly from Africa via the slave trade to Trinidad and those who had come as transferees with French or British settlers, as noted earlier. The movement of Africans via the slave trade to Trinidad was of short duration and certainly did not reach the kind of volume experienced by the other colonies in the region. As already indicated, during the Spanish period the numbers were quite small, given the low demand of agricultural production and the availability of indigenous labour. There were some attempts to use Trinidad as a transit depot for slaves for other parts of the Spanish Empire. Although these efforts failed and many of the arrivals remained in Trinidad, they were not numerous enough to augment in any significant way the African component of the population. But between 1776 and 1808, Eltis et al. have calculated disembarkations at 24,389 arrivals in Trinidad from Africa. Their figures indicate that the people came from every part of western Africa, with 43.3 per cent from the Bight of Biafra, 12.6 per cent from West-Central Africa, 7.2 per cent from the Gold Coast, 4.5 per cent from the Bight of Benin, 1.6 per cent from Senegambia and 1.4 per cent from Sierra Leone, with a large proportion of the arrivals coming from unspecified parts of Africa (30.9 per cent).

The 1813 returns are much more specific about ethnic origins, but the data provide only geographical identifications or regional ports of embarkation. The returns list approximately 360 possible ethnicities, which when broken down into broader ethnic/regional origins suggest the following as the ethnic/regional composition of the Trinidad slave population in 1813: Bight of Biafra (42.3 per cent), West-Central Africa (19.0 per cent), Senegambia (12.5 per cent), Gold Coast (8.3 per cent), the Bight of Benin (7.9 per cent), the Windward Coast (6.6 per cent), Sierra Leone (3.2 per cent), and Mozambique (0.1 per cent).

All the direct arrivals from Africa came to the frontier with various expectations of their fate based on their previous understandings of what it meant to be in a situation of subordination. Some of them may have had direct personal experience of slavery in Africa; others would have had indirect experience. And certainly all those who were victims of military conquest or defeat and civil war had some understanding that after defeat, enslavement and transportation across the Atlantic or the Sahara were likely consequences. After all, the institution of slavery was nothing new to Africans, and both the trans-Saharan and the trans-Atlantic trades had been in existence for hundreds of years, with the former being the older of the two. Their expectations of enslavement across the Atlantic were filtered through a web formed from rumour, snippets of real information, and understandings of their rights and obligations drawn from religious authorities or tradition and social practices in their own societies. Moreover, their expectations would have been shaped
or determined by their age, previous status and gender. It was with this mental preparation that they faced the reality of life in Trinidad, and it helped them shape the ways in which they responded to the realities of their new environment.

The returns for 1813 list another 11,633 as Creoles; that is, their place of birth was not Africa, although one or both of their parents could have been African born. The places of birth for the Creoles listed in the 1813 returns were Trinidad for 7088 (60.9 per cent), the British sugar colonies for 2282 (19.6 per cent), the marginal British colonies for 294 (2.5 per cent), the French colonies for 1593 (13.7 per cent), the Spanish colonies for 118 (1.0 per cent) and other places for 227 (2.0 per cent). The use of the term ‘Creole’ in this context is problematic, however, for beyond place of birth it does not tell us much about ethnic identification, although at best it assumes much about cultural practice. It is simply a label applied by slave-owners to put a value on indigenes as already seasoned and socialized into slavery; and for bureaucrats to distinguish place of birth for the convenience of classification for the purpose of policing the provisions of the Act for the abolition of the slave trade. This is not to say that at some point individuals born in a certain locale would not identify as such so as to distinguish themselves from others. But that may be one of many identities that the individual could assume depending on the situation and the need. While there are references in the literature on slavery which suggest that the enslaved accepted the distinction between African and Creole, it may be exaggerated, and certainly not useful and precise enough for illuminating ethnic identification and cultural orientation in slave-society Trinidad. Whatever eventually became ‘Creole’ was not clear enough at this point to warrant the use of this label for any purpose beyond place of birth.

These Creoles were a fairly young population. I have divided the group into four age gradations on the basis of a number of assumptions about age, socialization and ethnic identification. I am assuming that there were no major external events or circumstances that would force individuals to make choices about ethnic identity. If that is so, we can assume that at the age of 14 and under, identity was being shaped in the crucible of the family; at ages 15–29 the external community became increasingly more important in the shaping of identity; and that when people reached 30 there was a gradual settling down. Moreover, it would be the 50-plus cohort that provided leadership for the cultural direction of the community, and here ethnic identity was articulated for instrumental purposes and responded much more to external circumstances, such as perceived political need or economic threat. The age structure of the Trinidad slave population in 1813 displays a very high percentage of children aged 14 and under among the Creole population, in contrast to the very small number of children born in Africa.

Few of the African born had been on the island for more than ten years; many more may have had an experience elsewhere in the Caribbean before being transferred to Trinidad. But the vast majority of the African born would have arrived with a sense of their ethnic identity fully formed in Africa and, the trauma of capture, transport and enslavement notwithstanding, a fairly
Table 11.1  Age structure of Trinidad’s enslaved population, 1813

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Creoles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–14</td>
<td>125 (0.9%)</td>
<td>6,448 (55.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–29</td>
<td>6,916 (49.7%)</td>
<td>3,016 (25.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–49</td>
<td>5,975 (42.9%)</td>
<td>1,782 (15.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>905 (6.5%)</td>
<td>387 (3.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,921</td>
<td>11,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


uncorrupted and untruncated understanding of themselves; that is, who they were *vis-à-vis* others. Those aged 30 and over were the segment more likely to produce the political activists and community leaders and organizers. This age cohort could not help but construct a self-identity that was informed by their understandings of self fashioned in the homeland, although with adjustments reflecting their current Caribbean reality. Among the Creole population, slightly more than half were below the age of 14, meaning that their self-identity had to have been inculcated within the crucible of the family. Their formative years were being spent in households under the socializing influence of parents, many of whom were African born and not Creoles.

According to Higman, slave families in Trinidad tended to be predominantly female-headed; that is, a unit of a mother and her children. The composition of the families in which ‘Creole’ children lived were varied; they tickle the historical imagination about the range of possibilities for cultural socialization and ethnic identification, making the bland label of Creole untenable if not useless. Iris Dorel was a 40-year-old mother from Senegal with a 16-year-old mulatto daughter born in Saint-Domingue, a 13-year-old son born in Jamaica and a 3-year-old son born in Trinidad. This portrait of a family reveals the movement of slaves in the diaspora and in particular the migratory patterns that created Trinidad, and the portrait hints at a woman in a family who may have been forced to hold on to fast-fading cultural memories as the only mooring in a constantly changing world. For Iris Dorel, perhaps the only stable thing in her life was an understanding and valorization of herself as determined by her reconstructed memories of Senegal. She must have tried to socialize her Creole children as Senegalese. The understanding of what it was to be Senegalese as reflected in a whole range of cultural activities (public and private, daily and occasional) was reinforced, expanded or altered depending on the circumstances of the external community; that is, whether there were more co-ethnics around or whether they became increasingly exposed to other cultural influences.

All these female-headed households lived in close proximity to similar households. For example, on the small Riche Plaine Plantation in Diego Martin in 1831, Franchise Augustin, a 43-year-old Igbo with three daughters and two sons, all listed as Creole, lived next door to Angelle Marinette, a 42-
year-old Bambara with country marks on her face and with three daughters and two sons. They lived in close proximity to Clotilde Aye, a 41-year-old Moco with two Creole daughters, and Rose Courtande, a 40-year-old Chamba, with her 4 1/2-year-old daughter. When these children met to play and to socialize, what kinds of information did they exchange about parent–child protocols, culinary habits or religious practices that helped them to define who they were, other than the vague label Creole? The Riche Plaine estate was small, with only 47 slaves; there were other female-headed families, a number of single females and ten single males ranging in ages from 19 to 53 and consisting of four Creoles, three Moco, two Mina and one Arada. Since the fathers of these children were not co-resident, and assuming that they were not in close enough proximity to exercise any influence on the socialization of the children, it was those single males who would have been the role models for those areas of socialization where the male figure was important.

There were also nuclear families comprising a husband, wife and their children. But although this kind of family was common for both Africans and Creoles in the urban centres, on the plantations, Africans were twice as likely to be in nuclear units: 40 per cent among plantation Africans and 20 per cent among plantation Creoles. There was considerable regional endogamy, but the pairings tended also to be continental rather than African–Creole: only 10 per cent of the African males had Creole wives and only 13 per cent of the African females with husbands had Creole mates. We must not ignore the fact that choices were restricted by those who were available on the plantation (and perhaps in the immediate vicinity), but certainly some of the objective and subjective criteria normally used for mate selection would have been difficult to apply.

Some of the groups were too small to form endogamous relationships on the same plantation – those from Sierra Leone, for example. Others were far more likely to have a pool of partners on the same plantation. Higman reports that ‘with the exception of those from the Bight of Biafra, African women were always more endogamous, regionally, than the men’. But given that there were more Bight of Biafra women available, men from the Bight of Biafra may have had a better opportunity to enforce regional/ethnic endogamy than the women – unless they engaged in non-residential polygamous relationships. Senegambian men were the least likely to find enough co-ethnics as mates since the number of Senegambian women was very low. Given the number of women from the Bight of Biafra, they not only tended to have their choice of co-ethnics as mates but also were the mates of every other ethnic group. These women were therefore in the most favourable position to influence the private cultural sphere since they featured in more child socialization circumstances than other women.

The need for extra-regional partners provides some interesting examples and again raises intriguing questions about the formation of ethnic identity. For example, Saladan Bouqui, a 55-year-old Hausa, was married to 48-year-old Angelique, a Nagô, and lived with her son Christophe, a Creole of Saint-Domingue; Jean Pierre, a 37-year-old Mandingo, was married to Dalida, a 36-
year-old Nagô, who also had a son born in Saint-Domingue. These cases represent a certain willingness to cross ethnic boundaries for purposes of marriage. Partners may well have been chosen with an eye to cultural compatibility, but what happened when the pool dried up or other subjective factors came into play, such as attractiveness? Let us take the case of Senegambian men. In a group of 167 Senegambian males, nineteen were married to Central African women, 58 married to women from the Bight of Biafra and another nineteen married to Creoles. Whose cultural traditions dominated? Did it depend on the strength of personality of the individuals? Or did it depend on which partner lived in a community where their co-ethnics dominated and therefore shaped at least the public sphere? At any rate, these intermarriages were the building blocks of an intra-African Creolization that is as important as, if not more so than, the more commonly understood Afro-European Creolization.

Another source of African-born arrivals to Trinidad came from British attempts to police the Atlantic sea lanes to effect the suppression of the slave trade after 1807. At first the target was illegal British traders, but the Royal Navy eventually expanded its net to include the ships of other nations that had also made the trade illegal and had signed suppression treaties with Britain. Depending on where they were intercepted, the confiscated cargoes were deposited in Sierra Leone, St Helena, Rio de Janeiro or Havana. Occasionally the cargoes from captured ships on their way to Puerto Rico were not placed under the jurisdiction of the Mixed Commission in Havana but were sent to Trinidad. But all in all, this source for African-born arrivals was not numerically significant in the period 1807–38. In all, probably no more than 812 people in six batches arrived between 1817 and 1835.

The Africans arriving after 1807 also changed the ethnic composition of the African-born population in Trinidad. In 1813, although those from the Bight of Biafra and from West-Central Africa continued to be significantly represented (42 and 19 per cent of the African-born population respectively), the numbers from Senegambia, the Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin were not inconsiderable. But after 1808, and especially after 1838, the liberated African arrivals would increase the complement from Central Africa, and in particular those coming from the Bight of Benin. The ensuing shock waves from the 1804 jihad of Usman dan Fodio, the continued emergence of the Dahomeans as a major supplier of slaves, and the ongoing civil wars in Yorubaland consequent on the collapse of the Oyo Empire generated large numbers of captives for the Atlantic slave trade during this period. Many of them, originally destined for a life of enslavement in Cuba or Brazil, would find themselves rescued and relocated in Trinidad.

The second stream in the Trinidad subaltern population consisted of slaves who came with their owners when the latter transferred their investments, stock and labour to the new frontier. They came in two waves: the first, between 1777 and 1797, were primarily French coming from Grenada, Martinique and Guadeloupe; the second, between 1797 and 1837, came primarily from British colonies.
For the slave population who were transfers from the French West Indian colonies, we do not know at this stage the precise breakdown between those who were African born and those who were Creoles. But we can assume that their ethnic origins reflected the contours of the trade to the French Caribbean. We know that for the French colonies for 1715–792, the Bight of Benin and the Congo plus Angola were the two dominant regions of origin; the Bight of Benin averaged 23 per cent, with most going to Martinique, and the Congo–Angola region averaged 42 per cent, with most going to Saint-Domingue.25

Another group in these slave transfers came with British planters, who, like their French counterparts, sought to take advantage of a new frontier with its fertile soil and in this case an island that was now British by conquest. Some of them came in the decade between conquest in 1797 and abolition in 1807. But the bulk of them, like the Carmichael family from St Vincent and the Burton Williams family from the Bahamas, came between 1807 and 1837.26 Although the British slave-trading patterns of the period are a useful guide from which to guesstimate the ethnic composition of these British transfers, it is more likely that the African-born component may have been lower and that there were more born in the Caribbean to Creole parents. Among the 212 slaves transferred by Burton Williams, only 28 were listed as African born.27

Although compulsory registration may have slowed down the ‘open’ illegal trade, there was still the possibility of exploiting the loopholes in the Abolition Act, which permitted the transfer of slaves by new settlers. Many illegal slaves were transferred this way. Between 1813 and 1825, about 6315 slaves, primarily from the older territories, were brought in to augment the slave population.28 But in an Act of 1825, new and stringent regulations were introduced that virtually closed the door to new settlers and their slaves except for those listed as domestics. This opportunity was also exploited, and between 1825 and 1830 about 1109 ‘domestics’ were brought in, many of them promptly sold as field labour.

The transferees were both African born and Creole. The term ‘Creole’ does not tell us much about cultural practices or ethnic identification. It is useful in this instance only in so far as place of birth is important, but place of birth is not the issue with which I am concerned at the moment. The Creoles all came with a previous experience of slavery that had been developed in the Caribbean and stamped with Caribbean reality. Slavery demanded a continuous process of ‘negotiation’ between slave master and slave in which the latter wrung from the former a certain informally agreed bundle of rights and obligations. There is no doubt that the parties negotiated from unequal positions of strength. The slave-owner had at his disposal and for his support the military might and power of the empire and of local military forces, and the right to impose on-the-spot doses of violent discipline. Short of undertaking open collective rebellion (which was always a rare and difficult but not impossible card to play), the enslaved forced a modus vivendi on the slavocracy that at least established the limits of exploitation. This ‘understanding’ reflected local practice and conditions; it was separate from formal legal statutes and therefore differed between colonies and often within colonies as it
reflected specific work and social environments. Moreover, it encompassed not only work/industrial arrangements but also cultural and social practice.

All the transferees came from long-established and older colonies and therefore came to their new homeland with an understanding of what were the expectations of slave status in the Caribbean. Those who were born in Africa would have already been disabused of any illusion about the uninterrupted continuities of African understandings of slavery. In Trinidad, at the very least they demanded what they had already 'negotiated' in their old habitations and they sought to exploit the opportunities of the new situation in order to better their condition. This included arrangements in the workplace as well as improvements in their material, social and cultural lives.²⁹

Refugees from the French Caribbean and nearby Venezuela constituted a third stream that made up the Trinidadian subaltern population. Despite the change of political rule, French settlers continued to flock to Trinidad. Since 1791, the aftermath of the Haitian insurrection had provided a sufficient push factor to account for the steady stream of arrivals to Trinidad. The actual revolution in Haiti, its repercussions in Martinique and Guadeloupe, including the short-lived moment of freedom and emancipation in those islands, generated refugees throughout the Atlantic world, and Trinidad was one of the beneficiaries. This group of refugees was a mixed lot. It included Africans whose freedom had been short-lived, those free 'coloureds' and free blacks whose freedom was questioned and denied by the Bonapartist reaction in the French Caribbean, and those whites who ran for their lives when faced with the reality of a successful slave revolt. All of them sought refuge in the frontier climate of Trinidad. In the 1810s, the revolutionary wars in nearby Venezuela produced another stream of refugees, who ironically enough included some people from French territories who had fled some ten to fifteen years earlier and now were relocating again. In the period between November 1814 and January 1817, some 3823 of these refugees applied for and received permission to settle in Trinidad.

Whereas the transferees came with their owners, who were seeking new economic opportunities, the refugees were fleeing political turmoil and therefore were forced to uproot. While the slaves in both groups were uprooted and endured forced relocation, there were sufficient significant differences between the two sets of circumstances for us to argue that the slaves would have seen and understood the differences in their situations and to speculate on the possible impact these would have had on their responses. In the case of the transferees, there was a little more order and organization in their movement to the frontier. Moreover, they were coming to a society to which their owners were invited, as in the case of the French responding to the Cedula or the English owners who were encouraged and welcomed as part of a strategy to consolidate British control of the former Spanish colony with its relatively important French population. The refugees had been uprooted from situations of turmoil caused by revolution and civil war and were not particularly welcome in Trinidad. After the capitulation, the British administration feared being overwhelmed by the French, whom they accused of introducing
republican ideas. But even more importantly, in the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution, the British administration feared that the slaves who were arriving with their refugee owners would spread the contagious virus of revolution. The refugees from Venezuela also had to declare in their applications for asylum that they had not borne arms on the side of the republican insurgents during the conflict.

Although the vast majority of the refugees from Venezuela were free (white, ‘coloured’ and black), among them would be slaves, some of whom were coming with their owners but also a number of them who were coming on their own. Their stories as they were related in their applications for asylum are as pitiful as those of their owners. They repeat in both comic and tragic detail the numerous stories of human courage that had become a characteristic of that episode of human migration which created the Americas. Some of them would come in groups, as in the case of Antoine, a 26-year-old Moco, his face pitted from smallpox, who fled to the woods with John Pierre, another Moco, and La Fortune, a Quaqu, when Guria fell to the insurgents. Others would be families, or at any rate mothers desperately trying to protect their children. Marie Colastic, another Moco, also fled to the woods with a child she had for a free person, but the child died in the woods before she could get to Trinidad. And there was 35-year-old Anne Sogrin, a Creole from St Vincent whose master, Étienne Sogrin, died in the woods trying to escape the insurgents, whereupon she fled to Trinidad with her two daughters, 8-year-old Rosiette and 3-year-old Astasie. Some of them would find their freedom short-lived; for example, the six slaves (Basil, 10; Jeaux, 26; Border, 35; Baptist, 17; Modeste, 25; and Manoux, 10) whose owner died during the fighting and who fled to Trinidad only to be reclaimed by the daughter of their previous owner, herself a refugee. The same fate befell 21-year-old Antoine, ‘a native of Guinea’, who escaped from Guria during the turmoil only to be reclaimed by the son of his former master when he arrived in Trinidad.

All these slave refugees, whether they succeeded in claiming freedom or not, found that the frontier situation of Trinidad provided opportunities and new conditions that shaped both slavery and freedom. Some of the enslaved belonging to impoverished owners who were attempting to recoup their economic standing through super-exploitation on the frontier found that the amelioration measures of the 1820s gave them new weapons with which to protect themselves and to carve out some areas of cultural autonomy. The free ‘coloureds’ and free blacks who had to prove their status found that the struggle to be free and non-white in a slave society was long and arduous and required stances and strategies that often deepened their creolization, and for some widened the gap between them and an acknowledged African identity.

Demobilized soldiers constituted the fourth stream of arrivals that contributed to the make-up of the subaltern population. While the authorities feared those refugees who had borne arms in the struggle in Venezuela or those who might have been involved in the earlier revolutionary struggles in the French Caribbean, they had been accepting as settlers since 1815 another group of arrivals who had had military experience. These were the black
Americans who fought on the side of the British in the 1812 Anglo-American war. At the end of the war, they were disbanded in the Bahamas and then subsequently sent to Trinidad, where they were settled in seven villages in the Savanna Grande district. Some of the earlier arrivals of May and July 1815 settled in Port of Spain near Laventille and some in the central district of Caroni, since the villages in the south were not ready. But the later arrivals were moved immediately to the south. These company villages, as they were called, were numbered according to the Company of the Corps of Colonial Marines in which the settlers had served during the war. The old sergeants and corporals were placed in charge of the settlers to keep the peace and maintain quasi-military discipline. But a white superintendent was given overall disciplinary control over the entire settlement project. It was hoped that these villages would form a line of defence in the newly developing plantation areas of south Trinidad and a pool from which trained militia could be recruited in the event of a slave insurrection.

The first three groups of Afro-American arrivals had been of soldiers recruited mainly in New Orleans, the border area between Spanish Florida and the backlands of Georgia, and from Spanish Florida proper. But the majority of the soldiers had originally been recruited principally from escaped or liberated slaves in the Chesapeake, drawing from Virginia and Maryland and in the sea islands off the coast of Georgia.\textsuperscript{35} It is difficult to establish the ethnicity of these immigrants. There are no clues from the list of names that allow for informed speculation about their ethnic origins. There is no indication of how many of them were African-born or how many of them first- or second-generation Afro-Americans. It has been suggested that they initiated rice cultivation in Trinidad, but this is questionable.\textsuperscript{36} At any rate, we do not know what kind of rice or what was the technology used in order to make some connection between that and possible ethnicity.\textsuperscript{37}

As is to be expected, since they were soldiers, the group was predominantly male, although on settlement some of them moved with their families and it was reported that the first arrivals in 1815 and 1816 numbered 547 men, 83 women and 87 children. Subsequent arrivals included black Americans in 1821, who were not necessarily soldiers, from Halifax, Nova Scotia, where they had taken refuge following the British defeat in the American War of Independence. By 1824, there were 923 inhabitants in the settlements, but by 1838 the population of the villages was estimated at only 828.

The 'military' arrivals also included demobilized soldiers of the British West India regiments. During the Napoleonic Wars, the British Army had increased its use of African soldiers serving in the Caribbean. Between 1795 and 1808, the army had purchased about 13,400 slaves in order to create eight regiments of Africans officered by whites. And between the end of the slave trade and 1815 another 2500 had been recruited: about 1600 from recaptured Africans at Sierra Leone, about 200 free Africans from Sierra Leone and nearby regions, and about 700 slaves recruited in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{38}

At the cessation of hostilities, the question of disbandment became an issue. Since many West Indian administrations were hostile to the idea of free
Africans with military training settling in their slave colonies, the demobilized soldiers were given the option of settlement in Sierra Leone. Understandably, many of the African soldiers themselves expressed resistance to the idea of repatriation to an Africa that they had left under traumatic circumstances. They were surely apprehensive of their chances of reuniting with families and communities destroyed or dislocated because of the very reasons that had made them victims of the slave trade in the first place. Consequently, the British finally decided that only those who had been born in the Caribbean or had left Africa at an early age had the right to remain in the Caribbean; those who opted to remain could settle only in Honduras or Trinidad, and all others were to be sent to Sierra Leone.

The administration of post-abolition Trinidad with the labour needs of the frontier society prominent in its list of priorities readily accepted the demobilized soldiers as settlers. Like the Afro-Americans who had arrived earlier, these demobilized soldiers were seen not only as a pool of trained personnel in the advent of a slave insurrection but also as a labour force that could maintain the roads to the eastern regions of the frontier, just as the Afro-Americans were being used in the south. The disbanded soldiers were therefore settled on Crown lands at Manzanilla and in smaller settlements at Tourure, Las Sievas and Cuare.

The original group of settlers at Manzanilla comprised 240 men of the Third West India Regiment, with 41 women and 29 children. Later, the ex-soldiers were joined by demobilized soldiers of the Sixth West India Regiment and the first group of Africans liberated by the Royal Navy and sent to Trinidad. Their numbers were increased from time to time as other soldiers were demobilized and opted for settlement on the island. It is much easier to establish the ethnic – regional origins of these demobilized soldiers than those of the Afro-American settlers. Those who had been purchased between 1795 and 1807 reflected the British trading patterns of the period; and those recruited after 1808 reflected the ethnic and regional patterns of origins of the rescued Africans at Sierra Leone.

Although it was primarily the Third and Sixth West India Regiments that were demobilized and settled in Trinidad, the ethnic – regional origins of the Fifth Regiment, which was raised at the same time as the Third and Sixth, provides some indication of the likely ethnic composition. Between 1798 and 1808, the 745 African-born recruits to the Fifth West India Regiment were primarily Igbo (234) and Congo (103). The Hausa, Moco, Mungola, Mandingo, Popo, Nagó (Yoruba), Mandingo and Coromantee each had between 18 and 79 members, and 28 other groups recorded under a dozen each.\(^{39}\) The soldiers in Trinidad would have had a similar ethnic profile, at least up to 1838, with the Igbo and Congo dominating numerically.\(^{40}\)

During the period up to emancipation, the demobilized African soldiers and the Afro-Americans never fulfilled the expectations of the administration: the road system was not kept open, they did not become self-sufficient and thriving communities, nor was there much cause to use them as defence against slave revolts. But they were of importance to the slave community. The
Americans brought with them a pattern of religious worship, a West African-influenced approach to the Baptist faith, that has persisted to this day. They were more than another group of free non-whites in the society. For unlike the free 'coloureds' and free blacks who came with the French influx, the demobilized soldiers in particular were closer culturally to the enslaved population.

Despite intentions, it was not possible to keep them isolated and to minimize their contact with slaves on the plantations. There were constant complaints of absenteeism and absconding, no doubt prompted by the need for some of the more rambunctious of the settlers to escape the quasi-military confinements of the settlements, which perhaps reminded them too much of their military stints, but also of the nearby slave plantations. But perhaps an even more compelling reason was the need for this predominantly male group to find female companionship. Some of the American soldiers escaped and eventually moved to the slave plantations to be with their women. In 1817, the authorities found it necessary to settle 63 African women seized from an illegal slaver among the black Americans. Another group of 60 liberated African women who had been first sent to Antigua and then transferred to Trinidad eventually settled among the disbanded soldiers at Cuare. The soldiers had petitioned the governor for 'their country women, because the Creoles talk too much'. The women came from the Gambia and Senegal Rivers, and the governor commented that few blacks from that region were to be found in the regiment and fewer in the colony generally. But surely he was mistaken, since in the slave population there were co-ethnics from the Senegambian region. At any rate, the governor did not think too highly of the women from Antigua, since he claimed that they were 'smart ladies whose corsets, sleeves a la Gigot were not well calculated for a cutlass'. Yet these efforts at finding female companionship extended the possibilities of intra-African creolization.

But more importantly, these free non-whites became in the slave society a potent symbol of the possibility of freedom. It is not clear what contribution they made to the rate of manumission, which increased between 1808 and 1834 despite efforts to prevent the haemorrhaging of the labour pool in post-abolition Trinidad. Certainly Muslims, who identified as Mandingo and who were prominent among the ex-soldiers, organized themselves to purchase the freedom of hundreds of fellow believers during this period. The leaders of the community used a common religion to transcend ethnic differences and to be inclusive enough that even those who were not of Manding ethnicity could be considered Mandingo. Their claim that they had manumitted all their fellow believers may be slightly exaggerated, but there is no doubt that they had a clearly identifiable presence in Trinidad. Their effort is noteworthy not because of the numbers manumitted, since there was some relaxation on the process of manumission, but because it was done as a collective effort. Certainly their project for repatriation clearly signified a continued commitment to an African homeland. But it was also understandable given their recent arrival, the circumstances of their enslavement and exodus from Africa, the common military experience of the core leadership and the corporate nature of the Islamic community. They took advantage of the opportunities for capital
accumulation, manumission and ethnic clustering in the urban area for an enlightened literate elite to promote their corporate ethnic existence.

There were no other groups that organized similar projects of manumission and repatriation. Yet at the time of emancipation there were other groups that had a common identity. The Dama from the interior of Cameroons and the Moco from southern Nigeria both sent messages to the British queen, Victoria, which suggests an organized and institutionalized existence. There is also a message from a people calling themselves ‘Wadoeloes’, whom the governor described as being of African descent. But we are not sure what being Dama and Moco meant to these literate, urban-based signers of the petitions. The signatories of the petition signed on behalf of ‘the Moco Nation of Africans and the Damas Society of Creoles’. There is no hint of any ‘commitment’ to an African homeland in the Dama petition that suggested a willingness to repatriate. In fact, they considered themselves loyal subjects of Her Majesty, whom they praised because the Queen had ‘condescended to admit into her presence, and to treat with benignity, the rude African’. If, as is possible, their homelands had been invaded and life destroyed in the jihad in the central Sudan or in related Fulani incursions, then it may well be that they had made an accommodation with their new homeland, since repatriation was difficult if not impossible. In a frontier society where the self-identified European ethnic groups – Spanish, French and English – competed for economic, political and cultural space, it should not be surprising that enterprising cultural entrepreneurs among the non-whites would use ethnic identity in fairly pragmatic and instrumental ways.

Numerical dominance is not the best indicator or guide to the possibilities and processes of cultural continuities and change. The mere existence of numbers of the same regional origin or ethnic group, whether clearly identifiable or not, is not in itself sufficient enough to guarantee the direction of cultural continuity and change or of ethnic identification. There must also be the structural conditions that facilitate continuity and promote change, and also the psychological orientations that would allow individuals or groups to identify and take advantage of those structural conditions. The size and proximity of the slave-holding units, for example, is crucial to an understanding of the possibilities of ethnic clustering, intermarriage and other social patterns that facilitated continuities while at the same time promoting change. Moreover, the choice of ethnicity, whether in continuation of old identities or the adoption of new ones, was both individual and situational. Individuals had to feel or be encouraged to believe that a particular situation demanded the emphasis on and the trumpeting of ethnic values and identities.

At the time of emancipation in 1838, the petition mentioned above was signed on behalf of 1207 Moco island-wide and 120 Dama in Port of Spain. There is no mention of these Dama and Moco societies in the post-emancipation period. But visitors and government officials continued to talk about the existence of an African Muslim community and other ethnic groups. The changed circumstances of the post-emancipation period may have militated against the prominence of some groups and their activities, and hence they do
not come to our attention. Or the leadership may have been able to convince
the group that there was no need to emphasize specific African identities. The
spotlight shifted to those groups coming among the greater number of liber-
ated Africans being settled on the island between 1838 and 1869. Congo and
Yoruba were predominant among these newcomers, and the Yoruba in par-
ticular would wield an overwhelming influence on the emerging popular
culture of the colony. In the context of the greater freedom available in the
post-slavery period, these newcomers were sufficiently numerous to engage in
a pattern of ethnic clustering in villages and urban areas that facilitated the
reconstruction of a way of life rooted in Yoruba ethnicity. This consolida-
tion of Yoruba culture mirrored similar developments elsewhere in the
Americas, as other chapters in this volume demonstrate.

Notes

1 Pierre Gustave Louis Borde, *The History of the Island of Trinidad under the
Spanish Government* (Paris, 1876, 1883); J. F. Dauxion Lavaysee, *Description of
Venezuela, Trinidad, Margarita and Tobago* (London, 1820); see also E. Williams,
*History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago* (Port of Spain, 1962); J. Millette,
*The Genesis of Crown Colony Government* (Port of Spain, 1970); B. Brereton, 

2 See Linda Newson, *Aboriginal and Spanish Colonial Trinidad* (New York: Aca-


4 Linda Newson, *Aboriginal and Spanish Colonial Trinidad* (New York: Academic

5 Williams, *History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago*, p. 29.


7 For an English translation of the 1783 cédula, see Lionel M. Fraser, *History of
Trinidad from 1781 to 1813*, vol. 1 (Port of Spain, 1891), Appendix pp. i–v;
Gertrude Carmichael, *The History of the West Indian Islands of Trinidad and

8 See Lavaysee, *Description of Venezuela, Trinidad, Margarita and Tobago*, p. 330;
F. Mallet, *Descriptive Account of the Island of Trinidad* (London, 1802).

9 The term is from Seymour Drescher, *Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of
Abolition* (Pittsburgh, 1977), which is a response to the influential E. Williams,
*Capitalism and Slavery* (University of North Carolina Press, 1944). For an
assessment of the debate, see Barbara Solow and Stanley Engerman, *British

10 Quoted in Williams, *History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago*, pp. 67–8.

11 See Commission of Inquiry into the Negro Character, *Parliamentary Papers (PP)*

12 See David V. Trotman, ‘Tension on the frontier: crime and punishment in Trinidad,
1820–1834’, paper presented at the 32nd Annual conference of the Association of
Caribbean Historians, Cayenne, April 2000.

13 See Eric Williams, ‘The British West Indian slave trade after its abolition in 1807’,

14 The Slave Registration series (T 71 vols 501–519 in the British Public Record Office) are a mine of information on the slave population. So far, only the 1813 volume has been thoroughly used, by A. Meredith John, The Plantation Slaves of Trinidad, 1783–1816 (Cambridge, 1988), and Barry Higman, Slave Populations of the British Caribbean (Press University of the West Indies, 1995). The others have been under-utilized. For the Slave Registration Act of 1812, see (PRO) FO 881/1493.


16 These figures are based on Lovejoy’s revision of Barry Higman’s calculations of the 1813 registration. See this volume, chapter 1.


20 All of these and succeeding examples are taken from PRO, T 71, vols 501–519. I am relying on vignettes to give a flavour of the situation.

21 Higman, ‘African and Creole slave family patterns in Trinidad’, pp. 52–3; see especially table 4, p. 54.


24 See, for example, (PRO) CO 295 vol. 108, no. 56 Hill to Glenegel, 6 October 1835, for the arrival of ‘Las Siete Hermanas’ from Havana and the distribution of 262 Africans.

25 See Eltis et al., Atlantic Slave Trade.


27 See (PRO) T 71, vol. 456 return no. 772, 1 January 1822. Most of them were the descendants of slaves who had emigrated with Burton Williams’s father to the Bahamas after the American Revolution. See (PRO) CO 295, vol. 71, no. 24, Woodford to Bathurst, 13 April 1826 and CC 295, vol. 72, no. 66 with enclosure, Woodford to Bathurst, 3 October 1826.


29 For rebellion over garden plots and work schedules by transferred slaves, see (PRO) CO 295, vol. 92 no. 8, Governor to Goderich, 13 January 1832; (PRO) CO 295, vol. 98, no. 4, Hill to Stanley, 30 June 1833; PP 1831–2, vol. 46, 176, 297
30 For these stories, see (PRO) CO 385/1, Particulars of settlers allowed to stay in Trinidad, 1814–1822.
31 (PRO) CO 385/1, folio 234, p. 156.
32 Ibid.
33 CO 385/1, folio 290, p. 186.
34 CO 385/1 folio 251, p. 166 and folio 249.
36 See Donald Wood, Trinidad in Transition, p. 38; but Linda Newson lists rice among the exports in the 1780s and suggests that it may have reached the island in the seventeenth century, for it was being cultivated in nearby Tobago in 1667. See Linda Newson, Aboriginal and Spanish Colonial Trinidad, pp. 160, 214.
38 On the West India Regiments, see Roger Norman Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India Regiments, 1795–1815 (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1979); Roger Norman Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies (Gainesville, FL, and Kingston, 1998); Brian Dyde, The Empty Sleeve: The Story of the West India Regiments of the British Army (London; Hansib, 1997).
39 For the ethnic composition of the Fifth West India Regiment, see Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats, p. 115, table 4.
40 A preliminary look at the discharge papers for the soldiers of the Third West India Regiment shows that 311 of those discharged were born in Africa. See (PRO) WO 97/1–1271, Index to Discharge Papers, 1760–1854.
43 (PRO) CO295/122, no. 93, 71–80, Hill to Glenelg, 20 September 1838.
44 For a discussion of this, see Colleen Kriger, ‘The conundrum of culture in Atlantic history’, unpublished conference paper presented at ‘Enslaving Connections: Africa and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade, York University, Toronto, October 2000.
45 See, for example, George Truman, John Jackson and Thomas B. Longtread, Narrative of a Visit to the West Indies in 1840 and 1841 (Philadelphia, 1844); and report of Robert Mitchell, Commissioner of Crown Lands, in (PRO) CO 295/243,
no. 46 and enclosures, Gordon to Buckingham, 8 April 1868.