“Performing” Interactivity: Understanding some potentials.
*** Although this reading is not hyperlinked on the coursepack page, it can be accessed through a posting from Caitlin from October 27, 2009.****
Steve Dixon’s approach to theorizing cinematic interactivity is systematically categorized and historicized. He stresses from the onset that “interactivity” is not a new idea in any art form; that there has always been a negotiation between “the beholder and the beheld” (559). Yet, digital interactivity, in its varied modules, provides new possibilities for the user (and/or viewer) to more personally define, effect and even change the outcome of the art piece. Dixon stresses that these new experiences allow a user/viewer to be “directly addressed” and thereby to “respond meaningfully.” For the first time, in the advent of this digital interactive technology, the performer is aligned with the “us” – the spectators – who are at once positioned as active users (561).
Dixon traces the outcome of this new interactive relationship as a retort to our television-era “‘of non-response – of irresponsibility’ where television’s very presence is a form of Orwellian social-control” as it adopts a non-conversational, passive spectator form (561). Interactive digital art works, according to the numerous examples Dixon presents throughout his article, stress subjective agency that allow for a connective conversation with the mass media not possible with prior technological forms, such as television or traditional cinema. Dixon presents us with Weibel and Dinkla’s poetic definition of interactivity (a floating work of art ) as a ‘connective’ state – “a web of influences that are continually reorganized by all participants” (560-61, italics added).
The emphasis on Dixon’s (and Weibel and Dinkla’s) ideas of interactivity is fluidity: these are continually shifting pieces of art, without predetermined outcomes, that place a limited about of responsibility on the user. I do stress the word limited, though, because as Dixon illustrates throughout his article, many of the pieces he cites are performing a controlled environment of interactivity. Dixon very clearly states that this is because “users only want a modest level of freedom” (564). So, when he presents us with an early example of cinematic interactivity such as Lorna, by Lynn Hershman (http://www.lynnhershman.com/investigations/voyeurism/lorna/lorna.html), what we notice is not necessarily an unleashing of user/viewer control, but rather, as Dinkla notes: “The simultaneity of active and passive roles in one person – controlling and being controlled – becomes clear right at the beginning … Paradoxically, they (the viewers/visitors) are asked to free Lorna from her plight using precisely the media which increases her fears (568).”
This quotation refers to precisely how many (if not, all) of the pieces Dixon cites are “performing” interactivity. In their controlled environments of interactivity, they are highlighting the process, the act, of interactivity lacking from traditional television and cinema. Much like Dinkla, I would argue that these interactive pieces refer to the process of spectatorship as limited in their self-reflexive mode. Of course, these pieces are controlled: they are authored and programmed, but in the spaces of interactivity they provide, they are allowing the viewer/user to imagine a space of spectatorship which is less limited, less controlled, and more fluid.
After introducing us to Augusto Boal’s (who just recently passed this May) theories of the Theatre of the Oppressed, Dixon proceeds to align Boal’s concern with participatory theatre ethics with digital interactivity ethics. Dixon presents us with 4 qualitative categories to organize and understand different types and levels of interactivity present in various digital artworks. He stresses that the 4 categories are not meant to assess quantitative hierarchies among the various pieces, but rather to assist him in the untangling process of understanding the systems and depths by which the user interacts with each piece.
For Dixon, this is a very important categorical process as it frames the proceeding methodological assessment of the interactive works. My initial question is whether or not he succeeds in his categorization? Did you find these 4 categories useful in understanding their interactive potential? I notice that he does not provide a definitive breakdown of each category until page 583. He defines them in saying: “navigation (the course the user takes), participation (user’s helping to bring to life the environment’s sensory features), conversation (a dialogue between the world and the computer) or collaboration (the user and computer creating art together).” Why would Dixon place such a clear definitive breakdown of these categories so late into the article?
A prevailing theme in the article is the success and failures of certain examples of interactive cinema. This binary translates into many of the arguments and examples Dixon places forward: commercial movies vs. artistic examples of interactivity; yes or no questions in specific moments of cinematic interactivity, etc. If we are asked to understand interactive cinema solely in binaries, how can we simultaneously understand it as an exercise in exposition? Perhaps, if we move away from binaries and understand all of these pieces and their layouts through more complex formulas, we will become closer to really capitalizing on the potentiality of thinking about interactive cinema. As such, I do believe certain examples Dixon brought forth such as Telesymphony (http://www.flong.com/projects/telesymphony/) and Touch Cinema did provide a “successful” environment in which to perform interactivity. Rather than relying on the binaries of yes/no interactivity, these pieces create an interesting immersive and fluid environment meant to expose certain viewing limitations we do not always think about as traditional media spectators.
Further Questions:
1) The earlier examples of interactive cinema Dixon cites (from the 1970-80s) seem to be more about exposing the form of traditional media/cinema, rather than about the novelty of the “interactive cinema” (578), which many of the newer examples seem to be relying on. What can we take from this idea? What does it inform us about the nature and potential of storytelling from an interactive perspective?
2) There is a lot of emphasis throughout Dixon’s article placed on the crowd vs. individual cinematic interactivity (another binary, but I think, as useful one). Tender Loving Care (574-577) seems not to work because it is geared towards an individual (male???) user, while The Consensual Fantasy Engine (579) appears successful because its smart use of democratic vote “empowered the audience to become highly active and interactive with one another” (579). Does the greatest potential of interactive cinema lie in crowd-based participation (and I cite again examples such as Telesymphony and Touch Cinema)?
3) Hitchcock’s Rear Window is referenced numerous times throughout this article. Why is a film about the pleasure of voyeurism cited so often in an article about “performing interactivity?” I think there is an important link here between discussing the form of interactive performance as an exposition of the nature of traditional forms of media. What do you think?